Eustade v. Eustade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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CARL EUSTADE,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff, 23-CV-1081 (PKC) (LB)

- against -

JOSEPH EUSTADE; MARTHA LOUISSAINT;

and THE EUSTADE AND LOUISSAINT

FAMILY,

Defendants.

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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On December 23, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Carl Eustade filed this action in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York and alleged federal question jurisdiction.

(Compl., Dkt 2.) On January 27, 2023, the Southern District granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed

in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (See Dkt. 3.) By Order dated January 31, 2023, the Southern District

transferred the action to this Court. (Transfer Order, Dkt. 4.) For the reasons set forth below, the

Complaint is dismissed. In light of his pro se status, Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days from the

date of this Order to submit an Amended Complaint.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Complaint is far from a model of clarity. He alleges that Defendants, some of

whom appear to be family members, violated his First Amendment rights. (Compl., Dkt. 2 at 2.)

According to Plaintiff, he was “drugged” and misdiagnosed at Brookdale Hospital, and “got

molested and still face[d] prison time,” and was “also in the trains . . . every day being framed with

voodoo.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Eustade and Louissaint sent people “through the

internet” to harass and frame him. (Id. at 5.) It is unclear what relief Plaintiff is seeking. (Id. at

6.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained in a complaint

are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In

reviewing a pro se complaint, courts must hold the pleadings “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d

Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint

liberally”).

Nonetheless, a district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied

that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is “frivolous” when either: (1) “the factual contentions are

clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy” or (2) “the claim

is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141

F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff Fails to Comply with Rule 8

Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff must provide a short,

plain statement of claim against each defendant named so that they have adequate notice of the

claims against them. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). A pleading that only “tenders naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal citations and alterations

omitted). To satisfy this standard, a complaint must at a minimum “disclose sufficient information

to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and

to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d

Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). “When a complaint fails to comply with these

requirements contained in Rule 8, the district court has the power, on motion or sua sponte, to

dismiss the complaint or to strike such parts as are redundant or immaterial.” Chapman v. United

States Dep’t of Justice, 558 F. Supp. 3d 45, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citations and brackets omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint plainly violates Rule 8. The Complaint contains only “naked

assertions” and fails to “disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant[s]”—let alone the

Court—to understand what allegations Plaintiff is making , the claims he is bringing, and the legal

basis for the relief he seeks. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Kittay, 230 F.3d at 541. Therefore, on

the basis of Rule 8 alone, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Basis for Federal Question Jurisdiction

Plaintiff asserts that the Court has federal question jurisdiction, but does not suggest a

plausible basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court has “original jurisdiction of all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331;

see also Bracey v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff

properly invokes [Section] 1331 jurisdiction when [he or] she pleads a colorable claim “arising

under” the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513

(2006).

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to allege that federal question jurisdiction is predicated

upon the First Amendment, his claim fails. A claim “may be dismissed for want of subject-matter

jurisdiction [because] it is not colorable, i.e., if it is ‘immaterial and made solely for the purpose

of obtaining jurisdiction’ or is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513

n.10; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). Plaintiff references the First

Amendment in the Complaint. (See Compl., Dkt. 2, at 2.) However, simply purporting to raise a

federal issue in a complaint will not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction: a federal

district court may only exercise federal question jurisdiction if the federal cause of action alleged

potentially has merit. See Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d

Cir. 2005) (“a plaintiff cannot create federal jurisdiction under § 1331 simply by alleging a federal

claim where in reality none exists. Subject matter jurisdiction will lie only where the court

determines that the substance of the plaintiff’s allegations raises a federal question.”); Perpetual

Securities, Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Federal question jurisdiction exists

where a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or

that plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal

law.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted, and emphasis in original). Plaintiff’s Complaint,

as presently pled, fails to allege a substantial, non-frivolous federal claim that implicates the

Court’s federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, the Complaint must be dismissed.

III. Leave to Amend

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days from the date

of this memorandum and order to file an Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is advised that should he

elect to file an Amended Complaint, he must plead sufficient facts to allege a violation of his

constitutional or federal rights and comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

which requires a short and plain statement of his claim. Plaintiff must name as proper defendants

those individuals who have some personal involvement in the action he alleges in the Amended

Complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). If

Plaintiff wishes to bring a claim against a defendant and he does not know the name of the

individual, he may identify each of them as John Doe or Jane Doe, along with place of employment

(if applicable), and to the best of his ability describe each individual and explain what each

defendant did or failed to do in violation of his constitutional or federal rights.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and for failure to conform with Rule 8(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days leave from the date of this

memorandum and order to file an Amended Complaint as detailed above. If Plaintiff fails to file

an Amended Complaint within the time allowed or show good cause why he cannot comply,

judgment shall enter. All further proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order

would not be taken in good faith, and therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: February 17, 2023

Brooklyn, New York