“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
How later courts described this case
- “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------------------------------X
LAQUAN JONES,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
20-CV-693 (AMD) (SJB)
-against -
ROBERTO ASCENCIO; NYPD Warrant
Squad JOHN DOE #1; NYPD Warrant
Squad JOHN DOE #2; NYPD Warrant
Squad JOHN DOE #3; NYPD Warrant
Squad JOHN DOE #4; KIRK SENDLEIN,
Assistant District Attorney; RICHARD A.
BROWN, Queens District Attorney,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------------------X
ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:
On January 31, 2020, the pro se plaintiff commenced this action alleging that members of
the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) and the Queens District Attorney’s Office
violated his civil rights. (ECF No. 1.) Because the complaint named the United States as the
sole defendant, the Court dismissed the complaint on March 18, 2020, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 4.) The plaintiff was given 30 days to file an
amended complaint identifying the individual or individuals believed to be responsible for the
alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. The plaintiff did not file an amended complaint
or otherwise respond to the order, so the action was dismissed on April 29, 2020. However, the
next day, April 30, 2020, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging false arrest and
malicious prosecution against seven individual defendants. (ECF No. 6.) On May 12, 2020, the
Court accepted the plaintiff’s late filed amended complaint and reopened the action. The
plaintiff’s claims against Assistant District Attorney Kirk Sendlein and former Queens District
Attorney Richard Brown are dismissed. The plaintiff’s claims against NYPD Detective Roberto
Ascencio, NYPD Warrant Squad John Doe #1, NYPD Warrant Squad John Doe #2, NYPD
Warrant Squad John Doe #3 and NYPD Warrant Squad John Doe #4 will proceed.
BACKGROUND
On January 7, 2016, NYPD Detective Roberto Ascencio, NYPD Warrant Squad John
Doe #1, NYPD Warrant Squad John Doe #2, NYPD Warrant Squad John Doe #3 and NYPD
Warrant Squad John Doe #4 arrested the plaintiff inside his home in East Elmhurst, Queens
“without cause or proper warrant,” and charged him with robbery in the first degree. (ECF No. 6
at 7.)1 According to the plaintiff, Assistant District Attorney Kirk Sendlein and then Queens
District Attorney Richard Brown requested that he be held on “excessive bail,” and the plaintiff
was held at Rikers Island until April 22, 2016. (Id. at 7-8.) On January 30, 2017, the criminal
case against the plaintiff was dismissed. (Id.) The plaintiff seeks $10 million in damages. (Id.
at 13.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
At the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of “all well-
pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). Because
the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings
drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed
Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008). However, even a pro se complaint must
plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
1 All referenced page numbers correspond to those generated by the Court’s Electronic Case
Filing system.
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). While “detailed factual
allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). Similarly, a complaint is insufficient to state a claim “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis
action if the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If a
liberal reading of the pleading “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” the court
must grant leave to amend it at least once. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.
2000) (quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff’s claims against Assistant District Attorney Kirk Sendlein and former
Queens District Attorney Richard Brown must be dismissed.2 As prosecutors, they are entitled
to absolute immunity for acts within the scope of their duties as advocates in the prosecutorial
process. Santulli v. Russello, 519 F. App’x 706, 711 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Ogunkoya v.
Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431
(1976)) (“Absolute immunity bars § 1983 suits against prosecutors for their role ‘in initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.’”). Immunity attaches “regardless of any
allegations that [the prosecutor’s] actions were undertaken with an improper state of mind or
improper motive.” Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (same).
2 District Attorney Brown died in 2019, which is additional reason for dismissal.
The plaintiff does not allege, nor do any facts alleged suggest, that ADA Sendlein or DA
Brown acted outside the scope of their duties in prosecuting the case against him. Thus, they are
immune from suit in this action. Additionally, the plaintiff has not alleged that Brown was
personally involved in any purported violation of his constitutional rights. Because there is no
supervisory liability under Section 1983, the plaintiff’s claim against Brown fails for this reason
as well. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . 1983
suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1987)) (“‘Absent some personal
involvement by [the supervisory official] in the allegedly unlawful conduct of his subordinates,’
he cannot be liable under section 1983.” (alteration in original)).
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff=s claims against Kirk Sendlein and Richard Brown are dismissed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). No summonses will issue against these defendants, and the Clerk of
Court is directed to amend the caption to reflect the dismissal of these defendants.
The plaintiff’s claims may proceed against NYPD Detective Roberto Ascencio, NYPD
Warrant Squad John Doe #1, NYPD Warrant Squad John Doe #2, NYPD Warrant Squad John
Doe #3 and NYPD Warrant Squad John Doe #4.
The Clerk of Court will issue a summons as to NYPD Detective Roberto Ascencio.
Administrative Order No. 2020-12 suspends the United States Marshal’s service of process
during the current national coronavirus emergency. Once service of process is reinstated, the
summons, complaint, amended complaint and this order will be served upon Detective Ascencio
by the United States Marshal Service without prepayment of fees.
As the true identities of the John Doe defendants are unknown at this time, the Court
requests that Corporation Counsel ascertain the full name and service addresses of the John Doe
Officers who arrested the plaintiff on January 7, 2016. See Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d.
Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Corporation Counsel need not undertake to defend or indemnify these
individuals at this time. This Order merely provides a means by which the plaintiff may name
and properly serve the defendants as instructed by the Second Circuit in Valentin.
Corporation Counsel is hereby requested to produce the information regarding the
identity and service address of the John Doe defendants within forty-five days of the entry of this
Order. Once this information is provided, the amended complaint will be deemed amended to
reflect the full name and service addresses of the John Doe defendants, summonses will issue
and the United States Marshal Service will serve the summonses, complaint, amended complaint
and this Order upon them without prepayment of fees as set forth above.
The matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Bulsara for pretrial supervision. The Court
certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and
therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
s/Ann M. Donnelly
_________________________
ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
June 11, 2020