“state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”
How later courts described this case
- “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”
- noting that even after Twombly, the Court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------- x
MALACHI CHAPMAN, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
-against- : MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
:
TOSHANA MAYCOCK, : No. 21-cv-4940 (KAM)(JRC)
:
Defendant. :
---------------------------------- x
MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
On September 15, 2021, pro se Plaintiff Malachi Chapman
(“Plaintiff”), a resident of Brooklyn, New York commenced this
action against pro se Defendant Toshana Maycock, also a resident
of Brooklyn, New York, and the mother of his child.1 (ECF No. 1,
Complaint (“Compl.”).) Plaintiff has paid the Court’s filing fee
to initiate this action. (ECF No. 2, Filing Fee.) For the reasons
discussed below, the Complaint is dismissed.
1 On July 2, 2021, Plaintiff brought a purported class action against the United
States Department of Justice challenging decisions made in his family court
action as well as in family courts throughout the country. See Chapman v.
United States Dep’t of Just., No. 21-cv-3906(KAM). By order dated September 3,
2021, the action was dismissed without prejudice because the Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim against the defendant.
1
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this section 1983 action for alleged
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 249, Hate crime acts; 18 U.S.C. § 241,
Conspiracy against rights; 18 U.S.C. § 242, Deprivation of rights
under color of law; 18 U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy to commit offenses
or to defraud United States; 31 U.S.C. § 3729, False claims; and
18 U.S.C. § 1506, Theft or alteration of record or process; false
bail. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 46‒61.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has failed to comply
with family court orders setting forth conditions of parental
behavior, has been late when dropping off and picking up their
child, and has filed frivolous lawsuits against Plaintiff in family
court. (Id. ¶¶ 13-17.) Plaintiff seeks to set aside family court
orders of protection and child support. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff
submitted 314 pages of supporting documents, including a copy of
Title IV of the Social Security Act. (See ECF Nos. 1-2; 1-3.).
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, and injunctive and declaratory
relief.
2
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of New York, 631 F.3d
57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained in the complaint
are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se complaint is held
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see Harris
v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after
Twombly, the Court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se
complaint liberally”).
Federal court jurisdiction exists only when a “federal
question” is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when there is
“diversity of citizenship” and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal courts “have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”
3
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). When a federal
court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Id.; see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff’s allegations, even liberally construed, fail
to state claims “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Moreover, federal courts
lack jurisdiction over ongoing domestic relations matters. In
addition, based on the complaint, diversity jurisdiction is
lacking as Plaintiff alleges that he and Defendant both reside in
Brooklyn, New York.
Even if Plaintiff has paid the required filing fee, a
district court may dismiss the case, sua sponte, if it determines
that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or the action is
frivolous. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp.,
221 F.3d 362, 363–64 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Hawkins–El III v.
AIG Fed. Sav. Bank, 334 F. App’x. 394, 395 (2d Cir. 2009)
(affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of fee paid
frivolous complaint).
4
DISCUSSION
I. The Complaint Fails to State a Federal Claim
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983; 18 U.S.C. § 249; 18 U.S.C. § 241; 18 U.S.C. § 242; 18 U.S.C.
§ 371; 31 U.S.C. § 3729; and 18 U.S.C. § 1506, and invokes a number
of purported constitutional violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 46‒61.)
However, “[s]imply raising a federal issue in a complaint will not
automatically confer federal question jurisdiction.” Perpetual
Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002). Rather, a
court must “proceed prudently and make pragmatic distinctions
between those allegations, if any, that raise substantial
questions” and those that are “so patently without merit as to
justify . . . the court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction.”
Id. (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., 438 U.S.
59, 70 (1978)). There is no subject matter jurisdiction if the
purported federal claim is clearly “‘immaterial and made solely
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ or is ‘wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.’” S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs
Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Here,
even given a liberal construction, and despite Plaintiff’s
reference to many federal statutes and purported constitutional
rights, his allegations do not support a colorable federal claim
such that the Court’s federal question jurisdiction may be invoked.
5
A colorable section 1983 claim requires that a plaintiff
allege two elements: (1) that the conduct challenged “must have
been committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell
v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)); and (2) that the
conduct complained of “must have deprived a person of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.” Id.; see also Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51,
53 (2d Cir. 1999).
The Constitution regulates only the conduct of
government actors and not that of private parties. Ciambriello v.
Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). Private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful, is generally beyond the reach of
section 1983. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,
50 (1999); cf. Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (“state action may be found if,
though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and
the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”) (quoting Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
For Plaintiff to successfully allege a section 1983
claim, he must first establish that the conduct of the named
6
Defendant is “fairly attributable to the State.” American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 50. In other words, for Plaintiff to
show that his constitutional rights have been violated, he “must
first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes ‘state
action.’” See Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323 (citing United States
v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
Am., 941 F.2d 1292, 1295‒96 (2d Cir. 1991)). Private individuals
who are not state actors may nonetheless be liable under section
1983, however, if they have conspired with or engaged in joint
activity with state actors. Anilao v. Spota, 340 F. Supp. 3d 224,
253 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Stewart v. Victoria's Secret Stores, LLC, 851
F. Supp. 2d 442, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Stating a claim for joint
action or conspiracy with state actors requires more than
conclusory allegations and naked assertions. The complaint must
set forth a plausible theory of agreement and concerted action to
violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Stewart, 851 F. Supp.
2d 445‒46.
Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim fails because Defendant
is a private individual and Plaintiff has failed to plead a
plausible claim for joint action or conspiracy between Defendant
and state actors. Washington v. Williams, No. 19-cv-00289(MKB),
2019 WL 1876787, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2019). Here, the
Complaint states nothing more than bare and unsupported
7
allegations of a conspiracy between Defendant, a private
individual, and family court referees. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 19
(“both the referees have conspired against my rights to profit off
Title IV D, which is also infringement because of the illegal
seizure of one’s property protected under the 4th amendment.”).)
These allegations fall short of what is necessary to support a
claim of joint action or conspiracy with state actors and thus
impose individual liability under section 1983. Accordingly,
neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor the other federal statutes cited are
applicable and cannot be cited in a conclusory manner to establish
subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Domestic-Relations Abstention
The Supreme Court has recognized a domestic relations
exception to subject matter jurisdiction that “divests the federal
courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody
decrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); Tait
v. Powell, 241 F. Supp. 3d 372, 376 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2017). The
domestic relations exception arises from the Supreme Court’s
recognition that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
states, and not to the laws of the United States,” In re Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890). The Second Circuit has held that
though the domestic relations exception does not apply where the
8
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on a
federal question, not diversity, Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d
618, 623 (2d Cir. 2019), the court may nevertheless exercise
“domestic relations abstention” where a litigant’s claims are “on
the verge of being matrimonial in nature” and where “there is no
obstacle to their full and fair determination in state courts.”
Id. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Notwithstanding the labels used by Plaintiff to
characterize his claims, this action, in essence, is one seeking
to set aside family court orders of protection and child custody
and support. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 6 (“This case seeks declaratory
relief from the lower court decisions because constitutional
rights were not protected, oath of office were not honored when
cited 28 USC 453, conspiracy against and when judicial decision
have been comprised due to fraud upon the court . . . .”).) Indeed,
the Second Circuit in Deem held that the district court properly
abstained from considering the plaintiff’s claims that defendants
“conspired to maliciously prosecute him and to violate his right
to intimate association with his children” by seeking and obtaining
a temporary order of protection, because they were, “at a minimum,
on the verge of being matrimonial in nature.” 941 F.3d at 620,
625. See also Willliams v. NYU Hosp. Center Fin. & Payroll
9
Support, 19-cv-11612(LLS), 2020 WL 1878119, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
14, 2020) (“The domestic relations abstention doctrine bars this
Court from considering any challenge Plaintiff may be making to
entry of the child support order itself.”). Here, all the claims
for which Plaintiff seeks relief, regardless of how they are
framed, arise from the custody and support of his child, and thus
his claims fall within the ambit of the domestic relations
abstention doctrine.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges no plausible facts to
suggest that there are any obstacles preventing him from receiving
a full and fair determination in state court. Family court is
available as a forum to resolve his claims, and Plaintiff’s
conclusory statements alleging family court’s disregard of the
Constitution, or joint activity or conspiracy between Defendant
and family court referees, (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 19, 20, 30), without more,
are not sufficient to show that his claims are not capable of being
resolved fairly in state court.2
2 On December 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed an additional 72-page document (ECF No.
12) related to his family court matters, which does not change the Court’s
analysis that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and the instant action
therefore must be dismissed.
10
CONCLUSION
The complaint is hereby dismissed without prejudice
because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(3), and pursuant to the domestic relations abstention
doctrine. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment
dismissing this action, serve both pro se Plaintiff and Defendant
and note service on the docket, and close this case.
Although Plaintiff has paid the filing fee to bring this
action, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any in forma pauperis appeal from this order would not be
taken in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,
444‒45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
_________/s/______________
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
December 23, 2021
11