Oliver v. Yaphank Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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VIRTUE MEKHI OLIVER,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against- 20-CV-01877 (JS)(AYS)

YAPHANK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

OFFICER JOHN DOE 1, OFFICER JOHN

DOE 2, OFFICER JOHN DOE 3, OFFICER

JOHN DOE 4, LT. JOHN DOE, SGT.

JOHN DOE, WARDEN JOHN DOE,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Virtue Mekhi Oliver, pro se

729378

Riverhead Correctional Facility

110 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 11901

For Defendants: No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

On April 20, 2020, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Virtue

Mekhi Oliver (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in this Court pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the Yaphank

Correctional Facility (“the Jail”) and several unidentified

individuals alleged to be employed at the Jail together with an

application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Compl., D.E. 1; IFP

Mot., D.E. 2.) Upon review of the declaration in support of the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. However, for

the reasons that follow, the Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED as

against the Jail pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff’s claims against Sgt. Doe, Lt. Doe, and

the Warden are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1) and Plaintiff’s claims against

the remaining Defendants shall proceed.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff’s handwritten Complaint is submitted on the

Court’s Section 1983 complaint form and is brief. In its entirety,

Plaintiff alleges:

On January 15, 2020 between the time of 3:30 to 5:30

while I was locked in my cell at Yaphank Correctional

Facility I was told to put my hands behind my back and

put them against the door with a soft cast onto be

handcuffed. While being handcuffed by officers John Doe

1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and John Doe 4 supervised by

Sgt John Doe who was supervised by Lt. John Doe. My hand

was being bent and twisted in awkward positions which

caused new injuries to my existing injuries.

(Compl. ¶ II at 5.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges he suffered

broken seaphoid and torn ligaments in my wrist, 2

surgeries are needed one for the seaphoid to be repaired

and one to repair the torn ligament I have in my wrist.

Medical treatment was not received yet. I also need to

attend physical therapy to reclaim large and small motor

1 All material allegations in the Complaint are presumed to be

true for the purpose of this Order, see, e.g., Rogers v. City of

Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a

pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court is required

to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true).

Excerpts from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as they

appear in the original. Errors in spelling, grammar, and

punctuation have not been corrected or noted.

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skills in my hand.

(Compl. ¶ II.A at 5.)

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks to recover

a damages award in the total sum of twenty-two million dollars.

(Compl. ¶ III.)

DISCUSSION

I. In Forma Pauperis Application

Upon review of Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the

application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that

Plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment

of the filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

II. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous

or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii),

1915A(b). The Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as

it makes such a determination. See id. § 1915A(b); Liner v. Goord,

196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that under §§ 1915,

1915A, sua sponte dismissals of frivolous prisoner complaints are

not only permitted but mandatory).

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Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se

plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,

537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d

197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). However, a complaint must plead

sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citation

omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678;

accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir.

2011). While “‘detailed factual allegations’” are not required,

“[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides that

[e]very person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at

least in part to a person acting under color of state law and (2)

the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the

Constitution of the United States.” Rae v. Cty. of Suffolk, No.

07–CV–2138, 2010 WL 768720, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010) (quoting

Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999).

A. Claims against the Jail

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the Jail are not

plausible because it does not have an independent legal identity.

It is well-established that “under New York law, departments that

are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a

legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and,

therefore, cannot sue or be sued.” Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t,

224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Lukes v. Nassau Cty.

Jail, 2012 WL 1965663, *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012) (dismissing

claims against the Nassau County Jail because it is an

“administrative arm of Nassau County, without a legal identity

separate and apart from the County”); Hawkins v. Nassau Cty. Corr.

Facility, 781 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 at n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).

Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the Jail

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are not plausible and are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b). Given Plaintiff’s pro se

status, the Court has considered whether he has alleged a plausible

claim if his claims were to be construed as against the

municipality, Suffolk County. For the reasons that follow, the

Court finds that he has not.

B. Claims as Construed against Suffolk County

It is well-established that a municipality, such as

Suffolk County, cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C.,

436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978);

Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008). To

prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff

must show “that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’

caused the alleged constitutional injury.” Cash v. Cty. of Erie,

654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131

S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011)); see also Monell, 436

U.S. at 690-91. “[L]ocal governments . . . may be sued for

constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental

‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval

through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436

U.S. at 690-691 (internal citation omitted).

To establish the existence of a municipal policy or

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custom, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a formal

policy which is officially endorsed by the municipality, see

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359; (2) actions taken or decisions made

by municipal policymaking officials, i.e., officials with final

decisionmaking authority, which caused the alleged violation of

the plaintiff’s civil rights, see Amnesty Am. v. Town of W.

Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); Jeffes v. Barnes, 208

F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2000); (3) a practice “so persistent and

widespread as to practically have the force of law,” Connick, 131

S. Ct. at 1359; see also Green v. City of N.Y., 465 F.3d 65, 80

(2d Cir. 2006), or that “was so manifest as to imply the

constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making officials,”

Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); or (4) that “a

policymaking official exhibit[ed] deliberate indifference to

constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates.” Cash, 654

F.3d at 334 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

also Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d

415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009) (A municipal custom may be found when

“‘faced with a pattern of misconduct, [the municipality] does

nothing, compelling the conclusion that [it] has acquiesced in or

tacitly authorized its subordinates’ unlawful actions.’”) (quoting

Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007) (second

alteration in original)).

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any factual allegations

from which the Court may infer that the conduct of which Plaintiff

complains of was caused by a policy or custom of Suffolk County.

Accordingly, even affording the pro se Complaint a liberal

construction, there are no factual allegations from which the Court

could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 claim against

Suffolk County.

C. Claims against Sgt. Doe, Lt. Doe, and the Warden

In order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983

against an individual defendant, a plaintiff must allege the

personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. Farid v. Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d

Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court held in Iqbal that “[b]ecause

vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . [section] 1983 suits,

a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,

through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. A

complaint based upon a violation under Section 1983 that does not

allege the personal involvement of a defendant fails as a matter

of law and should be dismissed. Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x

199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).

Here, although Plaintiff seeks to impose Section 1983

liability on Sgt. Doe, Lt. Doe, and the Warden, Plaintiff has not

included any factual allegations against these individuals.

Indeed, apart from the caption of the Complaint, the Warden is not

again mentioned in the body of the Complaint. Wholly absent are

any factual allegations of conduct or inaction attributable to

Sgt. Doe, Lt. Doe, and the Warden and it appears that Plaintiff

seeks to impose liability solely based on the supervisory positions

they hold. Because the Complaint is devoid of any allegations

sufficient to establish any personal involvement by Sgt. Doe, Lt.

Doe, and the Warden in the conduct of which Plaintiff complains,

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against these Defendants are not

plausible and are thus DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b).

D. Claims against John Does 1-4

Though thin, the Court declines to sua sponte dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims against John Does 1-4 at this early stage in

the proceedings. Although the Court would ordinarily order

service of the Summonses and Complaint by the United States Marshal

Service (“USMS”), given the national emergency caused by the COVID-

19 virus, the Court requests that the Suffolk County Attorney

accept service of the Complaint after these “John Doe” Defendants

are identified.

The Second Circuit has held that district courts must

provide pro se litigants with reasonable assistance in

investigating the identity of such “John Doe” defendants. See

Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court serve a

copy of the Complaint together with this Order on the Suffolk

County Attorney. The Suffolk County Attorney is requested to

attempt to ascertain the full names of the unidentified Defendants,

who are alleged to be employed at the Yaphank location of the

Suffolk County Correctional Facility and to have interacted with

Plaintiff on January 15, 2020 as described in the Complaint.

Within sixty (60) days of the date that this Order is served upon

it, the Suffolk County Attorney shall provide the Court and

Plaintiff with the names of these individuals and shall apprise

the Court whether, in light of the national emergency caused by

the COVID-19 virus, it will accept service of the Complaint on

behalf of these individuals.

Once the information is provided to the Court by the

Suffolk County Attorney, Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be deemed

amended to reflect the full names of these Defendants. The Suffolk

County Attorney need not undertake to defend or indemnify these

individuals at this juncture. This Order merely provides a means

by which Plaintiff may properly name and serve these Defendants as

instructed by the Second Circuit in Valentin.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s application

to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, however Plaintiff’s claims

against the Jail are sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A (b)(1). Plaintiff’s

claims against Sgt. Doe, Lt. Doe, and the Warden are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

1915A(b)(1) and Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining

Defendants shall proceed. It is further ORDERED that the Clerk

of the Court shall serve a copy of the Complaint together with

this Order on the Suffolk County Attorney. The Suffolk County

Attorney is requested to attempt to ascertain the full names of

the unidentified Defendants, who are alleged to be employed at the

Yaphank location of the Suffolk County Correctional Facility and

to have interacted with Plaintiff on January 15, 2020 as described

in the Complaint. Within sixty (60) days of the date that this

Order is served upon it, the Suffolk County Attorney shall provide

the Court and Plaintiff with the names of these individuals and

shall apprise the Court whether, in light of the national emergency

caused by the COVID-19 virus, it will accept service of the

Complaint on behalf of these individuals.

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The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)

that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith

and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose

of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-

45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of

this Order to Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

_/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT ____

JOANNA SEYBERT, U.S.D.J.

Dated: May 7 , 2020

Central Islip, New York