Quadir v. NYS Department of Labor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MOHAMMED QUADIR,

Plaintiff,

-v-

16-CV-7476 (JPO)

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR,

Defendant.

MOHAMMED QUADIR,

Plaintiff,

17-CV-5177 (JPO)

-v-

OPINION AND ORDER

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR,

Defendant.

J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Mohammed Quadir brings these related actions against his former employer, the

New York State Department of Labor (“DOL”), alleging disability discrimination, failure to

accommodate, and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.

DOL moves for summary judgment on all claims in both actions. For the reasons that follow,

DOL’s motions for summary judgment are granted.

I. Background

Quadir has filed three related actions in this Court against the DOL, which the Court

refers to as Quadir I (13 Civ. 3327), Quadir II (16 Civ. 7476), and Quadir III (17 Civ. 5177).

The Court assumes familiarity with the background of this case as set forth in its prior opinions.

See Quadir v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 39 F. Supp. 3d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Quadir v. N.Y.

State Dep’t of Labor, No. 13 Civ. 3327, 2016 WL 3633406 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2016), aff’d, 691

F. App’x 674 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 658 (2018); Quadir v. N.Y. State Dep’t of

Labor, No. 16 Civ. 7476, 2017 WL 4217137 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017). This opinion addresses

the pending motions in Quadir II and Quadir III.

The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise noted.

Beginning in 2010, Quadir was employed by DOL in its Bronx Career Center as a Labor

Services Representative (“LSR”). (Dkt. No. 681 (“SOF”) ¶ 1.) LSRs provide services to job

seekers during regular business hours. (SOF ¶ 5.) Quadir’s responsibilities as an LSR “included

meeting individually with job seekers, assessing their skills, assisting in preparing their resumes,

and matching them with available job postings.” (SOF ¶ 4.)

From April 15, 2013, to April 11, 2014, Quadir was absent from work on 92 days and

arrived to work late 145 times. (SOF ¶ 8.) And from April 15, 2014, to April 15, 2015, Quadir

was absent from work 97 days and arrived to work late 146 times. (SOF ¶ 9.) DOL asserts that

it took several measures to address Quadir’s absences and late arrivals. In 2014 and 2015,

Quadir was counseled several times regarding his absenteeism, tardiness, and failure to follow

the proper procedure for reporting unscheduled absences and late arrivals. (SOF ¶ 15.) In April

2015, Quadir received a performance rating of “unsatisfactory” during his annual evaluation.

(SOF ¶ 22.) He was rated unsatisfactory in several respects, and the evaluation noted that his

“extensive absenteeism and tardiness disrupted the operations of the Bronx Career Center.”

(SOF ¶¶ 23–24.) Further, Quadir was served with two disciplinary notices, one in June 2015 and

one in May 2016, due to his poor attendance record. (SOF ¶¶ 17–18.)

1 All docket citations herein refer to Quadir II, No. 16 Civ. 7476.

On November 12, 2014, Employment Services Manager Atul Sheffey met with Quadir

and discussed several topics including his late arrivals to work. (SOF ¶¶ 3, 25.) Quadir notes

that while he did not “very specifically and very directly” ask for an accommodation, he

informed Sheffey that he was chronically late due to his disability. (Dkt. No. 92 (“CSOF”) ¶ 26.)

Quadir asserts that he was “in effect” requesting an accommodation to come in later in the

mornings, an accommodation that Sheffey denied. (Id.) Sheffey maintains that Quadir did not

ask him “to arrive late to work as an accommodation for an asserted disability.” (SOF ¶ 26.)

In August 2015, DOL asked the Employee Health Service (“EHS”) to undertake a

medical examination of Quadir and determine whether he was fit to remain an LSR “in response

to concerns about [his] high rate of tardiness and absenteeism and his behavior when he [was] in

the office.” (SOF ¶¶ 31–32.) The EHS-appointed psychologist found that Quadir was not fit to

perform his job duties. (SOF ¶¶ 33–34.) Based on this report, EHS’s Medical Director,

Dr. Richard Ciulla, advised DOL that Quadir was unfit to perform the duties of an LSR. (SOF

¶ 35.) DOL subsequently placed Quadir on involuntary medical leave, effective October 8,

2015. (SOF ¶ 36.) In January 2016, Quadir requested reinstatement. (SOF ¶ 37.) In response,

DOL requested that EHS arrange a second medical evaluation for Quadir. (SOF ¶ 38.) A new

EHS-appointed psychologist also found that Quadir was unfit to perform his job duties. (SOF

¶¶ 38–39.) Dr. Ciulla reviewed this new report and again advised DOL that Quadir could not

perform the duties of an LSR. (SOF ¶ 40.) As a result, DOL denied Quadir’s reinstatement

request on March 28, 2016. (SOF ¶ 41.) Quadir administratively appealed his suspension, but it

was upheld by a Neutral Hearing Officer on April 11, 2016. (SOF ¶¶ 42–43.) That

determination was adopted by DOL a week later. (SOF ¶ 46.) Quadir appealed DOL’s

determination to the New York Civil Service Commission, which affirmed DOL’s decision on

February 28, 2017. (SOF ¶ 47.)

While Quadir was on involuntary medical leave, New York State discontinued its

contributions toward his health insurance premiums. (SOF ¶ 49.) When the state ends its

contributions, employees’ policies are cancelled if they do not pay the full premium. (Id.)

Quadir notes that he requested a waiver-of-premium form from DOL, and his application was

ultimately denied. (CSOF ¶ 50.) Sometime after the denial of the waiver, Quadir’s health

insurance was cancelled due to non-payment. (See SOF ¶ 50.)

Quadir remained on involuntary medical leave from October 8, 2015, until he was

terminated effective December 15, 2016. (SOF ¶ 51.) On October 19, 2016, after Quadir had

been on involuntary medical leave for over a year, the point at which DOL typically terminates

such employees, DOL notified Quadir of its intent to terminate him. (SOF ¶¶ 52–53.) Quadir

was advised that he could apply for restoration to duty prior to the date of his termination if he

submitted medical documentation affirming that he could return to work without restrictions.

(SOF ¶ 54.) Quadir notes that he requested an extension until January 6, 2017, to submit his

request, which was denied. (CSOF ¶ 54.) In any event, Quadir was advised that he was

terminated effective December 15, 2016, due to the length of his involuntary medical leave and

because he had not provided documentation demonstrating that he could return to work. (SOF

¶ 56.) Quadir administratively appealed his termination, which was affirmed by a Neutral

Hearing Officer on August 5, 2017. (SOF ¶¶ 57–58.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if, considering

the record as a whole, a rational jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. See Ricci v.

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).

“On summary judgment, the party bearing the burden of proof at trial must provide

evidence on each element of its claim or defense.” Cohen Lans LLP v. Naseman, No. 14 Civ.

4045, 2017 WL 477775, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2017) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322–23 (1986)). “If the party with the burden of proof makes the requisite initial showing,

the burden shifts to the opposing party to identify specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue

for trial, i.e., that reasonable jurors could differ about the evidence.” Clopay Plastic Prods. Co.

v. Excelsior Packaging Grp., Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5262, 2014 WL 4652548, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

18, 2014). The court views all “evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,”

and summary judgment may be granted only if “no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of

the nonmoving party.” Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (second quoting Lunds, Inc. v. Chem. Bank, 870 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1989)).

III. Discussion

A. Disability Discrimination Claims

To establish a prima facie Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show:

“(1) plaintiff’s employer is subject to the Rehabilitation Act; (2) plaintiff was disabled within the

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; (3) plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the essential

functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff suffered an

adverse employment action because of her disability.” Quadir I, 2016 WL 3633406, at *5

(quoting Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2004) (alterations omitted)).

DOL argues that Quadir was not otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of

his job due to his chronic absences and lateness. “[R]egularly attending work is an essential

function of virtually every job.” Vandenbroek v. PSEG Power CT LLC, 356 F. App’x 457 (2d

Cir. 2009) (summary order) (citation omitted). Quadir’s rate of absences and late arrivals is

staggering — it is undisputed that from April 15, 2013, to April 11, 2014, Quadir was absent 92

days and was late 145 times (SOF ¶ 8), and that from April 14, 2014, to April 14, 2015, Quadir

was absent 97 days and was late 146 times (SOF ¶ 9).

In further support, DOL has offered evidence that punctuality and attendance were

especially essential to the LSR role. The Bronx Career Center is one of the busiest DOL

facilities in New York State, serving an average of 500 to 600 people a week. (SOF ¶ 6.) That

work must be performed during regular business hours, when job seekers are allowed to visit the

facility. (SOF ¶ 5.) Additionally, when Quadir appealed his involuntary medical leave to the

agency, Neutral Hearing Officer Campagna held that “it is clear . . . that regular attendance is an

essential job function” because the role requires “face-to-face interaction with customers and

employers and teamwork.” (Dkt. No. 74-8 at 14.) Campagna’s findings were fully adopted by

the DOL and affirmed by the Civil Service Commission. (See Dkt. Nos. 74-9, 74-10.)

Moreover, the disruption that Quadir’s absence caused was not theoretical. Quadir’s supervisors

noted that his “excessive absences and late arrivals to work frequently disrupted the efficient

operations of the Bronx Career Center, inconvenienced job seekers whose appointments had to

be delayed or rescheduled, and imposed burdens on other LSRs who were tasked with additional

work in [Quadir’s] absence.” (Dkt. No. 69 ¶ 12; see Dkt. No. 70 ¶¶ 20–21.)

Quadir advances no evidence that punctuality and attendance were not essential functions

of the job, nor does he offer any evidence that DOL’s records of his absences were somehow

erroneous. Instead, he first seeks to explain his absences, arguing that up to 40% of those

absences were due to “supervisory harassment.” (See Dkt. No. 88 at 4 (noting that he “had been

disciplined and written up so many times and . . . found the environment so stressful that [he]

often found it difficult to come to work.”).) It is unclear whether Quadir’s increased distress

over his work environment was, at least in part, due to his disability. However, employers are

not required “to tolerate chronic absenteeism even when attendance problems are caused by an

employee’s disability.” Lewis v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 908 F. Supp. 2d 313, 337 (E.D.N.Y.

2012), aff’d, 537 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (quoting Mescall v. Marra, 49 F.

Supp. 2d 365, 374 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Therefore, the reasons why Quadir found himself

unable to attend work are irrelevant. Because he indisputably was unable to show up to work

regularly, he was not otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job as a matter

of law.

For similar reasons, Quadir’s argument that he was qualified for his position aside from

his absences is unavailing. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 88 at 9 (noting that he “was not only meeting, but

exceeding DOL’s numerical performance metrics.”).) However, “[t]o be a qualified individual,

‘in addition to possessing the skills necessary to perform the job in question, an employee must

be willing and able to demonstrate those skills by coming to work on a regular basis.’” Ramirez

v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 481 F. Supp. 2d 209, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Mescall, 49 F. Supp.

2d at 374) (second alteration omitted). Therefore, it is irrelevant whether Quadir was performing

on other metrics, because it is undisputed that he failed to come to work regularly — an essential

function of his job. Accordingly, Quadir’s disability discrimination claims must be dismissed.

B. Reasonable Accommodation Claims

To establish a claim for failure to make reasonable accommodations under the

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the plaintiff is a person with a disability under

the meaning of the Act; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3)

with reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at

issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” Quadir I, 2016 WL

3633406, at *2 (quoting Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.

2004)) (alterations omitted). “After this prima facie case is established, an employer can defeat

such a claim if it shows ‘(1) that making a reasonable accommodation would cause it hardship,

and (2) that the hardship would be undue.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch.

Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999)). “Although a public entity must make ‘reasonable

accommodations,’ it does not have to provide a disabled individual with every accommodation

he requests or the accommodation of his choice.” McElwee v. Cty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641

(2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

Quadir argues that DOL “repeatedly denied [his] reasonable accommodation requests to

come to work a little later in the morning at reduced pay.” (CSOF ¶¶ 8–9; see also Dkt. No. 2-1

at 19 (alleging that DOL denied his request for “an alternative work schedule or grace period,

which would have allowed him to report to work [at about] 9:30 or 9:45 [a.m.].”).) DOL

counters that Quadir never made any such accommodation request. Quadir concedes that while

he did not “very specifically and very directly” request an accommodation, he apprised Sheffey

of the fact that he was continually late due to his disability and Sheffey failed to accommodate

him with an alternative work schedule. (CSOF ¶ 26; SOF ¶ 26.) As evidence of this denial, he

offers an email sent by Sheffey in which Sheffey acknowledged that Quadir “said he was late

because of [his] illness,” but stated that he still needed to be on time for work. (Dkt. No. 70-2.)

It is true that “generally, it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the

employer that an accommodation is needed.” Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 184

(2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). However, even if no request is made, “an employer has a duty

to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability . . . if the employer knew or reasonably

should have known that the employee was disabled.” Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d

127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003)

(noting that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are typically considered to impose identical

requirements). DOL was aware that Quadir’s chronic lateness was due to his disability (see Dkt.

No. 70-2), and therefore a lack of notice does not bar Quadir’s claim.

However, the requested accommodation was not reasonable as a matter of law. “[A]

reasonable accommodation can never involve the elimination of an essential function of the job.”

Maysonet v. Valley Nat’l Bank, No. 17 Civ. 3939, 2019 WL 1368327, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,

2019) (quoting Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2003)). As discussed

supra Section III.A, punctuality and attendance were essential job functions. And allowing

Quadir to come in thirty to forty-five minutes late each day would definitionally mean that he

would not be at work during full business hours — the hours at which job seekers utilized DOL’s

services. (See Dkt. No. 69 ¶ 11.)

Even if the requested accommodation did not eliminate an essential function, courts may

“grant summary judgment[] for defendants in cases in which the plaintiff’s proposal is . . .

clearly ineffective.” Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139. Setting aside his tardiness, Quadir missed over

ninety days of work a year from April 2013 to April 2015. (SOF ¶¶ 8–9.) There is no indication

that allowing Quadir to work on a later schedule would have alleviated his chronic absenteeism

and allowed him to show up for work regularly.

Because Quadir’s proposal would eliminate an essential function of the role and the

proposal is clearly ineffective, Quadir’s reasonable accommodation claims must be dismissed.

C. Retaliation Claims

To establish a claim for retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show

that “‘(1) she engaged in an activity protected by the Rehabilitation Act; (2) the employer was

aware of this activity; (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (4) a

causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity,’ that is,

the employer acted with a retaliatory motive.” Quadir I, 2016 WL 3633406, at *6 (quoting

Caskey v. Cty. of Ontario, 560 F. App’x 57, 58 (2d Cir. 2014)) (alterations omitted). “In the

retaliation context, ‘a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the

challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Id. (quoting

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).

“Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the

defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment

decision. If a defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must point to evidence that would be

sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the employer’s explanation is merely a

pretext for impermissible retaliation.” Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 721 (2d Cir.

2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Quadir claims that he was subjected to a litany of adverse employment actions in

retaliation for his litigation of Quadir I. As an initial matter, Quadir asserts that the “disciplinary

write-ups, emails and counseling sessions” that he had been subject to were retaliatory. (See

Dkt. No. 88 at 2.) However, any counseling memos, and by extension the counseling sessions

that produced them, do not qualify as adverse employment actions. As this Court previously

held in Quadir I, “counseling memos . . . which note Quadir’s absenteeism and tardiness issues,

are concededly not disciplinary in nature and would not have deterred a reasonable employee

from engaging in protected activity.” 2016 WL 3633406, at *7 (citing Tepperwien v. Entergy

Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 570 (2d Cir. 2011)). Further, while the two disciplinary

notices issued to Quadir threatened suspension and termination (see Dkt. Nos. 74-3, 74-4), “the

threat of disciplinary action, without more, does not constitute an adverse employment action.”

Henry v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 396, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Additionally,

Quadir himself has acknowledged that no consequences flowed from either of these notices.

(See Dkt. No. 73-1 at 52:4–16.) Accordingly, the disciplinary notices cannot form the basis of a

retaliation claim. Similarly, any emails likewise do not qualify as adverse employment actions in

the absence of any material consequences that resulted. See Tepperwien, 663 F.3d at 571 (noting

that “trivial harms” such as “petty slights or minor annoyances . . . are not materially adverse”

(citation omitted)).

Quadir further complains that he was subject to “full restrictions” in retaliation for

Quadir I. (See Dkt. No. 88 at 2.) “[F]ull restrictions refers to the process of strictly monitoring

an employee’s time and attendance, and requiring the employee to provide medical

documentation for every unscheduled partial or full-day absence . . . . If the employee does not

provide medical documentation,” the employee will not be compensated for the absence. (Dkt.

No. 70 ¶ 29 (emphasis omitted).) As an initial matter, his complaint on this score is time-barred.

Quadir II only covers acts that “took place between June 8, 2014, and November 6, 2015.”

Quadir II, 2017 WL 4217137, at *2. However, Quadir was placed on full restrictions in April

2014. Quadir I, 2016 WL 3633406, at *6.

And this question was fully litigated in the previous lawsuit. In Quadir I, this Court

noted that “[p]lacement on full restrictions may have inconvenienced Quadir, but inconvenience

and scrutiny from management are not, alone, sufficient to constitute an adverse employment

action.” 2016 WL 3633406, at *6. Quadir now argues that placement on full restrictions

prevented him from accruing leave — essentially costing him “tens of thousands of dollars.”

(Dkt. No. 88 at 12.) Whether or not that is accurate, this Court previously noted that Quadir’s

placement on full restrictions “furthered a legitimate goal, especially given his attendance

record.” Quadir I, 2016 WL 3633406, at *7. Quadir did not then, nor does he now, offer any

evidence that DOL’s explanation of his continued placement on full restrictions was somehow

pretextual, given that his attendance did not improve. (See Dkt. No. 69 ¶ 61.) Accordingly,

Quadir’s placement on full restrictions was not retaliatory as a matter of law.

Next, Quadir complains of the unsatisfactory evaluation that he received in April 2015.

He asserts that as a result of that negative evaluation, he was denied a pay raise. (Dkt. No. 88 at

8.) However, DOL advances a legitimate reason for the unsatisfactory evaluation — Quadir’s

excessive absenteeism and its impact on Bronx Career Center operations. (See Dkt. No. 69 at

Dkt. No. 69-10 at 8.) The only evidence that Quadir offers as pretext is the notion that he was

satisfactory in other areas of his job. (See CSOF ¶¶ 22–23.) However, DOL offers evidence that

Quadir’s “deplorable attendance record would have resulted in an overall performance rating of

unsatisfactory even if his work had been satisfactory in all other respects, which . . . it was not.”

(Dkt. No. 69 ¶ 62.) Quadir does not dispute his chronic absences, nor does he offer any evidence

that an unsatisfactory performance rating based even entirely on those absences was atypical or

pretextual. As this Court has already noted, attendance at work is an essential job function. As

such, no rational factfinder could find, without more, that merely being satisfactory in other areas

is sufficient evidence of pretext under the circumstances. Accordingly, all retaliation claims

based on the April 2015 unsatisfactory evaluation are dismissed.

Quadir further argues that his involuntary medical suspension, as well as the denial of his

request for reinstatement, was retaliatory. However, both his involuntary medical suspension

and the denial of his request for reinstatement were based on independent evaluations. New

York Civil Service Law § 72(1) allows an agency to place an employee on leave if a “medical

officer [selected by EHS] . . . certif[ies] that such employee is not physically or mentally fit to

perform the duties of his or her position.” In August 2015, due to Quadir’s frequent absenteeism

and lateness, DOL requested such an examination. (See Dkt. No. 71-1.) After evaluating

Quadir, an independent psychologist found that he was unfit to perform the duties of an LSR.

(Dkt. No. 71 ¶¶ 32–33.) DOL asserts that Quadir was suspended solely as a result of that

evaluation. (Dkt. No. 74 ¶ 33.) Quadir administratively appealed his suspension, but the

suspension was upheld by the hearing officer. (See Dkt. No. 74-8.) The hearing officer’s

determination was adopted by the DOL and affirmed by the Civil Service Commission. (See

Dkt. Nos. 74-9, 74-10.) When Quadir sought to be reinstated in January 2016, DOL requested

another full medical evaluation. (Dkt. No. 74 ¶¶ 34–35.) He was again found unfit by another

independent psychologist, and his request for reinstatement was denied. (Dkt. No. 74 ¶¶ 36–38.)

Quadir spends the bulk of his opposition pointing to perceived flaws in the reports of the

psychologists who evaluated him and offers the fact that his EHS-appointed psychologists are

married to each other as evidence of bias. (See Dkt. No. 88.) However, even if Quadir is

correct, these facts do not constitute evidence that DOL’s reliance on those reports when it

decided to suspend Quadir was pretextual. Further, because Quadir’s suspension was upheld by

an “independent, neutral, and unbiased adjudicator,” the decision is “highly probative of the

absence of discriminatory intent.” Collins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.

2002). Because Quadir does not offer any evidence that either DOL’s proffered reasons for

requesting the medical evaluations or its reliance on those evaluations were pretextual, his

retaliation claims based on his involuntary medical suspension must be dismissed.

Quadir also argues that the termination of his medical insurance and the denial of his

request to not pay the full premium were retaliatory. However, this is simply a consequence of

his involuntary medical suspension. As a matter of course, New York State does not “contribute

toward health insurance premiums for employees on unpaid leave.” (Dkt. No. 74 ¶ 40.) To

remain enrolled in his health insurance, Quadir was required to pay the entire premium. (Id.)

Ultimately, his insurance was cancelled for failure to pay the premium. (Dkt. No. 74 ¶ 41.)

DOL asserts that it “did not initiate the cancellation, and did not have any authority to continue

[Quadir’s] coverage.” (Id.) Quadir only asserts in defense that he received the waiver form from

DOL, and that a DOL employee provided him with an incorrect figure regarding the cost of his

premium. (CSOF ¶¶ 49–50.) However, even if true, this evidence does not show that DOL had

any control over whether Quadir kept his insurance. Because Quadir cannot show that DOL

“took [this] adverse employment action against [him],” Quadir I, 2016 WL 3633406, at *6

(quoting Caskey, 560 F. App’x at 58), any retaliation claims based on his loss of medical

insurance must be dismissed.

Finally, Quadir argues that DOL’s retaliation against him for the litigation of Quadir I

culminated in his termination. However, New York law provides that if an employee placed on

involuntary medical leave under New York Civil Service Law § 72 “is not reinstated within one

year after the date of commencement of such leave, his or her employment status may be

terminated.” N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 72(4). DOL asserts that it typically terminates any

employee who is on involuntary medical leave for more than a year. (Dkt. No. 72 ¶ 9.) DOL

maintains that the only reasons that Quadir was terminated were the length of time he had been

on involuntary medical leave and the fact that he had failed to submit any medical evidence

showing that he was fit to return to work. (Dkt. No. 72 ¶ 27.) Quadir administratively appealed

his termination, which was upheld by a neutral hearing officer. (See Dkt. No. 74-15.) Quadir

contests none of these facts, arguing only that he was denied an extension to submit evidence

that he was able to return to work. (See CSOF J 56-57.) However, this is not evidence that

DOL/’s reason for terminating him was pretextual. In the absence of any evidence of pretext, any

retaliation claims based on his termination must be dismissed.

In sum, because Quadir does not advance evidence that any adverse actions taken against

him by DOL were in retaliation for his litigation of Quadir I, no reasonable jury could find in his

favor on his retaliation claims. Accordingly, those claims must be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket Number 66 in No. 16 Civ.

7476, and Docket Number 39 in No. 17 Civ. 5177, enter judgment on behalf of Defendant, and

close both of these cases.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2020

New York, New York

United States District Judge

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