Smalls v. Cooper

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

AARON D. SMALLS,

Plaintiff,

-against- 22-CV-4115 (LTS)

AMY COOPER, M.D.; DANIEL S. MUNDY,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

M.D.; MATTHEW CARETTO, ESQ.; ADA

CHARLOTTE ARMOUR,

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at the North Infirmary Command on Rikers Island,

brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts claims against his criminal defense

counsel, an assistant district attorney, and two forensic psychiatrists who examined Plaintiff’s

fitness to proceed to trial. By order dated May 25, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought

by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been

granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

(2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Aaron Smalls alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was recently employed

working at a food truck, which was stationed near the Queens Center Mall. (ECF 2 at 4, ¶ 4.)

While incarcerated, Plaintiff was engaged in “mailing schooling,” and he “was the teacher’s aide

at countless G.E.D. programs in different prisons.” (Id. at ¶ 2.) He “only smoke[s] marijuana

from a dispensary, which is legal,” and he only drinks alcohol in social situations. 2 (Id. at ¶ 3.)

On March 22, 2022, Plaintiff had a video conference with forensic psychiatrist Amy

Cooper, M.D. (Id. at 5.) At that time, Plaintiff was waiting for his ‘bi-aural behind the ear

dig[i]tal hearing” aids to be issued, and he seems to allege that he did not receive them until

April 28, 2022, after the conference. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Cooper’s evaluation was

“illegal,” by which he appears to mean that it was unlawful for Dr. Cooper to interview him

when he did not have his hearing aids. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff attaches to the complaint reports from Dr. Cooper and Dr. Daniel S. Mundy,

another forensic psychiatrist, in which both opined that Plaintiff was unfit to proceed to trial on

the criminal charges against him.3 (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff points to numerous errors in their reports.

For example, Plaintiff notes that he “never stated [that he] lived in Washington, D.C. [He] stated

that because of [his] excelling in school in Columbia, S.C., he attended Clark Elementary School

and James Bolten Space Center of W.A. Perry Middle School so he was award[ed] trips to

Washington, D.C., the Pentagon, and ‘Capitol Hill!’ etc.” (Id. at 5, ¶ 2.). He also indicates that

2 All spelling and punctuation from quoted material is original, unless otherwise noted.

3 In light of the pyschiatric reports attached to Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court considers

below whether appointment of a guardian ad litem in this matter is warranted.

Dr. Mundy’s misstatements about his education “make [Plaintiff] look dumb” and suggest that

Plaintiff is “a manipulator and unethical.” (Id. at 4.) Moreover, Plaintiff “never state[d] [that] he

hears voices.” Rather, his “[sub]conscious inspire[s] [his] idea[s] and creativity,” as is true with

most artists. (Id. at 9.)

Plaintiff describes his father as “an evil genius psychopath” and notes that his “lawyer is

being influence[d] by him.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff’s father is “trying to bury [Plaintiff] illegally or

physically.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was “told in evaluation that he is a liar. Yet all 3 of them

are being coached by [his] father.” (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff also lists numerous “concepts” that he has created and seeks to patent, including

the “Intell[i]gent Baby Scroller,” which has a “secure breathable” atmosphere controlled by a

parent’s phone, and “Intell[i]gent Tint,” car color tinting using “pixel circuits and radio wave[s]”

controlled by a phone. (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff brings suit under Section 1983 against Doctors Cooper and Mundy, defense

counsel Caretto and Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Charlotte Armour. Plaintiff seeks

damages and asks the Court to order that Defendants be “suspended.” (Id. at 11.)

DISCUSSION

A. Private Parties

A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted

under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private parties therefore are not generally liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723

F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n,

531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir.

2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”).

Absent special circumstances suggesting concerted action between an attorney and a state

representative, see Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Adickes v.

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)), an attorney’s representation of a defendant in state

criminal proceedings does not constitute the degree of state involvement or interference

necessary to establish a claim under Section 1983, regardless of whether that attorney is privately

retained, court-appointed, or employed as a public defender. See Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d

88, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)); see also

Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a legal aid organization

ordinarily is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983). Plaintiff’s defense attorney, Matthew

Caretto of the Legal Aid Society, does not qualify as a state actor. Plaintiff therefore does not

state a claim against Defendant Caretto under Section 1983.

B. Prosecutorial Immunity

Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope

of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather,

are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Giraldo v. Kessler,

694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see

also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a

“functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the

actor who performed it” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Prosecutors are also

absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly

connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009).

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead facts about what ADA Armour did or failed to do that

violated his rights. He thus fails to state a Section 1983 claim against her on which relief can be

granted. To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are based on actions within the scope of her official

duties and associated with the conduct of pretrial criminal proceedings, the claims would be

dismissed because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), (iii); see also Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F. 3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011)

(holding that claim against prosecutor is frivolous if it arises from conduct that is “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”).

C. Claims Against Forensic Psychiatrists

Plaintiff sues Doctors Cooper and Mundy in connection with examinations and reports

that they provided to the criminal court, which had ordered that Plaintiff be examined under N.Y.

Crim. Proc. Law § 730.30. “Certain actors associated with the courts enjoy absolute, quasi-

judicial immunity from suit because such immunity is ‘necessary to protect the judicial

process.’” Gross v. Rell, 695 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2012). This quasi-judicial immunity has

been extended to probation officers preparing and submitting presentence reports for sentencing

purposes. Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 1998).

District courts in this circuit have also applied quasi-judicial immunity to medical

professionals who conduct court-ordered examinations and prepare reports pertaining to a

defendant’s competency to stand trial. Chavez v. Doe 1-9, No. 19-CV-4109 (RA), 2020 WL

230027, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2020) (holding that “[t]o the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims

against doctors who examined him pursuant to C.P.L. § 730, those actions were taken in

connection with a court-ordered competency examination, and those doctors are thus immune

from suit”); Walton v. Rubel, No. 16-CV-1989 (ENV) (LB), 2018 WL 3369664, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

July 10, 2018); McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Absolute

immunity has extended to . . . court-appointed doctors and psychiatrists . . . .”), aff’d, 434 Fed.

Appx. 32 (2d Cir. 2011); Hunter v. Clark, No. 04-CV-0920, 2005 WL 1130488, *1-2 (W.D.N.Y.

May 5, 2005) (holding that court-appointed psychiatrists, who submitted reports to the court after

examining the plaintiff in a criminal case, enjoyed absolute immunity).

Plaintiff’s claims against Doctors Cooper and Mundy arise from their involvement in

conducting court-ordered psychiatric evaluations under Section 730 and submitting such reports

to the criminal court. Defendants are immune from suit for such claims, and the Court therefore

dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against them based on quasi-judicial immunity. 4 See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

D. Leave to Amend

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). The

defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment. As set forth above,

Plaintiff’s criminal defense counsel is not a state actor subject to suit under Section 1983, and the

ADA is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for actions closely associated with judicial

proceedings. Moreover, quasi-judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against the psychiatrists

for their evaluation reports to the state criminal court. The Court therefore declines to grant

Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint because it would be futile to do so.

4 Under New York’s statutory procedure, the ultimate decision about a defendant’s

fitness to proceed lies with the court, and it need not accept the conclusions of the examiners,

even if they unanimously conclude that a defendant is (or is not) competent to stand trial. See,

e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.30 (3) (where “examination reports submitted to the court

show that each psychiatric examiner is of the opinion that the defendant is an incapacitated

person, the court may, on its own motion, conduct a hearing to determine the issue of capacity

and it must conduct such hearing upon motion therefor by the defendant or by the district

attorney.”). Plaintiff can raise his concerns about his hearing aids, or any other basis for

challenging the evaluations, in such a hearing.

E. Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court must appoint a

guardian ad litem – or issue another appropriate order – to protect a[n] . . . incompetent person

who is unrepresented in an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c); Galanova v. Portnoy, 432 F. Supp .3d

433, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“In cases in which the plaintiff is incapacitated, and therefore unable

to proceed pro se, and is unrepresented, the district court must not reach the merits of a claim

filed on behalf of an incompetent person who is not properly represented by a suitable guardian

and through counsel.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The duty to consider whether Rule 17(c) applies is triggered by “evidence from an

appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency indicating that the party had been

adjudicated incompetent, or if the court received verifiable evidence from a mental health

professional demonstrating that the party is being or has been treated for mental illness of the

type that would render him or her legally incompetent.” Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care

Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003).

Even when a plaintiff has been adjudicated incompetent at the time of bringing suit,

where the district court views it as “clear that no substantial claim could be asserted on behalf of

[an incompetent person], it may dismiss the complaint, but without prejudice.” Berrios v. N.Y.

City Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Galanova, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 433

(declining to appoint a guardian ad litem and dismissing claims without prejudice because “it is

clear that no substantial claim may be brought on behalf” of the plaintiff).5

5 The Court may also decline to appoint counsel on the same ground. See Mil’chamot v.

New York City Housing Auth., No. 15-CV-108 (PAE), 2016 WL 659108 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,

2016) (holding that a court “may decline to appoint counsel for an incompetent person,” and

dismiss the matter without prejudice, “when it is clear that no substantial claim may be brought

on behalf of such party”.).

Here, Plaintiff does not indicate that the criminal court has adjudicated him incompetent,

but he does show that two forensic psychiatrists who conducted court-ordered evaluations

concluded in their reports that he was unfit to stand trial. This suffices to trigger the Court’s duty

to consider whether to appoint a guardian ad litem in this matter. The Court nevertheless

concludes that appointment of a guardian ad litem is unwarranted because Plaintiff cannot pursue

any substantial claims arising from the events described in the complaint. Plaintiff’s claims

suffer from incurable legal defects, and the Court therefore declines to appoint a guardian ad

litem for Plaintiff in this action. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice. See

Berrios, 564 F.3d at 135.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint, filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed

without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2022

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge