Culpepper v. Suffolk County Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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KENNETH CULPEPPER,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against- 20-CV-4510(JS)(AYS)

SUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, ERROL TOULON, JR.,

MICHEAL FRANCHI, JOHN DOE #1,

JOHN DOE #2,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Kenneth Culpepper, pro se

559403

Suffolk County Correctional Facility

110 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 11901

For Defendants: No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

On September 23, 2020, incarcerated pro se plaintiff

Kenneth Culpepper (“Plaintiff”) filed a civil rights complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Suffolk County

Correctional Facility (the “Jail”), Errol Toulon, Jr. (“Sheriff

Toulon”), Micheal Franchi (“Warden Franchi”), and two individuals

named as “John Does” who are identified as the “Law Library

Officer” and the “Grievance Officer” together with an application

to proceed in forma pauperis. (Compl., D.E. 1; IFP, D.E. 2.)

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his

financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the

filing fee. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma

pauperis is GRANTED. However, for the reasons that follow, the

Complaint is DISMISSED: (1) WITH PREJUDICE as against the Jail

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b); and (2)

WITHOUT PREJUDICE as against the other Defendants and WITH LEAVE

TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT in accordance with this Order.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff’s handwritten Complaint is submitted on the

Court’s Section 1983 complaint form and is brief. (See Compl.,

D.E. 1.) Plaintiff generally complains about his access to the

law library during his incarceration at the Jail. In its entirety,

Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim alleges:2

Since I been locked up at Suffolk County Correctional

Facility I been denied the Law Library service. I only

go once a week which is not enough to fight my case.

I’m being house at a location that does not have Law

Library service but there’s other dorms in tis Jail that

does which will provide me with time to research my case.

I’ve grieved this issue numerous times to no avail and

I appealed the jail decision to the state and never got

a response its been pass 45 days. Since I’ve been locked

up Suffolk County Correctional Facility been violating

my due process rights and freedom of speech because they

1 All material allegations in the Complaint are presumed to be

true for the purpose of this Order, see, e.g., Rogers v. City of

Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a

complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court is required to

accept the material allegations in the complaint as true).

2 Excerpts from the Complaints are reproduced here exactly as

they appear in the original. Errors in spelling, grammar, and

punctuation have not been corrected or noted.

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don’t want me to about the law library they always

threaten me.

(Compl. at 4, ¶ II.) In the section of the form that calls for a

description of any injuries, Plaintiff wrote:

I was mentally distress I woke up with so much heartache

and pain I wanted to die. I was prescribed

psychological medication to deal with my pain and anger.

(Compl. at 4, ¶ II.A.) As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff

seeks an order giving him “enough time to work on my case” as well

as a damages award in the sum of five million dollars. (Compl.

at 5, ¶ III.)

DISCUSSION

I. In Forma Pauperis Application

Upon review of Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis

application, the Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified to

commence this action without prepayment of the filing fees. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s request to proceed

in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

II. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous

or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

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1915A(b). The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination. See id. § 1915A(b); Liner v. Goord,

196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that under §§ 1915,

1915A, sua sponte dismissals of frivolous prisoner complaints are

not only permitted but mandatory).

Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se

plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,

537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d

197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). However, a complaint must plead

sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citation

omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678;

accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir.

2011). While “‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required,

“[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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III. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at

least in part to a person acting under color of state law and (2)

the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the

Constitution of the United States.” Rae v. County of Suffolk, 693

F. Supp. 2d 217, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Snider v. Dylag, 188

F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999)).

A. Claims against Sheriff Toulon, Warden Franchi, the Law

Library Officer, and the Grievance Officer

In order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983

against an individual defendant, a plaintiff must allege the

personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Farid v. Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249

(2d Cir. 2010). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause

vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . [section] 1983 suits,

a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,

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through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.” 556 U.S. at 676. Thus, a plaintiff asserting a

Section 1983 claim against a supervisory official in his individual

capacity must sufficiently plead that the supervisor was

personally involved in the constitutional deprivation. See Rivera

v. Fischer, 655 F. Supp. 2d 235, 237 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing

Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 254 (2d

Cir. 2001); further citation omitted). A complaint based upon a

violation under Section 1983 that does not allege the personal

involvement of a defendant fails as a matter of law. See Johnson

v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).

Here, although Plaintiff names Sheriff Toulon, Warden

Franchi, the Law Library Officer, and Grievance Officer as

Defendants, none of these individuals is mentioned in the body of

the Complaint. Wholly absent from the Complaint are any factual

allegations of conduct or inaction attributable to any of these

individuals. Since Plaintiff seeks to hold Sheriff Toulon and

Warden Franchi liable for their subordinates’ actions or failure

to act solely because of the supervisory positions they hold, such

claims fail because an “individual cannot be held liable for

damages under [Section] 1983 ‘merely because he held a high

position of authority’ . . . .” Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union

Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir. 2004)(quoting Black v.

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Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Bellinger v.

Fludd, No. 20-CV-2206, 2020 WL 6118823, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16,

2020)(“A plaintiff must allege the direct or personal involvement

of each of the named defendants in the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, because

Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim against any of the

individual Defendants, such claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).

B. Claim against the Jail

Plaintiff also names the Jail as a Defendant. However,

“[t]he Suffolk County Correctional Facility is not a suable

entity.” McCallum v. Suffolk County Corr. Facility Riverhead, No.

19-CV-4591, 2019 WL 6050234, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2019); see

also Schiff v. Suffolk County Police Dept., No. 12-CV-1410, 2015

WL 1774704, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2015) (“[A]dministrative arms

of a municipality cannot be properly sued under § 1983, as the

municipality itself is the only proper defendant.”); Wiggins v.

Suffolk County Corr. Facility, No. 13–cv–0569, 2013 WL 1833260, at

* 4 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013)(same).

Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the Jail is

not plausible and is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b). Given Plaintiff’s pro se status,

the Court has considered whether the Complaint alleges a plausible

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claim when construed as against the municipality, Suffolk County.

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that he has not.

C. Claim as construed against Suffolk County

It is well-established that a municipality cannot be

held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691,

98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Roe v. City of

Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008). To prevail on a Section

1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show “that

‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the alleged

constitutional injury.” Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333

(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359,

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179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011)); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 91.

“[L]ocal governments . . . may be sued for constitutional

deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though

such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s

official decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691

(internal citation omitted).

To establish the existence of a municipal policy or

custom, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a formal

policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality, see

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359; (2) actions taken or decisions made

by municipal policymaking officials, i.e., officials with final

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decisionmaking authority, which caused the alleged violation of

the plaintiff’s civil rights, see Amnesty Am. v. Town of W.

Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); Jeffes v. Barnes, 208

F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2000); (3) a practice “so persistent and

widespread as to practically have the force of law,” Connick, 131

S. Ct. at 1359; see also Green v. City of N.Y., 465 F.3d 65, 80

(2d Cir. 2006), or that “was so manifest as to imply the

constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making officials,”

Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir.

2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); or (4)

that “a policymaking official exhibit[ed] deliberate indifference

to constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates.” Cash, 654

F.3d at 334 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

also Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d

415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009) (A municipal custom may be found “when

‘faced with a pattern of misconduct, [the municipality] does

nothing, compelling the conclusion that [it] has acquiesced in or

tacitly authorized its subordinates’ unlawful actions.’”) (quoting

Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007) (second

alteration in original)).

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any factual allegations

from which the Court may infer that the conduct of which Plaintiff

complains was caused by a policy or custom of Suffolk County.

Accordingly, even when construed as against Suffolk County, the

Complaint does not allege a plausible Section 1983 claim.

D. Leave To Amend

A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the

opportunity “to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the

complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”

Shomo v. City of N.Y., 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). If Plaintiff wishes to

bring a claim against an individual defendant, but does not know

the name of that individual, Plaintiff may identify that individual

as John or Jane Doe, and describe the individual, including his or

her title and the place of employment, to the best of his ability.

Further, for each Defendant named, Plaintiff needs to include: a

brief description of what the Defendant did or failed to do; how

the Defendant’s acts or omissions caused Plaintiff injury; and

“facts showing that limitations on his access to the law library

or to specific materials resulted in actual injury to Plaintiff,

such as the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious legal claim.”

Correa v. Smith, No. 20-CV-5791, 2020 WL 6293175, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Oct. 27, 2020) (sua sponte dismissing Section 1983 access-to-court

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)) (citing

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S. Ct. 2719,

2185, 153 L. Ed. 2d 413; (2002); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,

350-53, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2179-2182, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996)).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be labeled as an

“Amended Complaint,” bear the same Case Number as provided on this

Order, 20-CV-4510, and must be filed within sixty (60) days from

the date of this Order. Plaintiff is advised that an Amended

Complaint completely replaces the previous Complaints. Therefore,

Plaintiff must include all allegations he wishes to pursue against

any Defendant(s) in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is ON

NOTICE: If an Amended Complaint is not filed within the time

allowed, judgement shall enter without further notice and this

case will be marked CLOSED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that:

1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s claims against the Jail are sua sponte

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1);

3. Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Toulon, Warden

Franchi, John Doe #1 (Law Library Officer), and John

Doe #2 (Grievance Officer) are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

1915A(b)(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO

FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT in accordance with this Order. The

Amended Complaint must be labeled as “Amended Complaint,” bear the

same Case Number as this Order, 20-CV-4510, and must be filed

within sixty (60) days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff is

advised that an Amended Complaint completely replaces the previous

Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff must include all allegations he

wishes to pursue against any Defendant(s) in the Amended Complaint.

If Plaintiff does not file an Amended Complaint within the time

allowed, judgement shall enter without further notice and this

case will be marked CLOSED.

The Court certifies that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good

faith; therefore, in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the

purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.

438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of

this Order to Plaintiff at his last known address.

SO ORDERED.

Joanna Seybert

/s/

JOANNA SEYBERT, U.S.D.J.

Dated: December 7, 2020

Central Islip, New York