Peterkin v. Carr

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MEURIS PETERKIN,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

20-CV-524 (LDH) (TAM)

DETECTIVE DOUGLASS CARR and POLICE

OFFICER JOSE ALBARRACIN,

Defendant.

LASHANN DEARCY HALL, United States District Judge:

Meuris Peterkin (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this instant action against

Detective Douglass Carr and Police Officer Jose Albarracin (collectively “Defendants”) pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendants move pursuant to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

UNDISPUTED FACTS1

On August 27, 2018, Plaintiff’s cousin-in-law, Sadier Emmanus, contacted police to

report that Plaintiff had threatened her. (Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Civ.

R. 56.1 (“Pl.’s 56.1”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 61.) Specifically, Emmanus complained that she feared for

her safety because Plaintiff told her “you have it coming to you” and followed her as she tried to

get away from him. (Id.) Thereafter, on October 7, 2018, Emmanus filed a report at the

77th Precinct, reporting another incident with Plaintiff that occurred earlier that same day. (Id. ¶

1 The foregoing facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Further, facts that were not contradicted by citations to

admissible evidence are deemed admitted. See Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (“If

the opposing party . . . fails to controvert a fact so set forth in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement, that fact will

be deemed admitted.”).

2.) Emmanus complained that as she moved her car out of a driveway, Plaintiff began “throwing

remarks” at her and then went back into his home. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 7.) Plaintiff returned with a sharp

object in his hand and chased Emmanus as she tried to drive away. (Id.) Subsequently,

Defendant Carr, a domestic violence investigator, was assigned as the lead detective to

investigate Emmanus’s complaint. (Id. ¶ 3.) Thereafter, Defendant Carr reviewed the Complaint

Report and Domestic Incident Reports related to the October 7, 2018 incident and interviewed

Emmanus concerning the same. (Id. ¶ 4, 7–8.) During the interview, Emmanus confirmed the

information in her complaint and informed Detective Carr of the August 27, 2018 incident.

(Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) Defendant Carr also reviewed Plaintiff’s August 27, 2018 complaint report, which

indicated that Plaintiff’s threatening behavior had “been going on for a while” and that Plaintiff

had sent Emmanus “threatening” text messages. (Id. ¶ 9.)

On October 11, 2018, Plaintiff called 911 to report that his then-wife, Toneana Charles,

and their son were missing from their apartment, and that he suspected the two went to Charles’s

mother’s apartment located at 1045 St. John’s Place in Brooklyn (the “St. John’s Apartment”).

(Id. ¶ 10.) At about 12:04 a.m., on October 12, 2018, Defendant Albarracin and his partner,

Officer Elias Wallen, received a “radio run” reporting a domestic dispute between a female 911

caller and her son-in-law at the St. John’s Apartment. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant Albarracin and

Officer Wallen arrived at the St. John’s Apartment, where Ms. Charles reported that after she and

her son left their residence in fear of Plaintiff, Plaintiff followed them to her mother’s home. (Id.

¶¶ 12–13.) According to Plaintiff, he was asked to leave the premises by Defendant Albarracin,

which he did. (Defs.’ Reply Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Civ. R. 56.1 (“Reply

56.1”) ¶ 20, ECF No. 64.)

On October 14, 2018, Emmanus positively identified Plaintiff as the subject of her

previous complaint. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 19–21.) That same day, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Plaintiff

was arrested at his home by Defendants Carr and Albarracin and Plaintiff was transported to the

77th Precinct by Defendant Carr. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) Defendant Carr did not continuously supervise

Plaintiff after his arrest and last interacted with him at approximately 7:50 p.m. on October 14,

2023. (Id. ¶¶ 24–25.) Plaintiff remained at the 77th precinct for approximately eight hours,

without being fed or offered a meal. (Reply 56.1 ¶ 9.) At approximately 11:30 p.m., Plaintiff

was transported from the 77th Precinct to Brooklyn Central Booking. (Id. ¶ 14.) At

approximately 11:20 a.m., on the next day, Plaintiff was arraigned and released on his own

recognizance. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 27.) Plaintiff was in custody for a total of 19 hours and 20

minutes. (Id. ¶ 28.) He was not provided any food during this time. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 26, 28; Reply

56.1 ¶¶ 9, 14.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment must be granted when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The movants bear the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138,

148 (2d Cir. 2004). Where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movants’ initial

burden at summary judgment can be met by pointing to a lack of evidence supporting the non-

movant’s claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movants meet their initial burden, the

non-movant may defeat summary judgment only by adducing evidence of specific facts that raise

a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Davis v. New

York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court is to believe the evidence of the non-movant

and draw all justifiable inferences in her favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, but the non-movant

must still do more than merely assert conclusions that are unsupported by arguments or facts,

Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996).

“It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally

and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted),

including when facing a summary judgment motion, Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d

46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the “application of this different standard does not relieve

plaintiff of his duty to meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary

judgment.” Id. at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION2

I. Plaintiff’s False Arrest Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s false arrest claim must be dismissed because the arrest

was premised on probable cause. (Defs.’ Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 5,

ECF No 60.) The Court agrees.

“To state a claim for false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the

defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3)

the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise

privileged.’” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F. 3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bernard v.

2 Plaintiff attempts to assert additional legal claims in his memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. However, these claims may not be asserted at this stage. Accordingly, the Court declines to

address these claims or any related arguments. (Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum at 10.)

United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)). However, it is well settled that “the existence of

probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149,

152 (2d Cir. 2006). Probable cause for an arrest exists when a police officer has “knowledge or

reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a

person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is

committing a crime.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Swartz v.

Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2013). To decide whether probable cause existed at the time

of the arrest, the Court assesses “whether the facts known by the arresting officer at the time of

the arrest objectively provided probable cause to arrest.” Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 153. This

information, of course, may include a law enforcement “information from some person, normally

the putative victim or eyewitness.” Wieder v. City of New York, 569 F. App’x 28, 29 (2d Cir.

2014) (quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir.2006)); see also Miloslavsky v.

AES Eng’g Soc., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir.

1993) (“The veracity of citizen complaints who are the victims of the very crime they report to

the police is assumed.”).

Here, prior to Plaintiff’s arrest, Plaintiff’s cousin-in-law Sadier Emmanus, filed two

reports complaining of menacing and harassment. Subsequently, prior to Plaintiff’s arrest,

Emmanus identified Plaintiff to Detective Carr as the subject of her reports. (Defs.’ Mem. at 3;

Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 19.) In other words, Emmanus, the putative victim gave a law enforcement officer

information, from which he could reasonably believe that Plaintiff had committed the crime of

harassment. Nothing more is required.

Plaintiff argues, nonetheless, that the claim should survive because Defendants did not

“provide any admissible evidence such as a search warrant, summons or transcript from the 911

Dispatch Call Center to establish probable cause.” (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s

Opp’n”), ECF No. 63 at 13.) This argument is baseless. Simply put, the law does not require

that probable cause be premised upon evidence that might later be admissible at trial. See Mara

v. Rilling, 921 F.3d 48, 75 (2d. Cir. 2019) (observing that “evidence need not be admissible at

trial in order to support a finding of probable cause”) (quoting Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F. 3d

84, 91 n.7). Equally without merit is Plaintiff’s argument that the reports upon which Detective

Carr relied were “stale, fixed and false reports which has no basis, bares a name other than

[Plaintiff’s] own, and many more inconsistencies, irrelevant to this cause of action.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 13.) At bottom, none of Plaintiff’s arguments operate to defeat probable cause, and his

claim for false arrest must be dismissed.

II. Plaintiff’s Deprivation of Food Claim3

To establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for

deprivation of food and water, plaintiff must satisfy two prongs— “an objective prong showing

that the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute objective deprivations of the

right to due process, and a ‘subjective prong’ . . . showing that the officer acted with at least

deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d

Cir. 2017). Indeed “there is no static test to determine whether a deprivation is sufficiently

serious; the conditions themselves must be evaluated in light of contemporary standards of

decency.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Jabbar v. Fischer, 683

F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012)). Under the objective prong, the gating question, therefore, is

3 Finding that Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and deprivation of food cannot stand, the Court declines to reach

Defendants’ qualified immunity argument. Even if the Court had not dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, the claims against

Defendant Albarracin are ripe for dismissal for lack of personal involvement. “It is well-settled in this Circuit that

personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages

under § 1983.” Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010).

whether the challenged conditions “pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.”

Id.

Here, Plaintiff was in custody for a total 19 hours and 20 minutes. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 28.)

During this time, it is undisputed that he was not provided with food. (Reply 56.1 ¶¶ 9, 14; Pl.’s

56.1 ¶¶ 26.) It is also undisputed that Plaintiff never requested food. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 26.) In any

event, Plaintiff does not offer any evidence that he suffered any harm resulting from the

complained of deprivation. Indeed, the only harm Plaintiff has identified could only be

reasonably related to his claim for false arrest. (Reply 56.1 ¶ 30.)4 On these facts, Plaintiff fails

to establish a claim for deprivation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the case must

be dismissed accordingly.5 See Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 77 (2d Cir. 2020)

(granting motion to dismiss where Plaintiff failed to allege that he “request[ed] or had any need

for food, drink, or access to a bathroom,” or that the lack of accommodations “had any untoward

consequences whatsoever.”).

4 In Plaintiff’s statement of additional facts, he asserts that “[a]s a result of the illegal actions of Detective Douglas

Carr, Adam Mc. Lawhorn, Brian Duffy and Jose Albarracin. I was publicly embarrassed, maliciously prosecuted,

unable to work, became homeless, suffered a major depressive disorder and post traumatic symptoms disorder,

unable to provide adequate care and protection for my children. My wife who waited six years to reunite with me

filed for divorce, my daughter broke her knee, my son got robbed at knife point on his way to school. To date my

name as well as that of my children remain in the Statewide Central Register as neglected father and children. The

actions of those Police Officers have completely ruined my life.” (Defs.’ Reply 56.1 ¶ 30.) Defendants properly

dispute this fact on the basis that it is not supported with a citation to any record evidence. (Id.)

5Although on a motion to dismiss, this case is not altogether unlike Mason v. Besse, No. 20-CV-246 (KAD), 2021

WL 1248388 (D. Conn. Apr. 5, 2021). In Mason, the plaintiff alleged that an officer placed him in a cell for

fourteen hours without heat, a mattress, blanket, toilet paper, food, or clean drinking water. Id. at *6. The plaintiff

suffered from kidney cancer and alleged that the conditions of his confinement caused him emotional and physical

discomfort. Id. Despite these allegations, the district court concluded that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the objective

prong set forth in Darnell because he did not allege that the conditions “posed a substantial risk of harm to his

health.” Id. The same outcome is warranted here.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York /s/ LDH

March 29, 2024 LASHANN DEARCY HALL

United States District Judge