The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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CHARLES DIDIER CALIXTE,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against- 21-CV-3623 (RPK) (LB)
SUSAN RAY EQUITIES INC.,
Defendant.
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RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Charles Didier Calixte brings this action pro se against Susan Ray Equities Inc.
See Compl. (Dkt. #1). Because he fails to state a claim over which this Court has jurisdiction, his
complaint is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Calixte alleges that he lived in an apartment with his son and her mother, Compl. 5 &
8 (Dkt. #1), and paid some portion of the rent, id. 5-7. When he asked the landlord, defendant
Susan Ray Equities Inc., to transfer the lease into his name, defendant refused. Id. at 5. On August
20, 2021, defendant sent the building’s superintendent to change the locks and deny Mr. Calixte
access to the apartment. Ltr. from Charles Didier Calixte 1 (Dkt. #7). When plaintiff tried to gain
access, the superintendent called the police. Ibid. Mr. Calixte also claims that defendant “laced
his food.” Compl. 5. On this basis, Mr. Calixte sued for race discrimination, id. at 8, asserting
federal-question jurisdiction based on the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, id. at 3-4.
The Court ordered Mr. Calixte to show cause why the lawsuit should not be dismissed for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The order noted that federal courts lack jurisdiction over
landlord-tenant disputes and that Mr. Calixte failed to allege the facts necessary to support a
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or a claim of housing discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The Court directed Mr. Calixte to supplement his pleadings
to allege facts substantiating a federal claim. November 8, 2021 Order. In response, Mr. Calixte
explained that he is black, the superintendent is white, and defendant Susan Ray Equities is a
“Jew[-]owned business.” Ltr. 1-2.
DISCUSSION
A federal court may sua sponte raise the question of whether it has subject-matter
jurisdiction over a case. United Food & Comm. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-CIO v.
CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994). If a court “determines
at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed, and . . . held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quotations and citations omitted), but a pro se plaintiff must
“still . . . establish[ ] that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action,” Ally v. Sukkar,
128 F. App’x 194, 195 (2d Cir. 2005).
Mr. Calixte has failed to establish that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his case. He
invokes federal jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see Compl. at 4 (identifying the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments as the source of the Court’s jurisdiction). A case arises under federal law for
purposes of Section 1331 “if a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates
the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.” Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677,
690 (2006) (citations omitted). A federal court lacks jurisdiction over a federal claim that “clearly
appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or is “wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)
(internal quotations omitted). Here, construed liberally, the complaint might be read as invoking
the Fair Housing Act or Section 1983. But any assertions of federal jurisdiction under those
statutes appear wholly insubstantial and frivolous.
To plead a claim under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff must adequately plead housing
discrimination because of race. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). To do so, a plaintiff may offer direct
evidence of discriminatory treatment. “Direct evidence of discriminatory treatment is evidence
showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision,
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually
motivated the adverse action.” Fair Hous. Just. Ctr., Inc. v. Cuomo, No. 18-CV-3196 (VSB), 2018
WL 4565152, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018) (quoting United States v. Hylton, 944 F. Supp. 2d
176, 187 (D. Conn. 2013), aff’d, 590 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2014)). Alternatively, a plaintiff may
make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc). To do
so, he must offer “at least minimal support for the proposition that” an adverse action by a housing
provider “was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Ibid.
Mr. Calixte falls far short of pleading that defendant took action against him based on race
under either of these methods. He alleges no direct evidence of discrimination, since he does not
allege facts, such as statements or written policies, that directly show that defendant treated him
as it did because of his race. Nor does he provide even minimal support for the claim that defendant
was motivated by discriminatory intent under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Mr. Calixte’s
allegations that Mr. Calixte is black and the owners of defendant are allegedly Jewish is not
remotely adequate to support an inference that defendant’s actions toward Mr. Calixte were
motivated by his race. After, all, “the mere fact that something bad happens to a member of a
particular racial group does not, without more, establish that it happened because the person is a
member of that racial group.” Williams v. Calderoni, 11-CV-3020 (CM), 2012 WL 691832, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (emphasis in original), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Schwartz, 529 F. App’x
89 (2d Cir. 2013); Brown v. Greene, 11-CV-4917 (BMC), 2012 WL 911560, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
16, 2012) (rejecting “conclusory allegations that [the plaintiff] was mistreated as a result of his
race”); see Jackson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 15-CV-5062 (PKC) (ST), 2018 WL
8369422, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2018) (rejecting as insufficient to raise an inference of
discrimination the allegation that “everyone [the plaintiff] communicated with and had authority
over her application was white” (internal quotations and brackets omitted)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1376840 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019), aff’d, 811 F. App’x 27
(2d Cir. 2020). Beyond this, Mr. Calixte’s assertions that defendant abused him because of his
race depend entirely on “speculative inference.” Francis, 992 F.3d at 74. But speculative
inference is not enough to state a Fair Housing Act claim.
Plaintiff also falls far short of stating a valid Section 1983 claim. Section 1983 permits suit
against any person who deprives another of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” However, “[e]mbedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a
dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair
the conduct may be.” National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
Accordingly, “[w]hen Congress enacted § 1983 as the statutory remedy for violations of the
Constitution, it specified that the conduct at issue must have occurred ‘under color of’ state law.”
Ibid.; see Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259, 263-64 (2d Cir.
2014). As a result, suits may only be brought against private individuals “if, [and] only if,” a
“close nexus exists between the state and the challenged action.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff alleges no
such nexus. Nothing in the complaint indicates that the landlord bore any relationship to the state,
or that the landlord’s actions “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Ibid. (quotations
omitted). Instead, Mr. Calixte simply asserts that a landlord did not transfer a lease into his name
and then locked him out. Accordingly, any Section 1983 claim set forth in the complaint is “wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (citations omitted).
In sum, Mr. Calixte states no valid federal claim. At most, he alleges landlord-tenant
disputes, and the Court lacks “subject matter jurisdiction over landlord-tenant matters such as those
raised here.” Allied Manor Rd. LLC v. Berrios, No. 17-CV-2277 (WKF) (RML), 2017 WL
5558650, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2017) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the complaint is
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The complaint is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff has thirty days to file a motion seeking leave to file an Amended
Complaint. The new complaint must be captioned “Amended Complaint” and shall bear the same
docket number as this order. All further proceedings are stayed for 30 days. If plaintiff does not
file such a motion within 30 days, judgment shall be entered dismissing the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Rachel Kovner
RACHEL P. KOVNER
United States District Judge
Dated: January 12, 2022
Brooklyn, New York