Opinion

Narinesingh v. Fedex Ground Package System Inc.

Court
District Court, E.D. New York
Filed
Dec 8, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.7%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Sharon Narinesingh, No. 2:22-cv-05235-NM-AYS

Plaintiff, Memorandum and Order

v.

FedEx Ground Package

System Inc.,

Defendant.

NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

On October 21, 2022, Plaintiff Sharon Narinesingh’s cause of action—

in which she seeks damages arising out of alleged aged-based workplace

discrimination during her employment with Defendant FedEx Ground

Package System, Inc.—was remanded to the Supreme Court of the State of

New York, Nassau County. See Order dated Oct. 21, 2022 (Brown, J.). Two

days earlier, Plaintiff had consented to the district court’s remand order

under certain terms and conditions later agreed to by the Court, to wit:

(1) that the Court’s prior rulings in the federal proceeding would have no

preclusive effect on plaintiff’s state-court claims, except that (2) her “potential

recovery” in state court “is capped at $75,000.” Id.; see also Pl.’s Mot. to

Remand to State Court, ECF No. 14.

Five days after the entry of Judge Gary R. Brown’s remand order, this

case was administratively transferred to the undersigned pursuant to a

random reassignment by the Clerk of Court.

On November 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a letter requesting clarification as

to one aspect of the conditions set forth in Judge Brown’s Order of Remand:

namely, whether the “cap[]” imposed on Plaintiff’s “potential recovery” in

state court is inclusive or exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs.

Plaintiff’s request was prompted by a position regarding her potential

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recovery that Defendant asserted on remand. Defendant contends that the

cap on damages agreed to by the parties, and which provided the

jurisdictional basis for the Court’s remand order, is inclusive of potential

attorney’s fees. Defendant asks that the Court either order that Plaintiff is

bound by a prior agreement to cap her total recovery in state court at

$75,000—inclusive of both damages and attorney’s fees—or rescind the

remand order. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that while her recovery of

damages may not exceed $75,000, she may—if she prevails in state court—

seek an award of additional attorney’s fees and costs, without running afoul

of Judge Brown’s Order of Remand.

It is undisputed that the basis for the remand previously agreed to by

the parties and ordered by the Court was premised on Plaintiff’s stipulation

as to the total amount in controversy in this action. Plaintiff’s concession

that the “amount in controversy” does not exceed $75,000 deprived the

federal district court of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The question

posed by the parties’ request for “clarification” of Judge Brown’s order, then,

may properly be reframed as whether the “amount in controversy” referenced

in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) necessarily includes the sum total not only of a

plaintiff’s estimated damages, but also any attorney’s fees a plaintiff may

seek to recover if she is the prevailing party. This Court concludes that it

does not.

For that reason, as well as others related to the facts and procedural

history of this case as set forth below, the Court declines to enter an order

limiting Plaintiff’s total recovery in state court to $75,000 inclusive of fees

and costs. Nor will this Court revoke the earlier Order of Remand. Instead,

the Court holds that the Order of Remand does not bar Plaintiff from seeking

damages in state court up to, but not exceeding, $75,000; and, if she

ultimately prevails on her state-court claim, she may then ask the state court

to award her additional attorney’s fees and/or costs. Similarly, the Order of

Remand does not prevent Plaintiff from seeking a settlement of this action in

which the total amount paid by Defendant pursuant to the settlement

exceeds $75,000, provided that any amount over that threshold be allocated

solely to attorney’s fees and/or costs.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who worked at a FedEx Ground sorting facility for

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approximately one-and-a-half years, alleges that her two managers made

derogatory comments about her age. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at 3-4. In

June 2022, she filed suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York,

County of Nassau, alleging “unlawful discriminatory workplace harassment”

under the New York State Human Rights Law. Id. at 3. While Plaintiff’s

counsel requested judgment in her favor “in the amount of $100,000 together

with costs and fees,” her complaint did not include a specific allegation as to

the damages she had incurred from the claimed violation of her rights. See

id. at 3-4, 8. On September 1, 2022, Defendant removed this case to federal

court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. On September 22, 2022, Defendant

requested a pre-motion conference to present a proposed motion to dismiss.

See Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conference, ECF No. 10, at 1.

At the October 13, 2022, conference, Judge Brown told Plaintiff’s

counsel that if this were a case where the damages were “likely to be $75,000

or under,” the Court would “not have jurisdiction to proceed.” See Tr. dated

Oct. 13, 2022 (“Oct. 13 Tr.”), ECF No. 16-1, at 3. Judge Brown then

dismissed the case without prejudice and allowed Plaintiff to either file an

amended complaint or move to remand. Id. at 9. Eight days later, upon

Plaintiff’s motion, Judge Brown remanded the case to state court, ordering

that his rulings in this matter “shall have no collateral estoppel or other

preclusive effect on plaintiff’s claims except that her potential recovery is

capped at $75,000.” See Order dated Oct. 21, 2022.

Plaintiff and Defendant now seek clarification from this Court on

whether Plaintiff’s stipulated and court-ordered “cap[]” on her recovery in

state court includes not just an award of damages, but also any claim

Plaintiff might make for attorney’s fees if she prevails. See generally Letter

re Damages Cap (“Pl. Letter”), ECF No. 15; Letter re damages cap and

remand to State Court (“Def. Letter”), ECF No. 16.

Neither party disputes that a district court may remand a matter if a

plaintiff stipulates that the plaintiff will not seek more than $75,000 in

damages. See Def. Letter, ECF No. 16, at 2 (citing Luce v. Kohl’s Dept.

Stores, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 82, 85 (D. Conn. 2014)). Yet Defendant’s counsel

argues that if Plaintiff seeks to recover $75,000 and additional attorney’s

fees, then the “amount in controversy” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) exceeds

$75,000 and remand was improper. Id. Defendant further contends that this

issue should be resolved before this case proceeds any further in state court,

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to determine whether the case should remain remanded. See id.

For her part, Plaintiff assures the Court that she is not seeking to

“back out” of her agreement to cap her total recovery at $75,000. See Pl.

Letter, ECF No. 15. She also offers that she could find no “definitive legal

authority” addressing the specific issue of whether such a cap includes or

excludes potential attorney’s fees. Id. However, Plaintiff declines to

stipulate to any fee-inclusive cap on her total recovery at $75,000 at this

time. Id. Instead, Plaintiff asks this Court to either resolve the issue in her

favor now, or—in the alternative—to direct the parties to continue their

state-court litigation on the merits, while deferring the question of whether

Plaintiff may recover a total award (inclusive of attorney’s fees) in excess of

$75,000 until the litigation advances to that point, since she may or may not

recover a damages-plus-fees judgment in excess of $75,000. Id.

The Court is mindful of the fact that the parties’ present dispute could

be entirely moot at some future point in their state-court litigation. For

example, the question upon which the parties now seek clarification would be

a non-issue if Plaintiff's state-court action is dismissed before a settlement or

trial; if she prevails on the merits, but the state court declines to award

attorney’s fees; or if she prevails on the merits, and the state court awards

attorney’s fees, but the combination of her damages and fees still proves to be

below $75,000.

On the other hand, in each of those scenarios, Defendant would still

need to litigate some or all of the underlying action in state court without any

certainty as to the maximum amount of potential exposure it faces—a

certainty that Defendant apparently believed it had when the federal district

court “capped” the total amount of Plaintiff’s recovery as a condition of

remand. Thus, the resolution of this question may impact Defendant’s

litigation strategy or settlement position as the matter proceeds. This Court

concludes that Defendant—as the party who removed this action to federal

court, and in light of the conditions of the district court’s grant of Plaintiff’s

motion to remand—is entitled to resolution of this outstanding issue before

the state-court litigation proceeds.

On the merits, however, the Court does not agree with Defendant’s

interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) as it applies to the “cap[]” on Plaintiff’s

total recovery set forth in the prior district judge’s Order of Remand. Thus,

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while this Court grants Defendant’s request to resolve the issue without

further delay, it declines to interpret or apply a $75,000 limit on Plaintiff’s

ultimate recovery that includes both damages and attorney’s fees.

ANALYSIS

A federal court does not have diversity jurisdiction over a civil action

unless the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

However, when considering whether a federal court has such jurisdiction,

“attorney’s fees only calculate into the jurisdictional amount in controversy if

they are ‘recoverable as a matter of right.’” Suarez v. Mosaic Sales Sols. US

Operating Co., LLC, 720 F. App’x 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Givens v.

W.T. Grant Co., 457 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also Kimm v. KCC

Trading, Inc., 449 F. App’x 85, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2012) (same); Brandon v.

O’Mara, No. 10 Civ. 5174 (RJH), 2011 WL 4478492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011)

(finding that the “plain text” of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) required the Court to

consider a $70,000 amount in controversy exclusive of a $50,000 request for

attorney’s fees and costs); Kim v. Trulia, LLC, 19-CV-06733 (DLI) (RER),

2021 WL 8743946, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021) (noting, in remanding a

case brought under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on jurisdictional

grounds, that “[w]hen a court has discretion to award attorney’s fees under a

state statute, attorney’s fees cannot be included in the jurisdictional amount”

(citation omitted)).

Under the New York State Human Rights Law, when a plaintiff seeks

relief in court for an unlawful discriminatory practice, a court has discretion

over whether to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party. See

N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296; 297(9)-(10). Plaintiff has alleged the unlawful

discriminatory practice of age discrimination under the state human rights

law and sought relief in court. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at 3-4. Since any

award of attorney’s fees in Plaintiff’s underlying state court action were she

to prevail would be a matter of discretion and not a matter of right, any

potential fee award could not be used to satisfy the amount-in-controversy

requirement, were this case in federal court.

Defendant nevertheless contends that since Plaintiff refused to

stipulate to a cap on total “damages and fees in an amount less than

$75,000,” the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and Plaintiff has

essentially reduced her demand to “defeat federal diversity jurisdiction.” See

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Def. Letter, ECF No. 16, at 3.

To support this contention, Defendant cites a singular case in which a

federal district court declined to remand an insurance dispute to state court.

See id. at 2-3 (citing Ventilla v. Pac. Indem. Co., No. 1:20-cv-08462 (MKV),

2021 WL 1894276 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2021)). In Ventilla, the court noted only

that if the plaintiff had offered to stipulate to “damages and fees less than

$75,000,” it “largely would [have] defeat[ed] any argument” that the amount

in controversy exceeded $75,000. Ventilla, 2021 WL 1894276, at *2.

However, the plaintiff in Ventilla made no such stipulation. Instead, that

court declined to remand after concluding that there was more than a

reasonable probability that the amount of actual damages in controversy was

in excess of $75,000, because, among other reasons, the plaintiff had

represented to the defendant in pre-filing communications that plaintiff had

suffered a loss of $256,000, and had filed a federal complaint pleading

damages “exceed[ing] $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” See id. at *1-

2. In other words, Ventilla did not actually pose—much less resolve—the

question of whether the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332(a) is

satisfied where a plaintiff’s damages do not exceed $75,000, but an

additional, discretionary award of attorney’s fees could make the total

judgment exceed $75,000.

Simply put, Defendant is correct that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)’s amount-in-

controversy provision is the appropriate framework through which to

interpret the terms of Plaintiff's stipulated remand in this case, and to

understand the terms of the court-ordered “cap[]” on “total recovery” that

Plaintiff is bound to accept. But Defendant is incorrect that this provision

should be interpreted to bar her from seeking a total judgment, inclusive of

any fees she may be awarded, that may exceed $75,000. As long as Plaintiff

does not seek or obtain an award of damages in excess of $75,000—which she

has unequivocally represented she will not—this order does not preclude her,

under either 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) or her earlier agreement, from seeking a

discretionary award of attorney’s fees on top of any such judgment.

CONCLUSION

This Court declines to rescind the October 21, 2022, Order of Remand

to Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Nassau, case number

607467/2022. Under that order and Plaintiff’s prior agreement, Plaintiff may

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not seek or recover damages in excess of $75,000. Thus, if Plaintiff prevails

or settles, this Court’s order shall not be construed to limit the recovery of

costs and attorney’s fees in addition to any damages recovered—even if those

amounts, in the aggregate, exceed $75,000.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ NRM

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: December 8, 2022

Brooklyn, New York

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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