Brown v. 46th President of the United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DAMONTE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

22-CV-1954 (LTS)

-against-

46TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; ORDER OF DISMISSAL

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Respondent.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, filed this action invoking the Court’s diversity

jurisdiction, seeking to subpoena the Biden/Harris administration and settle his claims against it.

By order dated April 11, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. The complaint is dismissed for the reasons set forth

below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a

complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While

the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se

pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the

“strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-

75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)

(holding that “finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the

level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141

F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions

are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this complaint against the “46th President of the United States” and “the

White House.” The complaint, which does not set forth facts explaining what occurred, contains

the following allegations. Plaintiff “provided” the Biden/Harris administration with a subpoena,

but the administration was “non-complaint.” (ECF 2-1 at 2-5.) Plaintiff “certifies the

establishment of litigation integrity respective of Court anti-contempt establishing as actions

have good and sufficient.” (Id.) Attached to the complaint is a “bibliography” that includes

references to music by recording artists Rihanna and Drake, YouTube videos, Wikipedia, and

government websites. (Id. at 6.) In a section titled “Statement of Claim — Harm,” Plaintiff

writes:

The concept of assessing “harm” an experience where the defendant imposes an

event by incitement and causation on a subject, in this regard pertaining to the

plaintiff, unwarranted is generally categorized to include physical bodily injury

however with respect to other realms of effects associated with the matters of

Brown v. 46th president of the United States, Commander-in-Chief.

(Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff seeks $11 billion in damages, for “recovery and relief from extenuating

circumstances due to incitement of grievances/causation of action(s) and event(s) from US

Department of Defense.” (ECF 2-2 at 1, 4.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint, even when read with the “special solicitude” due to pro se

pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474-75, does not allege any facts suggesting that he has a

plausible legal claim. Plaintiff provides no facts about the events giving rise to this action or

explaining the basis for seeking a subpoena or $11 billion in damages. The Court therefore

dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous because it lacks a basis in law or fact. See Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 324-25; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.

In any event, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing all suits

against the federal government, including suits against federal agencies and federal officers sued

in their official capacities, unless sovereign immunity has been waived.1 United States v.

Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502,

510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency [federal officers official

capacity] is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are . . . barred under the

doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”). Plaintiff’s claims against the

“46th president” and “the White House” are dismissed under the doctrine of sovereign immunity

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also 28 U.S.C.

1 The Federal Tort Claims Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (“FTCA”), provides for

a waiver of sovereign immunity for certain claims for monetary damages arising from the

tortious conduct of federal government officers or employees acting within the scope of their

office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The facts as alleged, however, do not suggest

that the FTCA provides a basis for a claim here.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) (allowing for sua sponte dismissal of an IFP action that “seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief”).

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Even if Plaintiff alleged facts describing the injury he experienced, he seeks relief from immune

defendants. Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the

Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed under the

doctrine of sovereign immunity for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3);

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Plaintiff’s request for a subpoena is dismissed as moot.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2022

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge