The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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CHUATUAQUA TASHEEMUA
HECKSTALL,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
v. 19-CV-6400 (RPK)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Chuatuaqua Tasheemua Heckstall challenges the Commissioner of Social
Security’s determination that she is ineligible for federal disability insurance benefits because she
is not disabled. The Commissioner has moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons given below, I deny the Commissioner’s
motion and remand to the agency for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I. Eligibility Review for Disability Insurance Benefits Applications
Disability insurance benefits are available to individuals who are “under a disability.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The term “disability” means an “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). An impairment must “result[] from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 423(d)(3).
The Commissioner uses a five-step analysis to determine whether an individual is entitled
to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Williams v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1999).
The analysis is sequential, and “if an individual is found to be disabled (or not) at any step, the
Commissioner is not required to proceed to the next step.” Williams, 204 F.3d at 49. The five-
step analysis proceeds as follows:
1. The Commissioner must first determine whether the claimant “is doing substantial gainful
work.” Ibid. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)).
2. If the claimant is not doing substantial gainful work, the Commissioner must then
determine that the claimant has a “severe impairment that limits [his or] her capacity to do
work-related activities.” Ibid. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).
3. If the Commissioner finds the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner next
considers whether the claimant has an impairment that “meets or equals the criteria of an
impairment listed in Appendix 1” to the regulation. Ibid. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)).
4. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the Commissioner must determine
whether the claimant possesses the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past
relevant work. Ibid. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)).
5. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his or her past relevant work, the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant is capable of “doing any other work.” Ibid. (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)).
The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps of the analysis, but the burden
shifts to the Commissioner for the fifth step. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77–79 (2d Cir. 1999).
Even when the claimant bears the burden of proof, the Commissioner generally has an affirmative
duty to develop the record because the review process is nonadversarial. See Burgess v. Astrue,
537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). “This duty exists even when the claimant is represented by
counsel.” Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). Failure by the Commissioner to “fully
develop[] the factual record” constitutes “legal error.” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 80.
As the Commissioner proceeds through the five-step analysis, he is also required to
consider four categories of evidence. Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999). These
categories are (i) “the objective medical facts”; (ii) “diagnoses or medical opinions based on such
facts”; (iii) “subjective evidence of pain or disability testified to by the claimant or others”; and
(iv) “the claimant’s educational background, age, and work experience.” Brown, 174 F.3d at 62
(citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983)).
II. Plaintiff’s Disability Insurance Benefits Application
Plaintiff was born in 1978, is educated through the 11th grade, and is capable of reading,
writing, and communicating in English. Certified Administrative Record (“AR”) 21, 232, 234.
She applied for disability insurance benefits on October 6, 2015. AR 196. In her application,
plaintiff alleged that she had been disabled since April 5, 2015. Ibid. That day, plaintiff allegedly
suffered a workplace injury when an elevator in which she was riding fell three floors. AR 15,
382. Plaintiff allegedly suffers from a number of conditions that limit her ability to work, including
herniated discs in her back and neck. See AR 233.
The Social Security Administration initially denied plaintiff’s claim on January 7, 2016.
See AR 91. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). See
AR 97. The Social Security Administration scheduled plaintiff’s administrative hearing for
March 13, 2018. AR 125. At that hearing, the ALJ noted certain documents were missing from
the record. See AR 59–63. The ALJ convened a second hearing on August 16, 2018, to hear
testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”). AR 69.
ALJ Dina Lowey presided over the hearings. AR 35, 64. Plaintiff was represented by
counsel. Ibid. At the March 2018 hearing, plaintiff testified she was thirty-nine years old, five
feet seven inches tall, and weighed 357 pounds. AR 41. Plaintiff testified she had last worked on
April 5, 2015, as a security guard supervisor. AR 42, 45.
Plaintiff testified that she suffered from chronic pain, “unbearable at times,” that “radiates
through [her] body” and causes her to “catch migraines,” “see colors,” and “feel lightheaded.”
AR 49, 57. As a result of her condition, plaintiff allegedly spent most of her time going to medical
appointments and laying down at home. See AR 46, 57. Plaintiff claimed she could not sit, stand,
or walk for more than twenty to thirty minutes at a time, and that the medication that she took to
control her blood pressure and bronchitis “incapacitate[d] her.” AR 49–50, 56. She testified both
that she could carry about five pounds and less than five pounds. See AR 56, 58. Plaintiff’s
boyfriend allegedly helped her grocery shop, cooked for her, and did her laundry. AR 46–47, 57.
At the August 2018 hearing, the ALJ solicited testimony from a VE. AR 69. The ALJ
recapped plaintiff’s prior testimony regarding her age, education, and work history. AR 70. Then,
the ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical person with those characteristics who could “do light
work,” “occasional[ly] push [and] pull,” “occasionally claim ramps or stairs,” “never climb[]
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,” “occasionally balanc[e] or stoop[],” “never kneel[], crouch[], or
crawl[],” “frequent[ly] reach[],” “occasional[ly] overhead reach” but not “more than [ten] times a
day,” and “frequent[ly] handl[e] and finger[],” but should avoid “concentrated exposure to extreme
temperatures and to wetness,” “concentrated exposure to irritants,” and “concentrated exposure to
hazardous machinery, unprotected heights, and operational control of moving machinery,” could
perform plaintiff’s past work. AR 70–71. The VE testified that such a hypothetical person would
be able to work as a security guard supervisor. AR 71. The ALJ then asked whether a person with
“an additional limitation of no repetitive extreme neck movement” could perform plaintiff’s past
work. Ibid. The VE responded that such a person could not do so but explained that a person with
those limitations could work as an office helper, information clerk, or clerical checker. AR 72.
The ALJ asked the VE to add a further limitation of sedentary work. AR 72–73. The VE testified
that such a person could work as a telephone order clerk, office clerk, charge account clerk, or
addressing clerk. AR 73.
III. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ issued a decision on October 2, 2018 based on the hearing testimony and the
medical record. AR 10. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled under Title II of the
Social Security Act and denied her application for disability insurance benefits. AR 10, 22—23. In
reaching that decision, the ALJ proceeded through the five-step analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520. The ALJ’s factual findings included the following:
e Step One. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 5, 2015.
AR 12; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 ef seq.
e Step Two. Plaintiff had the following “severe” impairments as defined by statute: obesity,
degenerative disc disease, diabetes mellitus, and asthma. AR 12; see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(c). The ALJ determined plaintiffs thyroid condition and hypertension did not
qualify as severe impairments within the meaning of the statute. See AR 12.
e Step Three. Plaintiff's impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or equal
the severity of listed impairments in the Social Security Administration’s regulations.
AR 13-14; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.
e Step Four. Plaintiff had the “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) to perform light
worked as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except for the following additional
limitations: plaintiff “can occasionally push, pull and climb ramps and stairs,” “can never
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but can occasionally balance and stoop,” “can never
kneel, crouch, crawl, or engage in repetitive and extreme neck movements,” “can
frequently reach, occasionally reach overhead, and not reach overhead repetitively,” “can
frequently handle[] and finger,” and “should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme
temperatures, wetness, irritants, hazardous machinery, unprotected heights[,] and
operational control of moving machinery.” AR 14; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
404.1569a.
e Step Five. Plaintiff was not capable of performing any of her past relevant work as a
security guard. AR 21; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565. However, plaintiff retained the ability
to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, including work
as an office helper, information clerk, or clerical checker. AR 21-22; see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1569, 404.1569a.
Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision from the Social Security Administration’s
Appeals Council. AR 1. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's appeal on September 11, 2019,
providing plaintiff with a final determination by the Commissioner. AR 1-6. Plaintiff then timely
filed this action.
LEGAL STANDARD
Claimants who are denied disability benefits by the Social Security Administration may
seek judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, the
court does not “decide de novo whether a claimant was disabled” or take a fresh pass at the ALJ’s
five-step analysis under the Social Security Act. Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted). Instead, the court’s review is limited to two areas. Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d
126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000).
First, the court reviews the Commissioner’s decision for legal error. Ibid. This inquiry
entails asking whether the claimant has had “a full hearing under the [Commissioner’s] regulations
and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Act.” Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11
(2d Cir. 1990) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Drake v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-CV-
5604 (DLI), 2018 WL 1556882, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018) (citing Cruz, 912 F.2d at 11).
Second, the court reviews whether “substantial evidence” supports the Commissioner’s
decision. Shaw, 221 F.3d at 131 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773
(2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit has described substantial-evidence review as “a very
deferential standard of review—even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Brault v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2012). Courts applying this standard will
not disturb the Commissioner’s factual findings if a reasonable mind could find “adequate” support
for them. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Nevertheless, the Commissioner’s
findings must be supported by more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence. Ibid. (quotation marks
omitted). To determine whether the Commissioner’s determination is supported by substantial
evidence, the reviewing court must “examine the entire record”—including “contradictory
evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.” Selian v. Astrue, 708
F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When substantial evidence
in the record supports the Commissioner’s findings, those findings are conclusive and must be
upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2013).
After completing its review, the district court may “enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing” the Commissioner’s decision. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Remanding to the Commissioner is appropriate when “the Commissioner has
failed to provide a full and fair hearing, to make explicit findings, or to have correctly applied the
regulations.” Rose v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 202 F. Supp. 3d 231, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). A remand
is also appropriate “[w]here there are gaps in the administrative record.” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 82–83
(quoting Sobolewski v. Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)). The court retains discretion
to remand the case with or without a rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
DISCUSSION
The Commissioner has moved for judgment on the pleadings. See Mem. of Law in Supp.
of the Commissioner’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (Dkt. #12) (“Commissioner’s Mem.”).
Construing the pro se plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition "to raise the strongest arguments that [it]
suggest[s],” Rose, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 239 (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d
471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)), plaintiff alleges that a medical opinion issued after the ALJ’s decision
warrants remand, Pl.’s Aff. in Opp’n (Dkt. #14); see Best v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-CV-5751
(PKC), 2020 WL 1550251, at *1, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020) (constructing pro se plaintiff’s
affidavit in opposition to the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as a cross-
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and then remanding based on this construed cross-motion).
The record also contains a letter from plaintiff’s former attorney to the Appeals Council
challenging the ALJ’s decision. AR 345–49. That letter argues that the ALJ did not properly
weigh the medical opinion evidence and did not properly assess the credibility of plaintiff’s
testimony. See AR 346. “In deference to [p]laintiff’s pro se status and out of an abundance of
caution, the Court will consider the arguments asserted in that letter[] . . . and overall[] whether
the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Krysten D. v. Saul, No. 18-CV-1363
(NAM), 2020 WL 70072, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2020) (citing Corbiere v. Berryhill, 760 F. App’x
54, 56 (2d Cir. 2019)). Because the Commissioner did not afford sufficient weight to the opinions
of plaintiff’s treating physicians or adequately develop the record with respect to those physicians,
the Commissioner’s motion is denied and the case is remanded.
For disability claims like plaintiff’s filed prior to March 27, 2017, ALJs were required to
apply the “treating physician rule.” Robin A. v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-6645
(EAW), 2022 WL 593451, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2022). That rule directs ALJs to give
“controlling weight” to a treating physician’s opinion that is “well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Where an ALJ gives less
than controlling weight to a treating physician’s medical opinion, the ALJ then “must explicitly
consider” certain nonexclusive factors, including: “(1) the frequency, length, nature, and extent of
treatment; (2) the amount of medical evidence supporting the opinion; (3) the consistency of the
opinion with the remaining medical evidence; and (4) whether the physician is a specialist.”
Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation
omitted). When the ALJ does not explicitly consider these factors, “the Second Circuit has held
that remand is unnecessary if the Court is able to look to other portions of the ALJ’s decision and
to clearly credible evidence in finding that her determination was supported by substantial
evidence, . . . but remand is required if the ALJ’s decision does not provide a sufficiently clear
indication regarding her unexplained justification for implicitly rejecting” a treating physician’s
opinion. Hall v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-5138 (RPK), 2023 WL 3389763, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
May 11, 2023) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
The ALJ erred in giving “some weight” to an October 2015 medical opinion from
Dr. Slukhinsky. See AR 19. During Dr. Slukhinsky’s third visit with plaintiff on October 29,
2015, see AR 454–62, 492, 494–98 (indicating that Dr. Slukhinsky treated plaintiff on April 9,
2015, August 11, 2015, October 29, 2015, and March 8, 2016), Dr. Slukhinsky diagnosed plaintiff
with “cervical spine derangement,” “disc termination,” “radiculopathy,” and “thoracolumbar spine
derangement.” AR 454. Dr. Slukhinsky then stated that plaintiff had “developed progressive
discogenic disease with chronic pain” and “weakness.” Ibid. Dr. Slukhinsky also concluded that
plaintiff could not stand or walk more than two hours per day, sit more than six hours per day, or
push and pull with her upper extremities. AR 455.
The sole reason that the ALJ afforded “some weight” to the October 2015 opinion was that
Dr. Slukhinsky rendered her “opinion . . . shortly after [plaintiff’s] April 2015 injury.” AR 19.
But Dr. Slukhinsky’s opinion was drafted more than six months after the injury, and the ALJ does
not explain why an opinion issued half a year after an accident was too close in time to that accident
to be given controlling weight. Beyond the ALJ’s dubious characterization of October 2015 as
“shortly after” the accident, the ALJ considered none of the factors relevant to the weight of a
treating physician’s opinion. And review of the record does not indicate how the ALJ’s decision
to give “some weight” to Dr. Slukhinsky’s opinion is at all consistent with the treating physician
rule. Estrella, 925 F.3d at 96.
The Commissioner argues that “the record evinces that [p]laintiff had demonstrated
improvement[] and that the severe limitations assessed by Dr. Slukhinsky were temporary,”
Commissioner’s Mem. 20, but the evidence the Commissioner points to predates Dr. Slukhinsky’s
October 2015 report by several months, see AR 540–43. Nor is this a case where “application of
the correct legal standard could lead to only one conclusion,” Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 409
(2d Cir. 2010) (alterations and citation omitted), because Dr. Slukhinsky’s opinion about plaintiff’s
pushing and pulling limitations seem more restrictive than the residual functional limitation, and
because the ALJ’s view of the medical evidence informed her assessment of plaintiff’s credibility,
see Bonneau v. Astrue, No. 13-CV-26, 2014 WL 31301, at *9 (D. Vt. Jan. 3, 2014). Accordingly,
the ALJ’s procedural error requires remand. See Estrella, 925 F.3d at 96.
Moreover, the ALJ does not appear to have weighed the opinions Dr. Slukhinsky formed
on April 9, 2015, August 11, 2015, or March 8, 2016. See AR 454–62, 492, 494–98. And the
April 9, 2015 charts are missing from the record. See id. 454 (noting that patient was first seen on
April 9, 2015). On remand, the ALJ should weigh Dr. Slukhinsky’s other opinions and endeavor
to obtain the missing charts from plaintiff’s April 9, 2015 visit. See Coppola v. Berryhill, No. 18-
CV-599 (HBP), 2019 WL 1292848, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2019) (duty to develop record
includes duty to “obtain complete reports from medical sources”); see, e.g., Truesdale v. Barnhart,
No. 03-CV-63 (SAS), 2004 WL 235260, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2004) (finding the ALJ violated
her duty to develop the record by not obtaining “a more complete report” from a treating physician
and not obtaining missing pages from a consulting physician’s report).
The ALJ made similar errors with respect to Dr. Stiler, a neurologist who treated plaintiff
five times between September 11, 2015, and March 7, 2017. AR 521–30. Dr. Stiler initially
diagnosed plaintiff with “traumatic cervical and lumbar radiculopathy” and concluded that plaintiff
had a “temporary total disability.” AR 523. About a month later, Dr. Stiler again examined
plaintiff and concluded that she was “[t]otally [d]isabled from working.” AR 525. On January 8,
2015, Dr. Stiler appears to have reached the same conclusion, though the pages of the record are
not assembled sequentially. See AR 526–28. The record also contains a chart from a March 23,
2016 examination. See AR 527. The single page of notes from that visit says “no change” and
diagnoses plaintiff with “cervical and lumbar [radiculopathy].” See ibid. (capitalization omitted).
Dr. Stiler appears to have last treated plaintiff on March 7, 2017. Unlike Dr. Stiler’s other records,
the March 2017 chart does not appear to include a conclusive diagnosis, but instead asserts that
plaintiff “may require surgical intervention since she has remained symptomatic.” AR 530.
The ALJ improperly gave “little weight” to Dr. Stiler’s “diagnosis.” AR 21. The ALJ
noted that Dr. Stiler found plaintiff “fully” and “temporarily[] disabled” at different times. Ibid.
The ALJ further stated that Dr. Stiler’s opinions were entitled to little weight because Dr. Stiler
did not “offer function by function analysis of . . . [plaintiff’s] limitations” and “a finding of
disability is reserved to the Commissioner.” AR 21. While the ALJ did not need to credit
Dr. Stiler’s ultimate conclusion about whether plaintiff was disabled, see Martes v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 344 F. Supp. 3d 750, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d
Cir. 1999)); Wider v. Colvin, 245 F. Supp. 3d 381, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2017), it was impermissible for
the ALJ to “summarily dismiss the medical findings upon which [Dr. Stiler] based [that]
assessment,” Otanez v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-8184 (KPF), 2016 WL 128215, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan 12, 2016). Instead of considering the factors relevant to the weight of a treating physician’s
opinion, the ALJ objected that Dr. Stiler did not analyze plaintiff’s functional limitations. AR 21.
Yet Dr. Stiler’s conclusions about plaintiff’s diagnoses and prognoses were medical opinions that
should have been weighed, Wider, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 390–91 (noting that diagnoses and prognoses
were considered medical opinions under the regulations prior to March 27, 2017), notwithstanding
the fact that Dr. Stiler did not also opine on plaintiff’s functional limitations. The ALJ failed to
recognize Dr. Stiler is a medical specialist who examined and treated plaintiff for years, or that
Dr. Stiler’s opinions seem largely consistent with Dr. Slukhinsky’s. Review of the record does
not establish that the ALJ’s weighing of Dr. Stiler’s opinions was consistent with the treating
physician rule, see Estrella, 925 F.3d at 96, and the Commissioner offers no justification aside
from the general rule that conclusions about disability are reserved for the Commissioner, see
Commissioner’s Mem. 22. As I already explained, the ALJ’s improper weighing of Dr. Stiler’s
opinion influenced the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s credibility. See Zabala, 595 F.3d at 409;
Bonneau, 2014 WL 31301, at *9. Therefore, remand is warranted to correct the Commissioner’s
procedural error. See Estrella, 925 F.3d at 96.
The ALJ also failed to develop the record of Dr. Stiler’s opinions. As the ALJ noted,
Dr. Stiler did not offer an opinion about plaintiff’s functional limitations. Given the
Commissioner’s obligation to “make a reasonable effort to obtain medical evidence from the
claimant’s treating physician or other treating health care provider” “[p]rior to evaluating evidence
from a consultative source,” Corporan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-CV-6704 (JPO), 2015 WL
321832, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(b)), the ALJ should have
contacted Dr. Stiler to “obtain more complete reports” describing plaintiff’s “limitations, and how
they affect [her] ability to perform various work-related activities,” Rivera v. Barnhart, 379
F. Supp. 2d 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Truesdale, 2004 WL 235260, at *6–7); see Cruz
v. Astrue, 941 F. Supp. 2d 483, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). That error calls for remand, too. See Rosa,
168 F.3d at 83; Morris v. Berryhill, 721 F. App’x 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2018).
In short, the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of two of plaintiff’s treating
physicians while “bas[ing] [her] conclusions largely on the findings of [a] one-time consultative
physician, [Dr. Sanford Wert], whose opinion [the ALJ] assigned [significant weight].”
Ramlakhan v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-8129 (RLE), 2017 WL 1209968, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
2017). On remand, the ALJ should comply with her affirmative duty to develop the record as to
Dr. Slukhinsky’s and Dr. Stiler’s medical opinions, and then weigh those opinions in accordance
with the Commissioner’s regulations.
Because remand is required for the reasons stated above, the Court need not reach
plaintiff’s other arguments. See Blowe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-2658 (JS), 2020 WL
3129062, at *5 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2020); Wikiert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-6799
(PKC), 2019 WL 959665, at *2 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2019); Schweers v. Berryhill, No. 19-CV-
6189 (RWL), 2020 WL 5518326, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2020); Crosse v. Colvin, 73 F. Supp.
3d 169, 173 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); Laura C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F. Supp. 3d. 64, 73 (W.D.N.Y.
2021); Susan G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-830S, 2021 WL 1920815, at *4 (W.D.N.Y.
May 13, 2021). On remand, the Commissioner should address the other claims of error raised by
plaintiff. See Givens v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-2102 (WIG), 2017 WL 5593780, at *5 (D. Conn.
Nov. 21, 2017); Molina v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-8088 (JLC), 2016 WL 7388374, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 2016).
CONCLUSION
The case is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
Order.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Rachel Kovner
RACHEL P. KOVNER
United States District Judge
Dated: May 17, 2023
Brooklyn, New York