Clarke v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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BRYAN LEE CLARKE,

Plaintiff,

-against- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

21-cv-1257(KAM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

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KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Bryan Lee Clarke appeals the final decision

of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the

“Commissioner”), which found Plaintiff not disabled and thus not

entitled to disability insurance benefits (“benefits”) under

Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Before the

Court are Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and

the Commissioner’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED

and the Commissioner’s cross-motion is DENIED, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum

and Order.

Background

The parties have filed a joint statement of stipulated

facts detailing Plaintiff’s medical history and the

administrative hearing testimony, which the Court incorporates

by reference. (See ECF No. 17, Joint Stipulation of Facts

(“Joint Stip.”).) Here, the Court briefly recounts the facts

relevant to the instant motions.

Plaintiff was born in 1987 and previously worked as a

construction worker. (ECF No. 19, Administrative Transcript

(“Tr.”), at 68.) He filed an application for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Act on October 29,

2018. (Stip. at 3.) Plaintiff alleged disability beginning May

5, 2018, due to a left shoulder injury, neck injury, right

shoulder injury, left knee injury, left ankle injury, left hip

injury, lumbar spine injury, and cervical spine injury. (Id.)

Administrative Law Judge Sandra M. McKenna (the “ALJ”)

determined Plaintiff had the “severe impairments” of “cervical

and lumbar disc herniations/bulges status post-surgery, left

knee tear status post-surgery, right shoulder tear, left

shoulder tear, and obesity,” which significantly limited his

ability to perform basic work activities. (Tr. at 57.) The ALJ

found Plaintiff was not disabled because he maintained the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform other jobs that

exist in the national economy in significant numbers. (Id. at

59-68.) Plaintiff appealed his decision to the Appeals Council.

(Stip. at 8.) On January 8, 2021, the Appeals Council denied

review of the ALJ’s decision, rendering it the final decision of

the Commissioner. (Id. at 1.)

Plaintiff initiated the instant action on March 3,

2021, (see ECF No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”)), and the Court

issued a scheduling order on March 10, 2021. (See ECF No. 4,

Scheduling Order.) By January 3, 2022, the entire set of both

parties’ motion papers was filed. (See ECF Nos. 14, Plaintiff’s

Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings (“Pl. Mem.”); 15, Defendant’s Memorandum of Law

in Support of Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion (“Def. Mem.”);

16, Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Pl. Reply

Mem.”).)1

Standard of Review

A claimant who is unsuccessful in applying for

disability benefits under the Act may seek judicial review in

federal court of the Commissioner’s denial of their benefits

“within sixty days after the mailing . . . of notice of such

decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of

Social Security may allow.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

1 Defendant did not file a reply brief.

“A district court may set aside the Commissioner’s determination

that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are

not supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is

based on legal error.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 120 (2d

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shaw v.

Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)).

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla”

and must be relevant evidence that a “reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Halloran v.

Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v.

Perales, 420 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). If there is substantial evidence in the record to

support the Commissioner's factual findings, those findings must

be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Inquiry into legal error

requires the Court to ask whether “the claimant has had a full

hearing under the [Commissioner’s] regulations and in accordance

with the beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.”

Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (second

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)). The

reviewing court does not have the authority to conduct a de novo

review and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the

ALJ, even when it might have justifiably reached a different

result. Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.

2012).

A claimant must be “disabled” within the meaning of

the Act to receive benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d). A

claimant qualifies as disabled when he is unable to “engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. §

423(d)(1)(A); Shaw, 221 F.3d at 131–32. The impairment must be

of “such severity” that the claimant is unable to do his

previous work or engage in any other kind of substantial gainful

work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation

process to determine whether a claimant meets the Act’s

definition of disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The

Commissioner’s approach can be summarized as follows:

[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the

claimant is not working, (2) that he has a

‘severe impairment,’ (3) that the impairment is

not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations]

that conclusively requires a determination of

disability, and (4) that the claimant is not

capable of continuing in his prior type of work,

the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5)

there is not another type of work the claimant

can do.

Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (quoting Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335

F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003)); accord 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

The claimant has the “general burden of proving . . .

his or her case” in steps one through four of the sequential

five-step framework. Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). At the fifth step, the

burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the commissioner to

show, in light of the claimant’s residual functional capacity,

age, education, and work experience, that claimant is able to

engage in gainful employment within the national economy.

Sobolewski v. Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Additionally, “because a hearing on disability benefits is a

non-adversarial proceeding, the ALJ generally has an affirmative

obligation to develop the administrative record.” Burgess, 537

F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

During this five-step process, the ALJ must consider

whether “the combined effect of all of [a claimant’s]

impairments” would be of sufficient severity to establish

eligibility for Social Security benefits. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1523(c). When considering the combined effect of

impairments, the ALJ must factor in both severe and non-severe

impairments. Id. § 416.945(a)(2).

“The Commissioner must consider the following in

determining a claimant’s entitlement to benefits: ‘(1) the

objective medical facts [and clinical findings]; (2) diagnoses

or medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence

of pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the claimant’s educational

background, age, and work experience.’” Balodis v. Leavitt, 704

F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Brown v. Apfel,

174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999)) (alterations in original).

Finally, a federal district court, when reviewing

decisions of the SSA, is authorized to order further proceedings

when appropriate. “The court shall have power to enter, upon

the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is

warranted where “there are gaps in the administrative record or

the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard.” Rosa v.

Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v.

Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Remand is particularly appropriate where further

findings or explanations will clarify the rationale for the

ALJ’s decision. Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39. If the record before

the Court provides “persuasive proof of disability and a remand

for further evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose,” the

Court may reverse and remand solely for the calculation and

payment of benefits. See, e.g., Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225,

235 (2d Cir. 1980); Kane v. Astrue, 942 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314

(E.D.N.Y. 2013).

Discussion

I. The ALJ’s Disability Determination

Using the five-step sequential process described

above, the ALJ determined at step one that Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 5, 2018. (Tr.

at 57.)

At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the

following severe impairments: “cervical and lumbar disc

herniations/bulges status post-surgery, left knee tear status

post-surgery, right shoulder tear, left shoulder tear, and

obesity.” (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered symptoms

consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome in his left wrist but

that it was a non-severe impairment because there was no

evidence that it imposed significant functional limitations.

(Id. at 58.) The ALJ also classified Plaintiff’s alleged ankle

pain as a non-medically determinable impairment because it was

not subject to laboratory testing. (Id.)

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not

have an impairment or a combination of impairments that met or

medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments

in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 58); 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. Specifically, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the

criteria of Listings 1.02 and 1.04. (Tr. at 58-59.) First, the

ALJ considered Listing 1.02, which concerns the major

dysfunction of a joint. (Id. at 58.) The ALJ found that

Plaintiff did not meet the Listing 1.02 criteria that requires

an individual to be unable to sustain “a reasonable walking pace

over a sufficient distance to be able to carry out activities of

daily living.” (Id.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff did not

meet the Listing 1.02 criteria of “involvement of one major

peripheral joint in each upper extremity, resulting in inability

to perform fine and gross movements effectively.” (Id.)

Next, the ALJ considered Listing 1.04, which concerns

spinal disorders. To qualify for Listing 1.04, an individual

must exhibit the following criteria:

(A) Evidence of nerve root compression

characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of

pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor

loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or

muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex

loss and, if there is involvement of the lower

back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting

and supine), or (B) spinal arachnoiditis,

confirmed by an operative note or pathology

report of tissue biopsy, or by appropriate

medically acceptable imaging, manifested by

severe burning or painful dysesthesia, resulting

in the need for changes in position or posture

more than once every 2 hours, or (C) lumbar

spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication,

established by findings on appropriate medically

acceptable imaging manifested by chronic non-

radicular pain and weakness, and resulting in

inability to ambulate effectively

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. The ALJ found “no

evidence” that Plaintiff met any of the criteria for Listing

1.04(A)-(C). (Tr. at 58-59.)

Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the

residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with the

following exceptions: “occasionally reach overhead with the

bilateral upper extremities; climb ramps, stairs, ladders,

ropes, and scaffolds occasionally; and balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch, and crawl occasionally.” (Id. at 59.)

At step four, the ALJ determined that based on the

above RFC determination, Plaintiff could not perform his past

relevant work as a construction worker. (Id. at 68.)

At step five, the ALJ found that there were jobs that

existed in significant numbers in the national economy that

Plaintiff could perform despite his restrictions. (Id. at 69.)

The ALJ consulted a vocational expert to determine whether there

were jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform

considering his age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity. (Id.) The vocational expert testified

that Plaintiff would be able to perform the requirements of

representative occupations such as assembler, table worker, and

preparer. (Id.) Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could make a

successful adjustment to other work that exists in the national

economy and was therefore not disabled within the meaning of the

Act, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). (Id.)

II. Analysis

Plaintiff contends remand is warranted because (1) the

ALJ failed to properly evaluate Listing 1.04(A) at step three,

and (2) the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by

substantial evidence. (ECF No. 16, Pl. Mem.) For the reasons

below, the Court finds the ALJ failed to provide adequate

analysis for concluding Plaintiff did not meet or equal Listing

1.04(A) at step three, and remands the case without analyzing

steps four or five.

A. Plaintiff Provided Evidence to Support a Colorable

Claim of Disability Under Listing 1.04(A)

At step 3, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove

that he meets the requirements of a Listing. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(d). If the plaintiff provides evidence to support a

colorable finding of disability under one of the Listings, then

the ALJ “must provide an explanation of his reasoning as to why

he believes the requirements are not met and explain the

credibility determinations and inferences he drew in reaching

that conclusion.” See Ryan v. Astrue, 5 F. Supp. 3d 493, 509

(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 469

(2d Cir. 1982)).

Plaintiff argues that he submitted medical evidence

sufficient to support a colorable claim that he had a spinal

disorder consistent with Listing 1.04(A). (Pl. Mem. at 12, 16-

19.) As explained above, to qualify for Listing 1.04(A), a

plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a disorder of the spine, (2)

resulting in nerve root compression, (3) limitation of motion,

(4) motor loss, and (5) sensory or reflex loss. 20 C.F.R. Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

First, Plaintiff argues he provided sufficient

evidence to indicate he had a spinal disorder. (Pl.’s Mem. at

12.) On June 14, 2018, Plaintiff underwent an MRI revealing

Herniated Nucleus Pulposus (HNP) at his C2-3 and C7-T1 and

bulges at C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6 levels. (Tr. at 741.) A

subsequent MRI showed disc desiccation involving all cervical

discs. (Tr. at 665.) HNP is listed explicitly as a spinal

disorder that qualifies for Listing 1.04(A). 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1.

Second, Plaintiff claims his spinal disorder was

characterized by nerve-root compression. (Pl. Mem. at 13-14.)

Plaintiff provided two examinations by Dr. Alexander Zhuravkov,

which returned positive diagnoses of axial compression. (Tr.

740-43.) Two examinations by Dr. Stelios Koutsoumbelis indicate

that Plaintiff had “C8 nerve root compression.” (Tr. at 891-

93.) Dr. Sasan Azar’s examination found an “impingement of the

right C8 exiting nerve root.” (Tr. at 895.) Plaintiff also

references a cervical epidural steroid injection by Dr.

Zhuravkov, where “flow dynamics revealed decreased flow along

the existing nerve roots bilaterally . . . this seemed to affect

the C5 and C6 nerve roots bilaterally.” (Tr. at 764.)

Third, Plaintiff asserts that the medical evidence

establishes that his nerve-root compression limited his range of

motion. (Pl. Mem. at 14-15.) The notes from Plaintiff’s

physical therapy appointments are replete with evaluations that

Plaintiff could not exercise a full range of motion. (See Tr.

at 460, 479-611.) Dr. Camari Wallace’s examination revealed a

restricted range of motion upon extension and lateral rotation.

(Tr. at 767.) Nurse Practitioner Daniah Jean-Francois’s

examination showed a decreased range of motion upon lumbar

flexion and extension and a limited range of motion in the lower

extremity. (Tr. at 688-89.) Consultative Examiner Dr. Chaim

Shtock found that Plaintiff had limited motion in his neck,

wrists, and left shoulder. (Tr. at 617.) Dr. Alexandre De

Moura’s tests noted Plaintiff was unable to turn “parts of his

body and/or head.” (Tr. at 888.)

Fourth, Plaintiff contends that his condition resulted

in “motor loss,” defined as “atrophy with associated muscle

weakness or muscle weakness.” (Pl. Mem. at 14); 20 C.F.R. Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Plaintiff’s physical therapy evaluation,

however, revealed 4/5 strength in the neck and upper and lower

abdominal.2 (Tr. at 480.) Dr. Yong Chi noted that Plaintiff

demonstrate 4/5 strength in the bilateral shoulders, left knee,

and left ankle. (Tr. at 462.) Dr. Wallace recorded Plaintiff’s

strength at 4+/5 in the lower extremity and assessed a positive

straight leg raising test. (Tr. at 767, 769.)

Finally, Plaintiff argues his motor loss was

accompanied by sensory and reflex loss. (Pl. Mem. at 14.)

Plaintiff cites medical results from pinprick and light touch

tests: Dr. Chi’s test demonstrated decreased response in the

right deltoid, bicep, median, ulnar, tibial anterior, and

peroneus nerve distributions. (Tr. at 463.) Dr. De Moura’s

tests indicated decreased response in the left C6 distribution,

absent the left brachial radial reflex. (Tr. at 629, 633.)

Reviewing the evidence in the record, this Court

concludes Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to support a

colorable claim of disability under Listing 1.04(A). See Ryan

v. Astrue, 5 F. Supp. 3d 493, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding a

plaintiff need not provide “overwhelming” evidence that they

meet a Listing to present a colorable case). As such, the ALJ

must explain “why he believes the requirements are not met and

explain the credibility determinations and inferences he drew in

2 The Court notes that a 4/5 muscle strength grade results can be defined as

“[m]uscle activation against some resistance, full range of motion.” Usker

Naqvi; Andrew l. Sherman, Muscle Strength Grading, NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE,

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK436008/

reaching that conclusion.” Id. at 509 (internal citation

omitted).

B. The ALJ Failed Sufficiently to Explain Why Plaintiff

Did Not Meet or Medically Equal Listing 1.04

The ALJ must properly consider whether the evidence

presented by the plaintiff is sufficient to support a disability

claim under the relevant Listing. This explanation must be more

than a bald assertion or “recitation of the standard.” Torres

v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-479S (WMS), 2015 WL 4604000, at *4

(W.D.N.Y. 2015). The ALJ’s analysis must “build an accurate and

logical bridge from the evidence to [his/her] conclusion.”

Hamedallah ex. Rel. E.B. v. Astrue, 876 F. Supp. 2d 133, 142

(N.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a

general principle, the ALJ’s analysis must be thorough enough to

enable judicial review of the ALJ’s decision and provide

Plaintiff with a thoughtful explanation for why the Plaintiff’s

claim was denied. See Hamedallah, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 142; Beers

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 449 F. Supp. 3d 96, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 2020);

Cecelia J. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-cv-1483 (HBS), 2021 WL

431673, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“It is well-established that an

ALJ must express the reasons underlying his findings with enough

clarity to afford meaningful judicial review.”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); Nashir v. Berryhill, No.

18-cv-767 (HKS), 2020 WL 1445069, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. 2020)

(“Plaintiff is clearly owed a more substantive explanation of

why he did not meet the Listing 1.04A.”). After reviewing the

evidence in the record and the ALJ’s decision, this Court

concludes that the ALJ’s explanation for why Plaintiff did not

meet Listing 1.04(A) was insufficient.

In the instant case, the ALJ’s entire step three

determination consists of a single sentence that there was “no

evidence” Plaintiff met any of the requirements for Listings

1.04(A)-(C). (Tr. at 58.) Such a brief statement is a mere

“conclusory observation” that fails to discuss “the crucial

factors in any determination with sufficient specificity to

enable the reviewing court to decide whether the determination

is supported by substantial evidence.” Pamela P. v. Saul, No.

19-cv-575 (DJS), 2020 WL 2561106, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. 2020)

(internal ellipsis and quotation marks omitted). The ALJ’s

brevity prevents the Court from reviewing whether and how the

ALJ evaluated the various medical evidence proffered by

Plaintiff.

An ALJ’s unexplained step three conclusion may

nevertheless be upheld if other parts of the opinion demonstrate

that their step three decision was supported by substantial

evidence. Berry, 675 F.2d at 469. Courts, however, refrain

from inferring the ALJ’s logic when credibility determinations

and inference drawing is required of the ALJ. Id. Here, the

ALJ does not discuss all the evidence presented by Plaintiff,

and the evidence discussed by the ALJ “only relate[d] to the

plaintiff's RFC determination and [did] not provide rationale as

to how the findings connect to specific criteria in Listing

1.04(A) under step three of the analysis.” Ortiz v. Saul, 19-

cv-2316 (KAM), 2020 WL 7699304, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); see also

Lamar v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-1019 (MPS), 2018 WL 3642656, at *8

(D. Conn. 2018) (remanding case where the court was “largely

left to speculate how the evidence discussed in the ALJ's RFC

rationale applies in the Listings context, as the ALJ did not

make the necessary findings on issues pertinent to his

determinations at step three of the disability analysis.”). For

instance, the ALJ references medical records with evidence of

Plaintiff’s nerve root compression several times during the RFC

determination, but does not examine the evidence in the context

of Listing 1.04(A) or provide any analysis contrary to

Plaintiff’s claim of C-8 nerve root compression. (Tr. at 61-

65.) As such, it is improper for this Court to evaluate the

grounds upon which the ALJ made the Listing 1.04(A)

determination. Beers, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 102 (“Due to the lack

of explanation, the Court is unable to meaningfully review the

ALJ's determination at step three of the sequential analysis.”).

On appeal, the Commissioner connects various

examination findings and medical opinions to explain why

Plaintiff failed to meet or equal Listing 1.04(A). (ECF No. 20,

Def. Mem. at 5-16.) The Commissioner, however, cannot cure the

ALJ’s lack of reasoning by providing his own. See Ortiz, 2020 WL

7699304, at *8; Newbury v. Astrue, 321 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir.

2009) (summary order) (remanding because a “reviewing court may

not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for

agency action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing

Snell v. Apfel, 177 F3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999)); see generally

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). It is not the

place of this Court to evaluate whether Plaintiff met Listing

1.04(A), or to speculate what the ALJ’s reasoning was when the

ALJ made the Listing determination. Ortiz, 2020 WL 7699304, at

*9 n.1 (“It is not the function of the Court to weigh the

medical evidence of record to determine whether [the Listing]

was met . . . It is the ALJ's job to make this determination in

a way a court can follow.” (citations omitted)); see Ryan, 5 F.

Supp. 3d at 508 (“While the Commissioner is correct that there

is . . . conflicting evidence regarding plaintiff's motor

functions during testing . . . , it is the obligation of the ALJ

to explicitly reconcile this conflicting evidence by evaluating

whether plaintiff meets or medically equals the requirements of

Listing 1.04A.”).

The ALJ’s conclusory statement, standing alone, is

“inadequate to substitute for specific findings in view of the

fact that plaintiff has at least a colorable case for

application of Listing 1.04(A).” Cherico v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-

5734 (MHD), 2014 WL 3939036, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The ALJ’s

opinion does not afford Plaintiff substantive reasons for the

Listing 1.04(A) determination and is insufficient to facilitate

adequate judicial review by this Court.

C. Remand is Appropriate for Clarification of Listing

1.04(A)

Remand is appropriate when an ALJ’s decision renders a

reviewing court unable to determine that the “ultimate decision

that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Listing 1.04(A) was supported

by substantial evidence.” McIntosh v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-5403

(ER) (DF), 2018 WL 4376417, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). District

courts may remand when an ALJ substitutes "boilerplate language”

for “meaningful explanations.” Ryan, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 508. It

is “particularly important for the ALJ to specifically address

evidence with respect to the step three analysis because a

claimant whose condition meets or equals that of a Listing is

deemed disabled per se and is eligible to receive benefits.”

Giambrone v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-05882 (PKC), 2017 WL 1194650, at

*18 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, this

Court remands to give the ALJ the opportunity to further discuss

the medical evidence in the context of Listing 1.04(A). Due to

the absence of specific findings by the ALJ, this Court is

unable to meaningfully review the ALJ’s determination and

evaluate whether it was based on substantial evidence. Rowe v.

Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00208 (MAT), 2018 WL 4233702 (W.D.N.Y.

2018) (“The ALJ’s failure to discuss any of this evidence at

step three of the sequential evaluation was erroneous. This

Court is, therefore, unable to perform a meaningful review of

the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not meet the

requirements of Listing 1.04(A).”).

On remand, the ALJ should specifically explain how he

weighed conflicting evidence, and explicitly articulate which

criteria from Listing 1.04(A) Plaintiff failed to meet based on

the evidence. See Nashir, 2020 WL 1445069, at *5 (“If, on

remand, Plaintiff is once again found not disabled at step

three, the ALJ must provide an explanation of what criteria from

Listing 1.04A Plaintiff failed to meet in consideration of all

of the evidence regarding his severe impairments of the cervical

spine.”).

D. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims

As set forth above, Plaintiff has articulated a claim

that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not based on substantial

evidence. (Pl. Mem. at 2-11.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends

that the ALJ erroneously discounted part of Dr. Koutsoumbelis’s

opinion. (Id.)

The Court need not address Plaintiff’s remaining

arguments, which concern additional steps in the sequential

disability determination. On remand, the ALJ must conduct a new

evaluation of the evidence, which may alter the current

administrative decision. A new step three analysis may render

the credibility determinations in step four unnecessary or

change the determinations relevant to Plaintiff’s claim.

Morales v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-06844 (LGS) (DF), 2015 WL 13774790,

at *23, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2015) (holding a court need not reach

additional arguments “given that the ALJ’s analysis may change

on these points upon remand.”); see, e.g., Ramirez Morales v.

Berryhill, No. 17-cv-06836 (MAT), 2019 WL 1076088, at *5

(W.D.N.Y. 2019) (declining to consider the plaintiff's remaining

arguments after remanding due to the ALJ’s failure to properly

assess the plaintiff’s medical records as they pertained to

Listing 1.04(A)); Ortiz, 2020 WL 7699304 (same); Bell v.

Colvin, No. 5:15-cv-01160 (LEK), 2016 WL 7017395, at *10

(N.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED and the Defendant’s cross-

motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. The Clerk of

Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment remanding this

case and to close the case.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 25, 2022

Brooklyn, New York

__________/s/_______________

HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO

United States District Judge