noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
How later courts described this case
- noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------- X
:
MICHAEL O. WILLIAMS,
:
Plaintiff,
: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
– against – :
24-CV-2733 (AMD) (SJB)
:
AMAZON,
:
Defendant.
:
--------------------------------------------------------------- X
ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:
On March 27, 2024, the pro se plaintiff filed th is action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, as well a s a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(ECF Nos. 1, 2.) The action was transferred to this District on April 12, 2024. (ECF No. 7.)
The Court grants the application to proceed in forma pauperis for the limited purpose of this
Order. As discussed below, the complaint is dismisse d with leave to amend.
BACKGROU ND
The complaint—a downloadable form from the Southern District of New York titled
“Employment Discrimination Complaint”—does not allege specific violations of federal or state
employment law; rather, in the “Statement of Claim” section, the plaintiff checked several boxes
noting that the defendant “terminated [his] employment,” “provided [him] with terms and
conditions of employment different from those of similar employees,” “retaliated against [him],”
and “harassed [him] or create a hostile work environment.” (ECF No. 1 at 1–5.) To support
these allegations, the plaintiff writes that the defendant “fired [him] for riding carts after one
warning,” “harassed [him] and refused [his] employment rights for an appeal.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.)
He also attached a number of exhibits, including a letter from the defendant stating that the
plaintiff’s “date of involuntary termination of [his] employment” is July 19, 2023, an undated
administrative complaint that the plaintiff filed with the defendant’s human resources
department, the defendant’s November 16, 2023 response to that administrative complaint, and
copies of the plaintiff’s previous disciplinary write-ups. (ECF No. 1 at 8–59.) The plaintiff
wants his job back, and seeks an unspecified amount in damages.1
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir.
2011). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is
“inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Further, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to provide a
short, plain statement of his claim against each defendant named so that they have adequate
notice of the claims against them. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that “tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal citations and
alterations omitted). To satisfy this standard, a complaint must at a minimum “disclose sufficient
information to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is
complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v. Kornstein,
230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). “When a complaint fails to
comply with these requirements contained in Rule 8, the district court has the power, on motion
or sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint or to strike such parts as are redundant or immaterial.”
1 The plaintiff requests damages for “[t]ime away from work,” “denial of employee rights,” “harassment,”
“mental fatigue,” and “PTSD.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.)
Chapman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 558 F. Supp. 3d 45, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citations
and brackets omitted).
Although a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),2 a district court must
dismiss an in forma pauperis action if the complaint “is frivolous,” “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). Further, while “pro se plaintiffs are
generally given leave to amend a deficient complaint, a district court may deny leave to amend
when amendment would be futile.” Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
The complaint does not allege a cognizable violation of federal or state employment law.
The sole allegations are that the defendant “fired [the plaintiff] for riding carts after one
warning,” “harassed [him]” and “refused [his] employment rights for an appeal.” (ECF No. 1 at
5.) The complaint must be dismissed, because the plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient “to
permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and
to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay, 230 F.3d at 541 (2d Cir. 2000).
Although he checked several boxes stating that the defendant harassed or retaliated against him,
the plaintiff does not explain why he is entitled to relief or that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction to hear his claim.3
2 See also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, the court
“remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).
3 Further, to the extent that the plaintiff intends to bring an employment discrimination claim under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he must also show that he exhausted all administrative remedies and
include relevant documentation from either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
or the New York State Division of Human Rights.
Accordingly, the complaint is deficient under Rule 8 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and must be
dismissed. See e.g., Hodge v. New York Unemployment, No. 24-CV-1631, 2024 WL 1513643, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2024); Chavez v. Cause Yall Took My Phone I Don’t Know Their Names,
No. 21-CV-8526, 2021 WL 5401485, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021) (“The complaint does not
contain a single fact suggesting that [the plaintiff] can state a viable claim that falls within the
Court’s jurisdiction.”).
LEAVE TO AMEND
A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”
Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav.
Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795–96 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court
grants the plaintiff 30 days to amend his complaint. However, if the plaintiff elects to file an
amended complaint, he must provide facts sufficient to support a cognizable violation of the
employment laws, as well as the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. For example, Title VII is a
federal statute that prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect
to “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a Title VII
claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has exhausted all administrative remedies and
provide facts to show that he is a member of a protected class, was qualified for the position, and
suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 2010).
Although the plaintiff may attach documents as exhibits in support of his amended
complaint, he must provide enough factual context to satisfy Rule 8—he may not rely on exhibits
to take the place of a statement of claim. See, e.g., Irons v. U.S. Gov’t, No. 21-CV-4683, 2021
WL 4407595, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021) (“Neither the court nor defendants should have to
parse through the complaint or attached exhibits to ascertain the factual basis for plaintiff’s
claims.”). If available, the plaintiff must attach all relevant documentation from the EEOC, the
New York State Division of Human Rights, or the New York City Commission on Human
Rights that bear on whether the defendant exhausted his administrative remedies. The new
complaint must be captioned “Amended Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this
Memorandum & Order, No. 24-CV-2733 (AMD) (SJB). The amended complaint will replace
the original complaint in its entirety; in other words, the amended complaint must stand on its
own without reference to the original complaint.
The Court will close the case after 30 days if the plaintiff does not file an amended
complaint or otherwise show good cause for an extension of time. The plaintiff may contact the
City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Project at 212-382-4729, for free,
confidential, limited-scope legal assistance.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days. The
Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the
plaintiff and note service on the docket.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status
is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
s/Ann M. Donnelly
___________________________
ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
April 19, 2024