The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-8501
SAMUEL ALBRIGHT BROWN, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; FNU WINKLER,
Officer; FNU SIMMS, Officer; FNU TEAGUE, Officer,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (5:08-cv-00113-GCM)
Argued: October 27, 2009 Decided: January 11, 2010
Before MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and Benson E. LEGG,
United States District Judge for the District of Maryland,
sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Legg wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Michael and Judge Gregory joined.
ARGUED: Charles Matthew Hill, PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. James Philip Allen, NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
LEGG, District Judge:
Samuel Albright Brown, an inmate incarcerated at the
Alexander Correctional Institute (“ACI”) in Taylorsville, North
Carolina, filed the instant suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that Defendants, Correctional Officers Winkler, Teague,
and Simms, and the North Carolina Department of Corrections,
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Specifically, Brown alleges that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the serious harm he
suffered at the hands of a fellow inmate. The district court,
after reviewing the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Because we disagree with the district
court’s finding that Brown’s complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, we vacate its dismissal of the
case and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I.
Brown’s complaint alleges the following facts. On May 9,
2008, an ACI staff member instructed him to enter the “Housing
Block” to retrieve a number of cleaning supplies. The staff
member gave the instruction despite having knowledge that
another inmate in the Housing Block harbored a grudge against
Brown. While gathering the cleaning supplies, Brown was
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assaulted and brutally beaten by that inmate. As a result of
that assault, a steel plate was inserted into Brown’s jaw and he
received “ongoing” medical care for “permanent” injuries.
Brown’s complaint further alleges that Officer Simms was in
“the Block” when the assault occurred, that Officer Teague
observed the assault, and that the “staff officers in question
were [n]egligent and placed [Brown] in a dangerous and
vulnerable position.”
In an administrative grievance form attached to his
complaint, Brown specified that Officer Winkler was the staff
member who was aware of the other inmate’s grudge against Brown
but nonetheless sent him to pick up cleaning supplies. The
administrative grievance form also alleges that Officer Teague
admitted to Brown that he witnessed the assault but chose not to
intervene.
The district court dismissed the case pursuant to § 1915A,
finding that Brown’s complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Brown now appeals the dismissal of
his claims against Officers Winkler, Teague, and Simms. He does
not appeal, however, the dismissal of his claim against the
North Carolina Department of Corrections.
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II.
Under § 1915A, district courts are required to review “any
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing
so, a court must either “identify cognizable claims or dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint
. . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
A complaint should be dismissed “if it does not allege
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.
2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twobly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In evaluating a complaint, this Court “will construe
the factual allegations ‘in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.’” Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir.
1991) (quoting Battlefield Builders v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060,
1062 (4th Cir. 1984)). Here, “[l]iberal construction of the
pleading is particularly appropriate” because it “is a pro se
complaint raising civil rights issues.” Loe v. Armistead, 582
F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 521 (1972)). We review de novo dismissals for failure
to state a claim. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 489.
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III.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to
protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Not
every injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another
establishes liability against a prison official, however. To
make a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must
satisfy two elements. First, “the deprivation alleged must be
sufficiently serious.” Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d
765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “To demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, a
prisoner must allege a serious or significant physical or
emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.” Id.
In this case, it is uncontested that Brown suffered significant
physical injuries as a result of the other inmate’s attack.
Second, a prisoner must demonstrate that the prison
official had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id.
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). When an
inmate makes a challenge under the Eighth Amendment, “the
requisite state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to
inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). A prison official demonstrates deliberate
indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Id. In other words, “the test is
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whether the guards know the plaintiff inmate faces a serious
danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet
they fail to do so.” Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (4th
Cir. 2002).
Applying that two-pronged test to the instant facts, we
hold that the district court erred in dismissing Brown’s claims
against Officers Winkler, Teague, and Simms.
A.
The State of North Carolina, representing each of the
Defendants, concedes error with respect to the claims against
Officers Winkler and Teague. The state acknowledges that the
complaint sufficiently alleges that Officer Teague observed the
altercation and failed to respond. The state also acknowledges
that Brown’s administrative grievance form states that Officer
Winkler was aware of the other inmate’s grudge but still sent
Brown into the Housing Block to pick up supplies. We agree that
those allegations sufficiently state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. As a result, the district court should not have
dismissed Brown’s claims against Officers Winkler and Teague.
B.
The State of North Carolina does not concede error with
respect to the claim against Officer Simms. The state contends
that no reasonable person could infer from the complaint that
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Officer Simms knew of the assault in time to intervene, yet
deliberately and indifferently failed to do so.
We disagree with that reading of the record. Brown’s
complaint alleges that Officer Simms was in “the Block” when the
assault occurred. A reasonable person could infer from that
statement that Officer Simms was aware of the attack, and that
his failure to intervene represented deliberate indifference to
a serious risk of harm.
Similarly, Brown’s complaint states that “staff members”
were aware of the other inmate’s grudge, that the staff members
knew there were prior problems between that inmate and Brown,
and that they placed Brown “in a [d]angerous and vulnerable
position.” Because there were only three ACI correction
officers designated in the complaint, it is reasonable to assume
that Brown was naming Officer Simms when he described the staff
members who were deliberately indifferent to the serious harm
posed by his fellow inmate. Accordingly, the district court
should not have dismissed Brown’s claim against Officer Simms.
IV.
Because Brown’s complaint alleges facts sufficient to state
a plausible claim, we vacate the district court’s dismissal
under § 1915A and remand the matter for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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