Wilson v. Caribbean Airlines Limited

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------------------x

SIMEON WILSON,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Case No. 20-CV-4524-FB-CLP

-against-

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES LIMITED,

Defendant.

------------------------------------------------x

Appearances:

For the Plaintiff: For the Defendant:

AMY ROBINSON JOHN MAGGIO

Giskan Solotaroff & Anderson LLP ALLISON M. SURCOUF

90 Broad Street, Second Floor Condon & Forsyth LLP

New York, New York 10004 7 Times Square

New York, New York 10036

BLOCK, Senior District Judge:

In this diversity action, Simeon Wilson alleges that Caribbean Airlines

Limited (“CAL”) negligently handled his baggage, allowing more than two

kilograms of cocaine to be planted inside it without his knowledge. CAL moves

for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and argues

that Wilson’s claim is barred by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”).

For the following reasons, the Court agrees and, accordingly, grants the motion.1

1CAL further argues that Wilson’s claim is preempted by the Montreal

Convention. The Court need not reach that issue.

I

On October 6, 2018, Wilson traveled by air from Georgetown, Guyana, to

New York City. After passing through airport security, he turned over his suitcase

to Guyanese officials, who took it to a staging area for loading onto an aircraft

operated by CAL. Wilson boarded without incident.

When he arrived in New York, Wilson disembarked, retrieved his suitcase,

and went through U.S. Customs. He was selected for a customs inspection, which

revealed more than two kilograms of cocaine in his suitcase. He was released on

bail the same day; the charges against him were dropped approximately ten weeks

later. This lawsuit followed.

II

With the ADA, Congress undertook sweeping deregulation of the airline

industry. The Act included a preemption provision “[t]o ensure that the States

would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.” Morales v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992). Thus, “a State, political

subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or

enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law

related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation

under [the ADA].” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).

The Supreme Court has held that the ADA’s preemptive effect is generally

broad: “The ordinary meaning of these words [‘relating to’] is a broad one . . . and

the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.

But it has only applied that general principle on three occasions. In Morales, it held

that the Texas Attorney General could not enforce proposed guidelines for airfare

advertising. See 504 U.S. at 391. Three years later, it held that the ADA

preempted a class-action lawsuit claiming violations of Illinois’s consumer-

protection law in connection with a frequent flyer program. See American Airlines,

Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995). Most recently, it held that a common-law

claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was

preempted. See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsburg, 572 U.S. 273 (2014). Like the

Supreme Court, the Second Circuit has also confined itself to preemption in cases

involving what might be described as the economics of the airline industry. See Air

Transport Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that

ADA preempted New York’s “Passenger Bill of Rights”).

Thus, the task of determining whether more traditional tort claims for personal

injuries has fallen to the district courts. In this circuit, they apply the three-part

analysis enunciated by then-District Judge Sotomayor in Rombom v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

Under that analysis, “[t]he threshold inquiry . . . is to define whether the

activity at issue in the claim is an airline service.” Id. at 221. Baggage handling

is, without question, an airline service. See Cuomo, 520 F.3d at 223 (“A majority

of the circuits to have construed ‘service’ have held that the term refers to the

provision or anticipated provision of labor from the airline to its passengers and

encompasses matters such as boarding procedures, baggage handling, and food and

drink—matters incidental to and distinct from the actual transportation of

passengers.”). Wilson attempts to avoid that conclusion by arguing that the relevant

activity was “securing passengers’ baggage from drug trafficking” and “protecting

passengers’ luggage from having drugs planted in it,” Pl’s. Mem. of Law 9; however,

it is undisputed that those acts were part and parcel of CAL’s bargained-for

agreement to transport Wilson’s luggage.

“[I]f the activity in question implicates a service, the court must then

determine whether the claim affects the airline service directly or [only] tenuously,

remotely, or peripherally.” Rombom, 867 F. Supp. at 222 (citing Morales, 504 U.S.

at 390). “Where a specific state tort claim has only an incidental effect on a service,

there is no preemption and the state tort action should continue.” Id. Wilson again

tries to reframe the issue, arguing that “[a]llowing drugs to be placed in a passenger’s

suitcase is certainly not directly related to safety or to baggage handling—in fact, it

is quite the opposite of what a passenger expects to receive from an airline ‘service.’”

Pl’s Mem. of Law 13. But the fact remains that that unfortunate result occurred

because, he alleges, CAL failed to take adequate precautions to prevent it. Such a

claim obviously directly impacts the airline’s baggage handling procedures.

Accord Abdel-Karim v. EgyptAir Airlines, 116 F. Supp. 3d 389, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

(“Because the plaintiff’s claims would require the defendants to adopt heightened

and qualitatively different procedures for baggage handling, the effect of the claims

would not be tenuous, remote or peripheral.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, “[t]he third prong of the preemption inquiry is whether the underlying

tortious conduct was reasonably necessary to the provision of the service.”

Rombom, 867 F. Supp. at 222. “[T]his prong has been applied only to exempt from

preemption actions that are ‘outrageous or unreasonable.’” Weiss v. El Al Israel

Airlines, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 2d 356, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). As Judge Sotomayor

poignantly put it: “[If the flight] attendant shoots the passenger to obtain quiet, would

the passenger’s state tort claim be preempted[?]” Rombom, 867 F. Supp. at 222.

Analogously, the Court would have no difficulty concluding that intentionally

planting drugs in a passenger’s suitcase qualifies as outrageous and unreasonable.

But Wilson does not allege that. Rather, he claims that CAL negligently failed to

prevent it from happening. There has not been any evidence that CAL or its

employees were involved in any other way. Thus, the third prong is satisfied.

Accord Hekmat v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 247 F. Supp. 3d 427, 433 (E.D.N.Y.

2017) (“[P]laintiffs have not accused JetBlue of theft. Rather, they accuse JetBlue

of negligence arising from its baggage handling procedures, which satisfies the third

prong of the test.”).

III

In sum, the Court concludes that the ADA preempts Wilson’s claim. This is

a difficult conclusion because it leaves Wilson without a remedy for serious damages

arising from a situation for which he bears no fault. Nevertheless, it is clear that the

ADA preempts at least some personal injury claims and, for the reasons set forth

above, Wilson’s claim meets all the criteria under Rombom’s well-respected

analysis. Perhaps it is some comfort to believe that this case might supply a vehicle

by which some higher authority can finally and authoritatively decide the extent of

the ADA’s preemptive effect on tort claims.

CAL’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the case is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

_/s/ Frederic Block__________

FREDERIC BLOCK

Senior United States District Judge

Brooklyn, New York

July 13, 2022