Leith v. The County of Nassau

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 3:27 pm, Oct 25, 2023

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TIVIA LEITH, et al.,

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM &

ORDER

CV 22-6933 (GRB)(AYS)

-against-

THE COUNTY OF NASSAU, et al.,

Defendants.

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GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:

In this action alleging false arrest and wrongful detention, the County of Nassau and

individual defendant police officers K. Sovaras and Kathleen Reid move to dismiss the sixth cause

of action1 in the Second Amended Complaint, which purports to allege a cause of action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for “racial profiling and racial discrimination.” Docket Entry (“DE”) 34. The

individual defendants contend that the complaint alleges insufficient factual material to plausibly

state a claim of discrimination, while the County, in turn, argues that because the claim fails to

adequately state a claim against the individual officers, the Monell claim against the County also

fails. Id. Because plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege facts supporting the sixth cause of

action, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Relevant Allegations

Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a Complaint in November 2022, an Amended

Complaint shortly thereafter and, following a pre-motion conference concerning a proposed

motion to dismiss, a Second Amended Complaint in April 2023. DE 1; DE 7; DE 21. In response

1 The motion is extremely limited in scope. The parties have agreed to the voluntary dismissal of the seventh and

eighth causes of action, which invoke the New York State Human Rights Law. DE 35-11 at 19. And the balance of

plaintiffs’ claims, concerning false arrest, false imprisonment and related matters, will proceed to discovery.

to defendants’ argument that the Second Amended Complaint fails to adequately allege that racial

discrimination was a motivating factor on the part of the defendant police officer in the traffic stop

and arrest (on an expired bench warrant) underlying this matter, plaintiffs cite a set of allegations

as “examples” of the factual underpinnings of their claim. See DE 35-11 at 14 (citing DE 21 ¶¶

15-22, 71, 73-127, 142, 147,148, 151, 193).

In sum, plaintiff Leith alleges that, while driving home at about 5 p.m. on December 7,

2021, she saw defendant Sovaras2 in his police car driving next to her. DE 21 ¶¶ 13-15. Defendant

Sovaras then pulled behind plaintiff Leith’s car, and after pacing her for a few minutes, pulled her

over. Id. ¶ 17. When Sovaras approached plaintiff Leith’s car window, Sovaras did not provide

her with a reason for the stop and instead requested her license and registration. Id. ¶¶ 18-21. A

few minutes later, Sovaras returned to plaintiff Leith’s car and informed her that she “had an

outstanding New York State warrant.” Id. ¶ 22. Ultimately, plaintiff Leith was arrested and taken

into custody. Id. ¶ 28. After eleven hours, she was released. Id. ¶ 51. Plaintiffs then conclusively

claim that:

Defendant County through Defendant K. Sovaras and Defendant Reid,

intentionally targeted and racially profiled Ms. Leith on the basis of her being

African American. Inexplicably, Defendants Sovaras did such under the guise of

having a phantom state arrest warrant . . . .

DE 21 ¶ 71.

Discussion

Standard of Review for 12(b)(6) Motions

Motions to dismiss are decided under the well-established standard of review for such

matters, as discussed in Burris v. Nassau County District Attorney, No. CV14-5540 (JFB)(GRB),

2 Notably, plaintiffs appear to concede that they have no basis to argue defendant Reid’s motivations were racially

based. Id. at 17.

2017 WL 9485714, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL 1187709 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 29, 2017), and incorporated by reference herein. The gravamen of that standard, of course,

is whether, assuming the allegations in the complaint to be true solely for the purposes of the

motion, the complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations to render the claims plausible.5 See

id. Notably, here, however, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Adequacy of the Allegations

In a recent en banc decision, the Second Circuit noted that civil rights statutes reach “‘only

purposeful discrimination.’ Therefore, to state a claim under either Section 1981 or 1982 a plaintiff

‘must allege facts supporting [a defendant's] intent to discriminate against him on the basis of his

race.’” Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).

Here, as to the individual officers, plaintiffs’ effort fails.

In arguing that they have “adequately pled an intention to discriminate,” plaintiffs rely

heavily on the decision in Dixon v. City of Syracuse, 493 F. Supp. 3d 30 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). There,

in a far more extreme factual situation (involving, inter alia, allegations of drawn weapons, a car

chase and an extended vehicular and physical assault of a plaintiff by a special police unit with a

developed reputation for targeting minority individuals), the district court found that plaintiffs had

sufficiently alleged specific acts of excessive force and racial profiling that fit within a larger

pattern of similar conduct. See generally id. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs’ attempt to buttress

conclusory allegations against the individual defendants with a purported statistical pattern of

5 In this regard, the Court has not, and will not, consider the extraneous factual material submitted by defendants on

this motion relating to various compliance programs implemented by the NCPD.

vehicular stops by Nassau County police officers reflecting “differential treatment of persons of

color.” See DE 35-11 at 16.

While the Second Amended Complaint’s allegations of statistical racial disparities in traffic

stops in Nassau County are concerning, these assertions do not establish a plausible factual basis

for the allegation of racial bias as against the individual officers in these circumstances. According

to the Complaint, plaintiff Leith was arrested based upon a bench warrant issued in late 2021,

which turned out to be vacated or resolved. DE 21 ¶¶ 49-51. In other words, unlike Dixon, no

pattern is alleged concerning the occurrences here that would further support a claim of racial

animus by the individual defendants. There is no allegation, for example, that Nassau County

police exhibited a pattern of utilizing expired or invalid court process to effect wrongful arrests.

Moreover, there are no facts alleged specific to these circumstances, such as the use of racial slurs,

that would form a basis for a plausible claim of animus by the individual officers. See in contrast

Ali v. Connick, 136 F. Supp. 3d 270, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“officers' use of racial epithets may be

regarded as direct evidence of racial animus”). As plaintiffs have not provided any plausible

factual allegations as to the motivations of the individual defendants, the motion to dismiss

pertaining to the individual defendants must be granted.

This leaves only the Monell claim against Nassau County. While plaintiffs have set forth

statistical allegations that could, under different circumstances, be considered in support of such a

claim against the County, the failure to allege facts supporting individual liability defeats the

municipal claim. “Statistics alone do not suffice to establish an individual disparate treatment

claim for a very good reason: the particular plaintiff must establish he was the victim of racial

discrimination.” Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). As the

Second Circuit explained:

[P]roof of discriminatory intent is required to show a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 194, 123 S.Ct. 1389.

Because neither a state nor a state official in his official capacity is a “person”

within the meaning of § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the requisite discriminatory intent must

be held by the state official in his individual capacity. Thus, liability for an Equal

Protection Clause violation under § 1983 requires personal involvement by a

defendant, who must act with discriminatory purpose. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Id. at 204. Absent actionable allegations of discriminatory intent by the individual defendants, the

claim against the County must also fail.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action must be

GRANTED in its entirety.

Plaintiffs have, at least implicitly, requested the right to replead. While such applications

are granted liberally, they are routinely denied where repleading would be futile. In this case, the

record reflects the filing of an initial complaint, two amended complaints and the previewing of

supplemental allegations by plaintiff in response to the motion, none of which suffice to adequately

plead the subject cause of action. Therefore, leave to replead is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Central Islip, New York

October 25, 2023

/s/ Gary R. Brown

GARY R. BROWN

United States District Judge