Smith v. US Bank National Association Mastr Asset Securities Trust 2006-WMC2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------x

STEPHEN SMITH,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

- against - 22-CV-3426 (PKC) (LB)

US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

MASTR ASSET, SECURITIES TRUST 2006-

WMC2, ELPINIKI M. BECHASKA, and

CREDIT SUISSE FINANCIAL

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

-------------------------------------------------------x

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On June 8, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Stephen Smith filed this action against U.S. Bank National

Association, Elpiniki M. Bechaska, an attorney, and Credit Suisse Financial Corporation.

(Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. 1 at ECF 1.1) Plaintiff seeks damages. (Id. at ECF 10–11.)

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. (Dkt. 2.) However, for the reasons

explained below, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days to file an

amended complaint.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “lacked standing” to commence a foreclosure proceeding

for a property located at 145-48 224th Street in Rosedale, New York (the “Property”). (Compl.,

Dkt. 1, at ECF 1, 5–6.) He alleges that “[t]his is not about the ‘. . . foreclosure case itself or the

1 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing

system and not the document’s internal pagination.

judgment . . .’ but the status and standing of the defendant’s ability to commence the proceedings.”

(Id. at ECF 6.)

Plaintiff includes documents related to the assignment of the mortgage for the property at

issue (id. at ECF 15–18), as well as for another property located at 774 Herkimer Street in

Brooklyn, New York (id. at ECF 12–14).2 Plaintiff does not include documents related to any

foreclosure or provide any information regarding the foreclosure. Plaintiff seeks, inter alia,

damages, “discharge of mortgage,” and “to discharge the loan from plaintiff’s credit report.” (Id.

at ECF 10.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss an IFP action if the

complaint “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addressing the sufficiency of a

complaint, a court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations and draw[s] from them all reasonable

inferences; but [it is] not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as

factual allegations.” Hamilton v. Westchester County, 3 F.4th 86, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2021). Courts

“liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to

raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154,

2 It is not clear what relevance, if any, the documents related to the 774 Herkimer Street

property have to do with this action.

156 (2d Cir. 2017). In addition, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Court Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must independently verify the existence

of subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah

Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 2016). Congress

has granted district courts two types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) “federal question

jurisdiction,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, over “cases in which there is a federal question,” and

(2) “diversity jurisdiction,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, over “certain cases between citizens of

different states, so long as the requirements of complete diversity and amount in controversy are

met.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2013). The plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing either type of subject matter jurisdiction. Makarova v. United States, 201

F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves the court’s power

to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630

(2002). “[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must

dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

II. Plaintiff Fails to Sufficiently Allege Federal Question Jurisdiction

Federal question jurisdiction exists where a plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a

violation of federal law or where “the well-pleaded complaint necessarily depends on resolution

of a substantial question of federal law.” Bracey v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d

108, 113 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants

lacked standing to commence foreclosure proceedings, presumably in state court, does not provide

a basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. This Court cannot make determinations on the

legal viability of a foreclosure or any other proceeding filed in state court. See Vossbrinck v.

Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014). Thus, the Court lacks federal

question jurisdiction over his claim that Defendants lacked standing to commence a foreclosure

proceeding in state court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). To the extent that Plaintiff lists thirteen counts

referencing various federal statutes and regulations (see Dkt. 1 at ECF 1–3), he provides no facts

to support a claim under these federal statutes or regulations. “Simply raising a federal issue in a

complaint will not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction.” Perpetual Sec., Inc. v.

Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002). There is no subject matter jurisdiction if “the purported

federal claim is clearly ‘immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ or

is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624

F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2010).

III. Plaintiff Fails to Sufficiently Allege Diversity Jurisdiction

Similarly, Plaintiff fails to provide a basis for diversity jurisdiction over this matter under

28 U.S.C. § 1332. For instance, he fails to allege his citizenship and the citizenship of each

Defendant named, he fails to set forth the amount in controversy, and he fails to allege the state

law at issue. Thus, the Court also lacks diversity jurisdiction over this matter. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3).

IV. This Court Has No Jurisdiction Over Claims Challenging State Court Judgments

Although Plaintiff claims that he is not “arguing the issues on the foreclosure” (Compl.,

Dkt. 1, at ECF 9), the Court nonetheless advises him that pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims that effectively challenge state

court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486–87

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). The doctrine applies when (1) the

federal court plaintiff has lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state

court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites the federal court to review and reject that judgment; and

(4) the state court judgment was rendered prior to the commencement of proceedings in the district

court. Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is

seeking to challenge a state court judgment of foreclosure, this Court would lack jurisdiction. See

Vossbrinck, 773 F.3d at 426 (state foreclosure action and judgment barred from district court

review by Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Swiatkowski v. New York, 160 F. App’x 30, 32 (2d Cir.

2005) (same); Desir v. Florida Cap. Bank, N.A., 377 F. Supp. 3d 168, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)

(“[C]ourts in this circuit routinely dismiss challenges to state court foreclosure judgments under

Rooker-Feldman.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status,

the Court grants him leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of this Order. If

Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, it must be captioned “Amended Complaint” and bear

the same docket number as this Memorandum and Order, No. 22-CV-3426 (PKC) (LB). The

amended complaint will replace the original complaint and must therefore stand on its own without

reference to the original complaint. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff must set forth facts to

show that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Legal conclusions and

conclusory allegations will not suffice. Plaintiff must provide facts sufficient to allow each named

Defendant “to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know

whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2019)

(quoting Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff must also provide the

date and location for each relevant event. In addition, should Plaintiff invoke diversity jurisdiction,

he must also set forth the citizenship of each plaintiff and each defendant named in the caption of

the amended complaint, the amount in controversy,3 and the state law at issue.

All further proceedings shall be stayed for thirty (30) days. If Plaintiff does not file an

amended complaint by that deadline or show good cause why he cannot comply, the Court shall

direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close this case. The Court certifies pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore

in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369

U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: July 11, 2022

Brooklyn, New York

3 “A party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of proving that it

appears to a ‘reasonable probability’ that the claim is in excess of the statutory jurisdictional

amount.” Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Am. Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 93 F.3d 1064,

1070 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d

Cir. 1994)). The amount in controversy must be non-speculative in order to satisfy the statute.