Antoine v. Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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LOVELY ANTOINE,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against-

19-CV-5676 (KAM)

BROOKLYN MAIDS 26, INC., and

JAMES HENESTROZA,

Defendants.

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KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Lovely Antoine (“plaintiff”) commenced this

action on October 8, 2019 against Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc.

(“Brooklyn Maids”) and James Henestroza (collectively,

“defendants”), asserting claims of discrimination, sexual

harassment, hostile work environment,1 and retaliation on the

basis of her sex/gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the New York

State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. State Exec. Law §§ 296

et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.

City Admin. Code §§ 8-107 et seq. (See generally ECF No. 1,

Compl.) Plaintiff further asserts claims of common law assault

and battery against Mr. Henestroza in his individual capacity.

1 Plaintiff’s claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment

fall under her Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL sex/gender discrimination

claims.

(Id.) Plaintiff seeks to recover back pay, prejudgment interest

on back pay, front wages, emotional distress damages, punitive

damages, and post-judgment interest, as well as attorneys’ fees

and costs. (Id.) Presently before the court is plaintiff’s

motion for default judgment against defendants pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) and Local Civil Rule

55.2(b). (See generally ECF No. 15, ECF No. 17.)

The court has reviewed plaintiff’s unopposed

submissions, which include the complaint, plaintiff’s affidavit,

the memorandum of law in support of plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment, the affidavits from plaintiff’s counsel in

support of plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, plaintiff’s

supplemental submissions regarding damages, and the transcript

of plaintiff’s testimony at the June 26, 2020 damages inquest.

For the reasons below, the court grants plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment with respect to all claims, awards compensatory

and punitive damages with pre- and post-judgment interest, and

attorneys’ fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The facts recited herein are drawn solely from

plaintiff’s complaint. Given defendants’ failure to respond to

the complaint, plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations are

accepted as true. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); Greyhound

Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158

(2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] party’s default is deemed to constitute a

concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability.”). In

determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to default judgment,

the court is “limited to the non-conclusory, factual

allegations” in the complaint. Johannes Baumgartner

Wirtschafts-Und Vermogensberatung GmbH v. Salzman, 969 F. Supp.

2d 278, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

Lovely Antoine accepted a job as a housekeeper for

Brooklyn Maids in October 2018. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 14.) At all

relevant times, Mr. Henestroza was the Chief Executive Officer

of Brooklyn Maids, and supervised plaintiff during her term of

employment. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) In late January 2019, Henestroza

asked plaintiff to clean his apartment. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff

was subjected to inappropriate sexual remarks and advances at

Henestroza’s apartment. (Id. ¶ 19.) Henestroza brought

plaintiff to his bedroom and told her, “this is where the magic

happens.” (Id. ¶ 20.) He also asked her about her sexual

history and what kinds of sex acts she enjoyed. (Id.) After

plaintiff left, Henestroza sent plaintiff text messages

conveying his romantic interest in her, and describing the size

of his penis. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff was “shocked” by

Henestroza’s behavior, rebuffed his overtures, and insisted that

she was not romantically interested in him. (Id. ¶ 22.)

Henestroza responded that he “really wanted to help her” and

would provide her with more work hours and return her to a five-

day per week schedule.2 (Id. ¶ 23.)

In early February 2019, Henestroza joined plaintiff on

an apartment-cleaning assignment, ostensibly to help her with

the laundry. (Compl. ¶ 24.) As plaintiff was working,

Henestroza locked the apartment door and began pressuring her to

have sex. (Id. ¶ 25) He then pushed her onto the bed and

coerced her into having sex. (Id.) Afterward, plaintiff

reiterated to Henestroza that she was not interested in him

sexually and wanted to maintain a professional relationship.

(Id. ¶ 26.) Henestroza subsequently reduced plaintiff’s

workdays and work hours. (Id. ¶ 27.)

In mid-February, plaintiff asked Henestroza when her

normal hours would be restored. (Compl. ¶ 28.) In response,

Henestroza withheld plaintiff’s pay for time she had worked

until late February, though he ultimately paid her back wages

due. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Soon after, Henestroza again withheld

plaintiff’s wages, prompting plaintiff to venture to

Henestroza’s house on March 1, 2019 in an attempt to collect her

wages. (Id. ¶ 30.) Henestroza responded by throwing plaintiff

against the wall and choking her. (Id. ¶ 31.) Henestroza warned

2 Plaintiff’s schedule was reduced to three days per week in mid-January

because work at the McCarren Hotel (where plaintiff performed most of her

cleaning assignments) had been slow. (Id. ¶ 17.)

plaintiff not to come back to his home, and threatened that he

“used to kill animals as a child.” (Id.) Plaintiff told

Henestroza not to contact her again. (Id. ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff concludes that the foregoing “are just some

of the ways Defendants discriminated and retaliated against

Plaintiff while employing her.” (Id. ¶ 37.)

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff timely and properly filed her Title VII

charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) on July 1, 2019, and was granted the right to sue on

September 9, 2019. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff filed a federal

complaint against Brooklyn Maids and Mr. Henestroza on October

8, 2019, asserting sex/gender discrimination and retaliation

under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL against both

parties, and assault and battery against Henestroza in his

individual capacity. (See generally Compl.)

On October 30, 2019, Magistrate Judge Kuo scheduled an

Initial Conference for December 12, 2019. (ECF No. 6.) On

December 10, 2019, plaintiff moved to adjourn the upcoming

conference, having served Brooklyn Maids on October 22, 2019,

and Henestroza on November 16, 2019, without response or answer

from either defendant. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff concurrently

sought leave to move for default judgment. (Id.) On December

10, 2019, Magistrate Judge Kuo granted plaintiff leave to move

for default judgment against defendants. (Dkt. Order dated Dec.

10, 2019.)

On January 13, 2020, plaintiff requested a certificate

of default. (ECF No. 11.) The Clerk of Court entered default

against defendants on January 21, 2020. (ECF No. 14.) On

January 24, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default

judgment, supplemented with plaintiff’s affidavit and memorandum

and the affidavits of counsel. (ECF Nos. 15-17.) Defendants

were served (ECF No. 16-6), but did not oppose the motion. In

addition, plaintiff provided live video testimony at a damages

inquest, held on June 26, 2020. (See Minute Entry dated June

26, 2020; see generally ECF No. 30, Transcript of Damages

Inquest Hearing, held June 26, 2020 (“Inquest Tr.”).)

Defendants were notified in advance of the inquest hearing (ECF

No. 18), but did not appear.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 establishes a two-

step process in the event of a defendant’s default. First, the

Clerk of the Court must enter the default if defendant fails to

“plead or otherwise defend” in response to a properly served and

filed complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); Priestley v.

Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011). Second, a

default judgment may then be entered if the complaint sets forth

a valid claim and the plaintiff has established her entitlement

to a specific amount of damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). When

determining whether to grant a default judgment, the court

considers three factors: “(1) whether the defendant’s default

was willful; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense to

plaintiff’s claims; and (3) the level of prejudice the non-

defaulting party would suffer as a result of the denial of the

motion for default judgment.” Joseph v. HDMJ Restaurant, Inc.,

970 F. Supp. 2d 131, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Mason Tenders

Dist. Council v. Duce Constr. Corp., No. 02-CV-9044, 2003 WL

1960584, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003)).3 The below analysis

considers these factors with respect to plaintiff’s motion for

entry of default judgment against defendants.

I. Willfulness

The Second Circuit has held that failure to respond to

a complaint evinces willful default. See S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137

F.3d 732, 738–39 (2d Cir. 1998) (unexplained failure to respond

to complaint indicates willfulness); Indymac Bank v. Nat'l

Settlement Agency, Inc., No. 07-CV-6865, 2007 WL 4468652, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007) (finding defendants’ failure to appear,

failure to respond to the complaint, and failure to respond to a

3 Although courts generally apply these factors to determine whether to

relieve a party from default or default judgment, see Pecarsky v.

Galaxiworld.com LTD, 249 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Davis v. Musler, 713

F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir. 1983), district courts in this circuit have similarly

employed this analysis in determining whether to grant a default judgment.

See Joseph, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 141; Mason Tenders, 2003 WL 1960584, at *2;

Santana v. Latino Express Rest., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 285, 291 (S.D.N.Y.

2016).

motion for default judgment indicated willful conduct); United

States v. DiPaolo, 466 F. Supp. 2d 476, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

(grounds for default judgment were established by defendant’s

failure to answer the complaint, particularly in light of the

fact that the defendant had expressed no intention to do so at a

later time).

It is indisputable that defendants have not appeared,

or responded to the complaint or plaintiff’s default motion. As

an initial matter, however, the court must determine whether

service was properly effected upon defendants in order to

determine whether their default was willful. See Deep Foods

Inc. v. Deep Foods Inc., 419 F. Supp. 3d 569, 577 (W.D.N.Y.

2019) (willfulness found where plaintiff submitted proof of

service demonstrating the summons and complaint were personally

served on defendants, plaintiff’s motion for default judgment

was served upon defendants at their last known addresses, and

defendants also did not respond to either).

A defendant may be served as provided by Rule 4 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 4(e)(1), an

individual may be served in a judicial district of the United

States by “following state law for serving a summons in an

action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state

where the district court is located or where service is made[.]”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Accordingly, service here was proper

if it conformed to the requirements of the New York Civil

Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”). Plaintiff properly served

defendant Brooklyn Maids under CPLR § 311(a)(1)4 and New York

Business Corporation Law § 306(b)(1):5 on October 22, 2019, a

process server over the age of 18 presented Sue Zouky, a legal

clerk for the Secretary of State, with a copy of the summons and

complaint. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff likewise properly served Mr.

Henestroza under CPLR § 308(2):6 on November 16, 2019, a process

server over the age of 18 served a copy of the summons and

complaint to a co-tenant at plaintiff’s last known residence;

4 The pertinent text of CPLR § 311(a)(1) provides that:

Personal service upon a corporation . . . shall be made by delivering

the summons . . . upon any domestic or foreign corporation, to an

officer, director, managing or general agent, or cashier or assistant

cashier or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to

receive service. A business corporation may also be served pursuant to

section three hundred six or three hundred seven of the business

corporation law.

5 New York Business Corporation Law § 306(b)(1) provides that:

Service of process on the secretary of state as agent of a domestic or

authorized foreign corporation shall be made by personally delivering

to and leaving with the secretary of state or a deputy, or with any

person authorized by the secretary of state to receive such service, at

the office of the department of state in the city of Albany, duplicate

copies of such process together with the statutory fee, which fee shall

be a taxable disbursement. Service of process on such corporation

shall be complete when the secretary of state is so served.

6 The pertinent text of CPLR § 308(2) provides that personal service

shall be made:

[B]y delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable

age and discretion at the . . . dwelling place or usual place of abode

of the person to be served and by either mailing the summons to the

person to be served at his or her last known residence . . . in an

envelope bearing the legend “personal and confidential” and not

indicating on the outside thereof, by return address or otherwise, that

the communication is from an attorney or concerns an action against the

person to be served, such delivery and mailing to be effected within

twenty days of each other . . . .

then, on November 19, 2019, the process server mailed a copy of

the summons and complaint, via first class mail and in an

envelope marked “PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL,” which did not

indicate that the communication was from an attorney or

concerned an action against Mr. Henestroza, to Henestroza’s last

known residence. (ECF No. 8.) There is no indication that this

mailing was not delivered to Henestroza.

Although properly served, defendants never answered

the complaint, nor did they request an extension of time to

respond. On January 24, 2020, plaintiff also mailed to

defendants a copy her memorandum of law and related exhibits in

support of her default motion, to which defendants again did not

respond. In addition, on August 13, 2020, plaintiff’s counsel

informed the court that he had received a phone call from Mr.

Henestroza. (ECF No. 28, Status Letter dated Aug. 13, 2020.)

According to counsel, Mr. Henestroza conveyed that he was aware

of the suit, and represented that he had an attorney, but

refused to provide his representative’s name or contact

information, and insisted that plaintiff’s counsel submit all

correspondence “through the Secretary of State.” (Id.) It thus

appears Henestroza is fully aware of the instant action.

Accordingly, defendants’ complete failure to respond

sufficiently demonstrates willful default. See Santana, 198 F.

Supp. 3d at 191 (“Defendant’s non-appearance and failure to

respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint or Motion to For [sic] Default

Judgment indicates willful conduct.”); United States of America

v. Myers, 236 F. Supp. 3d 702, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Defendant’s

failure to answer the Amended Complaint and to respond to the

[motion for default] demonstrated willfulness under existing

case law.”).

II. Meritorious Defenses

A defense is meritorious “if it is good at law so as

to give the factfinder some determination to make.” Am.

Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir.

1996). However, “[w]here a defendant fails to answer the

complaint, courts are unable to make a determination whether the

defendant has a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s

allegations, and, accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of

granting a default judgment.” Joseph, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 143

(citing Empire State Carpenters Welfare v. Darken Architectural

Wood, No. 11-CV-46, 2012 WL 194075, at *3 (E.D.N.Y Jan. 17,

2012) and Mack Fin. Serv. v. Poczatek, No. 10-CV-3799, 2011 WL

4628695, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011)). Moreover, when a

defendant has not presented a defense to the court, the well-

pleaded allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are presumed to be

true. Indymac Bank, 2007 WL 4468652, at *1; Myers, 236 F. Supp.

3d at 707-08.

Defendants have asserted no meritorious defenses to

plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations. Notwithstanding,

a plaintiff still must demonstrate that the factual allegations

set forth in her complaint state valid claims to relief. Myers,

236 F. Supp. 3d at 708; see Said v. SBS Elecs., Inc., No. CV-08-

3067, 2010 WL 1265186, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010) (“With

respect to liability, a defendant’s default does no more than

concede the complaint’s factual allegations; it remains the

plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that those uncontroverted

allegations, without more, establish the defendant’s liability

on each asserted cause of action.”); J & J Sports Prods., Inc.

v. Daley, No. 06-CV-0238, 2007 WL 7135707, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y.

Feb. 15, 2007) (“conclusory allegations based on information and

belief” are insufficient to support a finding of default-based

liability). The court now turns to the sufficiency of the

allegations in the complaint and finds, for the following

reasons, that the plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to

establish liability, and the defendants lack meritorious

defenses to the claims asserted.

A. Sex Discrimination

1. Title VII and the NYSHRL

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides

that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with

respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, the NYSHRL provides that

“[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice [f]or an

employer,” on account of an individual’s sex, “to discriminate

against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions

or privileges of employment.” N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(1)(a).

Moreover, “[h]ostile work environment and retaliation claims

under the NYSHRL are generally governed by the same standards as

federal claims under Title VII.” Schiano v. Quality Payroll

Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2006); see Setty v.

Fitness, No. 17CV06504NGGSMG, 2018 WL 8415414, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.

Dec. 18, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Setty

v. Synergy Fitness, No. 17CV6504NGGSMG, 2019 WL 1292431

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2019); Petrisch v. HSBC Bank USA, Inc., 2013

WL 1316712, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,2014). Thus, the court

will consider plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL claims in tandem.

See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F. 3d 358, 372 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999)

(“[S]ince claims under the NYSHRL are analyzed identically to

claims under . . . Title VII, the outcome of an employment

discrimination claim made pursuant to the NYSHRL is the same as

it is under . . . Title VII.”) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Henestroza subjected her to

recurrent and severe sexual harassment, amounting to a hostile

work environment. Courts have construed both Title VII and the

NYSHRL to include claims of a “discriminatorily hostile or

abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 21 (1993); Setty, 2018 WL 8415414, at *5. Although Title

VII's anti-discrimination provision does not explicitly

proscribe sexual harrassment arising out of a hostile work

environment, the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of

this cause of action. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (“[C]ourts have uniformly held, and we agree,

that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by

proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile

or abusive work environment.”); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,

883 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Today, the Supreme Court and

lower courts ‘uniformly’ recognize sexual harassment claims as a

violation of Title VII, notwithstanding the fact that, as

evidenced by the district court decision in Barnes, this was not

necessarily obvious from the face of the statute.”) (citation

and appellate history omitted).

A plaintiff raising a hostile work environment claim

under either Title VII or the NYSHRL must show that “the

harassment was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.’” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 147-48

(2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373

(2d Cir. 2002)). To determine whether a work environment is

hostile, a court must look to the surrounding circumstances

including:

the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its

severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s

work performance. The effect on the employee’s

psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to

determining whether the plaintiff actually found the

environment abusive. But while psychological harm,

like any other relevant factor, may be taken into

account, no single factor is required.

Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Generally, incidents of harassment

“must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently

continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive.”

Joseph, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 145 (internal quotation marks

omitted). However, even an isolated incident can meet the

threshold for hostility if it can and does independently “work a

transformation of the plaintiff’s workplace.” Alfano, 294 F.3d

365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, a plaintiff alleging a

hostile work environment "must demonstrate either that a single

incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of

incidents were `sufficiently continuous and concerted' to have

altered the conditions of her working environment." Id.

(quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir.

2000)).

Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim hinges

primarily on two incidents. Whether considered individually or

collectively, however, the alleged conduct easily surpasses the

threshold of severity. First, in January 2019, Henestroza

allegedly induced plaintiff to enter his bedroom on the pretense

that she was on a cleaning assignment, and instead,

propositioned her for sex and inquired about her sexual history.

After plaintiff declined, Henestroza volunteered an unsolicited

description of his penis and reiterated his romantic interest in

her. She rebuffed him, to which Henestroza responded with an

offer of additional work hours “to help her.” Then, in February

2019, Henestroza joined plaintiff on a cleaning assignment,

presumably to help her with the laundry, but, in fact, as a

pretext to contrive a sexual encounter. Plaintiff alleges

Henestroza sexually assaulted her. He locked the door, groped

her, pushed her onto the bed, and coerced Ms. Antoine into

having sex with him. Plaintiff thereafter reiterated that she

was not sexually interested in Henestroza, but this time,

instead of offering to “help her,” he withheld her wages.

The Second Circuit has recognized that, “even a single

incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of

the victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work

environment for purposes of Title VII liability.” Tomka v.

Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on

other grounds by Burlington Indus, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742

(1998). Here, Henestroza’s sexual assault of plaintiff in

February 2019 was independently severe enough to create a

hostile and abusive work environment, and constitutes per se

liability under Title VII and the NYSHRL. See Redd v. New York

Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Direct

contact with an intimate body part constitutes one of the most

severe forms of sexual harassment.”); see also Garcia v. N.Y.

City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 15-CV-2119 (DAB), 2016 WL

4097850, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2016) (allegations of grabbing

plaintiff’s buttocks, “nibbling” his ear, and kissing him on the

lips amounted to “physical harassment that could reasonably be

perceived as intimidating and humiliating”). Moreover,

plaintiff’s repeated attempts to forestall Henestroza’s advances

warrant the reasonable inference that she found his conduct

subjectively hostile and abusive. Accordingly, plaintiff was

subjected to a hostile work environment under Title VII and the

NYSHRL.

2. NYCHRL

“‘The New York City Human Rights Law was intended to

be more protective than [its] state and federal counterpart.’”

Bermudez v. City of N.Y., 783 F. Supp. 2d 560, 579 (S.D.N.Y.

2011) (quoting Farrugia v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 820 N.Y.S.2d

718, 724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006)). To state a claim for gender

discrimination under the NYCHRL, a “plaintiff need only show

differential treatment—that she is treated ‘less well’—because

of a discriminatory intent.” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole

Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013)

(quoting Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 78

(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2009)). Further, the NYCHRL does not

distinguish between discrimination and hostile work environment

claims; rather, both are governed by N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–

107(1)(a); Sotomayor v. City of N.Y., 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 261

(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Hostile work environment claims are analyzed

under the same provision of the NYCHRL as discrimination

claims.”) (citation omitted). “Employers may only avoid

liability under the NYCHRL for conduct that results in an

employee being treated less well because of her gender, when the

conduct complained of constitutes nothing more than petty

slights and trivial inconveniences.” Pryor v. Jaffe & Asher,

LLP, 992 F. Supp. 2d 252, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Because plaintiff has

adequately pled a claim for hostile work environment under the

NYSHRL, she has also done so under the NYCHRL. See Winston v.

Verizon Servs. Corp., 633 F. Supp. 2d 42, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

(allegations that successfully state a claim under the NYSHRL

“[a] fortiori . . . state[s] a claim under the [NYCHRL] . . . ,

which is more liberal than either its state or federal

counterpart.”) (citations omitted).

B. Retaliation

1. Title VII and NYSHRL

“‘The standards for evaluating retaliation claims are

identical under Title VII and the NYSHRL.’” Setty, 2018 WL

8415414, at *9 (quoting Russo v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 972 F.

Supp. 2d 429, 454 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)). Title VII provides that it

is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any of his

employees . . . because [she] has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Similarly, the NYSHRL makes it an unlawful

discriminatory practice for an employer “to expel or otherwise

discriminate against any person because [she] has opposed any

practices forbidden under this article . . . .” N.Y. Exec. Law

§ 296(1)(3). “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a

plaintiff must make four showings: that ‘(1) she engaged in a

protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of this activity;

(3) the employer took adverse employment action against her; and

(4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse

action and the protected activity.’” Summa v. Hofstra Univ.,

708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Schiano, 445 F.3d at

608). The court addresses each requirement in turn below.

First, plaintiff engaged in a “protected activity” by

objecting to Henestroza’s sexual advances. A “protected

activity” is an activity “taken to protest or oppose statutorily

prohibited discrimination.” Wimes v. Health, 157 F. App’x 327,

328 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Cruz, 202 F.3d at 566, superseded on

other grounds by N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85). A plaintiff need not

file a formal complaint to engage in a protected activity;

paradigmatic examples of protected activities include “making

complaints to management, writing critical letters to customers,

protesting against discrimination by industry or by society in

general, and expressing support of coworkers who have filed

formal charges.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 566 (citation omitted).

District courts in the Second Circuit diverge somewhat

as to whether rejecting a harasser’s sexual advances constitutes

a protected activity. Compare Hughes v. Twenty-First Century

Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

(“[Defendant’s] sexual advances ‘qualified as an unlawful

employment practice,’ and [plaintiff] engaged in protected

activity each time she rejected them.”), with Reid v. Ingerman

Smith LLP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“rejection

of sexual advances does not constitute a protected activity”);

compare Burrell v. CUNY, 894 F. Supp. 750, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

(refusing to accede to sexual advances is an activity protected

under Title VII), with Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc.,

941 F. Supp. 437, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (plaintiff did not

state retaliation claim where her immediate supervisor allegedly

assigned her undesirable work after she rebuffed his sexual

advances). Courts have justified excluding rejection of sexual

advances from the scope of protected activities by warning that

“every harassment claim would automatically state a retaliation

claim” were resisting a harasser’s advances to constitute a

“protected activity.” Reid, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (quoting Del

Castillo, 941 F. Supp. at 439).

The court disagrees with that position, however, and

adopts the stance aptly expressed by Judge Pauley, that

conceiving “protected activity” so narrowly “overlook[s] the

complex dynamics underlying a work environment fraught with

power disparities.” Hughes, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 448. As Judge

Pauley explained:

Sexual harassment can manifest itself in many forms.

Some are less obvious than others but just as

invidious. Formally reporting an incident of sexual

assault is one form of protected activity, but it is

not always available. An individual who is sexually

harassed by her supervisor, or someone with clout

within the company, faces a Hobson’s choice—she is

either forced to endure her supervisor’s unwanted

overtures, or file a complaint that will inevitably

bruise his ego and jeopardize her job and career.

Id. A majority of courts confronted with this issue have

reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Medisys

Health Network, 2011 WL 5222917, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2011)

(“There is no reason to disagree with the view of the majority

of courts that allegations that an employee consistently refused

her supervisor’s sexual advances constitutes ‘protected

activity’ for purposes of a retaliation claim.”); Little v.

Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 330, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

(“Rejecting sexual advances from an employer [ ] constitutes

‘protected activity.’ The prohibition against retaliation is

intended to protect employees who resist unlawful workplace

discrimination. Sexual harassment by an employer or supervisor

is an unlawful practice, and an employee’s refusal is a means of

opposing such unlawful conduct.”).

This case features the sort of workplace power

imbalance that Hughes contemplated. Plaintiff’s harasser,

Henestroza, was also the company CEO. Henestroza made his

unwelcome advances in private settings, outside of public view.

It is reasonable to infer plaintiff harbored a fear that

formally resisting Henestroza’s advances would have devolved

into a “he said, she said” dispute with her employer’s most

senior officer, with little prospect of anyone taking her side,

and a severe risk of repercussions. Thus, plaintiff rejected

Henestroza’s alleged sexual advances by, inter alia, expressing

to him personally that she was not romantically interested in

him. Plaintiff’s verbal and physical expressions of resistance

to Henestroza’s sexual advances were protected activities under

Title VII and the NYSHRL.

The remaining elements of plaintiff’s retaliation

claim are plainly established by her allegations. The complaint

alleges that plaintiff rejected Henestroza’s sexual advances by

telling him directly, thus making clear to Henestroza that

plaintiff was engaging in a protected activity. Thereafter,

Henestroza reduced plaintiff’s hours, and withheld her wages.

These actions constitute “materially adverse actions” because “a

reasonable employee would have found the challenged action

materially adverse, which in this context means it well might

have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination.” Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l

Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 25 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68

(2006)); see also Radice v. Eastport S. Manor Cent. Sch. Dist.,

No. CV 17-1 (GRB)(ST), 2020 WL 1041124, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,

2020) (“[T]he reduction of hours from 180 to 80 hours of work

time constitutes an adverse employment action.”); Lin v. Great

Rose Fashion, Inc., No. 08-CV-4778(NGG)(RLM), 2009 WL 1544749,

at *17 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2009) (reduction of hours constituted

adverse action).

Finally, the timing of Henestroza’s adverse actions

suggest they were in response to plaintiff’s protected activity.

In early February 2019, following an encounter in which

Henestroza allegedly coerced plaintiff into sexual intercourse,

plaintiff informed Henestroza that she was not interested in a

sexual relationship with him. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-26.) By mid-

February, Henestroza had docked plaintiff’s workdays and hours,

then began withholding her pay altogether. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.)

Causation can be pled “indirectly by showing that the protected

activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment . . .

.” Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal

quotations and citations omitted, emphasis in original). Here,

the “close temporal proximity” between plaintiff’s expressions

of disinterest in a sexual relationship, and Henestroza’s

adverse actions, is more than sufficient to infer causation in

establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. See Summa, 708

F.3d 115 at 128.

2. NYCHRL

A plaintiff can assert a retaliation claim under the

NYCHRL by alleging that “the employer engaged in conduct that

was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in”

protected activity, including, objecting to sexually harassing

behavior. See Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 112 (internal citation

omitted). As with Title VII and NYSHRL, “the NYCHRL require[s]

a causal connection between an adverse act and a protected

activity to prove a retaliation claim.” See, e.g., Dudley v.

N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 12 Civ. 2771, 2014 WL 5003799, at *25

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014). Unlike its federal and state law

counterparts, however, “a plaintiff is not required to show, ‘a

material adverse action’ under the NYCHRL.” Schaper v. Bronx

Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 408 F. Supp. 3d 379, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

In short, because plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation meet

the higher pleading thresholds under Title VII and NYSHRL, the

plaintiff’s claim also meets the requirements of the NYCHRL.

See Hagan v. City of N.Y., 39 F. Supp. 3d 481, 503 (S.D.N.Y.

2014) (“[T]he city law grants employees broader protections than

its federal and state counterparts.”).

C. Individual and Employer Liability

1. Title VII

Although Henestroza perpetrated the alleged harassment

and retaliation at issue, Title VII does not provide for

individual liability. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313–14. An employer,

on the other hand, can be held vicariously liable under Title

VII for the unlawful conduct of supervisors with the capacity to

take “tangible employment actions.” Setty, 2018 WL 8415414, at

*7 (citing Dillon v. Ned Mgmt., Inc., F. Supp. 3d 639, 655

(E.D.N.Y. 2015)). Liability may be imputed to an employer where

its supervisors engage in either discriminatory harassment or

retaliatory conduct. See, e.g., Bethea v. City of N.Y., No. 11

CV 2347 (SJ) (MJA), 2014 WL 2616897, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 12,

2014) (“[H]arassment and the retaliation at the hands of a

supervisor empowered to take tangible employment actions will

trigger an employer’s vicarious liability, but an employer is

also liable where it has negligently allowed harassment or

retaliation to occur or persist.”); Muraj v. UPS Freight Servs.,

No. 04-CV-6563 CJS, 2006 WL 2528538, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,

2006) (concluding that “under general principles of vicarious

liability under Title VII, an employer may be held vicariously

liable for tangible employment actions taken by its

supervisors,” which includes retaliation); see also Mys v.

Michigan Dep't of State Police, 886 F.3d 591, 600 (6th Cir.

2018) (“An employer is also vicariously liable for retaliation

that a supervisor initiates against an employee by causing

another actor, that might itself lack retaliatory animus, to

take an adverse action against the employee.”).

Henestroza’s sexual harassment of, and retaliation

against plaintiff, are imputed to Brooklyn Maids because

Henestroza was plaintiff’s direct supervisor. Henestroza was

the company CEO, maintained control over plaintiff’s

compensation and hours, and, on several occasions, told

plaintiff where to work. Therefore, Henestroza had authority to

take “tangible employment actions” in his capacity as Brooklyn

Maids’ CEO. “When, as here, the alleged harasser is in a

supervisory position over the plaintiff, the objectionable

conduct is automatically imputed to the employer.” Gorzynski v.

JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010)

(citations omitted); Welch v. Bill Cram, Inc., No. 6:15-CV-

06391(MAT), 2017 WL 3676040, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017).

Accordingly, Brooklyn Maids is liable under Title VII for

Henestroza’s misconduct.

2. NYSHRL

Under the NYSHRL, “[a]n employer cannot be held liable

for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became

a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.’”

Romero v. City of N.Y., 839 F. Supp. 2d 588, 635 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)

(quoting Doe v. State, 89 A.D.3d 787, 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d

Dep’t 2011)). “Condonation, which may sufficiently implicate an

employer in the discriminatory acts of its employee to

constitute a basis for employer liability under the Human Rights

Law, contemplates a knowing, after-the-fact forgiveness or

acceptance of an offense.” State Div. of Human Rights ex rel.

Greene v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 487 N.E.2d 268, 269 (N.Y.

1985); see Selmanovic v. NYSE Grp., Inc., No. 06–CV–3046, 2007

WL 4563431, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007). Alternatively, an

employer’s “calculated inaction in response to discriminatory

conduct, may as readily as affirmative conduct, indicate

condonation.” Guzman v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 09–

CV–4472, 2010 WL 1222044, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010)

(quoting Melendez v. Int’l Serv. Sys., Inc., No. 97–CV–8051,

1999 WL 187071, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999)).

Plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendants had knowledge of

and/or acquiesced in the discrimination and/or harrassment by []

Henestroza.” (Compl. ¶ 38.) The court need not credit this

conclusory allegation, however. JXB 84 LLC v. Khalil, No.

15CV6251NGGJO, 2017 WL 1184001, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 15CV6251NGGJO, 2017 WL

1184141 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (“The fact that a complaint

stands unanswered does not, however, suffice to establish

liability on its claims: a default does not establish conclusory

allegations, nor does it excuse any defects in the plaintiff’s

pleading.”). The complaint is bereft of allegations that any

actor, other than Henestroza, was remotely aware of, or blinded

themselves to, his conduct. Indeed, Henestroza’s aggressions

against plaintiff occurred in private settings, outside the

presence of others, and plaintiff does not allege that she

informed personnel at Brooklyn Maids, or that Brooklyn Maids

otherwise came to learn, of her mistreatment. Similarly absent

are allegations that Brooklyn Maids or its personnel, other than

Henestroza himself, were aware of his retaliatory acts against

plaintiff. Nor does the complaint allege, or plaintiff’s

memorandum of law assert, that Brooklyn Maids is Henestroza’s

alter ego. Plaintiff thus fails to sufficiently allege any

basis to hold Brooklyn Maids liable under the NYSHRL for

Henestroza’s conduct.

In contrast to Title VII, however, individuals may be

held liable under the NYSHRL for employment discrimination. See

Mandell v. Cty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 2003).

An individual may be held liable under the NYSHRL where, inter

alia, he has an ownership interest in the business or is a

supervisor that can make hiring and firing decisions. EEOC v.

Suffolk Laundry Servs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 497, 523 (E.D.N.Y.

2014) (quoting Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1317, and N.Y. Exec. Law §

296). Although the complaint does not allege that Henestroza

owned Brooklyn Maids, in whole or in part, during the relevant

time period, Henestroza, as CEO, clearly had authority to “do

more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.” Id.

As discussed above, Henestroza held and exercised authority over

plaintiff’s work schedule, pay, and assignments. He is,

therefore, subject to liability under § 296(1) of the NYSHRL.

See Matusick v. Erie Cty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 53 (2d Cir.

2014) (“[A]s a general rule, individuals may be subject to

liability as employers ‘if they have ownership interests in the

[employer] or do more than carry out personnel decisions of

others.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Townsend v.

Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012)).

3. NYCHRL

Both Henestroza and Brooklyn Maids are liable under

the NYCHRL. Employers may be held liable under the NYCHRL

where, inter alia, “the offending employee exercised managerial

or supervisory responsibility . . . .” Setty, 2018 WL 8415414,

at *9 (quoting Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 14 N.Y.3d 469, 479 (N.Y.

2010)). Individuals may be held liable under Section 8-

107(1)(a) of the NYCHRL “if they actually participated in the

conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.” Dillon, 85 F.

Supp. 3d at 658. Accepting the complaint’s well-pleaded

allegations as true, the court finds plaintiff has established

both Brooklyn Maids’ employer liability and Henestroza’s

individual liability under the NYCHRL. As the harasser and

retaliator, Henestroza is subject to liability under Section 8-

107(1)(a) for actually participating in the discriminatory

conduct. Moreover, because Henestroza—the “offending employee”—

exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility, liability

may properly be imputed to Brooklyn Maids, the plaintiff’s

employer. Accordingly, both defendants are properly held liable

for sex discrimination and retaliation under the NYCHRL.

D. Assault and Battery

The complaint further asserts causes of action under

New York state law for assault and battery. The complaint does

not pinpoint precisely which conduct the tort claims are

predicated upon, but it is reasonably clear that the assault and

battery allegations relate to: (1) the February 2019 incident in

which Henestroza pushed plaintiff onto a bed and sexually

assaulted her; and (2) Henestroza’s physical attack against

plaintiff at his home, in or around March 1, 2019, during which

he choked her. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 30-31, 63-65.)

Without question, the complaint states a claim for

assault and battery. To state claims for assault and battery

under New York law, a plaintiff must allege “an intentional

placing of another person in fear of imminent harmful or

offensive contact” and “an intentional wrongful physical contact

with another person without consent,” respectively. Girden v.

Sandals Int’l, 262 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). In February 2019, while

Henestroza and plaintiff were alone in a room, Henestroza locked

the door, cutting plaintiff off from a means of exit. At this

point, given Henestroza’s past advances, it is plausibly alleged

that plaintiff reasonably perceived Henestroza was posing a

physical menace to her body. Subsequent events, as alleged,

leave no room for interpretation. Henestroza intentionally put

plaintiff in fear of imminent offensive contact. He pushed

plaintiff onto a bed and coerced her into intercourse.7 The

7 These allegations of sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion, if

proven, potentially constitute criminal rape under New York law. See New

York Penal Law § 130.35(1) (“A person is guilty of rape in the first degree

when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person . . . [b]y

forcible compulsion.”). “In the civil context, the common meanings of

March 2019 incident is equally clear-cut. Henestroza threw

plaintiff against a wall and choked her. As if this violent

aggression were not enough, Henestroza warned plaintiff that he

“used to kill animals as a child,” and that she too should be

afraid. In both instances, the complaint sufficiently alleges

that Henestroza intentionally caused plaintiff to fear imminent,

harmful, and offensive contact, and did wrongfully contact her

without consent. Henestroza is thus personally liable for

assault and battery.

III. Prejudice Toward Plaintiff

Plaintiff has established claims against defendants

for sex/gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII,

the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL: Henestroza is liable for

discrimination and retaliation under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, and

defendant Brooklyn Maids is liable for discrimination and

retaliation under Title VII and the NYCHRL. Henestroza is also

liable for civil assault and battery.

The final factor the court must consider in

determining whether to grant plaintiff’s motion for default

judgment is whether plaintiff would be prejudiced if her motion

for default were denied. Denying the motion would be

‘assault’ and ‘battery’ subsume all forms of tortious menacing and unwanted

touching.” See Girden, 262 F.3d at 203 (quoting United Nat'l Ins. Co. v.

Waterfront N.Y. Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1993) and citing 6A

N.Y. Jur. 2d Assault—Civil Aspects § 2). Rape indisputably encompasses civil

assault and battery under New York law. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 994 F.2d at

108.

prejudicial to plaintiff “as there are not additional steps

available to secure relief in this [c]ourt.” Bridge Oil Ltd. v.

Emerald Reefer Lines, LLC, No. 06-CV-14226, 2008 WL 5560868, at

*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2008) (citing Mason Tenders, 2003 WL

1960584, at *3). Without the entry of a default judgment,

plaintiff would be unable to recover for the claims adequately

set forth in the complaint. A default judgment is thus

warranted.

DAMAGES

With defendants’ liability established, the court now

assesses the damages that plaintiff is entitled to recover.

Allegations of liability are deemed admitted upon default;

allegations of damages are not. See Greyhound, 973 F.2d at 158.

Rather, a court must ensure that there is an adequate basis for

the damages sought by a plaintiff before entering judgment in

the amount demanded. See Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc.,

873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989). The court must also be able to

ascertain the amount of damages “with reasonable certainty.”

Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp.,

109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997).

A court may make this determination based upon

evidence presented at a hearing or upon a review of “detailed

affidavits or documentary evidence.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 55(b)(2); Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504,

508 (2d Cir. 1991). In addition, where the damages are “not

susceptible to simple mathematical calculation, Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) gives courts discretion to determine

whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary or whether to rely

on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence.” Am. Jewish

Comm. v. Berman, No. 15 Civ. 5983 (LAK) (JLC), 2016 WL 3365313,

at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016) (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiff initially set forth her damages contentions

in an affidavit and memorandum of law. (See generally ECF No.

16-1, Affidavit of Lovely Antoine (“Antoine Aff.”); ECF No. 17,

Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default.)

On June 26, 2020, the court held an inquest to adduce further

evidence regarding plaintiff’s damages claims. Following the

inquest, plaintiff further advanced her damages contentions in a

supplemental memorandum of law and additional exhibits. (See

ECF No. 25, Pl.’s Supplemental Brief on Damages and Attorneys’

Fees (“Pl.’s Supp. Br.”); ECF No. 25-2, Plaintiff’s Notes

Regarding Her Work Schedule (“Antoine Notes”); ECF No. 26,

Affidavit of Liana Kaplan, MSW (“Kaplan Aff.”).) Of course, the

court may only consider plaintiff’s submissions and testimony to

the extent they are admissible. See Poulos v. City of N.Y., No.

14 Civ. 3023 (LTS) (BCM), 2018 WL 3750508, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July

13, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3745661

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018); see House v. Kent Worldwide Mach.

Works, Inc., 359 F. App’x 206, 207 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary

order) (“[D]amages must be based on admissible evidence.”).

Here, the court finds Ms. Antoine’s testimony, affidavit, and

exhibits are indeed admissible to demonstrate her damages. See

Angulo v. 36th St. Hosp. LLC, No. 19CIV5075GBDSLC, 2020 WL

4938188, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 19CIV5075GBDSLC, 2020 WL 4936961

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2020); Poulos, 2018 WL 3750508, at *4

(“Plaintiff’s own declaration is admissible to demonstrate his

damages.”).

There are two documents that plaintiff submitted

which, although admissible, merit additional discussion. The

first is an affidavit from social worker Liana Kaplan, a

Domestic Violence Counselor. (See Kaplan Aff.) Ms. Antoine

proffered the Kaplan Affidavit to support her claim of emotional

distress damages. Plaintiff testified at the inquest that,

sometime after Henestroza attacked her, she moved out of the

home she shared with her family and relocated to a shelter for

abused women and their children. (Inquest Tr. 18-19.)

Plaintiff met with Ms. Kaplan on four occasions, in April and

May 2019, while staying at the domestic violence shelter with

her son. (Kaplan Aff. ¶¶ 5-6.) Ms. Kaplan’s affidavit does not

purport to diagnose Ms. Antoine’s mental condition. Instead,

Ms. Kaplan relates plaintiff’s self-described mental state.

(Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) The Kaplan Affidavit is thus hearsay. See Fed.

R. Evid. 802. Although it is hearsay, the Kaplan Affidavit is

admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), an exception

to the rule against hearsay for statements concerning the

declarant’s “then-existing state of mind . . . or emotional,

sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or

bodily health) . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). Ms. Kaplan

relates plaintiff’s statement regarding the “anxiety and pain”

that she was experiencing at the time, and how plaintiff’s stay

at the shelter was “exacerbat[ing] her depression and anxiety.”

(Kaplan Aff. ¶ 9.) This statement falls squarely within the

exception of Rule 803(3). Accordingly, the Kaplan Affidavit is

admissible to prove plaintiff’s emotional state in the aftermath

of quitting Brooklyn Maids.

The court will also consider Ms. Antoine’s notes

regarding her work schedule at Brooklyn Maids. Under Federal

Rule of Evidence 901(a), an item of evidence can be

authenticated through the production of “evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it

is.” Digital evidence can be authenticated by, inter alia,

testimony that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to

be, or the evidence’s “appearance, contents, substance, internal

patterns, or other distinctive characteristics.” Fed. R. Evid.

901(b)(1) & (4). Plaintiff testified that she kept a memo in

her phone documenting her hours and pay while employed with

Brooklyn Maids. (Inquest Tr. 13:3-8.) Under penalty of

perjury, plaintiff’s counsel appended to his declaration, “[a]

true and correct copy of notes taken by Ms. Antoine regarding

her schedule.” (ECF No. 25-1, Supplemental Declaration of H.

Joseph Cronen (“Cronen Supp. Decl.”) ¶ 3.) The contents and

appearance of plaintiff’s notes generally conform to her

description at the inquest: they document the days she worked,

how long she worked for, and how much she was paid. (See

generally Antoine Notes.) In addition, the insignia atop the

notes indicates the source was a notepad application on a

Smartphone. (Id.) The Antoine Notes are therefore

authenticated and admissible.

Having considered the admissible evidence, this court

awards damages in the amounts stated and for the reasons

discussed below.

I. Back Pay

Violations of “Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL entitle a

plaintiff to compensatory damages for pecuniary loss as well as

pain and suffering.” Moore v. Houlihan’s Restaurant, Inc., No.

07 Civ. 3129(ENV)(RER), 2011 WL 2470023, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 10,

2011). “Victims of employment discrimination are entitled to

reasonable damages that would make the plaintiff ‘whole for

injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment

discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton

Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1988)). Under Title VII, the

NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, a plaintiff is generally, but not

automatically, entitled to an award of back pay from the date of

termination to the date of the judgment. DeCurtis v. Upward

Bound Int’l, Inc., No. 09-CV-5378, 2011 WL 4549412, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011).

The complaint alleges that, following the March 1,

2019 incident, in which Henestroza choked plaintiff, she told

him not to contact her again. Plaintiff’s affidavit, filed in

connection with her motion for default judgment, elaborates that

she quit her job with Brooklyn Maids at some point after March

1, 2019, citing fear for her physical safety. (Antoine Aff. ¶¶

20-21.) Plaintiff further testified that she quit her job with

Brooklyn Maids in “the first week of March.” (Inquest Tr.

16:11-12.) In addition, the “intolerable” circumstances leading

to plaintiff’s departure amount to a constructive discharge by

Brooklyn Maids. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 151–52 (2d

Cir. 2003) (“An employee is constructively discharged when his

employer, rather than discharging him directly, intentionally

creates a work atmosphere so intolerable that he is forced to

quit involuntarily.”) (citing Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148

F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 1998)).

At the damages inquest, plaintiff testified that at

the time of her exit, she had been working five days a week, for

ten hours a day. (Inquest Tr. 17:4-6.) Plaintiff noted that

this 50-hour workweek included ten hours overtime per week.

(Id.) This testimony generally comports with the complaint,

which alleges plaintiff initially worked five days a week, from

8 a.m. to approximately 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., daily. (Compl. ¶

15.) Plaintiff told the court she was paid $990 each week, and

that Henestroza owed her “more than $5,000” in unpaid wages at

the time she quit. (Inquest Tr. 17:7-13.) According to

plaintiff, Henestroza generally paid her exclusively in cash

“because he decided he was going to budget my money for me.”

(Id. 13:3-5.) To document her time and unpaid wages, however,

plaintiff maintained records on her phone. (Id. 13:6-8.) Upon

the court’s request, plaintiff agreed to make a copy of her

records and provide them to the court. (Id. 17:14-20.)

Plaintiff’s notes suggest she worked sixty hours per week

throughout February 2019, her last month of employment. (See

Antoine Notes 3-4.)

Plaintiff also affirmed and testified to the myriad

circumstances that prevented her from obtaining new employment

after Brooklyn Maids. Under Title VII, a prevailing plaintiff

forfeits her right to back or front pay if she fails to mitigate

damages by not using “reasonable diligence in finding other

suitable employment.” Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231

(1982). The plaintiff’s duty is “not onerous, and does not

require [her] to be successful in mitigation.” Dailey v.

Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 456 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Ms. Antoine states in her affidavit that, “I have

attempted to get a new job, but I have not yet been hired

anywhere.” (Antoine Aff. ¶ 28.) After Henestroza assaulted and

threatened her with physical harm in March 2019, plaintiff moved

from her home to a domestic violence shelter, where she received

routine psychological treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) At the time

she moved in, she was suffering from “a lot of trauma,” and two

therapists were treating her. (Inquest Tr. 25:4-5.) During her

six-month stay at the shelter, she was largely inhibited from

seeking new employment due to the socially isolated conditions

at the “safe house.” (Id. 25:9-13.) Plaintiff’s job search was

further impeded by the need to attend to her child, who was six-

years-old at the time. (Id. 25:14-19.) Further complicating

matters, Ms. Antoine became pregnant in or around September

2019, and gave birth in April 2020. (Id. 25:19-20; Antoine Aff.

¶ 33.) Plaintiff attests she sought work, and applied for

positions online, but ultimately could not work because she: (1)

had a high-risk pregnancy, (2) had to walk her son to school in

the mornings and there was no bus service available to her; (3)

had to pick her son up from school daily at 2:00 p.m.; and (4)

had additional difficulty finding employment after the onset of

the COVID-19 pandemic. (Inquest Tr. 25:2-26:10.)

Under the circumstances, plaintiff has been

practically foreclosed from gaining new employment after leaving

Brooklyn Maids in March 2019. Defendants also have not

contested plaintiff’s evidence of mitigation or submitted any

contradictory evidence of their own. See Becerril v. E. Bronx

NAACP Child Dev. Ctr., No. 08CIV.10283(PAC)KNF, 2009 WL 2611950,

at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2009), report and recommendation

adopted sub nom. Becerril v. Ease Bronx NAACP Child Dev. Ctr.,

No. 08 CIV. 10283 PACKNF, 2009 WL 2972992 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,

2009) (finding plaintiff mitigated damages). Given the adverse

circumstances that confronted plaintiff, it is reasonable and

appropriate to conclude that she was reasonably diligent in her

search for new employment and her efforts to mitigate her

damages.

For these foregoing reasons, the court grants

plaintiff’s request for back pay. Plaintiff affirms she earned

$18 per hour working for Brooklyn Maids. (Antoine Aff. ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff’s back pay request seeks to recover her weekly income

of $990, based on her regular 40-hour workweek, plus ten hours

of weekly overtime at a rate of time-and-a-half.8 This request

is reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, plaintiff is

entitled to $990 per week, dating from March 1, 2019 to the

September 26, 2020, i.e., 82 weeks. Plaintiff is thus awarded

total back pay of $81,180.00.

II. Prejudgment Interest on Back Pay

“While the decision to award prejudgment interest is

left to the discretion of the district courts, the Second

Circuit has stated that ‘[t]o the extent . . . that damages

awarded to the plaintiff represent compensation for lost wages,

it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include

prejudgment interest.’” Shannon v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 136

F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Gierlinger v.

Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir. 1998)). Under federal law,

the applicable interest rate is the “the average rate of return

on one-year Treasury bills (‘T-bills’) for the relevant time

period.” Kuper v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 99 Civ.

1190(JSG)(MHD), 2003 WL 23350111, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18,

2003). Under New York law, “[interest shall be at the rate of

8 Plaintiff earned $720 per week based on her regular $18 per hour pay

rate and 40-hour workweek. Plaintiff earned, but was not paid, an additional

$270 per week for ten hours of weekly overtime at a rate of one-and-a-half

times her regular rate. See Nakahata v. New York–Presbyterian Healthcare

Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 200 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The FLSA mandates that [a

covered employee] be compensated at a rate of no less than one and one-half

times the regular rate of pay for any hours worked in excess of forty per

week.”) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)); Fermin v. Las Delicias Peruanas Rest.,

Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 19, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (same standard under New York

Labor Law) (citing Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 200).

nine per centum per annum, except where otherwise provided by

statute.” CPLR § 5004. Where, as here, a judgment is “based on

both state and federal law with respect to which no distinction

is drawn,” the applicable interest rate shall be “the federal

interest rate.” Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 629 F.3d 276, 280

(2d Cir. 2010). The court therefore disregards plaintiff’s

request for prejudgment interest at New York’s statutory rate of

nine percent per annum (see Pl.’s Supp. Br. 2-3), and awards

interest under federal law. Interest will also be compounded

annually, in order to guarantee plaintiff is completely

compensated. See Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 147 F.3d 83, 90

(2d Cir. 1998).

“The award of prejudgment interest should be

calculated from the time the claim arises through the date of

judgment.” Joseph, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 151. The following

methodology applies:

First, the backpay award should be divided pro rata

over the appropriate time period. Second, once the

award is divided, the average annual United States

treasury bill rate of interest referred to in 28

U.S.C. § 1961 will be applied. Third and finally, in

order to guarantee complete compensation to the

plaintiff, the interest will be compounded annually.

Id. at 151 (citations and alterations omitted).

Based on the foregoing, plaintiff is granted pre-

judgment interest on her total back pay award of $81,887.00.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to award prejudgment interest

using the foregoing methodology. Because the back pay and

relevant pre-judgment time periods coincide, prejudgment

interest shall be awarded from March 1, 2019, the date plaintiff

was constructively terminated, through to the date of entry of

judgment. The Clerk shall apply the average annual United

States T-bill rate of interest for the period March 1, 2019 to

September 30, 2020, as referred to in 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The

Clerk may utilize the government website,

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-

center/interest-rates/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 25,

2020), to ascertain the applicable rate.9 Finally, the interest

should be compounded annually.

III. Front Wages

The court has the discretion to award front wages to a

prevailing plaintiff under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the

NYCHRL. Becerril, 2009 WL 2611950, at *5; see also Santiago v.

Crown Heights Ctr. for Nursing & Rehab., No. 15CV4381DLICLP,

2017 WL 9482107, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017), report and

recommendation adopted as modified, No. 15CV4381DLICLP, 2017 WL

4410807 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2017) (awarding front wages under

federal, state, and city law); cf. Morse v. JetBlue Airways

Corp., No. 09-CV-5075 KAM MDG, 2014 WL 2587576, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

9 The Clerk may also utilize the Federal Reserve website,

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H.15 (last

visited Sept. 25, 2020).

June 9, 2014) (applying same substantive analysis for

entitlement to front wages under Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL).

“Front pay is an equitable remedy available to prevailing []

plaintiffs, and is generally understood to be an award for lost

compensation for the period between judgment and reinstatement.”

Whitten v. Cross Garage Corp., No. 00 CIV.5333 JSM FM, 2003 WL

21744088, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2003) (citing Robinson v.

Metro–North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 160 (2d Cir. 2000),

and Pollard v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848

(2001)). In essence, “front pay helps make a discharged

employee whole.” Id.

The efficacy of front pay depends on three

considerations, specifically, “(1) whether reinstatement is

either impossible or impracticable; (2) whether the plaintiff

has a reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable employment;

and (3) whether the calculation of front pay would involve undue

speculation.” Shannon, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (citing

Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728–29 (2d Cir.

1984)). Turning to the first inquiry, reinstatement is

impracticable, if not impossible. In their last encounter,

Henestroza assaulted and threatened plaintiff, prompting her to

quit in fear of her safety. Even if she could be reinstated, it

would not be fair to expect plaintiff to return to Brooklyn

Maids under the circumstances.

Second, plaintiff does not have a reasonable prospect

of obtaining comparable employment. This inquiry centers on

mitigation. “[A] prevailing plaintiff forfeits her right to . .

. front pay if she fails to mitigate damages by not using

‘reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment.’”

Becerril, 2009 WL 2611950, at *3 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 458

U.S. at 231). Plaintiff sought employment as diligently as

could be expected, in light of the adversity she encountered

after March 1, 2019. Moreover, the court anticipates that

plaintiff will encounter substantial difficulty securing

employment for the foreseeable future. Plaintiff is 37 years

old, and has an Associate’s Degree from Atlantic Union College.

(Inquest Tr. 6:2-6.) She is saddled with significant childcare

burdens, and has spent much of the last eighteen months in

domestic violence shelters. She is confronting numerous mental

and emotional health conditions. As if these circumstances did

not present enough obstacles to seeking and obtaining

employment, the job market has shriveled drastically due to the

COVID-19 pandemic.

Finally, calculating appropriate front pay does not

entail undue speculation. Plaintiff seeks front pay for a

period of two years. (Pl.’s Mem. 16.) A two-year award of

front pay, based on the difference between plaintiff’s past and

current earnings, is customary. See, e.g., Santiago, 2017 WL

9482107, at *22 (awarding two years of front pay by adding two

years of pay at plaintiff’s former annual salary, less

mitigation earnings); cf. Osorio v. Source Enters., Inc., No. 5

Civ. 10029 (JSR), 2007 WL 683985, at *6 (S.D.N. Y Mar. 2, 2007)

(affirming that “a five-year front pay award was not unduly

speculative or excessive” because plaintiff had “‘no reasonable

prospect of obtaining comparable alternative employment’ within

the next five years”). The court finds two years’ front pay is

appropriate and non-speculative given the formidable obstacles

that confront plaintiff.

The court will therefore award plaintiff $98,961.00,

which accounts for two years’ front pay at plaintiff’s base

salary, or $102,960.00, discounted to its present value.10 See

Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1189 (2d Cir.

1992) (“[A]n award of front pay should be discounted to its

present value.”); Chisholm v. Mem’l Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr.,

824 F. Supp. 2d 573, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (reducing front pay

award to present value at agree-upon discount rate).

10 The court applied a 2% discount rate in order to calculate the “present

value of a lost stream of earnings in an inflation-free economy.” Ammar v.

United States, 342 F.3d 133, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where the parties have

adduced no evidence relating to the discount rate and there has been no

upward adjustment of the undiscounted lost wages figure to cover future

inflation, this Court has authorized district judges to use a discount rate

of 2% per year.”).

IV. Emotional Distress Damages

Plaintiff seeks a “substantial emotion distress award”

for pain and suffering, past and future. (Pl.’s Supp. Br. 6.)

Courts in this district have adopted a three-tiered approach to

emotional distress damages, depending on whether the case is

“garden-variety,” “significant,” or “egregious.” See Setty,

2018 WL 8415414, at *16. “This approach has been used in

damages inquests on default judgments as well as in reviews of

jury verdicts.” Gutierrez v. Taxi Club Mgmt., Inc., No.

17CIV532AMDVMS, 2018 WL 3432786, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018),

report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Gutierrez v. Taxi

Club Mgmt., Inc., No. 17CV0532AMDVMS, 2018 WL 3429903 (E.D.N.Y.

July 16, 2018).

For “garden-variety” emotional distress claims, where

plaintiff “did not seek medical treatment but [] the evidence in

the form of plaintiff’s testimony describes shock, nightmares,

sleeplessness, humiliation, and other subjective distress,”

Santiago, 2017 WL 9482107, at *23, courts have awarded damages

ranging from $5,000 to $35,000. See, e.g., Joseph, 970 F. Supp.

2d at 153-54 (awarding plaintiff $30,000 in emotional distress

damages where plaintiff’s allegations of emotional distress were

“significant but [were] stated as conclusions drawn by the

Plaintiff herself[] [w]ithout any medical documentation[.]”).

For a “significant” emotional distress claim, where a plaintiff

has suffered “more substantial harm, usually evidenced through

medical testimony or documentation,” Joseph, 970 F. Supp. 2d at

153 (internal quotations and citations omitted), courts have

awarded damages ranging from $50,000 to $100,000. Rainone v.

Potter, 388 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see, e.g.,

Olsen v. Cty. of Nassau, 615 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47-49 (E.D.N.Y.

2009) (upholding award of $100,000 where plaintiff had

documented medical evidence that she suffered from depression,

lack of sleep, powerlessness, and lack of motivation); Hill v.

Airborne Freight Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67-68, 73-74

(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reducing a jury award of $150,000 to $50,000

for a plaintiff who established “numerous instances where

managers made disparaging remarks about African Americans” and a

negative effect on his personal and professional life, but who

did not pursue a course of psychological treatment). Finally,

in egregious cases, “where the discriminatory conduct was

outrageous and shocking or where the physical health of

plaintiff was significantly affected,” damages have been awarded

in excess of $100,000. Setty, 2018 WL 8415414, at *17 (emphasis

added) (quoting Rainone, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 123). Adjusting the

values above for inflation,11 results in the following scale:

11 In Gutierrez, Judge Scanlon noted in her Report and Recommendation,

thereafter adopted, that the prescribed damages ranges for emotional distress

claims were based on Rainone, which was decided in 2005. Gutierrez, 2018 WL

3432786, at *9 (citing Rainone, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 122). Taking a cue from

Gutierrez, the court has applied the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (“BLS”)

$6,500 to $46,000 for “garden-variety” cases; $65,000 to

$131,000 for “significant” cases; and above $131,000 in

“egregious” cases.

Given Mr. Henestroza’s outrageous and shocking

conduct, this is an egregious case. At the inquest, Ms. Antoine

provided a harrowing account of the physical and emotional

abuse, and threats by Henestroza. Mr. Henestroza made his

initial, inappropriate advances in January 2019, when Ms.

Antoine was assigned to clean his Queens apartment. (Inquest

Tr. 8:18-25.) Henestroza took plaintiff into his room and told

her “this is where all the magic happens.” (Id. 9:2-6.) He

inappropriately asked plaintiff about her sexual activities and

boasted about the size of his penis. (Id. 9:7-9.) After

driving plaintiff home, Henestroza sent her text messages

professing his desire to date her. (Id. 9:12-14.) Henestroza

repeated his boasts about his penis size and sexual prowess.

(Id. 9:14-16.) Ms. Antoine rebuffed his overtures, and advised

that she wished simply to “work and keep it professional.” (Id.

9:19-20.) Regardless, Henestroza continued to harass plaintiff

on subsequent occasions when she cleaned his apartment, which

made her “uncomfortable.” (Id. 9:24-10:2.)

Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) inflation calculator to adjust the

aforementioned amounts for inflation from September 2005, when Rainone was

decided, to August 2020, the last date for which BLS computes the CPI

adjustment. See CPI Inflation Calculator,

https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Sept. 25,

2020).

In February 2019, Henestroza joined plaintiff on a

cleaning assignment in Manhattan. (Inquest Tr. 10:3-7.) What

ensued was tantamount to rape:

Counsel: What happened when you were cleaning the

apartment?

Plaintiff: So I went in the apartment and I had to --

he came upstairs and he locked his door, and then he

pushed me on the bed, and I had on some spandex pants,

and he pulled down my pants and he just started -- he

got on top of me and he started having sex with me. It

was like really aggressive force, like pushing me down

on the bed and overpowering me.

Counsel: I'm so sorry to hear that. Did you tell him

to stop?

Plaintiff: Yes.

Counsel: Did he?

Plaintiff: He did not stop until he was done and he

came and he got up and, you know, got dressed and

walked out.

(Id. 10:10-21.)

Afterward, Henestroza drove plaintiff home. (Inquest

Tr. 11:4.) Ms. Antoine was outwardly distraught by Henestroza’s

assault. (Id. 11:5-7 (“I was upset. I got in the car. I was

screaming. I was furious. So I was just like cursing him out,

like how could you do something like that.”).) Henestroza,

however, was conspicuously indifferent to plaintiff’s distress.

(Id. 11:7-11 (“He just didn’t care. Like, I was in the car. I

was crying. Like, I was very emotional. I just felt like that --

I was in a shock of state that he would do something like that,

but he didn’t care. He was just laughing.”).) In the weeks that

followed, Henestroza reduced plaintiff’s work and withheld her

pay. (Id. 11:13-17.) Plaintiff testified that Henestroza

required her to have sex with him as a condition to paying her

wages. (Id. 11:16-20.)

Fed up with her treatment, plaintiff confronted

Henestroza at his apartment in early March 2019, to demand he

resume regularly paying her wages. (Inquest Tr. 12:2-4.)

Henestroza reacted violently, plaintiff recalled:

So he got really angry. He threw me against the wall

and started choking me. Then he told me I used to kill

animals when I was a kid. Do you know what I could do

to you? After that, I was like take me home. So he

drove me home in the car. He was threatening to kill

me. He's like oh, I know where you live. I know where

your family live. You don't know what I'm capable of

doing, you got to like watch yourself.

(Id. 12:4-12.) The attack left Ms. Antoine in fear for her

safety, and that of her family’s. (Id. 12:14-16.) About two

days later, Henestroza appeared at plaintiff’s home, and

threatened her. (Id. 18:11-17.) Plaintiff responded by calling

the police and obtaining an order of protection against

Henestroza. (Id. 18:19-21.)

After Henestroza threatened plaintiff at her home, she

“had to go to . . . a safe house[.]” (Inquest Tr. 18:24-25.)

Plaintiff moved to a domestic violence shelter with her son in

mid-March, and lived there until September 2019, at which point

she moved to a different shelter. (Id. 19:4-8.) Plaintiff has

received therapy at each shelter, and states was diagnosed with

anxiety, bipolar disorder, trauma, post-traumatic stress

syndrome, and significant depression. (Id. 21:1-4.) She was

also taking the anti-depressants Trazodone and Remron, but is no

longer on those medications. (Id. 21:6-7.)

Plaintiff described how Henestroza’s assault and other

threatening conduct has impacted her emotionally:

[I]t has made me very stressed out. A lot of stress,

loss of sleep. I lost a lot of weight. I'm having

nightmares. I'm scared. Every time I go out now I'm

like always paranoid because I don't know if I can run

into him and I'm scared for my family, my sister. I

haven't seen my family in 14 months. I haven't seen my

mom or my sister.

I try to avoid going where the incident happened when

he came to our house. I have like, you know, a lot of

trauma. My son, you know, I'm worried about him

because he's very sad, you know, since we had to move

and go hide and stuff. He kind of knows like what's

going on and it is affecting him. You know, I feel

like I'm powerless. I can't provide for my kids. I

don't have a job. I don't have no money and it's like

-- I feel like I can't protect myself. I'm not safe

anywhere.

(Inquest Tr. 21:21-22:10.)

Although the court credits plaintiff’s testimony, her

lack of corroboration must be acknowledged. Plaintiff did not

offer any corroborating witnesses at the inquest. After the

hearing, plaintiff’s counsel submitted a sealed affidavit from

Ms. Liana Kaplan, a Domestic Violence Counselor at plaintiff’s

shelter residence after March 2019. Although admissible, the

Kaplan Affidavit is not entirely illuminating. Ms. Kaplan did

not provide any diagnostic information about plaintiff’s mental

or emotional condition, despite having treated her on four

occasions. (Kaplan Aff. ¶ 8 (noting plaintiff’s shelter “does

not make diagnoses”).) Instead, she merely relates plaintiff’s

self-described medical conditions and history. Nor does the

affidavit specifically connect plaintiff’s mental health

difficulties to the events in question. Ms. Kaplan recalled

plaintiff telling her that “she was experiencing increased

anxiety and depression while she was at the [shelter],” and

“specifically recall[ed] [plaintiff] saying that being forced to

live in a shelter, along with her son, exacerbated her

depression and anxiety.” (Id. ¶ 9.) But if plaintiff told Ms.

Kaplan how Henestroza’s abuse led to her predicament, Ms. Kaplan

neglected to state that in her affidavit. As a result, the

affidavit is of minimal utility in connecting defendants’

conduct to plaintiff’s emotional distress, notwithstanding

plaintiff’s own credible testimony at the inquest hearing.

In light of Mr. Henestroza’s egregious conduct, and

having considered and credited plaintiff’s testimony, which is

uncontested, the court awards emotional distress damages of

$200,000. This award recognizes the shocking, likely criminal

nature of Henestroza’s actions, and the credibly traumatic

impact of those actions on plaintiff’s physical and mental well-

being. Plaintiff credibly testified that Henestroza subjected

her to an escalating pattern of abuse and threats. What began

in the confines of Henestroza’s home, with extremely

inappropriate remarks, laced with sexual innuendo and overtures,

evolved to sexual assault, violent choking, and threats to

plaintiff and her family’s lives. Henestroza’s sadistic conduct

had a crippling effect on plaintiff, emotionally and mentally.

She suffered stress, weight loss, sleeplessness, paranoia,

depression, hopelessness, and fear.

At the same time, the award above also accounts for

plaintiff’s lack of corroboration. Although Ms. Kaplan’s

affidavit confirms that plaintiff resided at a domestic violence

shelter with her son shortly after her final, violent encounter

with Henestroza, there is no corroborating evidence regarding

plaintiff’s mental health diagnoses, medications, and other

factors that would support a more significant award of damages

for emotional distress. The Report and Recommendation in Offei

v. Omar, thereafter adopted, serves as a helpful guidepost in

this context. No. 11 Civ. 4283 (SAS) (MHD), 2012 WL 2086294, at

*7 (May 18, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11

Civ. 4283 (SAS) (MHD), 2012 WL 2086356 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2012).

In Offei, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment and was

awarded $250,000 in damages for a one-time incident of sexual

assault. Id. Ms. Offei experienced severe emotional distress

that required her to take anti-anxiety medication on a daily

basis. Id. at *2. Dr. Boland, a clinical psychologist who

treated Offei after her assault, provided ample corroboration

for plaintiff’s account. Id. at *3. At the damages inquest,

Dr. Boland testified about Offei’s range of anxiety-related

conditions, and identified the assault as a cause of her

symptoms. Id. at *3-4.

Ms. Antoine, by contrast, suffered prolonged, severe

physical and verbal abuse that spanned several months. On the

other hand, her lack of corroboration warrants restraint when

awarding damages. The court finds that an award of $200,000

strikes a proper balance between the traumatic abuse plaintiff

suffered and the near-complete absence of corroborating

evidence. This award comports with sums awarded in similar

situations, and falls within the generally accepted spectrum of

emotional distress damages, given the nature of the abuse, the

harm inflicted, and the level of corroboration. E.g., Garcia v.

Comprehensive Ctr., LLC, No. 17 Civ. 8970 (JPO) (BCM), 2019 WL

8274296, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2019) (awarding $175,000 in

emotional distress damages to plaintiff who “suffered physical

violence, harassment, and discrimination for more than a year,

leading to psychological treatment” including therapy and

medication for diagnoses of PTSD and major depressive disorder),

report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1435002 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 24, 2020); Gutierrez, 2018 WL 3432786, at *9–10

(recommending $130,000 emotional distress award where plaintiff

endured severe and intense sexually harassing behavior that

caused her migraine headaches, nausea, vomiting, sleep

disorders, and anxiety lasting for over 18 months); Mayo-Coleman

v. Am. Sugar Holdings, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 79 (PAC), 2018 WL

2684100, at *3, 5 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2018) (reducing emotional

distress award from $1.7 million to $500,000 as “the greatest

amount that can be awarded without being excessive” where

plaintiff had both psychological and physical manifestations

resulting from extreme sexual harassment); Bouveng v. NYG

Capital LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 280, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (reducing

a $500,000 jury award to $150,000 where a plaintiff suffered

significant emotional distress); Caravantes v. 53rd St.

Partners, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 7821 (RPP), 2012 WL 3631276, at *24

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) (awarding $150,000 in compensatory

damages where emotional distress was significant); Thorsen v.

Cty. of Nassau, 722 F. Supp. 2d 277, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

(reducing a $1,500,000.00 award to $500,000.00 for “significant”

damages evidenced by the plaintiff’s testimony and the testimony

of his treating psychologist regarding the plaintiff’s

hospitalization for a “major stress attack”); Katt v. City of

N.Y., 151 F. Supp. 2d 313, 370–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (upholding

jury’s emotional distress damages award of $400,000 where

plaintiff suffered “permanent mental disabilities” and was

unable to work as a result of defendant’s sexual harassment).

V. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff also seeks a “significant” punitive damages

award, “[g]iven the abhorrent and shocking nature” of

Henestroza’s behavior. (Pl.’s Supp. Br. 8.) A prevailing party

is entitled to punitive damages under Title VII and the NYSHRL

where defendants “engaged in intentional discrimination . . .

with malice or reckless indifference to [plaintiff’s] federally

protected rights.” Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp.,

251 F.3d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 2001). A plaintiff is entitled to

punitive damages under the NYCHRL where “the wrongdoer’s actions

amount to willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or

where there is a conscious disregard of the rights of others or

conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard.” Chauca v.

Abraham, 30 N.Y.3d 325, 329 (2017) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Title VII limits compensatory and punitive

damages, excluding back pay, to $50,000 for employers such as

Brooklyn Maids who have one hundred or fewer employees. See 42

U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A); Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163

F.3d 684, 691 (2d Cir. 2008).12 The NYSHRL does not explicitly

12 The complaint states that Brooklyn Maids employs at least 15 or more

employees. (Compl. ¶ 8.)

provide for punitive damages. N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(9). The

NYCHRL, on the other hand, imposes no limit on the amount of

punitive damages a court may award. N.Y. Admin. Code. § 8-

502(a). Punitive damages are also recoverable in an action for

assault and battery under New York law, and “may be assessed

where a defendant’s actions evince a high degree of moral

culpability or demonstrate a wanton or reckless disregard for

the rights of the plaintiff.” Solis–Vicuna v. Notias, 71 A.D.3d

868, 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010); see Matthews v.

Garrett, 303 A.D.2d 563, 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2003).

The Second Circuit has recognized that:

[a]wards of punitive damages are by nature

speculative, arbitrary approximations. No objective

standard exists that justifies the award of one

amount, as opposed to another, to punish a tortfeasor

appropriately for his misconduct. Nor is there any

formula to determine the dollar amount needed to

effectuate deterrence.

Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2013). That said, the

Supreme Court has delineated several factors for courts to

consider in assessing the reasonableness of punitive damages,

including: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the

defendant’s conduct; (2) the difference between the actual or

potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive

damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive

damages awarded and the civil penalties imposed in comparable

cases.” DeCurtis v. Upward Bound Int’l, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5378

(RJS), 2011 WL 4549412, at *5 (S.D.N. Y Sept. 27, 2011) (citing

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). In

addition, no matter how egregious the underlying conduct, the

court is required to consider the defendant’s financial

circumstances in determining an award of punitive damages.

Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 121 (2d Cir. 2006).

The court agrees with plaintiff that defendants’

conduct merits sizeable punitive damages. Henestroza’s actions

were unquestionably reprehensible. Without rehashing

plaintiff’s detailed testimony in its entirety, it is clear that

Henestroza acted with malice and utter disregard for plaintiff’s

rights. Henestroza sexually assaulted Ms. Antoine. He attacked

her, strangled her, and threatened her life and the lives of her

family. Plaintiff testified that Henestroza merely laughed when

she confronted him about his egregious behavior, and even

retaliated by docking her hours. Moreover, he leveraged his

authority as CEO and his control over plaintiff’s work schedule

and compensation to withhold her pay, apparently in order to

compel sexual favors from her. Mr. Henestroza’s conduct was

therefore not only personally reprehensible. As an employer, he

abused his position of trust for unseemly, if not illegal, ends.

In sexual assault cases, courts in this Circuit

frequently award punitive damages that are equal to or less than

compensatory damages. See Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 818 (2d

Cir. 1997) (punitive less than compensatory); Doe v. HRH Prince

Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud, Saudi Oger Ltd., No. 13-CV-571 (RWS),

2017 WL 4541426, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2017) (same); Amador

v. Galbreath, No. 10-CV-6702, 2013 WL 1755784, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.

Apr. 24, 2013) (one-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory);

Ortiz v. Lasker, Jr., No. 08-CV-6001, 2010 WL 3476017, at *2

(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2010) (same); Cash v. Cty. of Erie, No. 04-

CV-0182 (JTC) (JJM), 2009 WL 3199558, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,

2009) (punitive less than compensatory). The court roughly

adheres to the one-to-one punitive-to-compensatory ratio here,

with only slight modification.13

Imposing a punitive damage award of $375,000 is

appropriate under the circumstances presented here. This award

falls within the broad range of punitive damage awards ordered

in like cases. See, e.g., Mathie, 121 F.3d at 818 (award of

$250,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive

damages is appropriate where corrections officer sexually abused

and forcibly sodomized inmate); Noonan v. Becker, 14 CV 4084,

2018 WL 1738746, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018) (awarding

$1,000,000 in punitive damages against defaulting defendant

police officer based on unchallenged factual allegations of

deliberate and outrageous conduct, including false arrest,

13 Leaving aside interest, plaintiff’s total compensatory damages,

including back pay, front pay, and emotional distress damages, amounts to

$380,141.

prosecution of false charges, sexual assault, battery and rape),

report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2088279 (S.D.N.Y. May

3, 2018); Offei, 2012 WL 2086294, at *8 ($100,000 in punitive

damages for one-time sexual assault); Ortiz, 2010 WL 3476017, at

*2 (awarding $250,000 in compensatory and $250,000 in punitive

damages to inmate raped twice by corrections officer); Cash,

2009 WL 3199558, at *4 (reducing jury punitive award to $150,000

for prisoner raped by corrections officer); Deborah S. v.

Diorio, 153 Misc.2d 708, 715 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992) (punitive

award of $200,000 to victim of date rape).

Finally, the court notes that, by defaulting,

defendant has surrendered the opportunity to demonstrate that

his financial circumstances should constrain the amount of any

such award. See Mathie, 121 F.3d at 816 (“Under well

established precedent in this Circuit, ‘it is the defendant's

burden to show that his financial circumstances warrant a

limitation of the award.’”) (quoting Smith v. Lightning Bolt

Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 373 (2d Cir. 1988)).

Accordingly, the court grants plaintiff’s request for

punitive damages in the amount of $375,000.

VI. Post-Judgment Interest

Post-judgment interest shall be imposed “on any money

judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.” 28

U.S.C. § 1961(a). This interest rate is calculated “from the

date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly

average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by

the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the

calendar week preceding[] the date of the judgment,” and “shall

be computed daily to the date of payment except as provided in

section 2516(b) of this title and section 1304(b) of title 31,

and shall be compounded annually.” Id. (a)-(b). The amount

upon which the post-judgment interest accrues “includes

compensatory damages, punitive damages, and fee awards.” Koch

v. Greenberg, 14 F. Supp. 3d 247, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations

omitted).

The court grants plaintiff’s motion for post-judgment

interest on plaintiff’s awards of compensatory damages, punitive

damages, and the attorneys’ fees and costs. The Clerk of Court

shall calculate post-judgment damages as instructed above from

the date of the entry of judgment.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff requests $12,631.25 in attorneys’ fees and

$655 in costs. (Pl.’s Supp. Br. 14.) A party prevailing under

Title VII and the NYCHRL is entitled to reimbursement of

attorneys’ fees at the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(k); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(g); DeCurtis, 2011 WL

4549412, at *6. Since the Title VII and NYCHRL provisions are

“substantively and textually similar . . . the reasonableness of

fees [are] analyzed the same regardless of which provision

provides [plaintiff’s] recovery.” Houlihan’s Rest., 2011 WL

2470023, at *7 n.10.

Courts in the Second Circuit calculate a

“‘presumptively reasonable fee’ by taking the product of the

hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate that

reflects ‘what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to

pay.’” Setty, 2018 WL 8415414, at *19 (quoting Arbor Hill

Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cty. of Albany, 522

F.3d 182, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2008)). “A reasonable hourly rate is

generally calculated by reference to the prevailing hourly rates

in the district where the court sits for attorneys of comparable

skill, experience, and reputation.” Setty, 2018 WL 8415414, at

*19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, counsel

must present time records that are itemized, for each attorney,

by date, hours worked, and nature of work performed. Id.

“Courts in this District have approved the following

hourly rates for attorneys practicing in the Eastern District of

New York: $300 to $450 for partners in law firms, $200 to $325

for senior associates, and $100 to $200 for junior associates.”

PNC Equip. Fin., LLC v. Montauk Transp. Serv. Inc., No. 18-

CV5883, 2019 WL 8685091, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2019), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-5883, 2020 WL 2219197

(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020); Castcapa Constr., LLC v. TMB Servs.,

LLC, No. 17-CV-1023, 2018 WL 623546 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018)

(junior associates are “typically compensated at between $100 to

$200 per hour”); Thomas v. City of N.Y., No. 14-CV-7513, 2017 WL

6033532, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017) (“An hourly rate of $450

remains within the range of rates found reasonable for partners

with twenty or more years of experience in this District.”);

Smart v. City of N.Y., No. 15-CV-1405, 2017 WL 933080, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017) (“In recent years, fees have been

awarded in the Eastern District of New York at an hourly rate of

$300 to $450 for partners and $100 to $325 for associates in

civil rights cases.”). Courts in this District have also

approved hourly rates for paralegals ranging from $70 per hour

to $100 per hour, while the average rate is $75 per hour. Nat'l

Integrated Grp. Pension Plan v. Dunhill Food Equip. Corp., No.

11-CV-3652, 2014 WL 887222, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014)

(citing Juarez v. Precision Apparel, Inc., No. 12-CV-2349 ARR

VMS, 2013 WL 5210142, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2013)

(collecting Eastern District cases)).

The court has reviewed the qualifications of

plaintiff’s attorneys and support staff, set forth in the

Supplemental Cronen Declaration, and counsel’s contemporaneous

billing records (ECF No. 25-3, Billing Records), and finds

plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs to be

reasonable. The chart below reflects each attorney and

staffer’s hourly rate, hours committed, and total fee:

Attorney/Staff Rate Hours Total

Rendered

Shawn Clark, Esq. $325.00 11.25 $3,656.25

H. Joseph Cronen, Esq. $250.00 32.5 $8,125.00

Samantha Cassinelli, Paralegal $100.00 6.7 $670.00

Candy Hernandez, Paralegal $100.00 0.4 $40.00

Madonna Isaac, Paralegal $100.00 1.4 $140.00

$12,631.25

(Cronen Supp. Decl. ¶ 6.)

Based on their credentials and experience, the court

finds that each attorney and staffer’s hourly rate, which

uniformly fall within recognized lodestars, is appropriate.

Shawn Clark, Esq., is a Senior Associate at Phillips &

Associates and his requested hourly rate is $325.00. He has ten

years’ experience as a practitioner, including positions in the

Legal Bureau of the NYPD, and the Special Federal Litigation

Division of the New York City Law Department. He has

significant experience in employment and discrimination matters,

including a number of trials. (Cronen Supp. Decl. ¶ 8.) Mr.

Cronen has been practicing law since 2012. (Id. ¶ 9.) His

practices include labor and employment, police misconduct, and

personal injury. (Id.) In 2015, he was second chair in a

personal injury trial in Bronx County Supreme Court and prepared

the plaintiff for direct examination. (Id.) Likewise, the

paralegals, Ms. Cassinelli, Ms. Hernandez, and Ms. Isaac, each

have commendable experience and credentials. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12.)

After thoroughly reviewing counsel’s billing records,

the court further finds that the hours expended are reasonable

and appropriate. Notably, in preparing the fee application,

counsel removed vague and duplicative entries and reduced the

time expended on certain tasks. (Cronen Supp. Decl. ¶ 7.)

Counsel also excised time entries for one associate who was

primarily occupied with administrative work. (Id.) Plaintiff’s

billing records are itemized by date, task, the time each task

began, and duration of each task in increments of tenths of an

hour. (See generally Billing Records.) The entries

substantially consist of time spent drafting and filing the

summons and complaint, serving the summons and complaint,

discussing the details of the complaint with the plaintiff,

preparing and filing the case in the EEOC,14 preparing

calculations of damages and drafting a demand letter, moving for

an entry of a default, preparing proof of damages, drafting the

motion for default judgment, preparing Ms. Antoine to testify at

the inquest, appearing at the inquest, and preparing the

supplemental damages submissions. (See generally Billing

14 Fees for time spent in connection with proceedings before the EEOC are

recoverable. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61–

64 (1980) (holding that Title VII allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees and

costs incurred in administrative proceedings prior to suit being brought in

federal court).

Records; see also Cronen Supp. Decl. ¶ 5.) Accordingly,

plaintiff’s counsel has demonstrated that the fees requested are

reasonable.

Plaintiff may also recover her costs, namely, a $400

fee for filing the complaint, and $255 expended for process

servers. “[A]ttorneys’ fees awards include those reasonable

out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily

charged to their clients.” Rhodes v. Davis, No. 08-CV-9681

(GBD), 2015 WL 1413413, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2015) (quoting

LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir.

1998)). “Court fees reflected on the Court’s docket and costs

for which a claimant provides extrinsic proof, such as an

invoice or receipt, are considered sufficiently substantiated,

as is a sworn statement or declaration under penalty of perjury

that certain amounts were expended on particular items.”

Mendoza v. CGY & J Corp., 2017 WL 4685100, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.

17, 2017) (citing Abel v. Town Sports Int’l, LLC, No. 09-CV-

10388 (DF), 2012 WL 6720919, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2012)).

Counsel’s payment of the $400 fee for filing the summons and

complaint is evident from the docket. (See Dkt. Entry dated

Oct. 1, 2019.) Exhibit 4 to the Supplemental Cronen Declaration

is a process server receipt for $255 evincing counsel’s costs

incurred serving defendants with the complaint and summons.

(See ECF No. 25-4.)

In sum, the court grants plaintiff’s counsel’s request

for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $12,631.25, and

reimbursement of $655 in costs.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for

entry of default judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff has established

defendants’ liability under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the

NYCHRL, for sex/gender discrimination and retaliation. Mr.

Henestroza is liable for discrimination and retaliation under

the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, and defendant Brooklyn Maids is liable

for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the

NYCHRL. Mr. Henestroza is also liable for assault and battery

under New York law.

The Clerk shall enter judgment against Brooklyn Maids

and Mr. Henestroza, jointly and severally, and award plaintiff

the following amounts:15

1) $81,180 in back pay.

15 “Although Title VII limits the amount of damages that may be awarded,

the NYSHRL and NYCHRL do not.” Houlihan’s Rest., 2011 WL 2470023, at *4.

Thus, Title VII’s damages cap does not limit the compensatory and punitive

damages otherwise available under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Accordingly, the

court awards all compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $50,000 under

the NYSHRL (excess compensatory) and NYCHRL (excess compensatory and

punitive). See Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 344 Fed. App’x

628, 631 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming a district court’s compensatory and

punitive damages award of $600,000 for violations of Title VII, the NYSHRL

and the NYCHRL); see also Manzo v. Sovereign Motor Cars, Ltd., 491 Fed. App’x

102, 103 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming a district court’s compensatory and

punitive damages award totaling $250,000 for Title VII and NYCHRL law

violations); Caravantes, 2012 WL 3631276, at *21 (“[W]here Title VII claims

are pled alongside NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims, courts have awarded damages in

excess of the Title VII statutory cap by allocating the excess award to the

state and city law claims.”) (citation omitted).

2) Prejudgment interest on plaintiff’s back pay award

from March 1, 2019 through to the date judgment is

entered. The Clerk shall apply the average annual

United States T-bill rate of interest for the period

March 1, 2019 to September 30, as referred to in 28

U.S.C. § 1961. Interest shall be compounded

annually.

3) $98,961 in front wages.

4) $200,000 in emotional distress damages.

5) $375,000 in punitive damages.

6) $12,631.25 in attorneys’ fees.

7) $665 in costs.

8) Post-judgment interest pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1961,

calculated from the date judgment is entered, and

compounded annually, which shall accrue on

plaintiff’s awards of compensatory damages, punitive

damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Following the entry of judgment, as set forth above,

the Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to serve a copy of

this Memorandum and Order of judgment on defendants at their

last known addresses, note service on the docket, and close this

case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2020

Brooklyn, New York

/s/

Hon. Kiyo A. Matsumoto

United States District Judge