Nixon v. Inquisitr, LTD.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------X

JUSTIN NIXON,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff, 20-CV-1819(JS)(SIL)

-against-

INQUISITR LTD.,

Defendant.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Richard Liebowitz, Esq.

Liebowitz Law Firm, PLLC

11 Sunrise Plaza, Suite 305

Valley Stream, New York 11580

James H. Freeman, Esq.

Liebowitz Law Firm, PLLC

1333A North Avenue, Suite 762

New Rochelle, New York 10804

For Defendant: Nolan Keith Klein, Esq.

Law Offices of Nolan Klein, P.A.

5550 Glades Road, Suite 500

Boca Raton, Florida 33431

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Justin Nixon (“Plaintiff”) commenced this

action against defendant Inquisitr Ltd. (“Defendant” or

“Inquisitr”) asserting a claim for copyright infringement under

the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101. Pending before the Court is

Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).

(Mot., ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff opposes the motion and requests the

opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. (Pl. Opp., ECF

No. 20.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s request for

limited discovery is denied and Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND1

I. Factual History

Plaintiff is a professional photographer with a usual

place of business located at 806 Fig Tree Lane, Brandon, Florida

33511. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff took a photograph

of the rapper Lil Wayne (the “Photograph”) and registered it with

the United States Copyright Office. (Id. ¶¶ 15-17.) The

Photograph’s Copyright Registration Number is VA 2-180-735, and

Plaintiff is the sole owner of the Photograph. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.)

Defendant owns and operates the website

www.inquisitr.com (the “Website”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) On December

19, 2017, Defendant published an article (the “Article”) on its

Website entitled Rick Ross Questions Birdman’s Net Worth After

Cash Money Boss Defaults On $12 Million Loan. (Id. ¶ 18.) Embedded

in the Article was an Instagram link that displayed the Photograph.

(Ex. C, ECF No. 13-3, attached to Am. Compl.) The Article featured

the Photograph, though Defendant did not license or obtain

permission from Plaintiff to publish the Photograph on the Website.

(Id. ¶ 19.)

1 The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint and

the parties’ submissions.

Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that

this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant “because

Defendant resides and/or transacts business in New York.” (Am.

Compl. ¶ 3.) He makes the following allegations regarding

jurisdiction:

•

The Website uses the English language and a

“.com” domain name “(which is based in the

United States)” (Am. Compl. ¶ 10);

•

Defendant “publishes news content that is

directed to audiences within this State and

Judicial District” on such topics as

“Jennifer Lopez, Rush Limbaugh, Hailey

Baldwin, the NBA, and WWE -– all of which are

United States-based celebrities and

organizations,” (id. ¶ 11); and

•

Defendant “has previously been sued within

this Judicial District and has resolved such

disputes” (id. ¶ 14).

The Amended Complaint further contains allegations, all made upon

information and belief, that:

•

Defendant maintains its principal place of

business in Brooklyn, New York. (Am. Compl.

¶ 6.) In support of this allegation,

Plaintiff attaches a screenshot from the

website glassdoor.com indicating that

Inquisitr’s Headquarters is in Brooklyn, New

York. (Id., Ex. A.)

•

Defendant’s Chief Executive Officer, Dominick

Miserandino (“Miserandino”), resides in

Oceanside, New York. (Id. ¶ 7.)

•

Defendant “employed and/or contracted with

individuals who reside within this Judicial

District for the purpose of operating,

managing, and supervising the photographic

content uploaded to the Website, including the

infringing content at issue in this case.”

(Id. ¶ 9.);

•

Defendant “received a financial benefit

attributable to the infringing activity

described herein as a result of transacting

business in this State and within this

Judicial District.” (Id. ¶ 12.) and

•

Defendant’s primary server is located in New

York. (Id. ¶ 13.)

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action on April 15, 2020,

stating a single claim of copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C.

§§ 106 and 501. After being served with a motion to dismiss by

Defendant, on June 16, 2020 (see ECF No. 9), Plaintiff filed the

Amended Complaint, which added the jurisdictional allegations set

forth above.2 Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to

dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack

of personal jurisdiction.

2 By Order dated June 26, 2020, a court in the Southern District

of New York, in another copyright infringement case, imposed

sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel Richard Liebowitz and also

ordered him to file a copy of that Order in all currently pending

cases. See Usherson v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., No. 19-CV-6368,

2020 WL 3483661, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020), aff’d sub nom.

Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., No. 20-2304-CV, 2021 WL

3118938, at *1 (2d Cir. July 23, 2021). Mr. Liebowitz has complied

with that directive in this case. (See ECF No. 16.)

In support of its motion, Defendant has provided an

affidavit from Daniel Treisman, the “Director and owner” of

Inquisitr, by which Defendant contends that it is an Israeli

limited company, incorporated in Israel without any real estate,

offices, mailing addresses, telephone numbers or bank accounts in

the State of New York. (Treisman Aff., ECF No. 19-3.) In response,

Plaintiff argues that jurisdictional discovery is warranted to

show whether Defendant has substantial ties with employees and/or

third-party contractors in New York.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Rule 12(b)(2)

To survive a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage

“for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima

facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law

Offices, 799 F.3d 161, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted);

see also Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha (“Penguin I”), 609

F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating personal jurisdiction over a person or entity

against whom it seeks to bring suit.” (citation omitted)). “A

prima facie showing of jurisdiction does not mean that plaintiff

must show only some evidence that defendant is subject to

jurisdiction; it means that plaintiff must plead facts which, if

true, are sufficient in themselves to establish jurisdiction.”

Tamam v. Fransabank Sal, 677 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, “a

complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for want of personal

jurisdiction so long as its allegations, taken as true, are

‘legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.’” Troma Ent.,

Inc. v. Centennial Pictures Inc., 729 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2013)

(quoting Penguin I, 609 F.3d at 35).

“In evaluating whether the requisite showing has been

made, the Court must construe the pleadings and any supporting

materials in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Hillel

v. Obvio Health USA, Inc., No. 20-CV-4647, 2021 WL 229967, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). “The Court will not, however, ‘draw argumentative

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor’ or ‘accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Id. (quoting In re

Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir.

2013); see also Bracken v. MH Pillars Inc., No. 15-CV-7302, 2016

WL 7496735, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2016)(“conclusory non-fact-

specific jurisdictional allegations or a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation will not establish a prima facie showing

of jurisdiction” (citation omitted)).

Under the plausibility standard in civil cases,3 a

plaintiff is not prevented from pleading facts upon information

3 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

and belief “where the facts are peculiarly within the possession

and control of the defendant,” or “where the belief is based on

factual information that makes the inference of culpability

plausible.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d

Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “However, even in those

circumstances, the plaintiff still bears the burden of alleging

the facts upon which her or his belief is founded.” Minnie Rose

LLC v. Yu, 169 F. Supp. 3d 504, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal

quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); see also Guo

Jin v. EBI, Inc., No. 05-CV-4201, 2008 WL 896192, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 31, 2008) (“Conclusory allegations showing the presence of

jurisdiction, particularly those stated only upon ‘information and

belief,’ are insufficient to establish that the court has personal

jurisdiction over the defendant.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)).

A determination that a court has personal jurisdiction

over a defendant requires two findings. First, the court must

determine whether the laws of New York provide for jurisdiction.

If they do, then the court must determine whether the exercise of

jurisdiction comports with the federal requirements of due

process. See Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d

158, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2010).

When addressing the question of jurisdiction, the Court

may consider matters beyond the face of the complaint. See Lugones

v. Pete & Gerry’s Organic, LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 226, 234 (S.D.N.Y.

2020) (“Where a court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the

jurisdictional question, it may, nevertheless, consider matters

outside the pleadings.” (citation omitted)). In this context, the

court “has considerable procedural leeway. It may determine the

motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery

in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on

the merits of the motion.” Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco

BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. Personal Jurisdiction in New York

Plaintiff suggests that Defendant is amenable to

jurisdiction under sections 301 and 302 (a)(1) of New York’s Civil

Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”). Under section 301, “a court in

New York may exercise general jurisdiction over an out-of-state

defendant if the defendant ‘engaged in continuous, permanent, and

substantial activity in New York.’” George Moundreas & Co SA v.

Jinhai Intelligent Mfg. Co., No. 20-CV-2626, 2021 WL 168930, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2021) (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum

Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000)). “The paradigmatic forums

where a corporate defendant is essentially at home are ‘where it

is incorporated’ and where it ‘has its principal place of

business.’” Kerman v. InterContinental Hotels Grp. Res. LLC, No.

20-CV-1085, 2021 WL 930253, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2021) (quoting

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)). “[G]eneral

jurisdiction extends beyond an entity’s state of incorporation and

principal place of business only in the exceptional case where its

contacts with another forum are so substantial as to render it ‘at

home’ in that state.” Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding

A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2014).

New York’s long arm statute allows a New York court to

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary

who, inter alia, “transacts any business within the state or

contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state. . . .”

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).4 “To determine the existence of

jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), a court must decide

(1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York

and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ such

a business transaction.” Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d

239, 246 (2d Cir. 2007). A party’s “[p]urposeful availment is the

overriding criterion necessary to establish personal jurisdiction

pursuant to § 302(a)(1), and requires more than random, fortuitous,

or attenuated contacts.” Philpot v. Kos Media LLC, No. 16-CV-

1523, 2017 WL 2270248, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2017) (internal

4 Plaintiff does not invoke section 302(a)(3), which, in copyright

infringement cases, would allow a court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant only where the

copyright holder is located in New York. See Penguin Grp. (USA)

Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 16 N.Y.3d 295, 302, 946 N.E.2d 159, 921

N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. 2011).

quotation marks and citation omitted), report and recommendation

adopted, 2017 WL 2269531 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017).

DISCUSSION

I. General Jurisdiction under New York law

In asserting general jurisdiction over Defendant under

section 301, Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that

Defendant’s principal place of business is in Brooklyn, New York,

an allegation that relies upon a webpage from the website

glassdoor.com indicating that Inquisitr’s “Headquarters” is in

Brooklyn, New York. (Ex. A, ECF No. 13-1. attached to Am. Compl.)

Defendant has submitted Treisman’s sworn affidavit stating that

Inquisitr is an Israeli limited company incorporated in Israel,

and that he does not operate an office, maintain a mailing address

or phone number, or have any bank accounts in the United States,

including in New York. (Treisman Aff. ¶ 3.)

The Glassdoor website submitted by Plaintiff constitutes

hearsay and is not admissible as support for his claim. See, e.g.,

Miami Prods. & Chem. Co. v. Olin Corp., 449 F. Supp. 3d 136, 179

(W.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[D]ocuments from the third-party website

submitted by Plaintiffs are inadmissible hearsay, and [the Court]

does not consider them for purposes of the personal jurisdiction

analysis.”); DeLorenzo v. Ricketts & Assocs., Ltd., No. 15-CV-

2506, 2017 WL 4277177, at *7 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017)

(“Plaintiff may not rely on a LinkedIn profile to establish

jurisdiction, as such an online profile is hearsay and does not

qualify as admissible evidence.”), aff’d sub nom. DeLorenzo v.

Viceroy Hotel Grp., LLC, 757 F. App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2018). Plaintiff

has alleged no facts to support a plausible inference that

Defendant is “at home” in New York, nor has he provided any

admissible evidence to rebut Treisman’s affidavit. Thus,

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant’s principal place of business

is in Brooklyn, New York is a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation and does not make a prima facie showing that general

jurisdiction exists.

II. Specific Jurisdiction under New York law

Plaintiff also contends that this Court has specific

jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to section 302(a)(1).

The first prong of that statute requires that the out-of-state

defendant either transact business within New York or contract to

supply goods or services in the state.

Where a non-domiciliary is sued in New York based on its

operation of a website, specific inquiries are warranted. “Because

websites are generally speaking, equally accessible everywhere,

the mere availability of the site to users in New York, standing

alone, does not amount to transacting business in the state for

purposes of section 302(a).” Royalty Network Inc. v. Dishant.com,

LLC, 638 F Supp. 2d 410, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). “When analyzing whether a defendant’s

internet activity rises to the level of purposeful activity

sufficient to satisfy Section 302(a)(1), courts apply a ‘sliding

scale’ test based on the level of a website’s interactivity.”

Audiovox Corp. v. S. China Enter., Inc., No. 11-CV-5142, 2012 WL

3061518, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2012). Accordingly, the issue

is where a particular website lies on the “spectrum of

interactivity,” Royalty Network, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 418, ranging

from passive websites “which merely make information available to

viewers,” Philpot, 2017 WL 2270248, at *10, to fully interactive

websites, “which are used to purposefully sell goods or services

in New York, or charge membership fees to registered users in New

York.” Id.

The Amended Complaint is devoid of any plausible

allegation that moves Inquisitr’s website anywhere beyond

“passive” on the spectrum. Plaintiff alleges that the Website

provides news content to its viewers, including those in New York.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 11.). Such passive websites have “been analogized

to an advertisement in a nationally-available magazine or

newspaper, and [do] not without more justify the exercise of

jurisdiction over the defendant.” Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding

Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

Beyond the conclusory and unsupported allegation that,

upon information and belief, Defendant “received a financial

benefit attributable to the infringing activity” (Am. Comp. ¶ 12),

there is no suggestion of any commercial activity conducted through

the Website. Plaintiff does not allege that Inquisitr’s viewers

are required to pay to access the content or that they can purchase

goods or services via the Website. A website that merely provides

information does not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of

conducting business activities in the state. See, e.g., ISI

Brands, Inc. v. KCC Int’l, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86 (E.D.N.Y.

2006) (“Internet websites that are not of a commercial nature and

do not permit the purchase of products on-line are not sufficient

to confer personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 302(a)(1).”);

Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Smartpool, Inc., No. 04–CV–5492, 2005 WL

1994013, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2005) (“Passive websites which

primarily make information available to viewers, but do not permit

an exchange of information, fail to justify the exercise specific

jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary.”). Even a broad reading of

the allegation construing “financial benefit” to mean “commercial”

activity is unavailing in light of the complete lack of any factual

support rendering the allegation plausible. See Savage Universal

Corp. v. Grazier Constr., Inc., No. 04-CV-1089, 2004 WL 1824102,

at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2004) (“It stretches the meaning of

‘transacting business’ to subject defendants to personal

jurisdiction in any state merely for operating a website, however

commercial in nature, that is capable of reaching customers in

that state, without some evidence or allegation that commercial

activity in that state actually occurred.”).

Plaintiff points to other allegations that he claims

support a prima facie showing that Defendant transacted business

in New York. He clearly relies upon Defendant’s relationship with

Miserandino, a New York resident, to suggest that Defendant

transacts business in the state, but his allegation and arguments

are inadequate to the task. The allegation in the Amended

Complaint, made upon information and belief, simply identifies

Miserandino as Inquisitr’s Chief Executive Officer without any

factual basis for that belief. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff

in his opposition papers again fails to articulate any basis for

this allegation; to the contrary, those papers walk back the

allegation in the Amended Complaint, describing Miserandino only

as a “senior-level executive.” (Pl. Opp. at 7.)

Defendant states that Miserandino is not an employee or

owner of Inquisitr, but rather works for Dysleximedia, LLC

(“Dysleximedia”), a third-party contractor of Inquisitr’s.

(Treisman Aff. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has seized upon Treisman’s

statement that Inquisitr contracted with Dysleximedia “to provide

a number of services including operational and executive support

service” (id.) and jumps to the conclusion that the contract was

“to upload photographic content to the Website within this Judicial

District.” (Pl. Opp. at 13.) Plaintiff presents no basis for

this inference, and “[t]he mere fact that a defendant purchases

goods or services from New York does not mean that it is doing

business here.” Arbitron Co. v. E.W. Scripps, Inc., 559 F. Supp.

400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l,

Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 227 N.E.2d 533 (1967)

(jurisdiction may be established through an agent if the agent

“does all the business which [Defendant] could do were it here by

its own officials.")).

Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had successfully

alleged that Inquisitr transacted business in New York, either

through the allegations regarding Defendant’s financial gain or by

Dysleximedia’s performance of services for Defendant in New York,

the Amended Complaint fails to satisfy the second prong for

specific jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) -- that the specific

cause of action asserted arose out of the party’s transaction of

business in New York. In other words, Plaintiff must plausibly

allege that the infringing publication of the Photograph took place

in New York, involved Defendant’s personnel in New York, or

“otherwise arose out of any of its activities in New York.”

Philpot, 2017 WL 2270248, at *9. He has failed to meet that

burden.

Plaintiff alleges two facts regarding Defendant’s

alleged infringement: (1) that Defendant ran an article on its

Website that featured the Photograph (Am. Compl. ¶ 18) and (2) that

Defendant did not license the Photograph from Plaintiff, nor did

it have his permission or consent to publish it (id. ¶ 19). He

does not plausibly claim that the infringing conduct occurred in

New York, but rather makes the conclusory allegation that “the

operative facts which form the basis of Plaintiffs claim from [sic]

copyright infringement occurred in the State of New York.” (Id.

¶ 20.) Plaintiff again fails to provide any hint whatsoever

regarding the source of his “information and belief” offered in

support of this allegation.

In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues that

Defendant “employed and/or contracted” with unspecified

individuals in this District “for the purpose of operating,

managing, and supervising the photographic content uploaded to the

Website, including the infringing content at issue in this case.”

(Pl. Opp. at 7-8 (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)) Again, he gives no

factual support or context for this statement. Absent factual

information that makes the inference of culpability plausible, his

suggestion that the Photograph was uploaded from New York is

insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden.

Moreover, even assuming that one of Dysleximedia’s

“operational” services was the uploading of material to the

Website, that company’s relationship with Inquisitr did not begin

until March 2018, a few months after the publication of the

Photograph that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claim. (See

Treisman Aff. ¶ 4.) Thus, Dysleximedia employees could not have

been involved with the particular transaction at issue here and

the second prong of section 302(a)(1) is not satisfied.

After construing the record in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, the Court finds that he has not made the requisite

prima facie showing of either general or specific personal

jurisdiction over Defendant.5

III. Plaintiff’s Request for Jurisdictional Discovery

In this Circuit, it is well settled that “even where

plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of personal

jurisdiction, a court may still order discovery, in its discretion,

when it concludes that the plaintiff may be able to establish

jurisdiction if given the opportunity to develop a full factual

record.” Leon v. Shmukler, 992 F. Supp. 2d 179, 194 (E.D.N.Y.

2014) (citations omitted). Jurisdictional discovery is warranted

only “where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing that there

is some basis for the assertion of jurisdiction[,] facts that would

support a colorable claim of jurisdiction.” Id. at 195 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original); see

5 As the Court finds that there is no specific jurisdiction under

New York law on the facts alleged, it need not address whether the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would satisfy the

constitutional requirements of due process. See generally Penguin

I, 609 F.3d at 35 (“[A]nalysis under Due Process principles is not

necessary unless there is long-arm jurisdiction under the

applicable state statute.”).

also Molchatsky v. United States, 778 F Supp. 2d 421, 438 (S.D.N.Y.

2011) (“A party seeking jurisdictional discovery, like a party

seeking other kinds of discovery, bears the burden of showing

necessity.”), aff’d 713 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff requests the opportunity to conduct discovery

“to meaningfully examine the contractual relationship between

Defendant and residents of the forum state as it relates to the

infringement in question.” (Pl. Opp. at 15.) While Plaintiff may

not be in full possession of the facts relating to the relationship

between Inquisitr and Dysleximedia or Miserandino, Plaintiff has

utterly failed to provide any factual basis to support the

allegations he has made. A plaintiff cannot open the doors to

discovery simply by filing a complaint replete with broad,

conclusory, allegations about what might be, without providing any

factual basis for those allegations or articulating how he came to

formulate them. To permit discovery in that situation turns the

process on its head and would merely encourage the filing of

complaints filled with “guesses” disguised as allegations.

In addition, as to Dysleximedia, further discovery is

unnecessary. Jurisdictional discovery is not warranted where

defendant “submits an affidavit that provides all the necessary

facts and answers all the questions regarding jurisdiction.”

A.W.L.I. Grp., Inc. v. Amber Freight Shipping Lines, 828 F. Supp.

2d 557, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Defendant has, through Treisman’s

sworn affidavit, established that any relationship with

Dysleximedia commenced after publication of the Photograph. As

discussed supra, the conduct forming the basis of Plaintiff’s

copyright infringement claim predates Defendant’s relationship

with Dysleximedia and thus the publication at issue did not arise

from any acts by the third-party contractor. Accordingly,

discovery into the nature of the relationship between the entities

would not assist Plaintiff in establishing jurisdiction.

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court declines to

grant Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion (Mot., ECF

No. 19) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close

the case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/_JOANNA SEYBERT __

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: August 17 , 2021

Central Islip, New York