Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Ace Caribbean Market

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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UNION MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

18—CV-1570(EK)(ST)

-against-

ACE CARIBBEAN MARKET and NEERA

RAMDIN,

Defendants.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

This is a dispute over liability for a fire that

destroyed several buildings in Queens, New York. The Plaintiff

is Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which insured four of

the fire-damaged buildings; it has asserted negligence claims

under New York law. Defendants are ACE Caribbean, Inc., which

operated the grocery store in which the fire started, and the

owner of the building, Neera Ramdin; they now move for summary

judgment. Because I find that the Plaintiff has adduced

insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact on a key

element of its claims — namely, causation — I grant summary

judgment.

I. Background

The following facts are drawn from the parties’ Local

Rule 56.1 statements, deposition transcripts, the Defendants’

expert reports, and other documentary evidence submitted by the

parties. I read the evidence “in the light most favorable to

the party against which summary judgment is contemplated” —

namely, Union Mutual. See NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC

Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 178 (2d Cir. 2008).

The parties agree that the massive fire originated on

ACE Caribbean’s premises. They disagree, however, on its cause.

Plaintiff claims the fire started because ACE Caribbean misused

extension cords or “power strips” in the store, most likely to

power one or more refrigeration units that the parties call

“coolers” or “freezers” (collectively, “coolers”). Based on

certain evidence described more fully below, Plaintiff argues

that the finder of fact could reasonably infer that one or more

of these coolers were plugged into a wall outlet through a

series of “low” or “light” gauge extension cords; that it was

unsafe to power the cooler (or coolers) this way, given the

electrical load they required; and that these extension cords

were the cause of the fire. Defendants, for their part, contend

that the cause of the fire is indeterminable.1

1 The insurance company for another damaged building sued Defendants for

negligence in New York Supreme Court, Queens County. That court denied

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that triable questions

of fact existed. See Amguard Ins. Co. v. ACE Caribbean Mkt., Inc., No.

703672, 2020 WL 7773548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 2020) (supplying no further

explanation). The Amguard decision is on appeal to the Second Department.

1. The ACE Caribbean Store

ACE Caribbean operated a grocery store on the first

floor of 110-14 Liberty Avenue in Queens. 110-14 Liberty was a

two-story, wooden-frame building that sat in the “middle of a

row” of similar buildings. Defendants’ Notice of Mot. for

Summary Judgment Dismissing the Action Motion (“Defs.’ Mot.”)

Ex. A pt. 2, Exhibits to Fire Marshal Lewis Expert Disclosure

(“Lewis Disclosure Exs.”) at 74, ECF No. 77-5. Neera Ramdin

owned the building. Kaminie Singh, who owned ACE Caribbean,

leased the premises from Ms. Ramdin.

Singh employed a number of people to operate the

store. Several of them were questioned extensively about the

store’s layout and use of electronics. Those witnesses included

Kaminie Singh (the store owner), Ms. Ramdin (the landlord),

Hemwantie Singh (Kaminie’s mother and a full-time employee), and

Danesh Gobind (a part-time employee).

Reading the evidence in the light most favorable to

Union Mutual, the testimony established that the store had two

checkout counters — one in the front, and one in the back — each

with a variety of small electronic appliances (cash registers,

scales, and the like); two “display” coolers in the middle of

the store, at least one of which contained vegetables; another

cooler toward the righthand wall, as seen from the entrance,

containing beverages; and a fourth, “walk-in” cooler for storage

located outside the store’s back door, past an employees-only

area to the rear.2

The witness testimony did not establish definitively

whether these appliances were connected to power via extension

cords. But reading the evidence in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff, (1) there were three “surge protectors” or “power

strips” in the store — one in the front, and two in the back,

Gobind Dep. 69:14-23; (2) the two coolers in the middle of the

store plugged into one of the two “surge protectors” or “power

strips” in the rear of the store, Kaminie Dep. 54:18-22; Gobind

Dep. 69:14-23, 80:9-19; and (3) there were no floor outlets near

at least one of the center coolers, or by the outdoor cooler,

that those coolers could have plugged into directly.3

2. The Fire and Ensuing Investigation

The fire started at approximately 10:52 p.m. on March

4, 2017. No one was inside ACE Caribbean at the time, and no

2 Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 42, ECF No. 78-1; see also Defs.’

Mot. Ex. G, Dep. of Denesh Gobind (“Gobind Dep.”) 29:1-17; 61:7-63:6, ECF No.

77-14; id. Ex. E, Dep. of Kaminie Singh (“Kaminie Dep.”) 10:19-24, ECF No.

77-12; id. Ex. F, Dep. of Hemwantie Singh (“Hemwantie Dep.”) 28:11-15, ECF

No. 77-13; Lewis Disclosure Exs. at 69 (“Interview Sheet” recording Fire

Marshal Lewis’s interview with Kaminie Singh).

3 Hemwantie Dep. 30:10-17 (did not recall seeing electrical wires

emanating from the outdoor cooler, and did not see outlets on the outside

wall nearby); Gobind Dep. 50:12-15 (“I’m not sure where [the outside cooler]

plugged in.”); id. 69:11-13 (no “outlets in the floor of the store”). Store

employees also left the coolers powered on overnight, including on the night

of the fire. Kaminie Dep. 56:2-4; Hemwantie Dep. 35:18-22; Gobind Dep.

42:15-21; id. 85:3-6; see also Gobind Dep. 27:4-8 (the “cooler in the back of

the store . . . always stays on”); id. 79:10-23; id. 80:23-81:1.

one in the vicinity was seriously harmed. But four buildings

that Union Mutual insured were destroyed or damaged, along with

the ACE Caribbean building. Amended Compl. at ¶ 11, ECF No. 45.

Union Mutual paid approximately $1.5 million in insurance

proceeds for damage to the five neighboring buildings, which it

seeks now to recover from ACE Caribbean. Id.

Fire Marshal Matthew Lewis of the New York Fire

Department (“FDNY”) led the investigation into the cause and

path of the fire. Marshal James Kelly was Lewis’s supervisor.

In its discovery disclosures pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff identified Lewis and Kelly

as “non-retained” expert witnesses. Plaintiff’s theory of

causation is not clearly articulated, but Plaintiff relies

heavily (if not entirely) on Lewis’s “Fire Incident Report” — on

which Kelly signed off — to establish that element. Kelly also

sat for a deposition, though his testimony was based largely on

Lewis’s findings.

Lewis was unable to fully investigate the ACE

Caribbean premises until March 21, when the FDNY used “heavy

machinery” to clear his path through the store. Defs.’ Mot. Ex.

A pt. 3, Dep. of Matthew Lewis (“Lewis Dep.”) 55:24-56:4, ECF

No. 77-6 (“[T]he amount of fire that was in the building caused

the floor of the second floor and the roof to collapse down into

the first floor. This is why it took so long to even put a

cause on it.”); see also Lewis Disclosure Exs. at 74. During

this inspection, Lewis determined (based on burn patterns, among

other things) that the fire’s “area of origin” was in the back

of the ACE Caribbean store. Id. 56:6-11.

When he was able to assess the scene at ACE Caribbean,

Lewis found a power strip in the store’s back-left corner with

“four or five” “low gauge” extension cords plugged into it. Id.

56:14-18; see also id. 148:2-6. Some of these extension cords

ran to the back counter area; one plugged into another extension

cord; and a third ran behind a bookcase, where it plugged into

“more electrical wiring.” Lewis Disclosures Exs. at 78

(observing the “fire damaged remains of wires leading from power

strip towards the front of the store and terminating in the area

of . . . sales counter”); Lewis Dep. 123:2-12; 133:19-134:4

(observing one extension cord “leading away from the power strip

along the east party wall towards the rear of the store behind

wooden book case”). There were other extension cords plugged

into extension cords in this area, though the power source for

these cords is unclear. Id. 166:22-25 (there were “extension

cords plugged into extension cords, . . . completely separate

from the power strip,” and “one or two of [them] may have run

back towards the power strip”). But Lewis was unable to

determine where most of these cords ran, or which appliances

they powered. He did not indicate that any of the cords he saw

powered a cooler. Cf. Lewis Dep. 130:21-131:4 (did not

determine where soda coolers on right-hand wall connected to

power source); id. 133:12-18 (he did not “see any outlets where”

the central open-top cooler “would have been plugged in, in the

floor”).

After discovering these cords, Lewis left the

premises; he explained that he cut the March 21 investigation

short due to the structural risks he faced. Id. 56:4-57:8.

Lewis did not access this space again.

3. The Fire Incident Report

On March 31, Lewis issued a Fire Incident Report (the

“FIR”) based on his investigation. The FIR reports that the

fire “originated inside 110-14 in the rear of [ACE Caribbean] .

. . at floor level, in combustible material.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex N

at 1 (“Fire Incident Report”), ECF No. 77-21. It contains two

statements about the cause of the fire that are in some tension

with one another; each side invokes the statement it views as

more favorable. Plaintiff points to Lewis’s notation that the

“cause of fire” was an “extension cord.” Id. This entry

corresponded to the “Numerical / Cause Code” “210,” which Lewis

selected from a prefilled menu on the report. Lewis Dep.

162:20-25 (explaining that he chose this code and description

because “[w]e have limited . . . cause codes and titles that we

can use”). Elsewhere on the FIR, however, in a box labeled

“Description (Specify if Accidental),” Lewis wrote: “NOT FULLY

ASCERTAINED DUE TO STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE.” Fire Incident Report

at 1 (capitalization in original). Defendants, not

surprisingly, focus on this statement.

At his deposition, Lewis testified that he reported

the cause was an “extension cord” because he “believed” that was

the source of the fire. Lewis Dep. 57:20-25 (“[W]e believed it

was the extension cords.”). Lewis arrived at that belief

because he found the “four or five light-gauge extension cords”

in the area where the fire began. Id. 56:14-18. Lewis

explained that, given the limited number of “cause codes”

provided, “I could either have used [the code for] extension

cords or wiring” in the Fire Incident Report. Id. 162:20-23.

He ruled out the possibility that “hard wiring” caused the fire,

because “the outlet didn’t look damaged on the inside,” and the

burn patterns suggested the fire started “below the outlet.” Id.

58:2; 109:19-25.

Lewis explained, however, that he was unable to “fully

ascertain[]” the cause of the fire due to structural risks in

the building. Id. 56:23-57:8 (“[W]e got to a point where we got

in, we were able to look at the outlet, we were able to find the

wiring and the damage we saw on the wiring and it came to a

point we decided it was more of a safety concern . . . [and] at

that point we said we are done”). He explained that “we

couldn’t come up and say it was this extension cord . . . . We

had the electrical back there. We had the wiring. The wiring

had damage, but to actually say that was exactly what caused the

fire . . . we couldn’t ascertain that.” Id. 57:20-25; Defs.’

Mot. Ex. B. pt. 3, Dep. of James Kelly (“Kelly Dep.”) 107:14-18,

ECF No. 77-9 (“When we closed this case . . . it was the belief

that the fire was caused by a failed extension cord. One of

those extension cords — we didn’t know which one . . . .”).

Lewis acknowledged that Kelly directed him to enter

the “NOT FULLY ASCERTAINED” language. Lewis Dep. 230:20-24.

Lewis noted that the entry “could have been reworded as not

fully ascertained electrical wiring” or “not fully ascertained

in the area of extension cords.” Id. 232:18-21. But Lewis

“st[ood] by” Kelly’s recommendation, and would have put down

“not fully ascertained” even without Kelly’s input. Id. 231:13-

15; id. 232:18-23 (“It would still stay not fully ascertained.

It could have been reworded as not fully ascertained electrical

wiring or not fully ascertained in the area of extension cords

. . . .”).

Lewis delivered the power strip and extension cords to

the FDNY for storage. Id. 58:24-25:5. Because the FDNY

determined the fire was “accidental,” it did not “send [the

devices] out for testing.” Id. 58:7-24.

Defendants report that Plaintiff engaged an expert

witness of its own — an electrical consultant and engineer named

James Pryor, who told defense counsel that he intended to

examine the “wires” and other “artifacts” from the scene. Decl.

of Dennis M. Rothman in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summary

Judgment Dismissing the Action ¶ 3, ECF No. 77-1. Pryor did in

fact go to defense counsel’s office to obtain these items. Id.

In the end, however, Plaintiff did not identify this expert as a

witness in discovery or produce any report from him. Id. at

¶ 4.

4. Defense Expert Testimony

The Defendants presented testimony and reports from

two expert witnesses: Eugene West (a former FDNY fire marshal)

and James Crabtree (an electrical engineer and certified fire

and explosion investigator). Both experts determined that there

was no evidence that the Defendants were responsible for the

fire. Defs.’ Mot. Ex. K, Dep. of Eugene West 85:17-22, ECF No.

77-18 (“[T]here’s no evidence [Defendants] did anything that

would have been contributory to the cause of this fire or may

have caused this fire.”); id. Ex. M, Dep. of James Crabtree

72:12-14, ECF No. 77-20 (”[T]here is no evidence that an

extension cord caused this incident.”).

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and

that she “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “can affect the

outcome under the applicable substantive law.” Graham v.

Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996). A genuine dispute is

one that can “reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In

performing this analysis, the Court must resolve all ambiguities

and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Gallo

v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219,

1223 (2d Cir. 1994). “If, in this generous light, a material

issue is found to exist, summary judgment is improper.”

Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass'n, 182 F.3d 157,

160 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New

York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985)).

The moving party may establish that there is no

genuine dispute “by showing that little or no evidence may be

found in support of the nonmoving party’s case.” Gallo, 22 F.3d

at 1223-24 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986)). If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving

party “must come forward with specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d

68, 73 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v.

Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 535-26 (2d Cir. 1994)). However, the

non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and may not

rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.”

Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). If “no rational

finder of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party

because the evidence to support its case is so slight, summary

judgment must be granted.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

III. Analysis

To succeed on a negligence claim, plaintiffs must

establish the familiar elements of “(1) duty; (2) breach of

duty; (3) proximate cause; and (4) damages.” Bah v. Everlast

Logistics, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

(internal quotations omitted).

Here, Defendants’ motion focuses on the third element,

causation, though they tend to conflate it at times with the

second. For example, Defendants argue that Fire Marshal Lewis

“made no determination that the owner or the tenant of the

premises . . . used the power strip or extension cords

improperly.” Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Summary Judgment

Dismissing the Action at 10, ECF No. 77-2; (citing Lewis Dep.

191:25-192:12). This determination would have been relevant to

the breach-of-duty element. Likewise, Defendants argue that

Lewis was “unaware of any fire codes violated by the

defendants,” id. at 11; this argument, too, is directed at the

question of breach rather than causation. I thus consider the

elements of breach and causation in turn.

A. Breach

On the subject of a breach, Plaintiff lays out the

following syllogism: it is undisputed that there was at least

one cooler inside the store, and another one outside, with no

outlets near them. These coolers must have been plugged into

outlets, and needed extension cords to reach them. The only

electrical cords (or power strips) recovered on premises were

“low” or “light” gauge cords. And Lewis testified that it would

be “unsafe” to use “extension cords plugged into extension

cords” to carry as much “amperage and voltage” as would be

required for “appliances . . . that need higher power.” Lewis

166:23–167:18. Therefore, the Defendants breached the

applicable duty of care.

There are potential problems with this syllogism.

There is no record evidence at all, for example, concerning the

actual amount of amperage or voltage that the coolers would have

required. Lewis appears to be speaking, in the quoted passage

above, to a set of hypothetical circumstances rather than the

actual circumstances he witnessed. But the Court does not need

to drill down on these breach-of-duty issues, because

Plaintiff’s evidence of causation is incontrovertibly

inadequate.

B. Causation

Plaintiff argues that the “circumstantial evidence” in

this case “is legally sufficient to establish Defendants’

negligence as being responsible for the cause and origin of the

fire.” Circumstantial evidence is, of course, admissible to

establish the cause of a fire. See Minerals & Chem. Phillipp

Corp. v. S.S. Nat’l Trader, 445 F.2d 831, 832 (2d Cir. 1971)

(“By the very nature of a fire, its cause must often be proven

through a combination of common sense, circumstantial evidence

and expert testimony.”); N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Schwanter,

39 A.D.3d 511, 511-12 (2d Dep’t 2007) (denying summary judgment

on negligence claim brought by fire-insurance subrogee that

relied solely on circumstantial evidence); see also Holland v.

United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (“Circumstantial

evidence . . . is intrinsically no different from testimonial

evidence.”).

Regardless of the type of evidence a plaintiff relies

on, however, it must come forward with a certain quantum of such

proof. Specifically, a plaintiff must “establish a reasonable

probability that the accident was caused by [Defendants’]

negligence” rather than some other cause. Williams v. KFC Nat’l

Mgmt. Co., 391 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2004). In doing so,

plaintiffs need not “adduce the most reasonable explanation for

the accident” or “eliminate all other possible causes” for it.

Id. Nor must they “rule out the existence of remote

possibilities that the injury was not caused by the defendant,

or that the defendant was not negligent.” Olsen v. K Mart

Corp., No. 04-CV-3648, 2005 WL 2989546, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,

2005). But the trier of fact still must be able to determine

the cause of the injury as a matter of “logical inference.”

Schneider v. Kings Highway Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 743, 744

(1986). This means that alternative causes must be sufficiently

“remote” that a fact-finder could discredit them without

resorting to “speculation.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff relies heavily on the report and

testimony of Fire Marshal Lewis to establish causation. But

this evidence does not come close to satisfying Plaintiff’s

burden. Marshal Lewis testified that he could not opine with

confidence on the cause of the fire. Given the Marshal’s candid

acknowledgment of uncertainty and the dearth of other evidence

tending to show causation, the negligence claim cannot survive

summary judgment.

“Where the evidence . . . is capable of an

interpretation equally consistent with the presence or absence

of a wrongful act, that meaning must be ascribed which accords

with its absence.” Prunier v. City of Watertown, 936 F.2d 677

(2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Lahr v. Tirrill, 274 N.Y. 112, 117

(1937)). As the court explained in Bernstein v. City of New

York:

Where the facts proven show that there are

several possible causes of an injury, for one or

more of which the defendant was not responsible,

and it is just as reasonable and probable that

the injury was the result of one cause as the

other, plaintiff cannot have a recovery, since he

has failed to prove that the negligence of the

defendant caused the injury.

69 N.Y.2d 1020, 1021 (1987) (internal quotations and citations

omitted)). Here, Lewis’s report and testimony cannot fairly be

read to support the conclusion for which Plaintiff relies on

them. And it allows for other possible causes — like a

manufacturing defect — that are just as reasonable.

Lewis did list “Extension Cord” in the “Cause of Fire”

field in his Fire Incident Report (on which Kelly signed off).

Fire Incident Report at 1. But immediately below that, in the

“Description” field, Lewis qualified that statement: “NOT FULLY

ASCERTAINED DUE TO STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE.” Id. In his deposition

testimony, Lewis acknowledged having reported (in the FIR) that

“the extension cord” was the cause of the fire. Lewis Dep.

183:13-19. But Lewis maintained that he was, in the end, unsure

about the fire’s precise cause:

Q. If you were sure if it was actually the

extension cord, would you have listed that in your

report?

A. Yes.

Q. If you were sure it was the power strip, you

would have listed that in your report?

A. Yes.

Q. But in this case, since you didn’t list it,

it’s safe to say you couldn’t ascertain that’s exactly

what happened?

A. Right.

Id. 186:4-15.

Moments later, Lewis confirmed that he “couldn’t make

that determination” as to “what caused the fire.” Id. 191:10-

14. Asked whether he ever “determine[d] any evidence of any

nature that there were any problems ever with the extension cord

or power strip,” he confirmed that he had not. Id. 191:16-24.

Kelly, too, testified that the FDNY could not determine the

actual cause of the fire. Kelly Dep. 64:9-24 (“I feel quite

sure that the fire started in that area; other than that, I

can’t tell you what failed or why. I believe it was not fully

ascertained.”); id. 69:17-25 (confirming “there’s no certainty

with respect to the cause” of the fire, and that the FIR said it

“was a failure in the wires because there was nothing else there

except the wires, and that’s why it’s not fully ascertained

because we really don’t know.”). Indeed, Lewis testified that

he selected the “extension cord” designation because he was

hamstrung by the list of available codes he could choose, and

the only code that made sense was the extension-cord code.

Lewis Dep. 162:20-163:14 (explaining that “[w]e have limited

. . . cause codes and titles that we can use,” his only options

were “extension cords or wiring,” and he ruled out “wiring”

because that meant “hard wiring in the walls and ceilings,”

which he had no evidence to support).

This is not testimony from which a reasonable trier of

fact could determine that the misuse of extension cords was

“more likely than not” the cause of the fire. It simply does

not “establish a reasonable probability that the accident was

caused by [Defendants’] negligence” rather than some other

cause. Williams, 391 F.3d at 420; see also Ongley v. St. Lukes

Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 725 F. App’x 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2018)

(expert’s “causation theories were too speculative to survive

summary judgment” because he was “unable to state to any

reasonable degree of medical certainty which of . . . three

possibilities caused the injury”). This is true even at the

high level of Lewis’s conclusion — before taking up Plaintiff’s

burden to “come forward with specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” LaBounty, 137 F.3d at 73.

Indeed, the more Lewis’s deposition delved into the

realm of specific facts, the more Lewis undermined the

Plaintiff’s contention. Asked, for example, if it was “possible

that the [extension] cord could have had a manufacturing

defect?”, Lewis responded “Very well could have, yes.” Lewis

Dep. 187:17-21. Lewis acknowledged that he could not “determine

with a reasonable degree of fire science certainty” whether or

not the extension cord was “overloaded.” Id. 187:7-11; see also

id. 189:8-21 (Lewis was uncertain whether an overload occurred,

because he was unable to ascertain what was plugged into the

power strip).4

Put simply, neither Fire Marshal conclusively

determined the source of the fire. They opined that it could

have been the extension cord, but given the facts before them,

they were ultimately unsure. And they acknowledged, repeatedly,

that other causes were possible. This evidence does not raise a

genuine issue of fact as to causation. Olsen, 2005 WL 2989546,

at *5 (no causation “where it is just as reasonable and probable

that the injury was the result of” another cause).5 Plaintiff’s

4 None of this, needless to say, is to impugn either of the Fire

Marshals’ expertise. Indeed, their candid acknowledgments of uncertainty

reflect obvious professionalism and care. This opinion cites their

acknowledgments of uncertainty simply to explain why the Plaintiff cannot

carry its burden at the summary judgment stage in reliance solely on their

analysis.

5 To the extent Plaintiff relies on its logical syllogism (separate and

apart from Lewis’s testimony), the evidence of causation remains insufficient

to surpass summary judgment. The relative placement of extension cords and

appliances in the store, including coolers, does not make the misuse of

extension cords more likely a cause than other alternatives, including, for

instance, design or manufacturing defects in the cords themselves. Lewis

Dep. 187:17-21 (cause “very well could have” been manufacturing defect).

negligence claims against ACE Caribbean and its owner, Ms.

Ramdin, are therefore dismissed.

Iv. Conclusion

For the reasons set out above, Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is granted in its entirety. The Clerk of Court

is directed to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United States District Judge

Dated: September 30, 2021

Brooklyn, New York

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