“[A] plaintiff need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “[A] plaintiff need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- “Before reaching the substance of [Plaintiff’s] Title VII claim for unlawful termination, we note that individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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GARFIELD W. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 23-CV-856 (PKC) (VMS)
GARY G. TERRINONI, VASANTHA K.
KONDAMUDI, SAM J. AMIFAR, ROBERT
AULICINO, STACY A. FRIEDMAN, JUDY
McLAUGHLIN, GUY MENNONNA, LENNY
H. SINGLETARY, III, SHARON WICKES,
ARMAND P. ASARIAN, JOHN J. FERRARA,
KIM C. FLODIN, JAMES GASPERINO,
LEONID GORELIK, SHARON M. LAWSON-
DAVIS, DEAN LINDSEY, KAREN MILANO,
DONALD P. MINARCIK, DEBORAH
NIEDERHOFFER, EGONDU ONUOHA,
AILEEN TANAFRANCA, JOHN WALSH,
PAUL Y. WONG, TOM FOLEY, and FRANKY
GOLDSBERRY,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
On February 1, 2023, pro se Plaintiff Garfield W. Wright, formerly employed at the
Brooklyn Hospital Center, filed this action against Defendants alleging employment
discrimination based on his religious beliefs pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17. (Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. 1, at ECF1 1–13.) Plaintiff seeks $2
million in damages, back pay, and reinstatement. (Id. at ECF 18.) The Court grants Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint with leave to amend within 30 days.
BACKGROUND
1 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing
system and not the document’s internal pagination.
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Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully terminated when he elected due to his religious
beliefs not to comply with a Covid-19 vaccine mandate imposed by his employer, the Brooklyn
Hospital Center, and his employer failed to grant him a religious exemption from the mandate.
(Dkt. 1, at ECF 15, 25.) On November 17, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. (Id., at ECF 20.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss an IFP action if the
complaint “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addressing the
sufficiency of a complaint, a court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations and draw[s] from
them all reasonable inferences; but [it is] not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th 86, 90–91
(2d Cir. 2021). Courts “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants,
reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish
Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017). In addition, the Court should generally
not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend. See Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to
“compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
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race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a Title VII
claim, a plaintiff must show that he is a member of a protected class, that he was qualified for the
position, and that he suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to
an inference of discrimination. See Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir.
2010). “[A]t the initial stage of the litigation . . . the plaintiff does not need substantial evidence
of discriminatory intent,” and need only “sustain a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting
an inference of discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311
(2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., 801
F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff need only give plausible support to a minimal inference
of discriminatory motivation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, “a
discrimination complaint . . . must [still] at a minimum assert nonconclusory factual matter
sufficient to nudge its claims across the line from conceivable to plausible to proceed.” EEOC v.
Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Title VII does not provide for individual liability; rather, only the employer may be
named. Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Before reaching the
substance of [Plaintiff’s] Title VII claim for unlawful termination, we note that individuals are
not subject to liability under Title VII.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, Plaintiff has
only named individual defendants and has not named his employer, the Brooklyn Hospital
Center, as a defendant. Plaintiff’s complaint is therefore dismissed against each individual
Defendant for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
CONCLUSION
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Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint, filed in forma pauperis, for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status,
the Court grants Plaintiff thirty (30) days from the entry of this Memorandum & Order to amend
his complaint to name the proper defendant.
The amended complaint must include a short and plain statement of facts sufficient to
support a plausible claim that his employer discriminated against him in violation of Title VII.
Plaintiff must also attach the EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter to the amended
complaint.
If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, it must be captioned “Amended
Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this Memorandum & Order: No. 23-CV-856
(PKC) (VMS). The amended complaint shall replace the original complaint. That is, the
amended complaint must stand on its own without reference to the original complaint.
All further proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended
complaint within the time allowed, or fails to show good cause why he cannot comply within the
time allowed, the Clerk of Court shall be directed to enter judgment and close this case.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
Memorandum & Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is
denied for the purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum & Order
along with an employment discrimination complaint form to the pro se Plaintiff and note service
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on the docket. Plaintiff may contact the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal
Assistance Project at 212-382-4729 for free, limited-scope legal assistance.
SO ORDERED.
/s/Pamela K. Chen
PAMELA K. CHEN
United States District Judge
Dated: March 9, 2023
Brooklyn, New York
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