The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------x
TONI PATRICIA IRONS,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
21-CV-4683 (KAM)(LB)
-against-
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT; DR.
ALEXANDRIA; STATE OF NEW YORK AND
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------x
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Toni Patricia Irons brings the instant pro
se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1, Complaint
(“Compl.”).) Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis
is granted. (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below
below, the complaint is dismissed and plaintiff is granted
thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Memorandum and
Order to submit an Amended Complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint is difficult to understand but
it appears that plaintiff alleges that she was “left an
inheritance that was stolen by the government, and when [she]
tried to obtain it and fix what the government did wrong to
[her] [she was] misdiagnosed and treated inhumanity [sic] and
deprived my life, liberty and my property and a right to speak
the truth.” (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff further alleges that “Dr.
Alexandria, never evaluated me and [diagnose] me as mentally
ill. Sueing on behalf of forced medications under threat and
pain and suffering, slandering my name, and wrongful
malpractice.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also asserts that she was
“arrested for a charge that I never did and was suppose[edly]
evaluated to see if I was able to stand [trial] and I was
introduced to 2 female [psychiatrist] and was never evaluated.”
(Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages and “her real name back.”
(Id. at 6.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to
less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and
the court is required to read plaintiff’s pro se complaint
liberally and interpret it raising the strongest arguments it
suggests. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Sealed
Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir.
2008). At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the court must
assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual
allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint must plead sufficient facts
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court
shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied
that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” An action is “frivolous” when either: (1) “the
‘factual contentions are clearly baseless,’ such as when
allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy”; or (2) “the
claim is ‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’”
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d
Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Rule 8
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a plaintiff must provide a short, plain statement of
claim against each defendant named so that they have adequate
notice of the claims against them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (Rule 8
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.”). A pleading that only “tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not
suffice. Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted). To
satisfy this standard, the complaint must at a minimum “disclose
sufficient information to permit the defendant to have a fair
understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to
know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v.
Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir.
Feb. 15, 2019).
The court is unable to determine exactly what claims
plaintiff is attempting to allege against each defendant and
thus, cannot evaluate whether plaintiff’s allegations state a
claim for relief. Neither the court nor defendants should have
to parse through the complaint or the attached exhibits to
ascertain the factual basis for plaintiff’s claims. Even
liberally construing the complaint in plaintiff’s favor, it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, the court will dismiss the complaint without
prejudice to allow plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
II. Claims Against the United States
In addition, plaintiff names the United States
government as a defendant. Claims against the United States,
however, are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Robinson v.
Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994).
Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against
the United States or agencies of the United States. See
F.D.I.C., 510 U.S. at 475. It is plaintiff’s burden to
demonstrate that sovereign immunity has been waived, and in the
absence of such a waiver the court lacks jurisdiction. See
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
Here, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the requisite waiver
of sovereign immunity by the United States. Thus, plaintiff’s
claims against the United States are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b).
III. Claims Against the State of New York
To the extent plaintiff seeks to bring claims against
the State of New York, those claims also cannot proceed because
“as a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal
court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity,
or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). New York has not
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court,
and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting §
1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d
35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Thus, plaintiff’s claims against the
State of New York are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
IV. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff's claim is brought pursuant to § 1983, which
requires that: (1) the conduct challenged must have been
“committed by a person acting under color of state law,” Cornejo
v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted); and (2) the conduct complained of
“must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id.
Here, plaintiff names Dr. Alexandria as a defendant,
but it is unclear whether Dr. Alexandria is a private medical
provider or a state or federal employee. If Dr. Alexandria is a
private physician, plaintiff is advised that Section 1983
“excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how
discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). A plaintiff, however, can establish that a
private actor was acting under color of state law by proving
either: “(1) the existence of joint activity between the private
actor and the state or its agents, or (2) a conspiracy between
the state or its agents and the private actor.” Young v.
Suffolk Cnty., 922 F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Dr.
Alexandria is implausible because plaintiff has not alleged
whether Dr. Alexandria is a state or federal actor. Nor has
plaintiff alleged any facts from which the court could
reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 conspiracy or joint
actor claim. Thus, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Dr.
Alexandria is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). To the extent plaintiff
intends to name Dr. Alexandria based on her possible status as a
federal employee, plaintiff’s allegations similarly fail as
possible Bivens claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
V. False Arrest Claim
Finally, to the extent plaintiff seeks to bring a
claim for false arrest, her claim, as stated, also fails. A
false arrest claim, brought pursuant to Section 1983 or Bivens,
requires plaintiff to name the arresting officer(s) as a
defendant and allege “[u]nder New York law, ‘to prevail on a
claim of false arrest a plaintiff must show that (1) the
defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was
conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent
to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise
privileged.’” Nzegwu v. Friedman, 605 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir.
2015) (quoting Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir.
2003)).
LEAVE TO AMEND
In light of this court’s duty to liberally construe
pro se complaints, the court will allow plaintiff 30 days leave
to file an Amended Complaint in compliance with Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules Civil Procedure. Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593 (2d
Cir. 2000). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, plaintiff must provide a short, plain statement of
claim to support her claim against each defendant so that the
defendant(s) have adequate notice of the claims against them.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). A pleading
that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal citations and
alterations omitted). Furthermore, plaintiff cannot rely on
exhibits or other documents to replace a statement of claim.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above,
plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In light of this court’s duty to liberally construe pro se
complaints, plaintiff is granted 30 days leave from the date of
this Order to file an Amended Complaint. Should plaintiff elect
to file an Amended Complaint, she must allege facts that support
the elements of the claim and identify defendants who personally
violated her constitutional rights while acting under color of
state or federal law. Plaintiff is advised that any Amended
Complaint she elects to file will completely replace, not
supplement, the original complaint. The Amended Complaint must
be captioned as an “Amended Complaint,” and bear the same docket
number as this Order: 21-CV-4683 (KAM) (LB).
No summonses shall issue at this time and all further
proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days. If plaintiff fails to
comply with this order within the time allowed, or cure the
deficiencies discussed herein, judgment shall enter dismissing
the action. The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(a)(3) that any in forma pauperis appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to send a
civil rights complaint form to plaintiff, and a copy of this
Order, and note service on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
Dated: September 27, 2021
Brooklyn, New York