The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
OMAR SANCHEZ and ALEXANDRA :
RAMOS, : MEMORANDUM DECISION
: AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, :
: 20-cv-4694 (BMC)
- against - :
:
KAREN GARDENS APARTMENT CORP. :
and JOSE BALAGOT,1 :
:
Defendants. :
:
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COGAN, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Omar Sanchez and Alexandra Ramos once worked as janitors for Karen
Gardens Apartment Corp. Sanchez sued Karen Gardens in state court, claiming that it failed to
pay the minimum wage under the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Ramos followed up with
her own suit in federal court, alleging that Karen Gardens violated not only the minimum-wage
provisions of the NYLL and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) but also the ban on sex
discrimination in the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). Both cases settled.
Later, a tenant at Karen Gardens reached out to plaintiffs. He sought to hire plaintiffs to
move furniture and remove garbage at his apartment. But a Karen Gardens board member
learned that plaintiffs were planning to work for the tenant, and the board member reported it
Jojo Balagot, the Karen Gardens President. Balagot told the tenant not to hire plaintiffs. The
tenant called off the deal.
1 Although plaintiffs named “Jojo Balagot” as a defendant, they have since clarified that his actual name is Jose
Balagot. The Clerk is directed to amend the docket sheet accordingly.
That sparked this second case, in which plaintiffs bring retaliation claims under the
FLSA, NYLL, and NYCHRL. Defendants initially said the settlement agreements barred
plaintiffs from working for individual tenants at Karen Gardens. Yet defendants have since
conceded that they were mistaken: the agreements barred plaintiffs from working for Karen
Gardens Apartment Corp. but not at Karen Gardens for individual tenants. Armed with this
concession, plaintiffs seek summary judgment as to liability.
Plaintiffs have established their prima facie case under the FLSA and NYLL’s “nearly
identical” retaliation provisions. See Jones v. Pawar Bros. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 3d 14, 27
(E.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) and N.Y. Labor Law § 215). First, plaintiffs
“engaged in protected activity” by filing a complaint in the first action. See, e.g., Santi v. Hot in
Here, Inc., No. 18-cv-03028, 2019 WL 290145, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2019). Second, there
was “an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff[s].” Mullins v. City of New York, 626
F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 2010). Preventing a potential employer from hiring plaintiffs “well might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting similar charges,” id. (cleaned
up), and it does not matter that plaintiffs were former employees, see Rodriguez v. Nat’l Golf
Links of Am., No. 19-cv-7052, 2020 WL 3051559, at *3 & n.3 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2020). Third,
a reasonable jury could find “a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Id. As defendants acknowledged, Balagot told the tenant that plaintiffs
“were not wanted on Karen Gardens Apartment Corp.’s premises because they sued Karen
Gardens Apartment Corp.”2
2 This statement comes from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statement, where defendants “[d]enie[d] knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth” of this statement of fact. Because “[a] party’s statement that it
can neither admit nor deny an adversary’s statement based upon the factual record is not a sufficient response to
establish a disputed fact,” this statement is deemed admitted. See Ezagui v. City of New York, 726 F. Supp. 2d 275,
285 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (alteration adopted and quotation omitted).
The burden of production thus shifts to defendants to provide a “legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employment action.” Mullins, 626 F.3d at 53 (quotation omitted).
In some circumstances, the interpretation of and reliance on a settlement agreement – even if
mistaken – provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an employment action. See
Jencks v. Mod. Woodmen of Am., 479 F.3d 1261, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 2007); Kendall v.
Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850–51 (10th Cir. 1993); Quarrie v. Wells, No. 17-cv-350, 2021 WL
1109227, at *8 (D.N.M. March 23, 2021).3 If the employer “relied not on the fact that it settled
[the plaintiff’s claim], but on the terms pursuant to which the claim was settled,” the employment
action “d[oes] not necessarily” amount to unlawful retaliation. Jencks, 479 F.3d at 1266
(quoting Kendall, 998 F.2d at 851). But if the employer acted because the plaintiff brought a
claim that the employer had to settle, the action is unlawful retaliation. Id. Here, Balagot’s
deposition testimony makes clear that a reasonable jury could find that defendants relied on their
mistaken interpretation of the settlement agreement, as opposed to using that interpretation to
cloak their retaliatory motive. See Dodd v. City Univ. of N.Y., 489 F. Supp. 3d 219, 252
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).4
Because defendants have met their burden, plaintiffs “must produce sufficient evidence to
support a rational finding that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons . . . were false, and that
more likely than not discrimination was the real reason for the employment action.” Mullins,
626 F.3d at 53–54 (quotation omitted). “[M]istakes or disagreements as to the correct
3 Although these cases concerned retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, other courts in
this Circuit have looked to interpretations of Title VII when applying the FLSA’s retaliation provision. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez, 2020 WL 3051559, at *3 n.3.
4 Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the settlement agreement required defendants to provide neutral references to
plaintiffs’ prospective employers. But “[t]his is not an action for breach of the settlement agreement or to enforce
the agreement,” and this issue does not resolve whether defendants’ reliance on and interpretation of the agreement
was pretext for retaliation. Kendall, 998 F.2d at 851.
interpretation or the enforceability of a contractual provision do not suffice to establish pretext,
even if the defendant is wrong.” Quarrie, 2021 WL 1109227, at *8. Rather, “the critical
question is whether the defendant honestly believed its interpretation was correct,” id. and
whether the employer acted “because [the plaintiff] brought a . . . claim that the [employer] had
to settle,” Jencks, 479 F.3d at 1266 (emphasis added) (quoting Kendall, 998 F.2d at 851). Here,
a reasonable jury could find that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was pretextual, for
Balagot said that plaintiffs “were not wanted . . . because they sued Karen Gardens.”
Thus, ambiguities and factual disputes preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs’ FLSA
and NYLL claims. Although the NYCHRL employs a somewhat more liberal standard, see
Benzinger v. Lukoil Pan Ams., LLC, 447 F. Supp. 3d 99, 129–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), the same
factual issues preclude summary judgment on the NYCHRL claim. Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment [32] is denied.
Digitally signed by Brian
SO ORDERED.
M. Cogan
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U.S.D.J.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
June 14, 2021