The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JAMES DALY,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM ORDER
2:23-cv-09179 (GRB) (JMW)
-against-
THE INCORPORATED VILLAGE
OF PORT JEFFERSON, et al.,
Defendants.
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A P P E A R A N C E S:
Raymond Negron
Raymond Negron, Esq.
234 North Country Road
Mount Sinai, NY 11766
For Plaintiff
Chelsea Ella Weisbord
Sokoloff Stern LLP
179 Westbury Avenue
Carle Place, NY 11514
For Defendants
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
In this Section 1983 action, Plaintiff asserts a variety of constitutional claims stemming
from what plaintiff describes as “baseless charges filed in Justice Court, a frivolous lawsuit in
New York Supreme Court, denial of building permits, issuance of stop-work orders without
authority, false public accusations of conduct, visitations to Plaintiff’s property for the purpose
of harassment, badgering, time-wasting, and creative legal fees.” Complaint ¶ 5 (ECF No. 1, at
2). Defendants, labelling the complaint as a mere “smorgasbord of claims under the U.S.
Constitution and New York law,” filed a pre-motion letter in anticipation of their motion to
dismiss the entire complaint. (ECF No. 11.) The pre-motion conference was scheduled
(Electronic Order entered January 10, 2024) and held before the Hon. Gary R. Brown on
February 21, 2024, at which a briefing schedule was set.
Presently before the Court is defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending the outcome
of the anticipated motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff strenuously opposes the stay,
claiming “there is no reason initial disclosure cannot take place as it is nothing more than the
collecting of records that are already at Defendants’ fingertips” (ECF No. 20). For the reasons
that follow, the motion is partially granted, and discovery is hereby stayed pending the outcome
of the motion to dismiss, with the exception of the parties making their respective initial
disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Staying litigation seems antithetical to Rule 1’s admonition to construe the rules so as to “secure
the just, speedy . . . determination of every action”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. However, often there are times
when delaying discovery in fact satisfies Rule 1’s other command to secure an “inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.” Id. As a result, courts are empowered to stay or suspend
proceedings, which “‘is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.’”
Thomas v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-5167 (SLT), 2010 WL 3709923, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2010) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). The filing of a
dispositive motion in and of itself does not halt discovery obligations. That is, a stay of
discovery is not warranted, without more, by the mere pendency of a dispositive motion.
Weitzner v. Sciton, Inc., No. CV 2005-2533 (SLT) (MDG), 2006 WL 3827422, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 27, 2006). Rather, the moving party must make a showing of “good cause” to warrant a
stay of discovery. Chesney v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 24, 236 F.R.D. 113, 115
(E.D.N.Y. 2006). In evaluating whether a stay of discovery pending resolution of a motion to
dismiss is appropriate, courts typically consider: “(1) whether the defendant has made a strong
showing that the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious; (2) the breadth of discovery and the burden of
responding to it; and (3) the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing the stay.” Id. (citation
omitted). “Courts also may take into consideration the nature and complexity of the action,
whether some or all of the defendants have joined in the request for a stay, and the posture or
stage of the litigation.” Id. (citation omitted).
It is against this backdrop that the Court considers the present application.
DISCUSSION
Defendants, relying on the arguments set forth in its pre-motion to dismiss letter filed at
ECF No. 11, contend that a stay is warranted because each of Plaintiff’s causes of action should
be dismissed on jurisdictional, procedural and/or substantive grounds.” (ECF No. 19, at 2)
Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are largely based on the following time-
barred challenged conduct:
(a) allegations from the 1990s regarding a street paving encroachment (¶¶ 141-143); (b)
2004 allegations regarding LIPA tree cutting (¶¶ 144-157); (c) 2005-2007 allegations
regarding code violations and resulting village court prosecution (¶¶ 158-190); (d) 2013
allegations regarding Japanese Knotweed on Plaintiff’s property (¶¶ 333-342); (e) 2013-
2015 allegations regarding 207 Shell Street property (¶¶ 120-138); (f) 2017 allegations
regarding flagpole installation and subsequent ZBA denial (¶¶ 305-332); (g) 2017
allegations regarding “No Parking Sign” (¶¶ 191-208); (h) 2017 allegations regarding
fence-related property disputes with neighbor (¶¶ 98-119); (i) 2017-2018 allegations of
trespassing (¶¶ 344-351); and (j) 2017 allegations regarding Plaintiff’s Code violations
and the Village’s resulting prosecution of those violations in Village Justice Court and
commencement of a lawsuit in Suffolk Supreme Court (¶¶ 210-304.)
ECF No. 19, at p. 3.
In sum, according to Plaintiff, he “waited anywhere between 6-25 years to challenge
these various claims.” Id. Defendants’ arguments regarding the fatal pitfalls of Plaintiff’s claims
appear to have merit.1
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s claims are largely time-barred. Specifically, they
argue that the claims asserting violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, relying on
Hardy-Graham v. Southampton Just. Ct., No. 2020 WL 8872601 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020).
Furthermore, the state law claims would also be time-barred by the applicable one-year-and-
ninety-day statute of limitations. See Libbey v. Vill. of Atl. Beach, 982 F. Supp. 2d 185, 213
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); see N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50–i.
Apart from the untimeliness of the bulk of the claims, Defendants argument that as to the
state law claims, namely, trespass, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff failed to serve a notice of claim, a jurisdictional pre-
condition to commencing an action here. See Griffin v. Inc. Vill. of Rockville Ctr., 2017 WL
11809932, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2017); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50–i.
Defendants also advance grounds attacking the pleading based upon Plaintiff’s failure to
satisfy the requisite elements of each claim, failure to plausibly allege any underlying
constitutional violations, and failure to allege facts sufficient to support his Monell claims
asserted against the Village. (See ECF Dkt. No. 11.)
1 To be clear, the Court is not in any way prejudging the anticipated motion to dismiss—which is before
Judge Brown—but is merely considering the plausibility of the claims based upon the submitted papers for
purposes of weighing whether a stay should be granted.
Discovery in this case on all of the claims as pleaded will likely be protracted and
expensive, particularly since the allegations in the Complaint span decades, name multiple
defendants from various agencies or boards within the Village and arise out of many different
incidents and activities. These claims are not merely based upon a single incident giving rise to a
constitutional claim. Even if Plaintiff’s claims are only partially dismissed, the parties could
avoid substantial burden and expense by a stay of discovery until the motion to dismiss has been
decided. At the very least it is not unlikely that much of the complaint could be dismissed on
statute of limitations grounds alone.
As to the prejudice to Plaintiff from the issuance of a stay, there appears to be none, as
Plaintiff’s opposition is silent on that point. See ECF No. 20, passim.
In sum, Defendants have made a strong showing that the claims subject to the Rule
12(b)(6) motion may be unmeritorious. Although unclear at this juncture what the scope or
breadth of discovery will be —thus weighing neither in favor nor against the imposition of a
stay—the Court concludes that Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by a stay of discovery pending the
resolution of the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to stay discovery is
granted.
Notwithstanding the issuance of a stay, the Court is directing that initial disclosures be
made on or before March 29, 2024. The briefing schedule appears to be lengthy, and even if
there is a partially or complete dismissal, the possibility of leave to amend persists on at least
some of the arguments advanced for dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for a stay of discovery (ECF No. 19) is
granted, and discovery is stayed pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss. The stay of
discovery will remain in effect until Defendants’ motion to dismiss is either denied or is granted
with leave to replead. In the latter scenario, Defendant is granted leave to renew his application
for a stay following the filing of a second amended complaint if one is permitted.
Notwithstanding the issuance of a stay, the parties are directed to make initial disclosures on or
before March 29, 2024.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 21, 2024
S O O R D E R E D:
/s/ James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge