Patel v. The United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RAJ PATEL,

Plaintiff,

-against-

21-CV-6553 (LTS)

THE UNITED STATES; THE HONORABLE

THE EXCELLENT JOE BIDEN, IN ALL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

CAPACITIES; AND THE HONORABLE

EXCELLENT DONALD J. TRUMP, IN ALL

CAPACITIES,

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff brings this action pro se. By order dated September 13, 2021, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The

Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a

complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While

the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se

pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the

“strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)

(holding that “finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the

level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is

‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is

based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Raj Patel, a resident of Indiana, filed this action against the United States,

President Joe Biden, and former President Donald J. Trump. The complaint is not a model of

clarity and has no apparent connection to New York or the Southern District of New York. He

asserts that he has been subjected to “battery/assault through a bio-stress weapon” in violation of

the “privileges and/or immunities [he] hold[s] pursuant to the United States Constitution[.]”

(ECF 2 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that “[c]entral to his complaint. . . is the [t]aking of [his]

intellectual property, [his] word patterns, through means and methods of advance weaponry.” (Id.

at 2.) He further alleges:

Beyond these aforementioned statutory and constitutional matters, my First

Amendment right to Free Exercise of Religion, Academic Freedom, prohibition of

Establishment of Religion, Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure, 13th

Amendment, 5th and/or 14th Amendment Due Process (especially, not Fair-Play),

the Guarantee Clause, federally-prohibited “pains” were violated, breach of

contract, defamation, theft of intellectual word property (my verbatim word

patterns), and civil-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“R.I.C.O.”)

Act (with possible multiple predicate crimes) violations, tortious interference in a

business transaction, and honest services duties, and functional removal the

constitutional ipso facto office of a qualified, selectable candidate for the United

States Presidency. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1931-34 and 1951, and 1961 et seq. and 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

(ECF 2 at 2.)

Plaintiff also claims that his privacy is being violated and that his words are being used

by others ‒ including professors at the University of Notre Dame, former President Trump and

his children, and other officials in the federal government ‒ without just compensation. He

asserts that his “word patterns were used to batter/whip [him] via the soundwaves as part” of an

“enterprise or scheme” across several states and internationally. (Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiff further

asserts that in 2018 and 2019, he requested that President Trump and officials in the White House

order the “restoration of [his] rights and to be free from this privacy breach and enterprise and to

ensure that private enforcement companies, working for political or personal rival, were not

harassing him.” (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff brings this action seeking various forms of injunctive relief, including an order

requiring his readmission into Notre Dame Law School for him to complete his degree. He also

seeks money damages.

Plaintiff has also submitted to the Court multiple purported amended complaints in which

he seeks to provide additional information instead of replacing the original complaint. Two days

after filing the complaint, Plaintiff submitted to the Court a motion to amend his complaint to

add certain legal theories and allegations concerning a 2009 attack “with a bio-tech weapon, to

deter [his] academic performance” in high school. (ECF 5 at 2.) Plaintiff also makes references

in the motion to Emory University and the taking of his words by former Presidents Barack

Obama and Trump. Plaintiff then filed a second amended which focused on professional

basketball player Gordon Hayward, who allegedly was Plaintiff’s schoolmate in high school, and

various matters involving members of Plaintiff’s family. (See ECF 11.) Plaintiff also filed a third

amended complaint in which he asserts that Gordon Hayward was using a “bio-tech stress

weapon, with verbatim word patterns, during the same year [Plaintiff’s] explicit contract with the

White House was made.” (ECF 12 at 1.) On September 16, 2021, Plaintiff submitted his fourth

effort at an amended complaint, seeking to add a claim that the University of Notre Dame

unlawfully discriminated against him by not readmitting him because of an “expunged case.”

(ECF 14 at 3.) He also submitted a “motion for joinder” to add the University of Notre Dame as

a defendant to this action. (ECF 15.) Along with the four amended complaints, Plaintiff has also

filed a purported order granting his petition for a writ of mandamus and directing President

Biden to restore all of Plaintiff’s rights and privileges. (See ECF 9.)

DISCUSSION

A. Complaint is frivolous

Plaintiff’s complaint, when read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings,

Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474-75, fails to allege any facts suggesting that he has a plausible legal

claim. Although Plaintiff cites to the Constitution, numerous statutes, and other grounds for

relief, the Court cannot identify any legal basis for Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief and

damages against the United States, President Biden, or former President Trump. Plaintiff’s

factual allegations are largely incoherent, irrational, or wholly incredible. See Denton, 504 U.S.

at 33. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous because it lacks a basis in

law or fact.1 See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-25; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

1 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), Plaintiff had the right to amend his complaint once as a

matter of course. Plaintiff submitted a motion to the Court to amend the complaint, but not an

amended complaint. He followed that up by filing a second and third purported amended

complaints. Although some of the submissions are not properly before the Court, in light of

Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court considers all of his filings together in dismissing this action.

Plaintiff has attempted to amend the complaint with filings that contain additional frivolous

claims and legal theories. Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an

amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the action as

frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

B. Plaintiff is warned about the filing of vexatious or frivolous litigation

Plaintiff has filed multiple similar lawsuits in federal courts around the country, all of

which have been dismissed for failure to state a claim and as frivolous.2 See, e.g., Patel v. United

States, No. 2:21-CV-4160-NKL (W.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 2021); Patel v. United States, No. 21-CV-

2263-UNA (D. D.C. Sept. 8, 2021); Patel v. United States, No. 21-CV-22729-BB (S.D. Fl. Aug.

12, 2021); Patel v. Biden, No. 2:21-CV-1345-APG-EJY (Aug. 9, 2021); Patel v. Biden, No. 21-

CV-1076-TSC (D. D.C. July 4, 2021) Patel v. Martinez, No. 3:21-CV-0241-RLM-JPK (N.D. Ind.

Apr. 8, 2021); Patel v. Patel, No. 20-CV-1772-TWP-MPB (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2020); Patel v.

Trump, No. 20-CV-0758-RLY-MJD (S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2020); Patel v. Trump, Case No. 20-CV-

0454- SEB-DML (S.D. Ind. Feb. 19, 2020); Patel v. FBI, No. 18-CV-3441-RLY-DML (S.D. Ind.

Nov. 13, 2018); Patel v. FBI, No. 18-CV-3442-WTL-DML (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2018); Patel v.

FBI, No. 18-CV-3443-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2018); see also Patel v. Patel, 834 F. App’x

244 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2021) (Mem) (upholding dismissal for failure to state a claim and warning

Plaintiff against filing frivolous appeals).

2 Plaintiff also has at least five other similar actions pending in federal courts. See Patel v.

United States, No. 3:21-CV-0628-RLM-JPK (N.D. Ind. filed Aug. 24, 2021); Patel v. United

States, No. 2:21-CV-16029-SDW-CLW (D. N.J. filed Aug. 21, 2021); Patel v. United States, No.

21-CV-3376-MLB (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 18, 2021) Patel v. United States, No. 21-CV-3335-MLB

(N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 16, 2021); Patel v. United States, No. 21-CV-2250-RLV-MG (S.D. Ind. filed

Aug. 14, 2021).

While this appears to be Plaintiff’s first filing in the Southern District of New York, he is

warned that the further filing of vexatious or frivolous litigation in which he fails to allege facts

showing that he is entitled to relief may result in an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), barring him

from filing new actions without prior permission in this Court. This warning is necessary, in light

of Plaintiff’s numerous filings, to conserve this Court’s judicial resources. See generally, In Re

McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1988).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

Plaintiff is also warned that further vexatious or frivolous litigation in this Court may

result in an order barring him from filing any new actions without prior permission. All other

pending matters in this case are terminated.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

Plaintiff has consented to electronic service. (ECF 4.)

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2021

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge