noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
How later courts described this case
- noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------------- X
:
MURAH JN BAPTISTE,
:
Plaintiff,
: ORDER
– against – : 24-CV-3032 (AMD) (LB)
:
ALSTOM and MV TRANSPORTATION, :
:
Defendants. :
------------------------------------------------------------- X
ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:
On April 19, 2024, the pro se plaintiff filed this action against Alstom and MV
Transportation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
(“Title VII”). (ECF No. 1.) The plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF No. 2.)
The plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted for the limited purpose of
this Order. For the following reasons, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice with leave to
file an amended complaint within 30 days after the entry of this Order.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff’s complaint is a downloadable form from the Eastern District of New York
titled “Employment Discrimination Complaint.” (See ECF No. 1.) He also attached exhibits,
including a “Notice of Right to Sue” letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and charges he submitted to the EEOC and the New York State Division
of Human Rights.1 (Id.) The plaintiff checked boxes on the form complaint for termination of
employment, unequal terms and conditions of employment, and retaliation. (Id. at 4–5.) He also
checked boxes for discrimination based on race, color, and national origin. (Id. at 5.)
In the plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” section, he alleges that MV Transportation
terminated his employment on March 9, 2021 because he “defend[ed] [his] right for fraud they
do in [his] employment, violate [his] right, they didn’t pay [him] [his] benefits; vacation, sick
day.” (Id. at 11.) The plaintiff further alleges that MV Transportation “abuse[d] [him] in [his]
New York State driver license ID registration” and “in [his] IRS federal tax return.” (Id.) He
states that MV Transportation retaliated against him in connection with his job applications and
job interviews, which led to more than 12 companies terminating his employment unlawfully.
(Id.) The plaintiff alleges that Alstom, which operates the “AirTrain” transportation system at
John F. Kennedy International Airport, withheld company benefits and discriminated against him
during his training. (E.g., id. at 12 (“[T]he trainer told me I have to come to training overnight
for me only because I am black. [A]ll other employees [who are] white stay in the daytime
training[.] I feel like that’s discrimination.”).)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir.
1 The plaintiff subsequently submitted 122 pages of exhibits, including documents relating to the Internal
Revenue Service, New York State Unemployment Insurance, and Department of Motor Vehicle. (ECF
No. 4.) Thereafter, he submitted an additional 62 pages of exhibits. (ECF No 5.)
2011). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is
“inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to provide a short,
plain statement of his claim against each defendant named so that they have adequate notice of
the claims against them. See id. at 677–78. A pleading that “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid
of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). To
satisfy this standard, a complaint must at a minimum “disclose sufficient information to permit
the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know
whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). “When a complaint fails to comply with these requirements [contained
in Rule 8], the district court has the power, on motion or sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint or
to strike such parts as are redundant or immaterial.” Chapman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 558 F.
Supp. 3d 45, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Although a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),2 a district court must
dismiss an in forma pauperis action if the complaint “is frivolous,” “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). Further, “[w]hile pro se plaintiffs are
generally given leave to amend a deficient complaint, a district court may deny leave to amend
when amendment would be futile.” Hassan v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 137 F. App’x 418,
420 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
2 See also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, the court
“remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).
DISCUSSION
The complaint does not allege a cognizable violation of federal or state employment law.
The plaintiff does not include sufficient facts for the Court to discern when he worked for
Alstom, or what either named defendant did or failed to do. Additionally, in the “Relief” section
of the complaint, the plaintiff states that he has suffered from “discrimination, fraud, abuse, and
persecution in employment, [and] retaliation.” (ECF. No. 1 at 6.) However, the plaintiff does
not state any damages or relief that he is seeking from the Court. Indeed, the plaintiff’s
allegations are insufficient “to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the
plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay,
230 F.3d at 541.
Accordingly, the complaint is deficient under Rule 8 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and must be
dismissed. See, e.g., Williams v. Amazon, No. 24-CV-2733, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72036, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2024); Hodge v. N.Y. Unemployment, No. 24-CV-1631, 2024 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64026, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2024).
LEAVE TO AMEND
A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”
Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav.
Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Court grants the plaintiff 30 days to file an
amended complaint. However, if the plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, he must
provide enough facts to support a cognizable violation of the employment laws. Title VII makes
it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). To establish a Title VII claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he has exhausted all administrative remedies and show that he is a member of a
protected class, was qualified for the position, and suffered an adverse employment action under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d
486, 492 (2d Cir. 2010). The plaintiff must also allege facts that “provide ‘at least minimal
support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.’” Vega v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Littlejohn v. City
of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)).
Although the plaintiff may attach exhibits to support his amended complaint, he must
allege in the complaint enough facts to satisfy Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure — he may not rely on exhibits to take the place of a statement of claim. See, e.g.,
Irons v. U.S. Gov’t, No. 21-CV-4683, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184635, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
2021) (“Neither the court nor defendants should have to parse through the complaint or attached
exhibits to ascertain the factual basis for plaintiff’s claims.”). The amended complaint must also
include all relevant dates, including the dates that he was employed by each named defendant, as
well as a short, plain statement of facts sufficient to support a plausible claim that each named
defendant discriminated against him in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff should attach all
relevant documentation from the EEOC and the New York State Division of Human Rights that
bear on whether the plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. The amended complaint
must be captioned “Amended Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this Order: 24-
CV-3032 (AMD) (LB). The amended complaint will replace the original complaint in its
entirety; in other words, the amended complaint must stand on its own without reference to the
original complaint.
The Court may close the case after 30 days if the plaintiff does not file an amended
complaint or otherwise show good cause for an extension of time. The plaintiff may contact the
City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Project at 212-382-4729, for free,
confidential, limited-scope legal assistance.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days. All further
proceedings are stayed for 30 days.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
s/Ann M. Donnelly
___________________________
ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
May 28, 2024