Walker v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority

USDC SDNY

DOCUMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRONICALLY FILED

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC #:

nnnac ccna nnnnnnnn cans □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ XK DATE FILED:_ 11/18/21

KELLIE WALKER, :

Plaintiff, : 21-CV-474 (VEC)

-against- : MEMORANDUM

: OPINION & ORDER

TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL :

AUTHORITY, D/B/A METROPOLITAN :

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY BRIDGES _ :

AND TUNNELS, VICTOR MUALLEM, and :

SHARON GALLO-KOTCHER, IN THEIR :

INDIVIDUAL AND PROFESSIONAL :

CAPACITIES, :

Defendants. X

VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge:

Discrimination has no place in the workplace. Anti-discrimination laws protect

employees when they are subjected to disparate treatment, a hostile environment or retaliation at

work on the basis of their protected characteristics. But to avail herself of the protection of

federal anti-discrimination laws, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that she suffered discrimination

because of her protected characteristic(s). Mere recitations of a plaintiff's membership in a

protected class and a litany of incidents of poor treatment, without factual connections between

the two, do not pass muster. In this case, Plaintiff Kellie Walker (“Walker”) asserts claims for

race and gender discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment against Triborough

Bridge and Tunnel Authority (“TBTA”), Victor Muallem (“Muallem’’) and Sharon Gallo-

Kotcher (“Gallo-Kotcher”), pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e, et seg. (“Title VIT’); the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”);

the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 41 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”); and asserts state law claims of

discrimination, assault, battery and negligent supervision and retention.

On January 19, 2021, Walker filed this case. See Compl., Dkt. 1. On May 11, 2021,

Walker filed an Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl., Dkt. 28. On June 1, 2021, Defendants

filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Notice of

Mot., Dkt. 30. On August 26, 2021, Walker filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) with

leave from the Court. See Order, Dkt. 38; SAC, Dkt. 39. By agreement of the parties, the Court

has construed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint as applicable to the

Second Amended Complaint. See Order, Dkt. 38. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Walker is a Black female employee in TBTA’s Office of Labor Relations. SAC ¶¶ 33,

37. Walker initially reported directly to Muallem, a white male who is director of labor relations

at TBTA. Id. ¶¶ 26, 39. After Walker complained about Muallem’s supervision, Gallo-Kotcher,

a white female who is vice president of labor relations at TBTA, began supervising her.1 Id. ¶¶

27, 41, 85, 89.

Walker alleges mistreatment by Muallem beginning in April 2019. According to Walker,

Muallem emailed her “unwarranted and gratuitous criticisms” from April 2019 to December

2019, id. ¶ 51; initially denied days off requested by Walker, id. ¶ 52; “stormed” into Walker’s

office and “screamed . . . at the top of his lungs, criticizing” Walker’s work, id. ¶ 53; repeatedly

interrupted Walker’s opening statement and “berated and belittled” Walker during an arbitration

proceeding in January 2020, id. ¶¶ 56–58; and struck Walker with the back of his hand during an

arbitration proceeding on February 3, 2020, id. ¶¶ 67–71. Following the alleged physical assault,

Walker filed a Workplace Violence Incident form with Gallo-Kotcher on February 4, 2020, and

1 The Complaint does not clearly allege whether Walker’s reporting relationship was ever officially changed.

an Incident Report with the New York City Police Department on February 5, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 82–

83.

Walker alleges that after she asked that she not be put in physical proximity to Muallem,

a “retaliation campaign” followed. After Gallo-Kotcher told Walker that she expected Walker to

continue to work with and report to Muallem, at the end of February 2020 Walker sent a letter of

representation to TBTA through counsel. Id. ¶¶ 85–88. Walker alleges that after she put in the

request and sent the letter of representation, Gallo-Kotcher began to micromanage and mistreat

her: Gallo-Kotcher allegedly commented on how many times Walker clocked in and out, id. ¶

89; “excessively” reprimanded her for “a purported mistake” Walker had made five months

prior, id. ¶ 91; required Walker to report on the status of all of her cases “within the hour,” id. ¶

92; “incessantly” asked Walker, but not other employees, about the status of her cases, id. ¶ 93;

gave Walker no time to prepare for a meeting to discuss her disciplinary cases, id. ¶¶ 94–95;

required Walker to work in the office when proceedings were being conducted virtually during

the COVID-19 pandemic, id. ¶ 96–97; “purposefully” made references to Muallem in Walker’s

presence, id. ¶ 101; “nastily responded” to an email from Walker, id. ¶ 102; and failed to

investigate another employee’s screaming at Walker and gave that employee the “‘benefit of the

doubt,’” id. ¶¶ 103–105.

At some point (the exact date is not alleged in the Complaint), Walker filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging Title

VII violations. Id. ¶ 28. On or about July 28, 2021, Walker received a Notice of Right to Sue

from EEOC. Id. ¶ 29.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “accept all factual

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

Meyer v. JinkoSolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting N.J. Carpenters

Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2013) (alterations

omitted)). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). “At this stage, dismissal is appropriate only where [the plaintiff] can prove no set

of facts consistent with the complaint that would entitle [her] to relief.” Meyer, 761 F.3d at 249

(citation omitted).

II. Discrimination Claims

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual with respect

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, to establish a prima facie case of employment

discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff “has the burden of establishing that (1) she is a

member of a protected class; (2) she performed the job satisfactorily or was qualified for the

position; (3) an adverse employment action took place; and (4) the action occurred under

circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Rasko v. New York City Admin. for

Children’s Servs., 734 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see also McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).2 Employment discrimination claims brought

under Title VII, Section 1981 and Section 1983 are all treated under the same McDonnell

Douglas framework. See Bermudez v. City of New York, 783 F. Supp. 2d 560, 576 (S.D.N.Y.

2011).

Because the prima facie case requirement is an evidentiary standard, “a plaintiff is not

required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . to defeat a motion to

dismiss.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015). “[B]ecause

a temporary presumption of discriminatory motivation is created under the first prong of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff ‘need only give plausible support to a minimal inference

of discriminatory motivation.’” Id. at 84 (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297,

311 (2d Cir. 2015)).

Under the relevant standard, therefore, Walker’s claims will survive to the extent she has

plausibly asserted facts supporting an inference of discrimination on account of her race or

gender. Walker has not done so.

A. Walker’s Section 1981 Claims Are Encompassed by Section 1983

The Supreme Court has clarified that, with respect to state actors, Section 1983 is the

exclusive remedy for violations of rights guaranteed under Section 1981. See Jett v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731–34 (1989); see also Bermudez, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 576.

“Public benefit corporations,” like TBTA, are state actors for purposes of section 1983 claims.

See Rozenfeld v. MTA Bus Co., No. 13-CV-4847, 2015 WL 1174768, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,

2 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate reason for its action. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show

that the defendant’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 93 (2d Cir.

2011) (citations omitted).

2015). State employees are also state actors for the purposes of discrimination claims. Roddini

v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 02-CV-4640, 2003 WL 435981, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2003)

(holding that, under Jett, individuals sued in their individual capacities who are state actors must

be sued under Section 1983 for violations of the rights guaranteed by Section 1981 (citations

omitted)).

Thus, Walker’s claims under Section 1981 are dismissed as against all Defendants.

B. Title VII Gender Discrimination Claim

With respect to her Title VII gender discrimination claim against TBTA, see SAC ¶¶

189–93, Walker must plausibly allege that (1) her employer took adverse action against her, and

(2) her gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Vega, 801 F.3d at 87.

Defendants do not deny that Walker belongs to a protected class or that she was qualified

for her position with TBTA. Rather, Defendants argue that Walker has failed to allege facts that

could plausibly establish that “the alleged actions she complains of were motivated by

discrimination” or that she suffered “a single adverse employment action.” Defs. Mem., Dkt. 31

at 10–15.3

Walker alleges mistreatment by Muallem, including: screaming and shouting, berating

and belittling, delays in approving time off, interruptions during arbitration proceedings and

physical assault. SAC ¶¶ 52–53, 56, 58, 68. Walker also alleges micromanagement and

mismanagement by Gallo-Kotcher, including: inquiring about and requiring Walker to report the

status of her cases frequently, not giving Walker sufficient time to prepare for her disciplinary

meeting, requiring Walker to work in-person at the office despite virtual proceedings and failing

3 The Court need not address Defendants’ argument that Walker has not alleged an adverse employment

action because, as discussed below, she has failed to plead that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent.

to address Walker’s complaint of another employee’s misbehavior. SAC ¶¶ 92–97, 104–06.

Walker does not, however, allege any connection between her gender and the mistreatment she

allegedly suffered. In particular, she does not allege facts from which the Court could plausibly

infer that she was targeted by Muallem or Gallo-Kotcher because she is a woman. Conclusory

allegations such as “Muallem physically assaulted her because she is a Black woman,” SAC ¶

74, and “[i]t also shows that as a white male, he believed it was acceptable for him to subject a

junior Black female employee to such horrific discrimination and humiliation,” id. ¶ 59,4 do not

move the allegation that her poor treatment was the result of her gender “across the line from

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Walker argues that a plausible inference of discriminatory intent can be established by

“show[ing] a mosaic of intentional discrimination.” Pl. Mem., Dkt. 35 at 16 (quoting Khanna v.

MUFG Union Bank, 785 F. App’x 15, 16 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A

plaintiff may defeat a motion to dismiss in a discrimination case “by indirectly showing

circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 87; see also

Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 547–48 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Circumstantial evidence that

facially sex-neutral incidents were part of a pattern of discrimination on the basis of gender may

consist of evidence that ‘the same individual’ engaged in ‘multiple acts of harassment, some

overtly sexual and some not.’” (citation omitted)). Walker suggests gender-motivated

discriminatory intent by pointing to allegations: regarding Muallem’s weight, SAC ¶ 71; that it

was “well-understood” that “Muallem believes his female colleagues should be subservient to

him,” id. ¶ 110; that Muallem had “regularly” described women at TBTA as “‘irate,’

4 The specific allegations against Muallem are almost entirely conclusory. Plaintiff’s allegations against

Gallo-Kotcher do not contain any allegations that draw a connection between Gallo-Kotcher’s alleged actions and

Walker’s gender.

‘aggressive’ or ‘rude,’” id. ¶ 112; and that other “women have regularly quit their

employment . . . so that they do not have to endure the condescending and demeaning way in

which Muallem interacts with them,” id. ¶ 113. The allegations that Muallem believed female

employees should be subservient to him and that female employees left because of Muallem’s

treatment of them are entirely conclusory. The remaining allegations do not raise a minimal

inference of discriminatory intent.

Walker’s allegations against Gallo-Kotcher and TBTA are even more threadbare. Walker

alleges that a third person “believed” that Gallo-Kotcher “impl[ied] that she was surprised that

[a] young black female intern would be able to get into [a] prestigious college.” SAC ¶ 43.

Walker does not allege any additional facts that even remotely suggest that Gallo-Kotcher was

motivated by gender animus. An inference of discriminatory intent with respect to Gallo-

Kotcher’s treatment of Walker cannot stand on the basis of that third-hand comment alone. See

Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[S]tray remarks of a

decision-maker . . . cannot prove a claim of employment discrimination . . . without other indicia

of discrimination . . . .”). Walker further alleges that a male, nonwhite colleague holding equal

rank to Walker was given more significant responsibilities, had access to higher-level meetings

and was never physically assaulted or otherwise mistreated by Muallem. SAC ¶¶ 48–50, 98.

The fact that one other non-white male received more career opportunities does not allow a

minimal inference of discriminatory intent. To succeed on the better-access-to-opportunity

claim, Walker must plausibly allege that the comparator is similarly situated to her “in all

material respects.” Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted). Walker failed to allege sufficient facts for the Court to infer that the non-white male

was similar to her in all material respects. See Risco v. McHugh, 868 F. Supp. 2d 75, 101

(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“To prevail, a plaintiff must show that her employer offered the training to

similarly situated employees, and that she was denied that training under circumstances that give

rise to an inference of discrimination.”).

For all of these reasons, the Complaint does not adequately allege gender discrimination

in violation of Title VII. Walker’s gender discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII is,

therefore, dismissed

C. Section 1983 Race Discrimination Claims

To state a Section 1983 claim against a state employee, a plaintiff must plausibly allege:

(1) a violation of constitutional or statutory rights; and (2) that the employee was acting “under

color of state law.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 88. Once the color of law requirement is met, Section

1983 claims are analyzed under the same McDonnell Douglas framework discussed above. See

id. (“[F]or a § 1983 discrimination claim to survive . . . a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must

plausibly allege a claim under the same standards applicable to a Title VII claim—and that the

adverse action was taken by someone acting ‘under color of state law.’”).

One crucial difference between Section 1983 and Title VII claims is the causation

standard. For Title VII claims, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the prohibited conduct was a

motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action. Id. at 85–87. For Section 1983 claims, but-

for causation is required and applicable at the pleadings stage. Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory

Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 304 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-

Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020)); see also Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200, 214

(2d Cir. 2019); Urli v. Hempstead Sanitary Dist. No. 7, No. 20-CV-960, 2021 WL 4311141, at

*5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2021) (applying the but-for requirement to a motion to dismiss analysis in

a discrimination case). Thus, Walker must plausibly allege that her race was a but-for cause of

the alleged adverse employment actions she suffered.

There is no real dispute that Muallem and Gallo-Kotcher acted under color of state law

because their direction and supervision of Walker were pursuant to their official duties at TBTA.

See Annis v. Cnty. of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1994) (“There can be no question

that defendants . . . are, in their personal capacities, amenable to suit under this statute, inasmuch

as they were conducting themselves as supervisors for a public employer and thus were acting

under color of state law.”).

Similar to her gender discrimination claims, however, Walker’s race discrimination

claims contain nothing more than conclusory language that Defendants’ alleged actions were

motivated by discriminatory intent. Nothing in the well-pled factual allegations directly

connects Defendants’ actions to Walker’s race. Conclusory allegations (such as “Muallem

physically assaulted her because she is a Black woman,” SAC ¶ 74) do not move the inference of

discrimination “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

After eliminating the conclusory allegations, none of the remaining factual allegations

supports a plausible inference that, but for Walker’s race, Defendants would not have treated

Walker the same way.5

Walker’s race discrimination claims pursuant to Section 1983 are, therefore, dismissed.6

III. Hostile Work Environment Claims

To state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “the

complained conduct: (1) is objectively severe or pervasive—that is, creates an environment that a

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive; (2) creates an environment that the plaintiff

subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive; and (3) creates such an environment because of the

5 See also supra II(B).

6 Walker’s Section 1983 claims may also be barred by qualified immunity. Because her claim fails for other

reasons, however, the Court need not wade into the qualified immunity thicket.

plaintiff’s [protected characteristics].” Robinson v. Harvard Prot. Servs., 495 F. App’x 140, 141

(2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

Section 1983 and Title VII cases are analyzed under the same burden-shifting McDonnell

Douglass framework. Naumovski, 934 F.3d at 221 (“[F]or claims arising under [Title VII and

Section 1983], the level of severity to demonstrate a hostile work environment is similar.”)

To state a claim under Title VII for a hostile work environment, Plaintiff must allege

facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that discrimination is a motivating factor in the

mistreatment. See Berrie v. Bd. of Educ. of Port Chester-Rye Union Free Sch. Dist., 750 F.

App’x 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2018) (“This mistreatment [in hostile work environment claims] must have

occurred because of [the] employee’s protected characteristic, such as race or national origin,

although the protected characteristic need not be ‘the only motivating factor.’”). But-for

causation is required for Section 1983 hostile work environment claims. Naumovski, 934 F.3d at

214 (“[C]ourts must account for a § 1983 plaintiff’s higher burden of producing evidence from

which a jury could infer that the individual’s discriminatory intent was a ‘but-for’ cause of the

adverse employment action.”).

Similar to the discrimination claims discussed above, Walker has not plausibly alleged

that gender or racial animus was a motivating factor behind Defendants’ alleged actions. Thus,

although Plaintiff has more than adequately alleged a hostile and abusive work environment,

both subjectively and objectively, she failed entirely to allege facts from which the Court can

reasonably infer that her race or gender was a motivating factor (let alone the-but for cause) for

the mistreatment.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims under both Title VII and

Section 1983 are dismissed.

IV. Retaliation Claims

To state a claim for retaliation pursuant to Title VII or Section 1983, a plaintiff must

plausibly allege that: “(1) defendants discriminated—or took an adverse employment action—

against [the plaintiff], (2) because [the plaintiff] has opposed any unlawful employment

practice.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 90. Title VII and Section 1983 retaliation claims are again

analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. at 88. For purposes of a retaliation

claim, an adverse employment action is any action that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 90 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa

Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)). “Retaliation occurs when an employer takes action

against an employee not because of his ethnicity, but because he engaged in protected activity—

complaining about or otherwise opposing discrimination.” Id. at 91.

Walker failed to allege that she engaged in a protected activity. Although Walker alleges

that she made a number of complaints, there is no allegation that she ever complained about

gender or racial discrimination. Walker has not alleged that the Workplace Violence Incident

form that she filed with TBTA, the Incident Report that she filed with the police department, her

request to not be placed in physical proximity with Muallem, or her letter of representation to

TBTA drew any connection between the poor treatment about which she was complaining and

her race or gender. See SAC ¶¶ 82–83, 85–88. Additionally, Walker has not alleged that she

reported the actions of individual Defendants to other TBTA supervisors. And it does not appear

that Walker filed a Charge of Discrimination with EEOC before the alleged retaliatory actions

occurred.7 “Generalized complaints about a supervisor’s treatment are insufficient” to qualify as

7 The Complaint does not allege the date on which the Charge of Discrimination was filed, even though all

other actions Walker alleged to establish that she engaged in a protected activity were dated. See SAC ¶¶ 28, 82–83.

a protected activity for purposes of retaliation claims. Risco, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (quoting

Rojas v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2011)). Walker’s Section

1983 and Title VII retaliation claims are, therefore, dismissed.

V. Monell Claims

Pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, a municipal entity may

only be held liable under Section 1983 if the plaintiff demonstrates that the alleged violation was

caused by a municipal “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Policy

or custom includes “the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking

officials,” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011), and “persistent and widespread”

practices that have become “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’

with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

Walker did not allege any policy or custom by TBTA in her SAC, which offered nothing

more than two passing, conclusory comments about “patterns” of discrimination and tortious

conduct.8 SAC ¶¶ 132, 182. In her brief in opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

Walker argues for the first time that TBTA was put on notice of Muallem and Gallo-Kotcher’s

behavior and therefore maintained a policy by “tolerating discrimination and harassment.” Pl.

Opp. at 21–22 (citations omitted). For a practice to rise to the level of “official policy,”

however, it must be “so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-

making officials.” Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297–98 (2d Cir. 2020). Walker’s

conclusory allegations do not suffice.

8 Walker did not allege with any specificity how the isolated incidents discussed in the complaint constitute

“patterns of discrimination.” See SAC ¶¶ 132, 182.

All of Walker’s Section 1983 claims against TBTA and against individual Defendants in

their official capacities are, therefore, dismissed.

VI. Remaining State Law Claims

With the federal question claims dismissed, the Second Circuit counsels district courts to

dismiss state law claims that are based solely on the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. “[I]f the

federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense,

the state claims should be dismissed as well.” First Cap. Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc.,

385 F.3d 159, 183 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Boustany v. Xylem Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 486, 496-97

(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Having dismissed all of Plaintiffs claims that were based on a federal

question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and there being no other basis for federal jurisdiction over this

case, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state

law claims.”). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

claims.

All of Walker’s state law claims are, therefore, dismissed without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Walker’s

Section 1981, Section 1983 and Title VII claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Walker’s state

law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to

close the open motion at docket entry number 30.

SO ORDERED. . ~

Wo ea on

Date: November 18, 2021 VALERIE CAPRONI

New York, NY United States District Judge

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