White v. Abney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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PAUL WHITE,

Plaintiff,

-against- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

17-cv-4286 (EK)(RER)

ALBERT ABNEY, et al.,

Defendant.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Paul White, proceeding pro se, commenced

this action in 2017 against several witnesses who had testified

against him at his 2014 criminal trial on real-estate fraud

charges. In his amended complaint, filed on December 23, 2019,

Plaintiff brings claims for fraudulent misrepresentation,

fraudulent inducement, tortious interference with business

relations, tortious interference with contracts, and unjust

enrichment against Sandra Schmidt, who testified against White

in the criminal case. Schmidt moves to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons

set forth below, that motion is granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Five Points

Correctional Facility, having been convicted of seven counts of

grand larceny and one fraud count at his jury trial in the New

York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County. See Amended Complaint

¶ 54, ECF No. 44 (Compl.); see also Spota v. White (“Spota II”),

48 N.Y.S.3d 268, 2016 WL 6427362, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).1

Following trial, Plaintiff was sentenced to twenty-one to sixty-

three years in prison and ordered to pay $2.975 million in

restitution. See Spota II, 2016 WL 6427362, at *2.

The conviction arose out of a scheme to defraud

investors in a real-estate development. See id. at *4. White

held himself out as a financial advisor and solicited clients —

including Schmidt — to invest by falsely representing “that he

was going to invest their money in an income-producing, low-risk

investment.” Id. He used this money to purchase the “John

Cline Reservoir,” a 400-acre parcel in North Carolina, using a

limited liability company that paid real estate “brokerage

commissions” to entities he controlled. Id. After he refused a

client’s demand that he return their investment, his investors

pursued criminal charges against him,2 see Spota v. White (“Spota

1 This court order granted summary judgment in favor of the District

Attorney of Suffolk County, acting as the “claiming authority,” to enforce

the civil forfeiture judgment against Plaintiff following his criminal

conviction. A copy of this court order is attached to the Amended Complaint

as Exhibit J.

2 In his Amended Complaint, White alleges that Schmidt made at least one

criminal complaint to the District Attorney’s Office and “engaged” District

Attorney Spota to “represent her” in recovering $297,000 that she used to

purchase the property. Compl. ¶ 47.

I”), 997 N.Y.S.2d 101, 2014 WL 2931068, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

2014),3 and the case was investigated and prosecuted by the

Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office. See Compl. ¶ 6;

People v. White, Case No. I-2710-2012. Following White’s

conviction for grand larceny and fraud, Schmidt was awarded

restitution in the amount of $297,000 (the amount of her

original investment). See Compl. Ex. N (Restitution Judgment

Order CPL § 420.10).

In 2016, the District Attorney brought a civil

forfeiture action against White and others to recover a total of

$2.4 million in proceeds from the scheme. Spota II, 2016 WL

6427362, at *1. In support of his motion for summary judgment,

the District Attorney cited trial evidence that White took

approximately $2.975 million from his victims and paid

approximately $500,000 back to them for an “option” to

repurchase their interests in the property. Id. at *4. White’s

opposition to this motion mainly challenged the trial court’s

$2.975 million restitution order, on the ground that the trial

court failed to consider the value of benefits received by his

victims and payments he had made to them. Id. The court

rejected this challenge as an improper collateral attack on his

3 A copy of this 2014 court order, which was issued before White’s

criminal trial, is attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit H.

criminal conviction and held that the District Attorney had

prima facie established its entitlement to judgment in the

amount of $2.4 million. Id.

In 2017, White notified Schmidt that the North

Carolina Superior Court had validated her property deed and she

therefore retained a valid ownership interest in the property.

Compl. ¶ 56; Ex. O. White contends that the court’s finding

proves he is “actually innocent,” because the basis for his

grand larceny conviction was the invalidity of the deeds he sold

to investors. Id. ¶¶ 54, 56. He requested that Schmidt sign

and file a Satisfaction of Judgment with the Clerk of Court in

Suffolk County, and notify the District Attorney of his actual

innocence.4 Id. ¶ 57. Schmidt did not take these actions. Id.

¶ 58.

Plaintiff subsequently brought this case against

Schmidt and others who assisted the District Attorney’s Office

in the criminal investigation and/or testified before the grand

jury, trial court, and civil forfeiture hearings. He contends

that the defendants misrepresented material facts to obtain his

“unjust criminal conviction . . . and incarceration,” including

by giving false testimony. Compl. ¶¶ 194, 197. Plaintiff’s

4 In a letter dated April 5, 2017 addressed to Schmidt, White informed

her that the “judgment is irreparably damaging my personal credit and you

could be personally responsible for the damages, if you fail to execute and

file the Satisfaction of Judgment enclosed herewith.” Compl. Ex. O.

original complaint alleged claims under the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), civil conspiracy, false

arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, tortious

interference with business relationships, and fraud, invoking

the court’s diversity jurisdiction for his state-law claims.

In a Memorandum & Order dated March 21, 2019, Judge

Margo K. Brodie found that diversity jurisdiction was lacking

because of incomplete diversity of citizenship. Memorandum &

Order at 4, ECF No. 28. She construed the complaint as

asserting federal claims under RICO, Section 1983 for false

arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and civil

conspiracy under Sections 1983 and 1985. Id. at 6-7. Judge

Brodie held that these federal claims were “patently without

merit.” Id. at 13. There was thus no basis for the court to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law

claims for tortious interference and fraud, which she dismissed

without prejudice.5 See id. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

dropped the claims against two defendants that were domiciled in

New York and brought this diversity action against the remaining

defendants, including Schmidt.

Plaintiff alleges defendant Schmidt knowingly made

false statements to the Suffolk County District Attorney’s

5 This case was subsequently reassigned to the undersigned judge in

February 2020.

Office in September 2012; see Compl. ¶¶ 147, 151, 153, 157, 161,

165, 169, 173, 177, 181, 185; before the grand jury in October

2012; see id. ¶¶ 148, 152, 154, 158, 162, 166, 174, 178, 182,

186; to the jury in his criminal trial in October 2014; see id.

¶¶ 149, 155, 159, 163, 167, 171, 175, 179, 183, 187; and to the

District Attorney’s Office in connection with the civil

forfeiture action in October 2016. See id. ¶¶ 150, 156, 160,

164, 168, 172, 176, 180, 184, 188.

The allegedly false statements include the following:

that Defendant falsely claimed that she did not sign a Purchase

Agreement for an ownership interest in the property in North

Carolina known as the John Cline Reservoir; that she did not

sign, in connection with her purchase of the ownership interest,

a Power of Attorney, a Dual Representation Agreement, a Tenant-

in-Common Agreement, and numerous documents with “First National

Qualified intermediary”; that she did not authorize an attorney

to represent her in purchasing the property; that she did not

authorize the attorney to create John Cline Reservoir I LLC on

her behalf to purchase the property; and that she did not

include the property on her federal and state tax returns, when

she had reported it as real estate in which she owned an

interest. See id. ¶¶ 147-188.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made these false

statements for the purpose of misleading the District Attorney’s

Office into bringing criminal and civil actions, and the jury

and judges into reaching adverse decisions, id. ¶¶ 196-98; and

that she knew and intended that they would prevent Plaintiff

from continuing to develop the property and interfere with his

contracts with third parties, including other investors, id.

¶¶ 244-45; 278-79.

Plaintiff also alleges that, had he known Defendant

would later make these false statements, he would not have

transacted business with her in the first place. See id. ¶ 207

(“Had Plaintiff . . . known that Schmidt was knowingly,

willfully and intentionally planning to fraudulently

misrepresent the material facts, as described in Paragraphs 147

through 188, . . . Plaintiff . . . would not have entered into

the SCHMIDT PA [Purchase Agreement] . . . .”).6

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of her

false statements, Defendant was unjustly enriched in the amount

of $27,720 he paid her for the right to repurchase her interest

in the property; $1.1 million that he invested in developing the

property; and an additional $30,000 of Plaintiff’s assets that

were “unjustly seized” based upon her false statements. See id.

6 Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made false statements to

induce him to sell her an ownership interest in the property, id. ¶¶ 227-28,

the alleged false statements all occurred between 2012 and 2016, id.

¶¶ 147-88, whereas the sale from Plaintiff to Defendant occurred in 2008, id.

¶¶ 26-34.

¶ 290. Plaintiff argues that it is against good conscience to

permit Defendant to retain these amounts, particularly in light

of his assertion that Defendant received a valid property deed

and retains an interest in the property. Id. ¶ 293. Defendant

moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as to all of

Plaintiff’s causes of action.

II. Legal Standards

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. E.g., Lundy

v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113

(2d Cir. 2013). However, only “a plausible claim for relief

survives a motion to dismiss.” LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic

Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2009). A claim is

plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631

F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)). Courts “are not bound to accept as true a

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. Nonetheless, in reviewing a pro se complaint, the

Court must be mindful that the plaintiff’s pleadings should be

held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (same); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72

(2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the court “remain[s] obligated to

construe a pro se complaint liberally”).

III. Discussion

A. Statements Made in Connection with Judicial Proceedings

Plaintiff’s claims are based on statements Schmidt

allegedly made to the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office

in the course of its investigation, as well as her testimony in

criminal and civil proceedings. These statements cannot be the

basis for the instant tort claims.

The Supreme Court has made clear that witness

testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity, given the

harm to the judicial process that would ensue if any aggrieved

defendant could sue a testifying witness. See Briscoe v. LaHue,

460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983) (discussing the common-law rule of

absolute immunity arising out of a witness’ testimony at trial);

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (discussing the

necessity of absolute immunity to assure that witnesses can

perform their function without harassment or intimidation). The

risk of a retaliatory lawsuit would, for obvious reasons,

disrupt the judicial process by diminishing prospective

witnesses’ willingness to come forward and give honest

testimony. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 332-33; see also White v.

Frank, 680 F. Supp. 629, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (describing the

“almost inevitable retaliatory suits that would follow every

adverse determination at trial, without the deterrent of

absolute witness immunity”).

The doctrine of absolute immunity for trial witnesses

has developed since Briscoe to protect witness statements made

in other contexts as well. In Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356

(2012), the Supreme Court held that grand jury witnesses enjoy

the same immunity as trial witnesses, and that this immunity

extends to claims against a witness “concerning the initiation

or maintenance of a prosecution.” Id. at 369.7 As the Court

observed, “[i]n the vast majority of cases involving a claim

against a grand jury witness, the witness and the prosecutor

conducting the investigation engage in preparatory activity,

such as a preliminary discussion in which the witness relates

the substance of his intended testimony.” Id. at 369-

70. Accordingly, an allegedly false statement cannot be the

subject of a collateral lawsuit simply because it was made in

7 The claims in Rehberg arose under Section 1983, which is commonly used

by plaintiffs challenging conduct in a criminal prosecution. Here, Plaintiff

brought claims for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious

prosecution, which Judge Brodie construed as arising under Section 1983 and

dismissed. See Memorandum & Order dated March 21, 2019. However, Briscoe

held in no uncertain terms that “the common law provide[s] absolute immunity

from subsequent damages liability for all persons — governmental or otherwise

— who were integral parts of the judicial process.” 460 U.S. at 335. It did

not carve out any exception based on the types of claims at issue.

preparation for judicial proceedings, as well as at trial:

“Were it otherwise, ‘a criminal defendant turned civil plaintiff

could simply reframe a claim to attack the preparation instead

of the absolutely immune actions themselves.’” Id. at 369

(quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 283 (1993)

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

There is an exception to this rule, but it does not

apply here. Courts have allowed suits against law enforcement

officers “who ‘set the wheels of government in motion by

instigating a legal action.’” Sankar v. City of New York, No.

07-CV-4726 (RJD) (SMG), 2012 WL 2923236, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July

18, 2012) (quoting Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 371)). This exception

may apply, for example, to an officer who is alleged to have

falsified an affidavit or fabricated evidence.8 See id. at *3;

see also Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 370 n.1. And the exception

8 Even in the example of a law enforcement officer who falsely builds up

the case, the rationale for allowing claims for conduct outside of the

judicial proceedings is not a limitation on the immunity for witness

testimony, but rather a recognition that some conduct “exists independently”

from witness testimony when the witness is also actively involved in an

investigation. In Coggins v. Buonora, 776 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2015), the

Second Circuit considered as a matter of first impression whether a law

enforcement officer is entitled to absolute immunity as a grand jury witness

pursuant to Rehberg when a plaintiff alleges that the officer withheld and

falsified evidence in addition to committing perjury before the grand

jury. Id. at 112. The court found that the complaint plausibly alleged

misconduct by the defendant officer without reference to his perjurious grand

jury testimony and could be subject to suit for that misconduct. Id. at 113.

Still, the Court noted that if discovery were to establish that any of the

alleged conduct constituted “preparatory activity” conducted in advance of

his grand jury testimony, then he would be entitled to absolute immunity for

that limited conduct under Rehberg. Id. at 113 n.7.

extends to a lay witness who “played an ‘active role in the

prosecution, such as [by] giving advice and encouragement or

importuning the authorities to act.’” Watson v. Sims, 648 F.

App’x 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Rothstein v. Carriere, 373

F.3d 293-94 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, simply “reporting a crime

to law enforcement and giving testimony does not constitute the

‘initiation’ of a criminal prosecution. More is required.” Id.

at 51.

Here, Defendant is not alleged to have “instigated”

the legal action against Plaintiff or taken an active role in

the investigation, prosecution, or civil forfeiture. Indeed,

the allegations do not suggest that she had any involvement in

the criminal or civil cases beyond her role as a witness.

Accordingly, statements that she made in connection with the

proceedings against Plaintiff — including those she made to the

District Attorney’s Office in preparation for those proceedings

— are protected by the immunity afforded witnesses under Briscoe

and Rehberg.

There are other safeguards in the judicial process to

manage the risk that a defendant is unjustly convicted based on

false testimony, including the opportunity for the aggrieved

party to pursue a direct appeal. As Plaintiff noted during oral

argument, he is currently appealing his conviction. See

Transcript of Oral Argument dated August 12, 2020 at 23:17-

23:22, ECF No. 53. And if a witness commits perjury, they may

be criminally prosecuted. The law is clear, however, that the

safeguards against allegedly dishonest testimony do not extend

to a collateral lawsuit by Plaintiff against Defendant in this

forum.

B. Claims for Fraud and Tortious Interference

Even if Defendant’s statements were not protected by

absolute immunity, the Amended Complaint would nonetheless fail

to state a claim. This section addresses Plaintiff’s claims for

fraud and tortious interference in turn.

1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent

Inducement

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant fraudulently induced

him into selling her an ownership interest in the Property and

executing the relevant investment contracts, but the alleged

false statements he identifies all occurred between 2012 and

2016 in connection with the criminal and civil cases. Compl.

¶¶ 147-88.

To state a claim for fraud under New York law, a

plaintiff must allege facts showing “(1) a misrepresentation or

a material omission of fact which was false and known to be

false by defendant, (2) made for the purpose of inducing the

other party to rely upon it, (3) justifiable reliance of the

other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and

(4) injury.” Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d

103, 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lama Holding Co. v. Smith

Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 421 (1996)). The claims for

fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement share the

same underlying elements. See, e.g., Hitachi Data Sys. Credit

Corp. v. Precision Discovery, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 3d 130, 148

(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“In order to make out a claim of fraudulent

inducement or fraudulent misrepresentation under New York law, a

plaintiff must allege that: ‘(1) the defendant made a material

false representation, (2) the defendant intended to defraud the

plaintiff thereby, (3) the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the

representation, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damage as a

result of such reliance.’”) (cleaned up). In a federal

diversity action, a fraud claim must be pled with particularity

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See id. This

requires a plaintiff alleging fraud to “(1) specify the

statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent;

(2) identify the speaker; (3) state where and when the

statements were made; and (4) explain why the statements were

fraudulent.” Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2004)

(citing Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d

Cir. 1993)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made false

statements to the District Attorney’s Office, the jury in his

criminal trial, and the judges in both the criminal and civil

proceedings. See Compl. ¶¶ 147-88. He claims that Defendant

made these false statements to mislead the District Attorney’s

Office into bringing criminal and civil actions and the jury and

judges into reaching adverse decisions. See id. ¶¶ 196-98.

Plaintiff fails to state a fraud claim because he does

not allege that these statements were made to him, or that he

reasonably relied on them to his detriment. A common-law fraud

claim is limited to statements on which the plaintiff reasonably

relied. See, e.g., Eternity Glob. Master Fund, 375 F.3d at 186-

87 (plaintiff must show that “the defendant intended to defraud

the plaintiff” and that the “plaintiff reasonably relied” on the

misstatement or omission).

2. Tortious Interference with Business Relations and

Contracts

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s false

statements interfered with his business relations and contracts

with third parties. To state a claim for tortious interference

with business relations under New York law, a plaintiff must

allege that “(1) the plaintiff had business relations with a

third party; (2) the defendant interfered with those business

relations; (3) the defendant acted for a wrongful purpose or

used dishonest, unfair, or improper means; and (4) the

defendant’s acts injured the relationship.” RFP LLC v. SCVNGR,

Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 191, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Catskill

Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Ent. Corp., 547 F.3d 115, 132 (2d

Cir. 2008)). “Conduct constituting tortious interference with

business relations is, by definition, conduct directed not at

the plaintiff itself, but at the party with which the plaintiff

has or seeks to have a relationship.” Symquest Grp., Inc. v.

Canon U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 257, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)

(quoting Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 3 N.Y.3d 182, 192 (2004)).

A plaintiff must do more than allege that the defendant’s acts

caused some form of interference with a business relationship.

Instead, a claim for tortious interference with business

relations requires a plaintiff to show that “the defendant’s

conduct . . . amount[ed] to a crime or an independent tort,” 16

Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 262 (2d Cir. 2015)

(quoting Carvel Corp., 3 N.Y.3d at 190), or alternatively, that

the defendant acted for “the sole purpose of inflicting

intentional harm on plaintiffs,” with no permissible purpose,

id. (cleaned up).

To state a claim for tortious interference with

contract under New York law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the

existence of a valid contract between plaintiff and a third

party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract;

(3) defendant’s intentional procurement of the third-party’s

breach of the contract without justification; (4) actual breach

of the contract; and (5) damages resulting therefrom.” Kirch v.

Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The complaint must identify a valid

and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and a third party

that was breached, and it must allege that the contract would

not have been breached but for the defendant’s intentional

conduct. See AIM Int’l Trading, L.L.C. v. Valcucine S.p.A., No.

02 CIV. 1363, 2003 WL 21203503, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2003).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had knowledge of his

relations and contracts with third parties, citing the facts

that (1) she knew Plaintiff was in contract to purchase

ownership interests in the property from the Stameys (the

sellers of the John Cline Reservoir), Compl. Ex. R; (2) her

Purchase Agreement disclosed that Plaintiff had other investors,

id. Ex. E; and (3) she signed a Dual Representation Agreement

authorizing the same attorney to represent her and other

counterparties in contracts with Plaintiff, id. Ex. D.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant knew that he was

developing the property at issue, as she had “personally visited

the property and observed the development.” Id. ¶ 258. In

light of these allegations, Plaintiff contends that Defendant

made false statements to prevent Plaintiff from completing his

purchase of the property, continuing the development of the

property, continuing to pay other investors the option payments,

and reselling the developed property once completed. Id. ¶ 260.

Defendant allegedly interfered with these activities by causing

Plaintiff to be arrested, indicted and eventually convicted, and

by causing the seizure of his assets. Id. ¶ 264.

Plaintiff’s criminal conviction, and the civil

forfeiture of his assets, surely had the effect of interfering

with his business relations and contracts. And it is undisputed

that Defendant played a role in the conviction and forfeiture,

given her testimony. However, Plaintiff does not allege that

Defendant directed any specific statements or conduct toward the

third parties with whom Plaintiff transacted business. Nor does

he allege facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendant

committed any act with the intent required to support either

tortious interference claim. Although he claims that Defendant

acted for the “sole purpose of harming plaintiff” and “utilized

wrongful means” to interfere with his business relations, these

are conclusory allegations for which no factual support is

provided. See RFP LLC, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 195 (“If there are

‘no allegations in the complaint capable of supporting a

reasonable inference that any . . . defendant acted with the

sole purpose of harming the plaintiff or used dishonest, unfair,

or improper means,’ then the claim should be dismissed.”)

(quoting Premium Mortg. Corp., 583 F.3d at 107); Merkin, 791

F.3d at 262 (describing the intent element of a tortious

interference with business relations claim as a “high bar” to

meet). And although he alleges that Defendant intentionally

procured, without justification, a breach of the contract

between Plaintiff and the Stameys, as well as breaches of other

contracts between Plaintiff and other purchasers, Compl. ¶ 284,

he again offers no factual support regarding her intent to cause

a third party to breach any particular contract. Intertek

Testing Servs., N.A., Inc. v. Pennisi, 443 F. Supp. 3d 303, 343

(E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“New York law emphasizes the requirement that a

tortious interference with contract claimant establish that the

defendant purposefully intended to cause a contract party to

breach a particular contract.”). Accordingly, the Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim for either tortious

interference with business relations or tortious interference

with contracts.

C. Claim for Unjust Enrichment

Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant was unjustly

enriched as a result of her alleged false statements. In an

action for unjust enrichment under New York law, “[t]he

essential inquiry . . . is whether it is against equity and good

conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is sought to

be recovered.” Alan B. Greenfield, M.D., P.C. v. Long Beach

Imaging Holdings, LLC, 114 A.D.3d 888, 889 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)

(quoting Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State of New York, 30

N.Y.2d 415, 421 (1972)). A plaintiff must show that “(1) the

other party was enriched, (2) at the plaintiff's expense, and

(3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the

other party to retain what is sought to be recovered.” Id.

(citing Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 182

(2011)). “Unjust enrichment . . . does not require the

performance of any wrongful act by the one enriched.” Id.

(quoting Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 242 (1978)).

Plaintiff alleges that he paid Defendant $27,720 in

option payments for his right to repurchase her Tenant-in-Common

ownership interest in the property, pursuant to the Purchase

Agreement, and that she was unjustly enriched in that amount

because her alleged false statements prevented him from being

able to exercising his right to repurchase. Compl. ¶ 290.

Plaintiff further alleges that she was unjustly enriched by $1.1

million that he invested in developing the property, in which

she now retains ownership interest. Id. Finally, Plaintiff

alleges that she was unjustly enriched by an additional $30,000

of Plaintiff’s assets that were “unjustly seized” based upon

Schmidt’s alleged false statements. Id.

Plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment is

fundamentally a challenge to the restitution award entered, and

the civil forfeiture authorized, by the state courts in

connection with his criminal conviction. Indeed, Plaintiff made

a similar argument to the state court overseeing the civil

forfeiture proceedings, claiming that the restitution award

issued by the trial court failed to consider the value of the

benefits received by his victims when calculating the amount he

owed to them. See Spota II, 2016 WL 6427362, at *4 (rejecting

this argument as a collateral attack on his criminal

conviction). This Court will not entertain a claim that

effectively seeks appellate review of a state court decision.

See Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423,

426 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal

district courts lack jurisdiction over cases that essentially

amount to appeals of state court judgments.”) (citing Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84,

(2005)). As discussed above, Plaintiff may pursue that

challenge on direct appeal of his criminal conviction in state

court.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Sandra

Schmidt’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice as to all

causes of action against her in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

SO ORDERED.

_/s/ Eric Komitee_________________

ERIC KOMITEE

United States District Judge

Dated: September 30, 2020

Brooklyn, New York