holding that court may imply consent for purposes of § 636(c)(1) “where . . . the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magistrate Judge”
How later courts described this case
- holding that court may imply consent for purposes of § 636(c)(1) “where . . . the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magistrate Judge”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK For Online Publication Only
----------------------------------------------------------------X FILED
BRAD PACKER, on behalf of 1-800- CLERK
FLOWERS.COM, INC,
12:12 pm, Sep 30, 2022
Plaintiff, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-against- ORDER LONG ISLAND OFFICE
15-CV-5933 (JMA) (JMW)
RAGING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC,
RAGING CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD.,
WILLIAM C. MARTIN, and 1-800-
FLOWERS.COM, INC.,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------X
AZRACK, United States District Judge:
On April 5, 2016, the parties, through their counsel, and after notice about their right to
withhold such consent, agreed to the assignment of a Magistrate Judge for all purposes in this
matter. Then-Magistrate Judge Brown assumed jurisdiction over the case and conducted various
proceedings.
On December 10, 2020, following his elevation to the district court, Judge Brown entered
the following order:
Following the remand of this case from the 2nd Circuit, and in light of the
engagement of the undersigned as a U.S. District Judge following the parties'
notices of appeal and cross-appeal and the parties' prior consent to a magistrate
judge for all purposes , the Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to reassign
this case to a magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of a
final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.
(Electronic Order dated 12/10/20.) The case was then reassigned to Magistrate Judge Lindsay,
and no party filed any objections either to Judge Brown’s 12/10/20 Order or the reassignment to
Judge Lindsay. Instead, the parties engaged in extensive litigation before Judge Lindsay, including
filing of voluminous motions, most notably summary judgment, which eventually encompassed a
standing argument under Transunion. Of course, the parties continued litigation – for several years
– before Judge Lindsay constitutes, at a minimum, implicit consent to her jurisdiction over the
matter.
In Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 375 F. App’x 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2010), defendants
challenged the entry of judgment by a Magistrate Judge because “they did not consent to the case
being reassigned to Magistrate Judge Conroy following the retirement of Jerome J. Niedermeier,
the magistrate judge to whom the case was initially referred.” The Circuit rejected this argument,
holding:
By appearing without objection before Magistrate Judge Conroy and filing various
submissions with the court, including a motion for summary judgment, after
receiving notice of the case reassignment, defendants—who had been advised of
their right to decline to have their case resolved by a magistrate judge—implicitly
consented to Magistrate Judge Conroy’s exercise of jurisdiction. See Roell v.
Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590, 123 S.Ct. 1696, 155 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003) (holding that
court may imply consent for purposes of § 636(c)(1) “where . . . the litigant or
counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still
voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magistrate Judge”).
Id. Such is the case at hand. By appearing, without objection, and participating for years before
Magistrate Judge Lindsay, the parties have unquestionably consented to her jurisdiction.
For reasons that are unclear on the record, and in contravention of Judge Brown’s
December 10, 2022 Order, on September 15, 2022, the Clerk reassigned the case to me, and
assigned Judge Wicks as the new magistrate judge on the case. (See Electronic Orders dated 9/15
and 9/16/22.) I inquired on the latter date as to whether the parties consented to Judge Wicks’
jurisdiction for all purposes or, at a minimum, for the pending motions. No response has been
received.
However, upon further reflection and examination of the docket, it appears that this matter
is appropriately assigned to a Magistrate Judge for all purposes. Judge Wicks, who was most
recently randomly selected for the case, may be in the best position to preside over this case. As
such, the Clerk of Court is directed to this case to him. Any party objecting to the exercise of
jurisdiction by Judge Wicks shall file such objection within ten days, and the case shall be
immediately reassigned back to Magistrate Judge Lindsay, to whose jurisdiction the parties have,
unquestionably, already consented by implication. See Astra USA, Inc., 375 F. App’x at 129.
Because of the copious motion practice, and in fairness to the parties, all pending motions
are deemed withdrawn without prejudice to refiling pursuant to a schedule to be set by Judge
Wicks and in a manner consistent with his individual motion practices.
The Clerk of Court is directed to assign this case to Magistrate Judge Wicks for all purposes
and to remove the undersigned from this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 30, 2022 _____________/s/ (JMA)_____________
Central Islip, New York Joan M. Azrack
United States District Judge