Lin v. Amazon.com, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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YUYAN LIN,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

21-cv-6203 (KAM)(MMH)

Plaintiff,

-against-

AMAZON.COM, INC., AMAZON.COM SERVICES,

LLC,

Defendant.

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KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Yuyan Lin, proceeding pro se, brings the

instant Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendant

Amazon.com Services LLC,1 asserting a negligence claim under New

York state law, as well as failure to accommodate claims under the

New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and the New York City

Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to

dismiss (ECF No. 48) the SAC (ECF No. 29) for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set

1 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint also names Defendant “Amazon.com, Inc.,”

but Defendant, without disagreement by Plaintiff, states that “Amazon.com, Inc.

is mis-named as a party to this action.” (ECF No. 48 (“Def. Mem.”) at 5.)

Consequently, the Court deems Amazon.com Services, LLC, to be the proper party

defendant and the caption shall be amended accordingly.

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forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The Court recounts the following relevant facts set

forth in the SAC, which are presumed true for purposes of

considering Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

I. Plaintiff’s Initial Employment and Requests for Transfer

Plaintiff was previously an employee of Defendant

Amazon.com Services LLC (“Amazon” or “Defendant”).2 She was hired

to work as a weekend reduced hour Single Pack packer at Amazon

Fulfillment Center in Staten Island (JFK 8) in November 2018.

Plaintiff was one of the best performers on the team, even

receiving Christmas appreciation lottery tickets from her manager

in December 2018 for her performance. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff was

approved for maternity leave from January through March 30, 2019,

and gave birth on January 20, 2019. (Id. ¶ 10.)

When Plaintiff returned to work on April 2, 2019, she

requested a modification of her schedule due to childcare needs.

She was designated to the “Picking” Department on April 8, 2019

and, due to not receiving other position offers, accepted the

position on April 11, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) Plaintiff asserts

2 The SAC does not explicitly state that Plaintiff was ever formally terminated

or resigned from her employment at Amazon following her medical leave, discussed

infra, but the Court infers that Plaintiff is no longer an employee.

2

that she accepted “without knowing any dangers or getting any

warning about the Picker position.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff initially exceeded the minimum requirements of

the Picker role. (Id. ¶ 17.) In April of 2019, Plaintiff was

working with a large order of heavy items, resulting in pain in

her shoulder, arms, lower back, legs, and feet. (Id. ¶ 18.) The

following day, Plaintiff was again assigned to the first-floor

station, where she believed the heavy items were located. She

then spoke to her manager, Rafael, emphasizing that she had just

returned from maternity leave and could not endure such an

intensive job. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Rafael “did

not agree [P]laintiff had a good reason to be accommodated or

assign[ed] to light duty,” refused Plaintiff’s request to be moved

from the first floor, and “affirmed that [P]laintiff should accept

whatever [was] assigned to her.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff, realizing

she could not remain in the Picker position, requested a transfer

to another department in April, May, June, July, August, and

September of 2019, requests which were all denied. (Id. ¶¶ 21-

23.)

In May 2019, Plaintiff spoke with the onsite Human

Resources department and the Single Pack Department Process

Assistant (PA), and again requested a transfer to a different

department. She was informed that she had to make her request

through the Amazon “A to Z” website or must speak with a manager.

3

( ¶¶ 23-24.) After Plaintiff spoke with the department manager,

the manager agreed to pull Plaintiff from the picking department

to work in a different role on an as-needed basis. (Id. ¶ 25.)

Plaintiff asserts that her new manager, Tommy, only sometimes

agreed to let Plaintiff “be pulled out from [the] picking

department.” (Id. ¶ 26.)

Many of Plaintiff’s co-workers were aware that she was

suffering from pain “due to [the] intensive work in her postpartum

period” and Plaintiff was subsequently informed of the time and

location of “light duty training.” (Id. ¶ 27.) In June 2019,

Plaintiff attended light duty training but was removed from the

training and sent back to picking at the request of an unknown

manager, who had spoken with Tommy, Plaintiff’s manager. (Id. ¶

28.)

Plaintiff alleges that her work performance continued to

deteriorate, as she “suffered more and more pain during her work.”

(Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff received a “coaching” from another PA, who

indicated that Plaintiff had a good reason for light duty work, as

she had just returned from maternity leave. Plaintiff proceeded

to relay this information to Nicholas, Tommy’s PA, who “declined

that postpartum was a good reason” and stated that the light duty

position was only for “limited, selected people.” (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.)

Two of Plaintiff’s coworkers were transferred to different

departments. Plaintiff alleges that one coworker was even assigned

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to the light duty position after being on family leave for one

month, even though that coworker did not have a disability or “any

other medical condition.” (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.)

II. Plaintiff’s Continued Injuries

Plaintiff’s performance continued to decrease due to the

increased severity of pain in her lower back, legs, arms, and neck,

ultimately resulting in a second “coaching” in July 2019. (Id. ¶¶

34-35.) On August 13, 2019, due to Plaintiff’s increased

difficulty standing and working, she went to the “M Care in JFK8

facility” for treatment and was instructed to go back to picking

work the same day. Plaintiff took medical leave on September 5,

2019, due to her “diagnosis [of] bodily injur[ies].” (Id. ¶¶ 36-

37.) On September 13, 2019, Lenox Hill Radiology NY found that

Plaintiff had a “[m]ild disc bulge at L5-S1 with intravertebral

dis[c] space narrowing and associated dis[c] desiccation.” (Id.

¶ 38.) Plaintiff alleges having at least five additional medical

visits regarding her pain, resulting in multiple injections and a

surgery referral. (Id. ¶¶ 38-43.)

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d

868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

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570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the conduct alleged.” Id.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), a district court must “accept as true all factual

statements alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” McCarthy v. Dun &

Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se,

pleadings “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise

the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Sykes v. Bank of Am.,

723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). A pro se complaint,

“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Boykin v.

KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v.

Pardus, 55 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). Although liberally

interpreted, a pro se complaint must still state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face, as the “duty to liberally construe

a plaintiff’s complaint [is not] the equivalent of a duty to re-

write it.” Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 663 F. Supp. 2d 379,

387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

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DISCUSSION

I. Negligence

Plaintiff first asserts a state law negligence claim

against Defendant. (SAC at 34.3)

Under New York law, common law negligence claims arising

from workplace injuries are “‘precluded by New York Workers’

Compensation Law, which provides the exclusive remedy for

negligence claims against an employer.’” Arbouin v. Bob's Disc.

Furniture, LLC, No. 20-cv-1893 (SJF)(SIL), 2021 WL 4813228, at *10

(E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No.

20-cv-1893 (JMA)(SIL), 2021 WL 4458932 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2021)

(citing Kelly v. N. Shore-Long Island Health Sys., 2014 WL 2863020,

at *11 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2014)); see also Dansler-Hill v.

Rochester Inst. of Tech., 764 F. Supp. 2d 577, 585 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

(collecting cases) (citing N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law §§ 11, 29(6)).

The SAC unambiguously pleads that Plaintiff was injured

in the course of her employment, which bars Plaintiff from

asserting a negligence claim. (SAC ¶¶ 18, 27, 29, 129); see also

Axis Constr. Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., No. 22-cv-1125

(DRH)(ARL), 2021 WL 3912562, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2021) (“The

practical reality here is New York law statutorily prohibits [an

employee] from naming his employer . . . as a negligent party

3 All pagination pin citations refer to the page number assigned by the Court's

CM/ECF system.

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liable for his injuries.”);

No. 17-cv-1003 (KAM)(VMS), 2019 WL 1050995, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.

5, 2019), aff'd, 794 F. App'x 132 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order).

There may be an exception to the exclusivity of the Workers’

Compensation Law, however, in situations “where injury is

sustained to an employee due to an intentional tort perpetrated by

the employer or at the employer’s direction.” Arbouin, 2021 WL

4813228, at *10 (citing Acevedo v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York,

189 A.D.2d 497, 500, 596 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t

1993)). To sufficiently plead the exception, “there must be

alleged an intentional or deliberate act by the employer directed

at causing harm to the particular employee.” Acevedo, 189 A.D.2d

at 501; see also Lauria v. Donahue, 438 F. Supp. 2d 131, 141

(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“When it has been determined that a plaintiff's

injury is the result of an intentional and deliberate act by the

defendant or someone acting on his behalf, the defendant is not

entitled to such immunity.”).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the high

pleading standard to satisfy the exception. Plaintiff alleges,

inter alia, that “Defendants clearly knew the hazards and the

defect [sic] of [the] Picker position,” and that “Defendants

disregard[ed] the daily data [that] showed that pickers’

performance drop[] sharply after long period[s] of walking.

Defendants chose coaching, warning, discipl[in]ing or firing

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pickers instead of improving defect[ive] task design and reducing

irrational task requirement[s].” (SAC ¶¶ 120, 124.) Plaintiff

also alleges in a conclusory manner that Defendant’s actions were

“outrageous, and demonstrated Defendants complete disregard [of]

employees’ health, public authority’s requirement and Plaintiff’s

health and safety,” and that she suffered and continues to suffer

injuries and damages as a “direct and legal cause of serious or

willful misconduct of Defendants.” (Id. ¶¶ 128-29.)

Even liberally construing such allegations, they may, at

best, invoke gross negligence or recklessness, which are

“insufficient to establish an intentional tort so as to circumvent

the Workers’ Compensation Law.” Arbouin, 2021 WL 4813228, at *10;

Lauria, 438 F. Supp. at 142. Nothing in the SAC alleges that

Defendant acted in an intentional manner in causing harm, let alone

in causing harm specifically to Plaintiff — the “particular

employee” at issue. See Acevedo, 189 A.D.2d at 501 (emphasis

added). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first claim is dismissed with

prejudice and without leave to amend a third time. The Court finds

here that amendment would be futile because the problem with

Plaintiff’s negligence claim is “substantive” and “better pleading

will not cure it.” See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99,

112 (2d Cir. 2000).4

4 Finally, although the issue was not raised by the parties and the Court need

not reach it here, even if Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded an intentional tort

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II. NYSHRL Claim

Plaintiff also asserts a claim for failure to provide

reasonable accommodations under the New York State Human Rights

Law (“NYSHRL”). (SAC ¶¶ 131-34.)

A. Legal Standard

Section 296(3)(a) of the NYSHRL states that it is an

“unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer . . . to refuse

to provide reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities, or

pregnancy-related conditions, of an employee . . . in connection

with a job or occupation sought or held.” N.Y. Exec. L. §

296(3)(a). A “pregnancy-related condition,” in turn, is any

“medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth that

inhibits the exercise of a normal bodily function or is

demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 292(21-f).

An employer is liable for a failure to accommodate under

the NYSHRL if: “(1) [the] plaintiff is a person with a disability

under the meaning of the [applicable statute]; (2) an employer

claim (as required to be excepted from the exclusive remedy of the Workers’

Compensation Law), there is a possibility that Plaintiff would “still be barred

from maintaining a separate action against [her] employer because [she] has

already accepted workers' compensation benefits.” Greco v. Staten Island Univ.

Hosp., No. 99-cv-7401(DGT), 2000 WL 804634, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2000) (“A

plaintiff loses his right to sue his employer, even where he has been injured

intentionally, by choosing to avail himself of workers' compensation.”) (citing

Werner v. State of New York, 424 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1981)). Here, the SAC asserts

that Plaintiff received (at least some) workers’ compensation for her alleged

injuries. (SAC ¶¶ 109-11.)

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covered by the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3) with

reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential

functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to

make such accommodations.” Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New York,

No. 17-cv-8024, 2019 WL 652593, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019)

(quoting McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125-26 (2d

Cir. 2013)). Here, notwithstanding that the Court assumes the

truth of the well-pleaded allegations in the SAC, the first three

elements are in dispute.

B. Analysis

1. “Disability” Under the NYSHRL

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to

sufficiently plead that she is a person with a disability because

“Plaintiff’s only purported condition is that she was in the

postpartum period.” (Def. Mem. at 11.) Courts in the Second

Circuit generally find that pregnancy itself is not necessarily a

disability requiring accommodation. See, e.g., LaBarbera v. NYU

Winthrop Hosp., 527 F. Supp. 3d 275, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2021), appeal

dismissed (2d Cir. July 7, 2021) (“[P]regnancy itself is not a

statutory ‘pregnancy-related condition.’”); Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore

Grp., Ltd., No. 11-cv-4938 (JFB)(GRB), 2012 WL 2244325, at *7

(E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012) (collecting cases). Further, although

Plaintiff devotes a significant portion of the SAC to describe

articles and other sources discussing the postpartum period and

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the physiological impact of pregnancy and the postpartum period on

the human body (SAC at 7-16), Plaintiff does not clearly allege

that she herself experienced these conditions during her pregnancy

or after she gave birth.

Importantly, however, the NYSHRL (as well as the NYCHRL,

see infra) has a “broader definition of ‘disability’ than does the

ADA,” and does not require “any showing that the disability

substantially limits a major life activity.” Arazi v. Cohen Bros.

Realty Corp., No. 20-cv-8837 (GHW), 2022 WL 912940, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 28, 2022) (citing Thomson v. Odyssey House, No. 14-cv-3857

(MKB), 2015 WL 5561209, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015), aff'd,

652 F. App'x 44 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (citation omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that, upon her return from

maternity leave and assignment to the picker position, her

“shoulder, arms, lower back, legs and feet got hurt badly” during

a shift where she received a “large percentage order of heavy items

when she was working at her picking station.” (SAC ¶ 18.) She

also alleges that many of her co-workers “knew that Plaintiff was

suffering pain due to intensive work in her postpartum period.”

Plaintiff further alleges that, in August 2019, she went to a care

center at her Amazon facility for treatment because “her pain [in

her] lower back, legs, arms and neck became more severe” and that

she found it “difficult[] to stand and work.” (Id. ¶¶ 27, 35.)

Plaintiff also asserts that she was “struggling [to accept] her

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disability, and [] the truth that she turn[ed] from one of the

fastest performers of the team to [] one of the slowest.” (Id. ¶

116.)

The Court finds that, at this stage of the action, these

allegations are sufficient, in light of the “broader definition”

of disability in the NYSHRL context. See Arazi, 2022 WL 912940,

at *7; see also Romanello v. Shiseido Cosms. Am. Ltd., No. 00-cv-

7201 (JGK), 2002 WL 31190169, at *7 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002)

(collecting cases), aff’d, 71 F. App’x 880 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary

order); Adams v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 16-cv-1986 (KAM) (LB),

2017 WL 9674513, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2017), report and

recommendation adopted as modified, No. 16-cv-1986 (KAM) (LB),

2018 WL 1532434 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018) (holding that,

“[l]iberally construing plaintiff's Amended Complaint,

[plaintiff’s allegations that] she suffers from left knee pain

related to ligament sprains, strains, and tears . . . sufficiently

plead[] a physical impairment”); cf. Glenn v. Kaleida Health, No.

17-cv-0025 (LJV), 2017 WL 3727313, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 7, 2017)

(finding that a plaintiff’s “general” allegations of being

“disabled within the meaning of the ADA” and that she “sustained

a shoulder injury at work” that was a “disabling condition” and

left her “not always able to physically perform some of her duties

due to her disability” were sufficient at the motion to dismiss

stage); Rice v. Wayne Behav. Health Network, No. 09-cv-6391T, 2010

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WL 811325, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010) (“[P]laintiff's allegation

of suffering from a disability, or being perceived as suffering

from a disability, sufficiently pleads that element of a cause of

action for discrimination. Whether or not his alleged disabilities

constitute disabilities under the ADA is a question not ripe for

adjudication at this stage of the proceeding.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

sufficiently pleaded a “disability” under the NYSHRL standard.

See, e.g., Shi v. Batgatelle Int'l, Inc., No. 20-cv-8473 (ER),

2023 WL 4187557, at *8 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2023) (“The standards

for establishing disability under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL are

more lenient than those under the ADA.”).

2. Employer Notice

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to plead

that she “provided notice to Defendant of any disability or

pregnancy-related condition” and that Plaintiff “does not allege

that she told any supervisor of a specific pregnancy-related

condition.” (Def. Mem. at 13-14.) As stated above, Plaintiff

alleges that, in April 2019, her “shoulder, arms, lower back, legs

and feet got hurt badly” during a shift where she received a “large

percentage order of heavy items when she was working at her picking

station.” (SAC ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that, the next day, she

was assigned to the same location and then talked to her manager,

emphasizing that “she just came back from her maternity leave and

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.” ( . ¶ 19 (emphasis

added).) Her manager “did not agree” that Plaintiff “had a good

reason to be accommodated or assign[ed] to light duty,” and refused

her request to be removed from the first floor where she had been

working. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff further alleges that in June 2019,

she spoke with a PA (Process Assistant) who “told Plaintiff that

she had a good reason for light duty because she just came back

from her maternity leave,” but that when Plaintiff relayed this to

another PA, “Nicholas,” he disagreed that being postpartum was a

good reason and stated that the “light duty” job was only for

“limited, selected people.” (SAC ¶¶ 30-31.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff did more to notify

her employer that she had a purported disability and was requesting

accommodation than “merely stating that she had returned from

maternity leave or that she was in the postpartum period.” (Def.

Mem. at 14.) Plaintiff specifically informed her manager of the

context that she had come back from maternity leave and thus “could

not endure such an intensive job.” (See SAC ¶ 19.) The Court

accordingly disagrees with Defendant’s characterization that

Plaintiff’s “complaints appeared mundane based on her position and

about the exertions her position entailed,” (Def. Mem. at 14) and

finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that she notified her

supervisor of her condition.

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Reasonable Accommodation

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded

that with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the

essential functions of her job to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss. Here, Plaintiff returned to work from maternity leave on

April 2, 2019. (SAC ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that, after being

assigned to the Picker position, she “tried her best to meet the

company’s requirement and performed exceeding the minimum standard

at her job . . . after [the] second week of the training.” (Id.

¶ 17.) Thereafter, Plaintiff experienced pain when performing a

particularly heavy task and requested accommodation. Plaintiff

therefore sufficiently and satisfactorily performed the

requirements of the Picker position for at least some time. This,

in turn, supports the plausible inference that with some

accommodation, Plaintiff could have reasonably continued to

perform the Picker role.

The Court notes that both cases upon which Defendant

heavily relies in its memorandum of law, McBride and Pimentel,

were based on summary judgment motions. McBride v. BIC Consumer

Prod. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2009); Pimentel v. Citibank,

N.A., 29 A.D.3d 141, 811 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t

2006). Indeed, the Court finds that development of salient facts

— such as “relevant factors that may influence a court’s ultimate

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conclusion as to a position’s essential functions,”

Charter Commc'ns, Inc., No. 18-cv-6744 (LDH)(RLM), 2022 WL 900602,

at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (quoting McMillan v. City of New

York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013)) — may be appropriate, and

accordingly, their assessment is better suited for a motion for

summary judgment. See, e.g., Tafolla v. Heilig, No. 21-2327, 2023

WL 5313520, at *5 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2023) (in reviewing a summary

judgment appeal, noting that “[t]o determine a position's

‘essential functions,’” a court “conduct[s] a fact-specific

inquiry into both the employer's description of a job and how the

job is actually performed in practice” (internal quotations and

citation omitted)); see also Campbell v. IPsoft Inc., No. 18-cv-

10684 (DF), 2021 WL 4248861, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2021);

Lawtone-Bowles, 2019 WL 652593, at *6 (“Ultimately, a factual

determination on the feasibility of ‘light duty’ — specifically,

whether it was reasonable and how it would have impacted the

‘essential functions’ of her job — is more appropriate at the

summary judgment stage.”); cf. Noll v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.,

787 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The reasonableness of an

employer's accommodation is a fact-specific question that often

must be resolved by a factfinder.”) (quotations and citation

omitted)).

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III. NYCHRL Claim

Plaintiff also alleges sufficient facts to state a claim

under the NYCHRL. Section 8-107(22) of the NYCHRL provides, in

part, that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an

employer to refuse to provide a reasonable accommodation “to the

needs of an employee for the employee's pregnancy, childbirth, or

related medical condition that will allow the employee to perform

the essential requisites of the job, provided that such employee's

pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition is known or

should have been known by the employer.” See N.Y.C. Admin. Code

§ 8-107(22).

Although the NYCHRL follows “the same general framework

as . . . the NYSHRL,” Brown v. Metro. Dental Assocs., No. 21-cv-

851 (CM), 2023 WL 5154415, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2023), NYCHRL

claims should be considered “separately and independently from any

federal and state law claims, construing [the NYCHRL’s] provisions

broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs to the extent that

such a construction is reasonably possible.” See Ya-Chen Chen v.

City Univ. of New York, 805 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). Here, because Plaintiff’s

failure to accommodate claim survives analysis under the NYSHRL,

it “necessarily survive[s] the more liberal standard of the

NYCHRL.” Brown, 2023 WL 5154415, at *7; see also, e.g., Farmer v.

Shake Shack Enters., LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 309, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

18

(“Because Farmer has adequately pled sex-discrimination claims

under . . . [the] NYSHRL, her similar claim under the broader

NYCHRL also necessarily survives.”). The Court therefore denies

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss

the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

In light of this Memorandum & Order, the parties are referred to

Magistrate Judge Henry for supervision of continued settlement

discussions, remaining discovery, and pre-trial issues as

appropriate.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 5, 2023 b “7 YY, —

Brooklyn, New York _ et the

iy °

HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO

United States District Judge

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