Mecca v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JOHN MECCA, Pro Se as Sovereign

Person of the United States,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 22-CV-2208(JS)(ST)

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST

COMPANY, as Trustee for Soundview

Home Loan Trust 2004-WMCI

Asset-Backed Certificates, Series

2004-WMCI,

Defendant.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: John Mecca, pro se

119 Whittier Drive

Kings Park, New York 11754

For Defendant: No appearance.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Before the Court is the application to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) filed by pro se plaintiff John Mecca (“Plaintiff”)

in connection with his Complaint against Deutsche Bank National

Trust Company, as Trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2004-WMCI

Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-WMCI (“Deutsche Bank” or

“Defendant”) (Compl., ECF No. 1); (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2). Plaintiff

has also filed a successive IFP motion, two motions for a

preliminary injunction (“PI”), as well as a motion for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”). (PI Mot. I, ECF No. 3; PI Mot. II, ECF

No. 6; IFP Mot. II, ECF No. 13; TRO Mot., ECF No. 14.)

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s IFP application

is GRANTED; however, the Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Plaintiff’s second IFP motion and

requests for injunctive relief are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

I. The Complaint1

Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is 38 pages long with

almost 1000 pages of exhibits attached, was filed pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Deutsche Bank. (See

generally Compl.) The Complaint purports to allege a deprivation

of Plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection

with an underlying state court mortgage foreclosure action. (See

id. at 1.) The property in dispute is Plaintiff’s residence, 119

Whittier Drive, Kings Park, New York (the “Property”). (Id.

at 2-3.) According to the Complaint, Defendant “produced with the

lower Supreme and Appellate courts an unconstitutional foreclosure

decision under color of law against Plaintiff John Mecca.” (Id.)

The gravamen of the present Complaint is that the state court

orders are invalid because Defendant: (1) did not produce “the

true original note and mortgage documents” and instead brought

1 Excerpts from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as they

appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and

grammar have not been corrected or noted.

copies of those documents to state court; and (2) lacked “standing

to bring their foreclosure case” in the absence of those original

documents. (Id. at 4-5.)

A judgment of foreclosure was entered by Suffolk County

Supreme Court on February 13, 2018 under Index No. 602190/2015 and

Plaintiff appealed. (See id. Exs. A, A-1, B.) By Decision and

Order dated February 23, 2022, the Appellate Division, Second

Department affirmed the judgment of foreclosure and sale. The

Appellate Division summarized the history of Plaintiff’s state

court litigation as follows:

On August 6, 2004, the defendant John Mecca

executed a note with Coastal Capital Corp.,

doing business as The Mortgage Shop, in the

sum of $342,000. The note was secured by a

mortgage on real property. The plaintiff

[Deutsche Bank] commenced an action to

foreclose the mortgage in 2010 (hereinafter

the 2010 action). In the 2010 action, the

plaintiff sought to recover the entire balance

of the mortgage debt. The Supreme Court

directed dismissal of the 2010 action “without

prejudice . . . to recommence upon proof of

proper standing.”

By summons and complaint filed March 4, 2015,

the plaintiff [Deutsche Bank] commenced this

action against Mecca, among others, to

foreclose the mortgage. The plaintiff sought

to recover the entire balance of the mortgage

debt. Mecca moved to compel the plaintiff to

produce various documents, including the

original note, for his inspection. The

Supreme Court denied this motion. Mecca then

moved for leave to renew and reargue his

motion to compel. He separately moved, inter

alia, to dismiss the complaint insofar as

asserted against him on the ground that the

action was barred by the statute of

limitations. The plaintiff cross-moved, among

other things, for summary judgment on the

complaint and dismissing Mecca’s affirmative

defenses, for an order of reference, and for

leave to amend the caption to delete the names

“John Doe #1 through John Doe #7.”

In an order dated February 13, 2018, the

court, inter alia, denied Mecca’s motion for

leave to renew and reargue his prior motion to

compel, denied that branch of his separate

motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to

dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted

against him, and granted the plaintiff’s cross

motion. In a second order dated February 13,

2018, the court, among other things, struck

Mecca’s answer and affirmative defenses and

referred the matter to a referee to ascertain

and compute the amount due and owing to the

plaintiff. On May 13, 2019, a judgment of

foreclosure and sale was entered, inter alia,

confirming the referee’s report and directing

the sale of the subject property. Mecca

appeals.

. . .

Mecca’s argument that the denial of his motion

to compel was inconsistent with the dismissal

of the 2010 action is without merit. The

Supreme Court directed dismissal of the 2010

action “without prejudice[ ] to recommence

upon proof of proper standing.” The plaintiff

established that it had standing to commence

the instant action by attaching a copy of the

note, endorsed in blank, to the complaint (see

U.S. Bank N.A. v Mezrahi, 169 AD3d 952, 953

[2019]). In opposition, Mecca failed to raise

a triable issue of fact. Mecca’s remaining

contention is without merit.

Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., v. Mecca, 202 A.D.3d 1052, 1053, 163

N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2022).

Plaintiff alleges here that the state court’s denial of

his discovery motions violated his federal civil rights. (See

Compl. at 5-6.) Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks “to stop the lower

State courts orders being enforced” and to “halt the now Defendants

Deutsche Bank et al. eviction and sale of Plaintiff John Mecca’s

house and property,” (id. at 7), which is scheduled for July 12,

2022. (See May 31, 2022 Ltr., ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff also seeks

to recover $80,000 from Defendant. (Compl. at 6.)

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court, having filed at

least five previous pro se complaints related to electromagnetic

waves and covert monitoring devices.2 Given Plaintiff’s history

of frivolous litigation, the Court entered a litigation bar that

enjoined Plaintiff from filing any new actions in this Court

related to electromagnetic waves and the covert implementation of

monitoring devices, without seeking leave of Court. See Lamb v.

Cuomo, No. 16-CV-6568, Filing Injunction Order, ECF No. 13. The

instant case, which was commenced on April 18, 2022, pertains to

a state court judgment of foreclosure and sale, which is not

subject to the filing injunction entered in Lamb.

2 See Lamb v. Cuomo, No. 16-CV-6568; Lamb v. Off. Governor for N.Y.,

No. 09-CV-1389; Lamb v. U.S.A., No. 07-CV-3705; Mecca v. U.S.

Gov’t, No. 06-CV-3492; Mecca v. Suffolk Cty. Police Dep’t, No. 01-

CV-4506.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Application is Granted

The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the

filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

IFP application is GRANTED.

II. Relevant Legal Standards

A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an in

forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). An action is frivolous as

a matter of law when, inter alia, it is based on an “indisputably

meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an arguable basis in

law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists on the

face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,

141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court is required to dismiss

the action as soon as it makes such a determination. See Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-

0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A.

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se

plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the “strongest

[claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)(emphasis in original)(internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Harris v. Mills,

572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)(“Even after Twombly, though, we

remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” (citing

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007))).

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United

States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at

least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law

and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed

under the Constitution of the United States.” Rodriguez v.

Shoprite Supermarket, No. 19-CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

C. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine3

Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court

“lack[s] jurisdiction over cases that essentially amount to

appeals of state court judgments.” Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home

Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014). At its core, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a district court from hearing

“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where: “(1) the

federal-court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff

complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the

plaintiff invites . . . review and rejection of that judgment; and

(4) the state judgment was rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Relevant here, where a plaintiff initiates a

federal court action after the entry of a foreclosure judgment,

“courts in this Circuit have consistently held that any attack on

3 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (holding that

only the Supreme Court can entertain a direct appeal from a state

court judgment); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (finding that federal courts do not have

jurisdiction over claims which are “inextricably intertwined” with

a prior state court determination).

a judgment of foreclosure is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.” Nath v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 15-CV-3937, 2016 WL

5791193, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted); see also Borukhov v. Vartolo, No.

19-CV-3395, 2020 WL 5424595, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,

2020)(Seybert, J.)(“To the extent [the plaintiff] asks the federal

court to grant him title to his property because the foreclosure

judgment was obtained fraudulently, Rooker–Feldman bars [his]

claim.”)(quoting Vossbrinck, 773 F.3d at 427)).

III. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Applying these standards to Plaintiff’s Complaint, even

with the special solicitude afforded to pro se pleadings, it is

readily apparent that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because

all four of Rooker-Feldman’s requirements are satisfied. First,

Plaintiff lost in state court when the Appellate Division affirmed

the Supreme Court’s entry of a judgment of foreclosure and sale

against the Property. See Deutsche Bank, 202 A.D.3d 1052 at

1053-54. Second, Plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state

court judgment, namely, that he suffered “hardship, monetary loss,

distress, damage to his credit rating and reputation.” (See Compl.

at 6.) Indeed, the gravamen of the Complaint is that the state

court orders have and will continue to harm Plaintiff given the

order of eviction and looming sale of the Property. Third,

Plaintiff invites review and rejection of the foreclosure judgment

based upon his request for this Court to “stop the lower State

courts orders being enforced,” to halt Defendant from evicting

him, and to stop the Property from being sold. (See id. at 6-7.)

And fourth, the Appellate Division affirmed the foreclosure

judgment on February 23, 2022, which is almost two months before

Plaintiff commenced the instant case on April 18, 2022. Thus, all

four requirements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied.4

Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims and the Complaint is DISMISSED

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

Moreover, even if Rooker-Feldman did not divest this

Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, the Complaint must

nevertheless be dismissed because it fails to allege a plausible

claim for relief. First, to the extent Plaintiff asserts a Section

1983 claim against Defendant, he has not included any allegations

4 Plaintiff’s due process claim is an unavailing attempt to confer

jurisdiction upon this Court. See, e.g., Castiglione v. Papa, 423

F. App’x 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2011) (“As noted by the District Court,

[plaintiff] cannot avoid application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine simply by ‘presenting in federal court a legal theory not

raised in state court,’ for example, by framing her claims under

§§ 1983 or 1985.”); Yanping Xu v. Suffolk Cty., No. 19-CV-1362,

2020 WL 3975471, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2020)(applying Rooker-

Feldman and explaining that “the Second Circuit has long held that

a ‘federal plaintiff cannot escape the Rooker-Feldman bar simply

by relying on a legal theory not raised in state court.’” (quoting

Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.2d 77, 87 (2d Cir.

2005))).

upon which the Court could reasonably find Defendant, a private

corporation, to constitute a state actor or to have committed any

state action. Tancredi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d

308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff pressing a claim of violation

of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is . . . required to

show state action.” (citing Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,

838 (1982))); see also Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, FA,

307 F. Supp. 2d 565, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“A private entity is

not . . . ‘a state actor where its conduct is not compelled by the

state but is merely permitted by state law.’” (quoting Cranley v.

Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2003))).

Second, to the extent that Plaintiff purports to pursue

a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, Plaintiff has failed

to allege any involvement by a federal actor, rendering such a

claim implausible as a matter of law. Hamilton v. New York State

Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 18-CV-1312, 2019 WL

2352981, at *6 n.12 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2019) (“The Fifth Amendment

is applicable to federal actors, not state actors.” (citing Snow

v. Vill. of Chatham, 84 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (N.D.N.Y. 2000))).

Third, to the extent any state law claims remain, the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such

claims. Federal courts “have supplemental jurisdiction over all

other claims that are so related to claims [over which the court

has] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Stated differently, “[t]he

state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of

operative fact.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 725 (1966). In deciding whether to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction, a district court should balance the “values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie–

Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). “In general,

where the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state

claims should be dismissed as well.” Delaney v. Bank of America

Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2014). Here, having dismissed

Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court finds the factors of economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity do not support the exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.

Accordingly, to the extent the Complaint asserts any state law

claims, they are DISMISSED.

IV. Plaintiff’s Requests for Injunctive Relief

In light of the Court’s ruling that it lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it need not address Plaintiff’s motions

for preliminary injunctions and for a TRO. Corbett v. City of New

York, No. 13-CV-0602, 2013 WL 12334603, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,

2013)(“Where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a

plaintiff’s claims, it may not consider plaintiff’s related

application for injunctive relief.” (citing Borden, Inc. v. Meiji

Milk Prods. Co., Ltd., 919 F.2d 822, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1990))); Bey

v. Jamaica Realty, No. 12-CV-2141, 2012 WL 1634161, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.

May 9, 2012) (“[T]he [pro se] complaint is dismissed and the Court

cannot consider plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining

order as this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this

action.”)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motions for a TRO and for a

preliminary injunction are DENIED.

V. Leave to Amend

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an

opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to

amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v.

Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo,

861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in the

Complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to

grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. See Flores-

Grgas v. New York City Admin. for Children Servs., No. 21-CV-5912,

2021 WL 3501327, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2021).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED and the

successive IFP application (ECF No. 13) is MOOT ;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims are

DISMISSED pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) and

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii);

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions for

preliminary injunctions (ECF No. 3; ECF No. 6) are DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO

(ECF No. 14) is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3), any appeal from this Order would not be taken in

good faith. Therefore, in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the

purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

438, 444-45 (1962); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall:

(1) Enter judgment accordingly;

(2) Close this case; and

(3) Mail a copy of this Memorandum & Order to Plaintiff at his

address of record.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT ____

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: June 21, 2022

Central Islip, New York