Scelza v. Scelza

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2:23 pm, May 28, 2024

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT

MICHAEL JOHN SCELZA, 23-B-5683,

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against- 24-CV-2378(GRB)(JMW)

VERONICA SCELZA, ANTOINETTE SCELZA,

DEPARTMENT OF SUFFOLK COUNTY

CORRECTIONS,

Defendants.

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GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is the application of Michael John Scelza (“Plaintiff”) to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”) in relation to his pro se complaint filed while he is incarcerated at the

Attica Correctional Facility and complaining of events alleged to have occurred while he was

detained at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility (“SCCF”). See Docket Entry “DE” 1, 5.

Upon review of Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court finds that he is qualified by his financial

position as reported in his IFP application to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee.

Accordingly, the application to proceed IFP (DE 5) is granted. However, for the reasons that

follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim and the complaint is thus

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

BACKGROUND

The present complaint is Plaintiff’s fourth IFP complaint alleging claims relating to his

detention at the SCCF’s Riverhead location.1 Like his earlier pleadings, the present complaint is

1 See 23-CV-5825(GRB)(JMW) Scelza v. Porter, et al. (IFP complaint dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b) where none of the defendants were state actors); 23-CV-

8106(GRB)(JMW) Scelza v. SCCF, et al. (IFP complaint dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b) for lack of: (1) state action; (2) personal involvement; and (3) the

capacity to be sued); and 24-CV-492(GRB)(JMW) Scelza v. Dep’t of Suffolk County Corr., et al.

submitted on the Court’s civil rights complaint form for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (“Section 1983”) and is brief. See DE 1. Plaintiff names Veronica Scelza (“Veronica”),

Antoinette Scelza (“Antoinette”), and the Department of Suffolk County Corrections (“DSCC”

and collectively, “Defendants”) as defendants. Plaintiff again alleges that, while detained at the

SCCF’s Riverhead location, he “was poisoned, beaten, and robbed of food” and “[b]oth staff of

the Jail and inmates are responsible for all the terrible and heinous things that happened in the

past.” Id. ¶ IV. In addition, for the first time, Plaintiff alleges that “Veronica and Antoinette

(wife and daughter) lied to the People of the State of New York, resulting in me being convicted

of Rape in the first degree on September 8th, 2023.” Id.

In the space that calls for a description of any injuries suffered and any medical treatment

required and/or received Plaintiff wrote: “scarring on feet by E.S.U. . . infection in stomic.

Mental mind state from being sexually assaulted.” Id. at ¶ IV.A. For relief, Plaintiff seeks to

recover a damages award in the sum of $25,000 each from Veronica and Antoinette and $10

million from the Suffolk County Correctional Facility.” Id. at ¶ III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Second Circuit has established a two-step procedure wherein the district court first

considers whether a plaintiff qualifies for in forma pauperis status, and then considers the merits

of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Potnick v. E. State Hosp., 701 F.2d 243, 244 (2d

Cir. 1983). Having already granted Plaintiff’s IFP application (DE 8), the Court turns to the

merits of the amended complaint.

(IFP complaint and amended complaint dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)

and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to plausibly allege a deliberate indifference claim challenging the

conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement at the SCCF).

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I. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

As Judge Bianco summarized,

A district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action

is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The Court is required to dismiss the action as

soon as it makes such a determination. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally,

see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010), and

to construe them “‘to raise the strongest arguments that [they] suggest [ ].’”

Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d

Cir. 2010)). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must

assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the

complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir.

2010), aff’d, --- U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013) (citing

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . are

not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s pro se status, a complaint must plead sufficient facts

to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The

plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128

(2d Cir. 2011). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff’s factual allegations must also be sufficient

to give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Patrick v. Bronx Care, No. 14-CV-7392 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 7476972, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y.

Dec. 31, 2014).

DISCUSSION

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I. The Complaint Fails to Allege a Plausible Federal Claim

In dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint against three inmates at the SCCF in his case

assigned docket number 23-CV-5825, the Court made clear that:

“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private

parties.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus,

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the Defendants, three fellow inmates at the

SCCF, necessarily fail because the Defendants are not state actors. See Wing v.

Myers, No. 18-CV-11056, 2019 WL 6732967, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2019)

(dismissing Section 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because

the defendants “are inmates, and not state actors. As such, Plaintiff cannot reach

their conduct in this lawsuit.’) (citing Wright v. Stallone, No. 17-CV-487, 2018

WL 671256, at *8 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) (dismissing claims against three

inmates who “are not state actors” in a § 1983 suit (citation omitted)); Lewis v.

Doe, No. 13-CV-3190, 2013 WL 5923723, at* 1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013)

(dismissing the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against “another inmate, who is not a

state actor”); see generally Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50

(1999) (“[T]he under color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach

merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” (citation and

quotation marks omitted)). Although Section 1983 liability may also extend to a

private party who conspires with a state actor to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323-24, Plaintiff has not alleged that the

Defendants conspired or jointly acted with a state actor to violate his

constitutional rights.

See Scelza v. Porter, et al., 23-CV-5825(GRB)(JMW), 2023 WL 5625449, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.

31, 2003), judgment entered, 2023 WL 7553882 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2023).2 Notwithstanding

this guidance, Plaintiff again seeks to impose Section 1983 liability on private parties, namely

his wife and daughter. Given that neither Veronica nor Antoinette are state actors, and the

absence of any facts from which the Court could reasonably construe that they conspired with a

2 The Court provided similar guidance in dismissing Section 1983 claims Plaintiff alleged against another inmate in

his complaint under docket number 23-CV-8106. See Scleza v. Suffolk County Corr. Fac., et al., 23-CV-8106

(GRB)(JMW), 2023 WL 8456069, at *3 (E.D.N.Y Dec. 5, 2023). There, Plaintiff was afforded several

opportunities to amend his complaint (see Elec. Orders dated January 9, 2024 and February 26, 2024), and, having

failed to do so, judgment was entered on April 8, 2024. (DE 15.)

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state actor or acted jointly with a state actor, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them are not

plausible, are frivolous, and are thus dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii),

1915A(b)(1).

Similarly, in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint under docket number 23-CV-8106 against

the SCCF, the Court explained:

[T]he Jail, as an administrative arm of the municipality, Suffolk County, is

without an independent legal identity and cannot be sued. Sturgis v. Suffolk

County Jail, No. 12-CV-5263, 2013 WL 245052, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013)

(sua sponte dismissing Section 1983 claims against the Jail, among others,

because it is an “administrative arm[ ] of the County of Suffolk [ ] [and] lack[s]

the capacity to be sued”) (citing Carthew v. County of Suffolk, 709 F. Supp. 2d

188, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)).

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status and the special solicitude afforded such litigants,

the Court has considered whether he has alleged a plausible claim when construed

as against the municipality, Suffolk County, and finds that he has not. As this

Court has recently explained:

Municipal governments, like Suffolk County, may be held liable

under Section 1983 ‘only for unconstitutional or illegal policies,

not for the illegal conduct of their employees.’ Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Thus, Suffolk County could

only face liability if Plaintiff alleged a pattern or practice of such

conduct. To state a claim against a municipality under Section

1983, ‘the plaintiff is required to show that the challenged acts

were performed pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.’ (id.)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Parker v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, No. 22-CV-3969(GRB)(AYS), 2023 WL

5047784, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2023). Here, as is readily apparent, Plaintiff’s

sparse complaint is devoid of any such allegations. Plaintiff has not pled that the

allegedly unconstitutional medical treatment -- or lack thereof -- were the result of

a policy or practice of Suffolk County. See, e.g., Parker, 2023 WL 5047784, at *6

(citing Joyner-El v. Giammarella, No. 09-CV-2731 (NRB), 2010 WL 1685957, at

*7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2010)) (dismissing any Monell claim because the

plaintiff had “pointed to no policy or custom on the part of New York City that

might plausibly have caused any of his alleged constitutional injuries”); Overhoff

v. Ginsburg Dev., L.L.C., 143 F. Supp. 2d 379, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing

Section 1983 complaint against municipality due to plaintiff’s failure to ‘allege

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that her constitutional rights were violated pursuant to any municipal policy or

custom’). Nor has Plaintiff included any facts in support of his failure to protect

claim that would allow this Court to reasonably infer that a policy, practice, or

custom of Suffolk County gave rise to the alleged attack.

Scelza, 2023 WL 8456069, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2023); see also Scelza v. Dep’t of Suffolk

Cnty. Corr. et al., No. 24-CV-00492(GRB)(JMW), 2024 WL 1211339, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21,

2024) (dismissing claims against the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department or the SCCF because

“these entities are administrative arms of the municipality, Suffolk County, and each lack an

independent legal identity and cannot be sued.”) (citing Scelza, 2023 WL 8456069, at *3) (citing

Sturgis v. Suffolk Cnty. Jail, No. 12-CV-5263, 2013 WL 245052, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013))

(sua sponte dismissing Section 1983 claims against the Jail, among others, because it is an

“administrative arm[ ] of the County of Suffolk [ ] [and] lack[s] the capacity to be sued”) (citing

Carthew v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 709 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)). Further, Plaintiff

continued to name the SCCF as a defendant in an amended complaint he filed under docket no.

24-CV-00492. In dismissing the amended complaint there, the Court again made clear that the

“Suffolk County Correctional Facility” is an “administrative arm[] of the municipality, Suffolk

County, and [] lack[s] an independent legal identity and cannot be sued.” Scelza v. Dep’t of

Suffolk Cnty. Corr., et al., No. 24-CV-00492(GRB)(JMW), 2024 WL 1934220, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

May 2, 2024) (citing Scelza, 2023 WL 8456069, at *3 (add’l citation omitted)).

Notwithstanding this guidance to Plaintiff in two earlier cases in this Court, he continues

to seek relief against the SCCF and includes no facts from which the Court could plausibly

allege a Section 1983 claim as against the municipality, Suffolk County. Accordingly, this claim

too is frivolous and is thus dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii),

1915A(b)(1).

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II. State Law Claims

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over

all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution.” However, courts “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim”

if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court explained that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims

are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction

doctrine - - judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity - - will point toward declining

to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

Here, given the absence of a plausible federal claim, the interests of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of not exercising supplemental jurisdiction at

this time over any state law claims that may be reasonably construed from the amended

complaint. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any

potential state-law claims contained in Plaintiff’s complaint.

III. Leave to Amend

A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once when

a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Shomo

v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). However, leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Here, Plaintiff has now pursued similar, frivolous claims in this Court in four cases with a

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total of five complaints and amended complaints.3 Plaintiff has not cured any of the deficiencies

the Court has identified nor does he attempt to satisfy the minimal pleading requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Indeed, the Court explained in two orders dismissing

Plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint, respectively, under docket number 24-CV-00492:

[T]he purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to

permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an

adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is

applicable.” Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A pleading that only tenders

naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id.

(internal citations and alterations omitted). Pro se pleadings are not exempt from

the notice requirements of Rule 8, see Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 76 (2d

Cir. 2004), and must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (alteration in original)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court may dismiss a complaint that is “so

confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if

any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Scelza, 2024 WL 1211339, at *5; Scelza, 2024 WL 1934220, at *2. Enough is enough. See In re

McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (“Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter

how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources. A part

of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the

interests of justice.”); see also Zaerpour v. Bank of America, et al., 23-845, 2024 WL 2069555,

at *2 (2d Cir. May 9, 2024) (affirming dismissal of frivolous pro se complaint without leave to

amend noting the “various opportunities to replead that [plaintiff] received by virtue of his three

prior lawsuits.”). Given that Plaintiff has ignored the Court’s guidance with regard to the

3 Plaintiff has also filed a Notice of Appeal in his cases assigned docket numbers 23-CV-5825 (see DE 8) and 23-

8106 (see DE 16.)

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minimal pleading requirements and substantive deficiencies in his claims, leave to amend the

complaint here would be futile and is thus denied.

III. Section 1915 Privilege

The Second Circuit has long-established that “the benefit of § 1915 is a privilege, not a

right . . . and that the court’s ‘extra measure of authority’ in dealing with § 1915 actions is necessary

because frivolous suits unduly burden the courts, sometimes obscuring meritorious claims,

occasion significant expenditures of public monies, and are a means by which plaintiffs can use

the federal government to harass individual defendants.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42

(2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). As in forma pauperis status is not a constitutional right but

rather a congressionally created benefit, it can be extended or limited by Congress. Polanco v.

Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Indeed, to help staunch a “flood of

nonmeritorious” prisoner litigation, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established

what has become known as the three-strikes rule. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. ----, 140 S.

Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). That rule generally

prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis—that is, without first paying the filing

fee—if he has had three or more prior suits “dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous,

malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g)).

In determining when a plaintiff should receive a strike for a dismissed case under section

1915(g), the Second Circuit has made clear that district courts should not impose strikes in its

dismissal orders. See Barreto v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 455 F. App’x 74, 76 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Deleon

v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2004)). Rather, a district court should only consider whether a

plaintiff has three strikes if it appears that the plaintiff has run afoul of section 1915(g) and is

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barred from proceeding in forma pauperis in the instant action. See id. As such,

[T]he district court judgments should clearly set forth the reasons for dismissal,

including whether the dismissal is because the claim is “frivolous,” “malicious,” or

“fails to state a claim,” whether it is because the prisoner has failed to exhaust an

available administrative remedy, or for other reasons.

Clarifications of this sort will undoubtedly assist subsequent courts that must

determine whether a plaintiff is barred from maintaining an action in forma

pauperis by the three strikes rule of Section 1915(g).

Deleon, 361 F.3d at 95 (citing Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 1999)) (purgandum).4

Incarcerated litigants face a greater risk of various harms while in prison, including

physical injuries, poor prison conditions, inadequate medical care, and other constitutional

deprivations, making their access to relief from the judicial system of the utmost importance. See

Rosa v. Doe, No. 21-2628, 2023 WL 8009400 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2023) (discussing history and

importance of in forma pauperis status). This access, however, when done through in forma

pauperis status, is not unrestricted and the indigent prisoner should be made aware of the

limitations. Once a prisoner accrues three dismissals based on either frivolousness, maliciousness,

or for failure to state a claim, that prisoner will be prohibited from commencing another action or

appeal in forma pauperis unless he is in imminent physical danger—regardless of the

meritoriousness of the case. See, e.g., Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2007)

(affirming dismissal of prisoner’s in forma pauperis action alleging claims of exposure to mold

and unjust discipline based on the three-strikes rule); Fate v. New York, No. 19-CV-4107 (CS),

2021 WL 1177966, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021) (dismissing prisoner’s in forma pauperis case

alleging campaign of police harassment and retaliation and a physical assault under the three-

4 See Farmers Property and Casualty Insur. Co. v. Fallon, No. 21-CV-6022 (GRB)(ARL), 2023 WL 4975977, at *3

n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2023) (discussing use of “purgandum” to indicate the removal of superfluous marks for the

ease of reading).

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strikes rule). Indeed, “[r]equiring prisoners to make economic decisions about filing lawsuits does

not deny access to the courts; it merely places the indigent prisoner in a position similar to that

faced by those whose basic costs of living are not paid by the state.” Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d

17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

Here, the Court does not impose any strikes against the Plaintiff but will note, however - -

for the pro se Plaintiff’s benefit - - that the statute under which he is proceeding is a privilege

subject to revocation. And the plain language of § 1915(g) suggests that such revocation is

compulsory in the face of abuse. See 42 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a

civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has [violated the three-strike rule]

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”) (emphasis added); see

also Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1723-24 (“That provision bars further IFP litigation once a prisoner has

had at least three prior suits dismissed on specified grounds.”). Accordingly, the Plaintiff

proceeding in forma pauperis here is cautioned that the dismissal of the present complaint for

failure to state a claim may be considered a strike by a future court and contribute to the

determination that he has violated the three-strikes rule of § 1915(g), barring him from

commencing further actions or appeals in forma pauperis.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s IFP application (DE 5) is granted; however, the

complaint (DE 1) is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case. The Clerk of the

Court shall also mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the pro se Plaintiff at his address

of record in an enveloped marked “Legal Mail” and note service on the docket.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

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would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Gary R. Brown

_______________________

Gary R. Brown

United States District Judge

Dated: May 28, 2024

Central Islip, New York

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