Uzamere v. Uzamere

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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CHERYL D. UZAMERE,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

22-CV-4876 (LDH) (LB)

-against-

EHIGIE EDOBOR UZAMERE, et al.,

Defendants.

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LaSHANN DeARCY HALL, United States District Judge:

On July 12, 2022, Plaintiff Cheryl D. Uzamere, appearing pro se, filed this action in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff

paid the filing fee to commence the action. (Id.) On August 18, 2022, the Honorable Steve C.

Jones, United States District Judge, dismissed the action in part and transferred the remaining

claims to this Court. (Order, ECF No. 9.) On August 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint naming 482 Defendants and consisting of over 3000 pages, including exhibits. (Am.

Compl., ECF Nos. 12–15.)

In the span of just one week, Plaintiff filed: (a) a 418-page motion for recusal, (ECF No.

21); (b) a 137-page application for an order to show cause to compel disclosure under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(a) (ECF No. 22); (c) a 171-page application for an order to show cause seeking relief

from Judge Jones’s Order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (ECF No. 23); (d) a motion seeking

reasonable accommodations and an extension of time to serve (ECF No. 25); and (e) a 232-page

request for a certificate of default against Defendants Ehigie Edobor Uzamere and Austin I.

Idehen pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). (ECF Doc. Nos. 26-27.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed

proof of service for the majority of the 482 Defendants.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motions and applications are DENIED, the

amended complaint is DISMISSED and Plaintiff is directed to SHOW CAUSE within 30 days

why a filing injunction should not be entered barring her from filing any new action in this Court

without first seeking permission.

MOTION FOR RECUSAL

At the outset, the Court considers Plaintiff’s motion for recusal (“Recusal Motion”).

(ECF No. 21.) It is important to note that Plaintiff does not appear to seek the district judge’s

recusal, but rather seeks to recuse Magistrate Judges and court staff whom Plaintiff characterizes

as “Babylonian Talmud-adherent Ashkenazi Jews. (Recusal Mot. at 2.) A party may request the

removal of “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States . . . in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455; United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d

764, 775 (2d Cir. 2007) (Section 455(a) “requires that a judge recuse himself ‘in any proceeding

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Serv.

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988))). But “a judge should not disqualify himself in the

absence of a violation of § 455.” Amico, 486 F.3d at 781 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiff’s

conclusory claims of “extrajudicial bias” (Recusal Mot. at 2), are entirely unsupported.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. See Dekom v. Nassau Cnty., 595 F. App’x. 12, 15 (2d

Cir. 2014) (affirming the denial of a motion for recusal where the “plaintiffs advanced no basis

for the district judge to recuse herself”).

DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a 707-page complaint against 306 Defendants in the Northern District of

Georgia. (See generally Compl.) On August 17, 2022, Judge Jones dismissed Plaintiff’s Part I

spousal support claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and transferred Plaintiff’s Part II

claims to this Court. (ECF No. 9.)

After the transfer to this Court, Plaintiff filed a voluminous amended complaint,

consisting of over 3000 pages against 482 Defendants. (Am. Compl., ECF Nos. 12–15.) In Part

I, Plaintiff again seeks spousal support from her alleged estranged husband Ehigie Edobor

Uzamere.1 (Am. Compl. at 69–80 (Part I)). Plaintiff contends that based on an order issued by

the Kings County Family Court Support Magistrate, Defendant Uzamere owes her spousal

support of $17,500.00. (Id. at 69.)

In Part II, Plaintiff alleges ten causes of action, including violations of the Sherman Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961, et seq, the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301, et seq, the Americans with Disabilities

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq, as well as claims

arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 18 U.S.C. § 2441, and state law claims of intentional infliction

of emotional distress and gross negligence. (ECF Nos. 12-1, 12-2, 12-3 (Part II)). The

defendants include various United States Senators, including those representing states that are

not New York, various Secretaries in the Executive Branch, and New York agencies.

Supporting Plaintiff’s claims are a plethora of fantastical and outlandish allegations,

many of which are rooted in Plaintiff’s blatantly anti-Semitic beliefs. For example, Plaintiff

repeatedly claims that:

[D]efendants . . . are members of the Democratic Party’s Babylonian

Talmud-adherent, Ashkenazi Jewish ethnoreligious cartel

1 Plaintiff’s own papers reveal that Ehigie Edobor Uzamere has disputed that he is Plaintiff’s spouse. (Ex. 1 at 132,

ECF No. 12-1.)

* * *

[A] seditious conspiracy that manifests itself by the defendants’

operation of a Sherman Antitrust violating, racketeer-influenced,

corrupt organization for which the goal is to normalize the practice of

pedophilia and associated sexual and non-sexual acts of violence and

domestic terrorism against the American people, and especially against

Native Americans and people of African descent to satisfy the

Ashkenazi Jewish community’s disproportionately high percentage of

individuals who are practitioners of pedophilia

(Am. Compl., at 2, 5.) Plaintiff seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 12-3

at 77–86.) Plaintiff also includes numerous exhibits consisting of thousands of pages. (ECF

Nos. 12-3–6, 12-13–14.) Notably, the exhibits included graphic images of children, as well as

personal identifying information necessitating sealing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), to “allow[] the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At the pleading stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume

the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

But the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In addition, a

pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007)).

Nevertheless, a district court may dismiss the complaint sua sponte if it determines that it

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), or that the complaint is frivolous,

see Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–64 (2d Cir. 2000).

“An action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) ‘the “factual contentions are clearly baseless,” such as

when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy;’ or (2) ‘the claim is “based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory.’” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437

(2d Cir. 1998) (quoting, inter alia, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

DISCUSSION

A. Part I – Spousal Support

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must independently verify the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. See Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 196 (2d Cir.

2016). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Makarova v.

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction . . .

may be raised at any time . . . by the court sua sponte[,]” and “[i]f subject matter jurisdiction is

lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d

697, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,

514 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

In Part I of the amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks this Court’s intervention in her

ongoing attempts to bring her estranged husband to account for his alleged misconduct and

abandonment. (Am. Compl. at 69–80.) Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to enforce a spousal support

order dated April 1, 2021 issued by the Family Court Support Magistrate (see Ex. A at 88–89,

ECF No. 12-1), that appears to have been later dismissed. (ECF No. 12-1 at 4 (“Defendant the

Honorable Ben J. Darvil dismissed my family offense petitions.”); ECF No. 12-1 at 138

(“Support Magistrate Harris’ Order of dismissal which was issued on 6/27/22.”).)

Plaintiff relies on Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 660 (Am. Compl. at

61), to provide a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s spousal support claim. This

statute, also known as the Child Support Enforcement Act, provides that the “district courts of

the United States shall have jurisdiction, without regard to any amount in controversy, to hear

and determine any action certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section

652(a)(8) of this title.” See 42 U.S.C. § 660. In Blessing v. Freestone, the Supreme Court held

that this section of the Social Security did not “give rise to individual rights.” 520 U.S. 329,

343–44 (1997) (“Title IV-D [of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669(b)] contains no

private remedy—either judicial or administrative—through which aggrieved persons can seek

redress.”). Nothing Plaintiff has alleged establishes that she has an enforceable right under this

provision of the Social Security Act.

Moreover, the domestic relations abstention doctrine prevents the Court from intervening

in Plaintiff’s spousal support matter unless Plaintiff can show an obstacle to the full and fair

determination of that dispute in state court. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d

Cir. 1990) (federal district court should abstain from exercising its federal-question jurisdiction

over claims in which it is “asked to grant a divorce or annulment, determine support payments,

or award custody of a child[]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Deem v.

DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 622–24 (2d Cir. 2019). Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that

an obstacle exists to the fair determination of this dispute in state court. Thus, Part I of

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3).2

2 Plaintiff also alleges diversity jurisdiction (Am. Compl. at 61), but complete diversity of citizenship is lacking. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332; see Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2014)

(diversity requires that “all plaintiffs . . . be citizens of states diverse from those of all defendants.”). Even if

diversity of citizenship existed, the domestic relations exception doctrine would deprive the Court of subject matter

B. Part II – Other Claims

Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims are frivolous because “‘the “factual contentions are

clearly baseless,”’” and “‘are the product of delusion or fantasy.’” Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.

“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the

irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to

contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Even a well-pleaded complaint

may be dismissed as factually frivolous “if the sufficiently well-pleaded facts are clearly

baseless—that is, they are fanciful, fantastic, or delusional.” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364,

368 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint contains allegations

of the delusional variety. The federal claims rely entirely on her contention that all 482

Defendants are part of a wide-ranging “Babylonian Talmudic, Ashkenazi Jewish ethnoreligious

cartel” that allegedly condones “pedophilia and sexual violence,” and is somehow responsible

for Plaintiff’s failure to obtain spousal support from her estranged husband. (See generally Am.

Compl.) Among the 482 Defendants is anyone ever associated with Plaintiff’s claim for spousal

support, judges (federal and state), elected officials (federal and state), government officials

(federal and state), agencies of the federal, state, and local governments, attorneys, federal and

state prosecutors, newspapers, private companies, non-profit organizations, and the Attorney

General for every state in the nation. Parsing the amended complaint reveals zero factual

allegations that support this alleged conspiracy, which demonstrates the claims’ delusional

nature.3 The amended complaint, therefore, must be dismissed.

jurisdiction over this claim. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992) (domestic relations exception to

subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody

decrees”).

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed a number of exhibits that do not support any plausible claims. For example,

in addition to her anti-Semitic submissions, she includes explicit photographs of genitalia and other photographs

which are disturbing and have nothing to do with her underlying claim for spousal support. (See, e.g., Am. Compl.,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

It is well-settled that “[t]he district courts have the power and the obligation to protect the

public and the efficient administration of justice from individuals who have a ‘history of

litigation entailing vexation, harassment and needless expense to other parties and an

unnecessary burden on the courts and their supporting personnel.’” Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d

121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “If a litigant has a history of filing ‘vexatious,

harassing or duplicative lawsuits,’ courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future

access to the judicial system.” Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted); Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (outlining factors to be

considered in imposing a filing injunction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

Plaintiff has a history of filing vexatious and harassing lawsuits necessitating restrictions

on access to the court. She has filed over 20 federal cases in the district courts of New York and

Rhode Island, the United States Court of Federal Claims, and the United States Court of Appeals

for the First and Second Circuits. The vast majority of these cases are related to Plaintiff’s issues

with her estranged husband. For example, Plaintiff has filed the following cases in the Eastern

District of New York:

Uzamere v. John Doe, et al., No. 07-CV-2471 (NGG) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007) (case

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction regarding Plaintiff’s divorce);

Uzamere v. Bush, et al., No. 08-CV-0891 (NGG) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2008) (case

dismissed and Plaintiff warned that the filing of frivolous and vexatious complaints may

result in sanctions);

Uzamere v. State of New York, et al., No. 09-CV-2703 (NGG) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. July 9,

2009) (same), appeal dismissed, No. 09-3197-cv (2d Cir. Oct., 13, 2009);

ECF No. 12-4. ) The Court takes further notice that Plaintiff has inundated the Court with voluminous submissions

which has burdened the Court’s resources and that she has, at times, engaged in harassing, and sometimes

antisemitic telephone calls to the Clerk’s Office and to chambers. Plaintiff has also attempted to contact judicial

staff outside of the Courthouse.

Uzamere v. USPS, No. 09-CV-3709 (NGG) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (same);

Uzamere v. Cuomo, et al., No. 11-CV-2831 (NGG) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2011) (case

dismissed as frivolous and noting that “Plaintiff has a long, tired history of vexatious

litigation in this court.”), appeal dismissed, No. 11-2713-cv (2d. Cir. Nov. 28, 2011),

cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1264 (Mar. 19, 2012).

Plaintiff has filed in the Southern District of New York:

Uzamere v. Family Court, No. 94-CV-4200 (TPG), slip op. (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1994)

(case dismissed);

Uzamere v. Allen E. Kaye, P.C., et al., 09-CV-3506 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009) (case

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and immunity and warning Plaintiff that

she may be barred from filing complaints related to her husband without first seeking

leave of Court), appeal dismissed, No. 09-1600-cv (2d Cir. June 24, 2009), cert. denied,

558 U.S. 965 (Oct. 13, 2009);

Uzamere v. USPS, et al., No. 10-CV-7668 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010) (case

dismissed);

Uzamere v. State of New York, et al., No. 19-CV-9064 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2019)

(case dismissed and Plaintiff barred from filing future in forma pauperis actions in the

SDNY without first obtaining permission from the Court), appeal dismissed, No. 19-3825

(2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2020).

Plaintiff has filed in the Federal Court of Claims:

Uzamere v. United States, Nos. 10-585C, 10-591C, 2010 WL 3528897 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 3,

2010) (two cases consolidated and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

Plaintiff has filed in the District of Rhode Island:

Uzamere v. United States, No. 13-505 (WES), 2013 WL 5781216 (D.R.I. Oct. 25, 2013)

(case dismissed and Plaintiff warned against filing further frivolous actions), aff’d, No.

13-2454 (1st Cir. Apr. 11, 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 981 (Nov. 3, 2014).

In light of the nature of Plaintiff’s instant action, her incessant submission of vexatious

and repetitive lawsuits, and Plaintiff’s persistence despite numerous warnings and a prior filing

injunction issued by the Southern District of New York, she is hereby directed to show cause

why she should not be barred from filing any new action (regardless of whether Plaintiff pays the

filing fee or seeks in forma pauperis status) in this Court without first obtaining permission.

Plaintiff shall file an affirmation within 30 days from the date of this order setting forth good

cause why the Court should not impose a filing injunction. If Plaintiff fails to file an affirmation

within the time allowed or if her affirmation fails to provide good cause for why the filing

injunction should not issue, an order barring Plaintiff from filing any new action in this Court,

without first obtaining the Court’s permission, shall enter.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the spousal support claim is DISMISSED for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, and the remaining federal claims are DISMISSED as frivolous.

Having dismissed all the federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiff’s motion for recusal is

DENIED and all other pending motions are DENIED as moot. Unless otherwise directed by the

Court, Plaintiff is prohibited from directly contacting any judicial chambers by telephone,

electronic mail, fax or other means.

The Court further directs Plaintiff to SHOW CAUSE why she should not be barred from

filing any new civil action without first obtaining the Court’s permission within 30 days as set

forth above. The Court directs Plaintiff to utilize the Affirmation form included with this

Memorandum and Order and to refrain from submitting inappropriate or voluminous documents.

All further proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days or until Plaintiff files the Affirmation,

whichever is earlier.

Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee to commence this action, the Court certifies

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good

faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v.

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail

a copy of this Order and the Affirmation form to Plaintiff and to note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

/s/LDH

______________________________________

LaSHANN DeARCY HALL

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

September 23, 2022

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

________________________________________X

CHERYL D. UZAMERE,

Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S AFFIRMATION

-against- 22-CV-4876 (LDH) (LB)

EHIGIE EDOBOR UZAMERE, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________________X

CHERYL D. UZAMERE, appearing pro se, make the following affirmation under the

penalties of perjury: I am the Plaintiff in this action and I respectfully submit this affirmation in

response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause dated ______________.

I should not be barred from filing any new action without first obtaining the district

court’s permission because _____________________________________________________

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[YOU MAY ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES]

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should not enter a filing

injunction.

DATED: ______________ ____________________________

Signature

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Address

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City, State & Zip Code