Opinion

Harvey v. Creedmoor Psychiatric Center

Court
District Court, E.D. New York
Filed
Feb 17, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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LAMAR HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

- against - 21-CV-7031 (PKC) (LB)

DARRIN GERSON, Chief of Service,

in his official capacity,

Defendant.

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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On December 10, 2021, Plaintiff Lamar Harvey, currently detained at Creedmoor

Psychiatric Center (“Creedmoor”) in Queens, New York, filed this pro se action against

Creedmoor and the Office of Mental Health, an agency of New York State.1 (Complaint

(“Compl.”), Dkt. 2.) By Memorandum and Order dated January 4, 2022, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissed the Complaint with leave

to replead within thirty (30) days. (Dkt. 6.) On February 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended

Complaint against Darrin Gerson, Chief of Service at Creedmoor. (Amended Complaint (“Am.

Compl.”), Dkt. 9.) The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for lack of standing, but

allows Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend his complaint.

BACKGROUND

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gerson denied his request to

access a law library, and that, “[b]ecause of [Plaintiff’s] 330.20 status,” the denial of access to a

1 Courts “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such

submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind,

864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017).

law library violates his constitutional rights.2 (Am. Compl., Dkt. 9, at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant’s conduct has caused him “mental anguish” and seeks unspecified monetary and

injunctive relief. (Id. at 4–5.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss an IFP action if the

complaint “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addressing the sufficiency of a

complaint, a court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations and draw[s] from them all reasonable

inferences; but [it is] not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as

factual allegations.” Hamilton v. Westchester County, 3 F.4th 86, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation

omitted).

“Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, ‘the judicial Power of the United States’

extends only to certain ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Lacewell v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency,

999 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1–2). “To satisfy the

Constitution’s ‘case-or-controversy requirement,’ a plaintiff in federal court ‘must establish that

they have standing to sue.’” Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013)).

“[A]t the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating” standing. Spokeo,

Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (quotations and ellipses omitted).

2 New York Criminal Procedure Law 330.20 governs the “[p]rocedure following verdict

or plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20.

DISCUSSION

The Amended Complaint alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Defendant denying

Plaintiff access to a law library deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional right to access the courts.

Section “1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Vill. of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 600 n.8 (2d Cir.

2016) (citation and quotations omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

that defendants violated plaintiff’s federal rights while acting under color of state law.” McGugan

v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

The constitutional right of access to the courts requires that inmates “be provided the tools

needed to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions

of their confinement.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). But there is no “abstract,

freestanding right to a law library.” Id. at 351. “To establish standing for a claim for denial of

access to the courts, an inmate must show that he suffered an actual injury, such that a

‘nonfrivolous’ legal challenge to his judgment of conviction or conditions of confinement ‘had

been frustrated or was being impeded’ by the actions of prison officials.” Rosado v. Maxymillian,

No. 20-3965-CV, 2022 WL 54181, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 2022) (summary order) (quoting Lewis,

518 U.S. at 351–53, 355). That is, “the inmate must demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in

the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Bourdon v.

Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2004) (ellipses omitted) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351)). For

example, “an inmate may establish standing ‘by demonstrating that he has been unable to file a

complaint or has had a complaint dismissed for failure to observe a technicality.’” Maxymillian,

2022 WL 54181, at *1 (quoting Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges only that he needs access to a law library “because of [his] 330.20

status.” (Am. Compl., Dkt. 8, at 4.) He does not allege that “he suffered an actual injury, such

that a ‘nonfrivolous’ legal challenge to his judgment of conviction or conditions of confinement

‘had been frustrated or was being impeded’ by the actions of prison officials.” Maxymillian, 2022

WL 54181, at *1 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351–53, 355). Thus, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue

a claim for denial of his access to the courts. The Amended Complaint therefore must be

dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Amended Complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court grants Plaintiff a final opportunity to file a second amended

complaint, which must be filed within thirty (30) days of this Memorandum and Order. Plaintiff

is advised that the second amended complaint will completely replace the original complaint and

amended complaint, must be captioned “Second Amended Complaint,” and shall bear the same

docket number as this Memorandum and Order. All further proceedings shall be stayed for thirty

(30) days or until Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, whichever is earlier. If Plaintiff fails

to file a second amended complaint within the time allowed or fails to show good cause why he

cannot, the Court shall direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: February 17, 2022

Brooklyn, New York

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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