McKoy v. John Doe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JERRY QUINN McKOY,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

- against - 21-CV-1873

SUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY and JOHN DOE OFFICERS # 1-5,

Defendants.

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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff Jerry Quinn McKoy, then detained at the Suffolk County

Correctional Facility (“Correctional Facility”), filed this pro se action against the Correctional

Facility and John Doe Officers # 1–5, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was injured

at the Correctional Facility. The Complaint is hereby dismissed in its entirety without leave to

amend.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that while detained at the Correctional Facility, he slipped and fell on a

wet floor outside of his cell and suffered injuries to his right arm, elbow, shoulder, and hip, for

which he received medical attention. (Dkt. 1, at 2, 4.) Plaintiff asserts that the John Doe Officers

violated his rights by failing to properly perform their duties to maintain a safe environment. (Id.

at 4.) Plaintiff seeks $5 million each in punitive and compensatory damages and requests that

officers be trained in their duties. (Id. at 5.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court “shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in

any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. The district court shall sua sponte dismiss a prisoner complaint if it is “frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To avoid dismissal, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

In addressing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations

and draw[s] from them all reasonable inferences; but [it is] not required to credit conclusory

allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Hamilton v. Westchester County,

3 F.4th 86, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Complaints filed by pro se litigants are held

to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and the Court is required to read the

Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally and interpret it raising the strongest arguments it suggests.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order

to maintain a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements. First, “the conduct

complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Pitchell v.

Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994). Second, “the conduct complained of must have deprived

a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Id. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead

that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); see also Farrell v. Burke,

449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006).

Prisoners and detainees have constitutionally protected rights to receive humane conditions

of confinement, including adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and security. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and is applicable to state detainees through the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that

suggest a violation of these rights. At most, Plaintiff’s allegations about injuries caused by water

on the floor may suggest a state law claim for negligence. Merely negligent conduct causing

unintended loss or injury to life, liberty or property is not sufficient to state a claim under the Due

Process Clause or any other provision of federal law. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332–

33 (1986) (due process protections are not triggered by lack of due care by state officials);

Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1986) (although official’s negligence led to serious

injury, the Constitution requires no procedure to compensate injury arising from negligence);

Brown v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-CV-420 (BMC), 2017 WL 473874, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

Feb. 3, 2017) (“[C]ourts have routinely found that allegations of a wet floor that cause a prisoner

to slip and fall at most support a finding of simple negligence, and therefore do not reach the level

of a constitutional violation required for a § 1983 claim.” (citing cases)).1 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Court has considered affording Plaintiff a chance to amend the complaint, see Cuoco

v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000), but declines to do so because it views the

1 Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that the medical care he

received after he slipped and fell was inadequate, which, in any event, would only give rise to a

constitutional claim if the care providers were “deliberately indifferent.” Smith v. Carpenter, 316

F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)).

opportunity as futile since a review of the Complaint does not suggest that Plaintiff has

inadequately or inartfully pleaded any potentially viable claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim

without leave to amend. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal

would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is respectfully

directed to enter judgment, close this case, and mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to

Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: April 12, 2022

Brooklyn, New York