Opinion

United States v. Gabriel Gonzalez-Perez

  • 534 F. App'x 583
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jul 22, 2013
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Kleinfeld, Smith
Nature of suit
Criminal
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.8%

The opinion

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 22 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-30212

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00296-JLR-2

v.

MEMORANDUM*

GABRIEL GONZALEZ-PEREZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2013**

Seattle, Washington

Before: KLEINFELD, M. SMITH, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Gabriel Gonzalez-Perez appeals his conviction and

sentence for three counts related to his distribution of heroin. See 21 U.S.C. § 841.

Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case,

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

we repeat only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal. We

affirm.

Gonzalez contends that the district court’s ruling limiting his questioning of

the government’s confidential informant denied him “a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006).

This argument fails because the district court’s ruling did not “infring[e] upon a

weighty interest of the accused” and was not “‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the

purposes [it was] designed to serve.’” Id. (citations omitted).

Gonzalez also contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the district

court erred by refusing to compel the government to grant use immunity to the

informant. We apply a two-prong test to determine whether due process requires

that “the district court impede on the discretion of the executive branch and compel

use immunity. . . .” United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008).

Specifically, the defendant must show that:

(1) the defense witness’s testimony was relevant; and (2)

either (a) the prosecution intentionally caused the defense

witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination with the purpose of distorting the fact-

finding process; or (b) the prosecution granted immunity

to a government witness in order to obtain that witness’s

testimony, but denied immunity to a defense witness

whose testimony would have directly contradicted that of

the government witness, with the effect of so distorting

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the fact-finding process that the defendant was denied his

due process right to a fundamentally fair trial.

Id. at 1162.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the testimony Gonzalez sought to elicit from

the confidential informant was relevant, Gonzalez is not entitled to relief because

he cannot satisfy either element of the second prong of the Straub test. As the

district court properly recognized, the prosecution did not intentionally cause the

informant to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. Nor did the prosecution grant

immunity to any government witness, or otherwise distort the fact-finding process.

Because the Straub test was not met, the district court properly denied Gonzalez’s

motion to compel the government to grant the informant use immunity.

We also reject Gonzalez’s challenge to his sentence. Gonzalez contends that

the district court erred by denying him “safety-valve” relief under the Sentencing

Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). To be eligible for

safety-valve relief, a defendant bears the burden to establish that he meets all five

statutory qualifying criteria, including that “the defendant did not . . . possess a

firearm . . . in connection with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2).

Here, the district court reasonably concluded that Gonzalez possessed a

firearm “in connection with the offense.” Id. Gonzalez admits that he owned the

gun that law enforcement found in his stash house. He also admits that the gun

3

was retrieved from a duffel bag that contained drug paraphernalia (i.e., a portable

digital scale). And Gonzalez admits that the gun was found in the same apartment

where law enforcement discovered a substantial quantity of heroin. Under these

circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that the district court’s decision that

Gonzalez possessed a firearm “in connection with the offense” was clearly

erroneous. See United States v. Ferryman, 444 F.3d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)

(holding that “this court reviews for clear error the district court’s factual

determination that a defendant possessed firearms in connection with the offense of

conviction, making him ineligible for safety valve relief”).

AFFIRMED.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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