The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------------x
AMADO DE JESUS MORENO; NELDA YOLANDA
REYES; JOSE CANTARERO ARGUETA;
HAYDEE AVILEZ ROJAS,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
- against - 18-CV-1135 (RRM)
KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, in her official capacity; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
L. FRANCIS CISSNA, Director, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, in his official capacity; U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------x
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, Chief United States District Judge.
Plaintiffs Amado de Jesus Moreno, Nelda Yolanda Reyes, Jose Cantarero Argueta, and
Haydee Avilez Rojas (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this putative class action against the
United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the DHS Secretary, the United States
Customs and Immigration Service (“USCIS”), and the Director of USCIS (collectively,
“Defendants”), alleging that their applications to adjust from Temporary Protected Status
(“TPS”) to Lawful Permanent Residents (“LPR”) status were improperly denied pursuant to an
unlawful USCIS policy of refusing to find that a grant of TPS constitutes an “inspection and
admission” for purposes of adjustment of status. Plaintiffs now move for a preliminary
injunction directing Defendants to re-open and re-adjudicate their adjustment applications
without applying that allegedly unlawful policy. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’
motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs are foreign nationals who entered the
United States without inspection sometime before their native countries – El Salvador in the case
of plaintiff Moreno and Honduras in the case of the other three plaintiffs – were designated for
TPS. After their countries were so designated, plaintiffs applied for, and were granted, TPS.
At some point after gaining TPS, all four plaintiffs applied for adjustment of status under
8 U.S.C. § 1255. Subsection (a) of this section provides:
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled
into the United States … may be adjusted by the Attorney General,
in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the
alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is
eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the
United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa
is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.
However, subsection (c) makes certain aliens ineligible for adjustment of status under subsection
(a). As relevant here, subsection (c) provides:
[S]ubsection (a) shall not be applicable to … (2) subject to
subsection (k), an alien (other than an immediate relative as
defined in section 1151(b) of this title or a special immigrant
described in section 1101(a)(27)(H), (I), (J), or (K) of this title)
who hereafter continues in or accepts unauthorized employment
prior to filing an application for adjustment of status or who is in
unlawful immigration status on the date of filing the application for
adjustment of status or who has failed (other than through no fault
of his own or for technical reasons) to maintain continuously a
lawful status since entry into the United States ….
Subsection (k) makes the provisions of subsection (c)(2) inapplicable to “certain
employment-based immigrants.” Specifically, it provides, in pertinent part:
An alien who is eligible to receive an immigrant visa under
paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of [8 U.S.C.] section 1153(b) … may
adjust status pursuant to subsection (a) and notwithstanding
subsection (c)(2) … if —
(1) the alien, on the date of filing an application for adjustment of
status, is present in the United States pursuant to a lawful
admission ….
Aliens who are eligible to receive an immigrant visa under § 1153(b)(3) include “skilled
workers” and other workers “who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under
this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which
qualified workers are not available in the United States.”
All four plaintiffs had their applications denied. The USCIS ruled that Moreno and
Cantarero Argueta, both of whom had obtained immigrant visas under §1153(b)(3), were
ineligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(c)(2) because they had failed to maintain
continuously a lawful status since entry into the United States. Moreno had been in the country
illegally from the time of his entry in 2000 until he was granted TPS status in 2001, (see Am.
Compl. (Doc. No. 12) ¶ 25), and Cantarero Argueta had “failed to maintain a lawful status
between April 7, 1997[,] when [he] entered the United States without inspection and April 11,
2000, when [he was] granted TPS.” (Notice of Intent to Deny (attached to Third Declaration of
Trina Realmuto in Support of Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Class Certification as Ex. Z) (Doc.
No. 32-29).) The USCIS ruled that Moreno and Cantarero Argueta – both of whom traveled
abroad after being granted TPS and were then paroled back into the United States (Am. Compl.,
¶¶ 21, 36) – were not eligible for the exception set forth in § 1255(k) because they were not
present in the United States pursuant to a “lawful admission” on the date they filed for
adjustment of status. With respect to Moreno, the USCIS ruled: “Reentry into the United States
based on an advanced parole is not considered an admission into the United States.” (USCIS
Decision dated July 14, 2017 (attached to Third Declaration of Trina Realmuto in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Class Certification as Ex. X) (Doc. No. 32-27).) Similarly, the
USCIS sent Cantarero Argueta a “Notice of Intent to Deny” which stated that being paroled into
the country was “not an admission, and without an admission he [was] not eligible for a waiver
of the bar to adjustment for unlawful presence under § 1255(k).” (Am. Compl., ¶ 39.)
Reyes’ application appears to have been rejected on different grounds: because she could
not adduce evidence that she had been “inspected and admitted or paroled,” as required by §
1255(a). After Reyes applied for adjustment of status, USCIS sent Reyes a Request for
Information, demanding evidence that she had been admitted or paroled into the United States.
(Am. Compl., ¶ 31.) Reyes’ attorney responded by arguing “that her grant of TPS constituted an
inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment, in accord with the plain language of 8
U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4).” (Id.) The USCIS implicitly rejected that argument in its Notice of
Decision, ruling that Reyes had failed to adduce the evidence necessary to establish her
eligibility for adjustment of status. (Id.)
While Plaintiffs have provided a declaration in which Avilez Rojas states that her
application for adjustment of status was denied on or about June 7, 2018, (Declaration of Haydee
Avilez Rojas (Doc. No. 41-4) at ¶ 5), the basis for that denial is unclear. The amended
complaint, which was filed on March 26, 2018 – more than two months before the USCIS denied
her application – merely speculates that it would “be denied based on USCIS’ policy of not
treating a grant of TPS as an inspection and admission for purposes of adjustment.” (Am.
Compl., ¶ 44.) However, Avilez Rojas’s declaration does not allege the basis for the denial.
This Action
On February 22, 2018, Plaintiffs commenced this putative class action against DHS;
USCIS; then DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen and then USCIS Director L. Francis Cissna – both
of whom were sued in their official capacities. Approximately one month later, Plaintiffs filed
an amended complaint, which principally alleges that pursuant to “a policy of refusing to find
that a grant of TPS constitutes an ‘inspection and admission’ for purposes of adjustment of
status,” USCIS denies applications for adjustment of status filed by “current TPS holders who
were not ‘inspected and admitted’ other than through the grant of TPS.” (Am. Compl., ¶ 81; see
also ¶¶ 89, 98.) That policy is set forth in volume 7, part B, chapter 2(A)(5) of the USCIS Policy
Manual, and provides, in part: “A foreign national who enters the United States without
inspection and subsequently is granted temporary protected status (TPS) does not meet the
inspected and admitted or inspected and paroled requirement.” Plaintiffs allege that this policy is
contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), which states that “[d]uring a period in which an alien is
granted temporary protected status under this section – for purposes of adjustment of status under
section 1255 of this title … , the alien shall be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful
status as a nonimmigrant.”
In support of this contention, Plaintiffs point to two cases – Flores v. U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., 718 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2013), and Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
2017) – which hold that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4) requires that TPS holders
be deemed “inspected and admitted” for purposes of adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. §
1255(a). However, Plaintiffs also acknowledge that there is authority to the contrary, noting that
“the Eleventh Circuit held the opposite” in Serrano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir.
2011) (per curiam). In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs principally allege that Flores and
Ramirez were correctly decided, stating: “Defendants properly apply 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254a(f)(4) and
1255(a) when, by ‘consider[ing]’ a TPS holder ‘as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a
nonimmigrant’ pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4), they find that the grant of TPS satisfies the
‘inspected and admitted’ requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).” (Am. Compl., ¶ 80).
In this action, Plaintiffs seek to compel USCIS to abandon its reliance on Serrano and to
adopt a policy consistent with Flores and Ramirez. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek an order
declaring 1) “that Defendants’ policy of refusing to find that a grant of TPS constitutes an
‘inspection and admission’ for purposes of adjustment of status and all adjustment decisions
issued based upon that policy are contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4),” and 2) “that all Plaintiffs
and proposed class members have been ‘inspected and admitted’ for purposes of 8 U.S.C. §
1255(a) pursuant to their grant of TPS.” (Am. Compl., p. 24.) Plaintiffs also request injunctive
relief: a prohibitory injunction directing “Defendants to immediately cease applying their policy
that a grant of TPS does not constitute an ‘inspection and admission’ for purposes of 8 U.S.C. §
1254a(f)(4),” and a mandatory injunction directing “Defendants to find that, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a(f)(4), Plaintiffs and proposed class members were ‘inspected and admitted’ for purposes
of their adjustment of status applications.” (Id.)
The Instant Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs now move for “a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to properly apply
the law with respect to their LPR applications.” (Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Plaintiffs’ Memo”) (Doc. No. 41-1) at 1.) Specifically,
Plaintiffs seek an order 1) directing Defendants to re-open and re-adjudicate their adjustment of
status applications and 2) enjoining Defendants from applying the policy of refusing to a) treat
TPS holders as being in lawful immigration status and b) consider TPS holders as being
inspected and admitted for the purposes of adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. §1255.
(Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order (Doc. No. 41-7) at 2.) Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction
essentially seeks the mandatory injunction requested in their amended complaint.
Plaintiffs argue that without a preliminary injunction they will suffer irreparable harm in
two respects. First, plaintiffs argue that they “are suffering and will continue to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction given their loss of the opportunity to
stabilize their status.” (Plaintiff’s Memo at 2.) Plaintiffs note that persons with LPR status are
not only “afforded the opportunity to permanently reside and work in the United States,” but are
eligible to apply for citizenship after five years (three for spouses of U.S. citizens such as
plaintiff Alivez Rojas). (Id. at 15.) Citing to Kirwa v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 285 F. Supp. 3d 21
(D.D.C. 2017); Vargas v. Meese, 682 F. Supp. 591 (D.D.C. 1987); and two other district court
cases, Plaintiffs argue that “[c]ourts have recognized that delaying the ability to apply for
citizenship constitutes irreparable harm.” (Plaintiffs’ Memo at 15.)
Second, Plaintiffs argue that they face the “imminent loss” of their TPS unless they are
granted injunctive relief. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs note that the loss of TPS could result in
deportation, which would cause Plaintiffs to be separated from friends and family in the United
States. It would also result in a loss of work authorizations, which would result in a “loss of
income and the ability to provide for themselves and their family members.” (Id.) In the case of
plaintiff Avilez Rojas, a retiree, loss of TPS would cause her to lose her Social Security benefits.
(Id. at 19.)
Plaintiffs acknowledge that a district court in the Ninth Circuit has enjoined Defendants
from terminating TPS for citizens of El Salvador. (Id. at 1.) However, Plaintiffs note that this
injunction does not cover citizens of Honduras and that Defendants are appealing that decision.
(Id. at 1, 16–17.) They speculate that they may not have time to reapply for adjustment of status
if the Ninth Circuit reverses the lower court. (Id. at 16–17.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must ordinarily establish (1) ‘irreparable
harm’; (2) ‘either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits of its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the
hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party’; and (3) ‘that a preliminary injunction
is in the public interest.’” New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d
Cir. 2015) (quoting Oneida Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011)).
However, the Second Circuit has “held the movant to a heightened standard where: (i) an
injunction is ‘mandatory,’ or (ii) the injunction ‘will provide the movant with substantially all the
relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the
merits.’” Id. (quoting Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33–34 (2d
Cir. 1995)). “When either condition is met, the movant must show a ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’
likelihood of success on the merits, Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1999), and make a
‘strong showing’ of irreparable harm, Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 773 (2d Cir. 1981), in
addition to showing that the preliminary injunction is in the public interest.” Id.
“Irreparable harm ‘is the single most important prerequisite’ for injunctive relief, and ‘in
the absence of a showing of irreparable harm, a motion for a preliminary injunction should be
denied.’” Uppal v. New York State Dep’t of Health, 756 F. App’x 95, 96 (2d Cir. 2019)
(summary order) (quoting Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir.
1999)). “Irreparable harm is defined as ‘certain and imminent harm for which a monetary award
does not adequately compensate.’” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harvey Family Chiropractic, 677 F.
App’x 716, 718 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (quoting Wisdom Imp. Sales Co. v. Labatt
Brewing Co., 339 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir. 2003)). In order “[t]o satisfy the irreparable harm
requirement, [p]laintiffs must demonstrate that absent a preliminary injunction they will suffer an
injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent, and one that cannot be
remedied if a court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm.” Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB
v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd.
v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007)).
DISCUSSION
In this case, Plaintiffs are not only seeking a mandatory injunction, but are seeking
injunctive relief that will provide them “with substantially all the relief sought” in this case and
that “cannot be undone” even if Defendants ultimately prevail on the merits. New York ex rel.
Schneiderman, 787 F.3d at 650; Tom Doherty Assocs., 60 F.3d at 33–34. The injunctive relief
Plaintiffs seek would require USCIS to reconsider their applications for adjustment of status and
to apply policies that would result in granting those applications. To obtain this injunctive relief,
Plaintiffs must make a “‘strong showing’ of irreparable harm.” New York ex rel. Schneiderman,
787 F.3d at 650 (quoting Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d at 773). They have failed to make this
showing.
First, as Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge in their motion for a preliminary injunction,
United States District Judge Edward M. Chen of the North District of California has already
entered a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants “from engaging in, committing, or
performing, directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever, implementation and/or enforcement
of the decisions to terminate TPS for Sudan, Haiti, El Salvador, and Nicaragua pending
resolution” of that case on the merits. Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1108 (N.D. Cal.
2018). Judge Chen also ordered Defendants to take “all steps needed to ensure the continued
validity of documents that prove lawful status and employment authorization” for these TPS
holders “pending completion of discovery and a ruling on the merits of the action.” Id. at 1108–
09. Although the Ramos defendants have appealed Judge Chen’s ruling, that appeal remains
pending before the Ninth Circuit.
While Plaintiffs’ Memo correctly notes that Judge Chen’s ruling did not prohibit the
termination of TPS for Honduras, the scope of the injunction has been expanded by recent
developments. First, in March 2019, the DHS Secretary entered into a stipulation in another
district court case – Bhattarai v. Nielsen – ensuring that Honduran TPS holders will retain their
TPS while the preliminary injunction in Ramos remains in effect, provided that the alien’s TPS is
not withdrawn because of individual ineligibility. Bhattarai v. Nielsen, No. 19-cv-00731 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 12, 2019). That stipulation was reflected in a notice published by the DHS in the
Federal Register on November 4, 2019, which stated: “Beneficiaries under the Temporary
Protected Status (TPS) designations for El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan
will retain their TPS while the preliminary injunction in Ramos remains in effect, provided that
an alien’s TPS is not withdrawn because of individual ineligibility.” Continuation of
Documentation for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status Designations for El Salvador,
Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan, 84 Fed. Reg. 59,403, 59,403, 2019 WL 5683994
(Nov. 4, 2019).
That same Federal Register notice also provided assurances that TPS would not be
terminated precipitously regardless of the outcome of the appeal in Ramos. Specifically, it
provided:
Should the Government prevail in its challenge to the Ramos
preliminary injunction, the Secretary’s determination to terminate
TPS for Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan will take effect no
earlier than 120 days from the issuance of any appellate mandate to
the district court. The Secretary’s determination to terminate TPS
for El Salvador will take effect no earlier than 365 days from the
issuance of any appellate mandate to the Ramos district court.
Id. at 59,405. DHS also announced that it was “automatically extending the validity of TPS-
related documentation for beneficiaries under the TPS designations for El Salvador, Haiti,
Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan … through January 4, 2021.” Id. at 59,403. That
documentation included certain Employment Authorization Documents (EADs), which
permitted the TPS holders to work legally in the United States.
In light of this Federal Register notice, the argument that Plaintiffs face the “imminent
loss” of their TPS and EADs unless they are granted injunctive relief is unpersuasive. The Ninth
Circuit has yet to issue a ruling on the Government’s appeal, and Plaintiffs have offered no
analysis to suggest that the Court of Appeals is likely to overturn Judge Chen’s decision.
Moreover, even if the Ninth Circuit were to reverse and vacate the injunction, Plaintiffs would
not be subject to immediate loss of their TPS and TPS-related benefits. Plaintiff Moreno’s status
and benefits would continue for at least a year, and the other three plaintiffs’ status and benefits
would continue for at least 120 days, from the date on which the Ninth Circuit issues its
mandate. During that period, Plaintiffs could renew their request for injunctive relief and would
not be at risk of deportation. Moreover, regardless of what the Ninth Circuit does, Plaintiff are
authorized to continue working until, at a minimum, January 4, 2021. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
have not established that they are in imminent danger of being deported or deprived of their
ability to earn a living.
Plaintiffs also assert that, absent injunctive relief, they will be delayed in their ability to
apply for citizenship and that this delay alone is sufficient to establish irreparable harm. That
assertion is not supported by the four cases they cite. Plaintiffs principally rely on Kirwa v.
United States Dep’t of Def., 285 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D.D.C. 2017), a case brought by non-citizens
service members who enlisted in the Army Reserve under the United States Department of
Defense’s Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (“MAVNI”) program. The DOD
initially “represented to plaintiffs that, in exchange for 8 years of military service, they would be
able to pursue an expedited path to citizenship shortly after enlistment” but subsequently
withheld a certificate that plaintiffs needed in order to file their applications, making it
impossible for them to pursue citizenship for “two or three years.” Id. at 43. Principally relying
on a line of cases holding that “delaying naturalization applications after applicants have been
promised an expedited path to citizenship constitutes irreparable harm,” id. at 42 (citing cases),
the district court held that the DOD’s refusal to promptly provide the certificates constituted
irreparable harm.
One of the cases cited by Kirwa is Vargas v. Meese, 682 F. Supp. 591, 595 (D.D.C.
1987), another of the cases on which Plaintiffs rely. In Vargas, the plaintiffs were Mexican
agricultural workers who had entered the United States before early July 1987 on temporary H-2
or H-2A visas to work on a harvest that was expected to end in October 1987. By statute,
holders of such visas were “eligible to apply for a change of status and to be accorded … rights
and benefits includ[ing] employment authorization and immunity from deportation or exclusion,
pending the adjudication of their … applications.” Id. at 591. However, “[o]n July 31, 1987,
without notice or comment, defendants published an amendment to the regulations” which
provided that those aliens who entered the United States on June 26, 1987, or thereafter could
file their applications “only at foreign processing offices having jurisdiction over their place of
foreign residence.” Id. at 593–94. In an opinion dated October 5, 1987, the district court
enjoined the Government from refusing to accept applications from plaintiffs while they were
still in the United States, stating, among other things: “[A]ccording to the plain language of the
statute, applicants may file for a change of status in the United States. That statutory right to file
will be mooted if their applications are not accepted in this country.” Id. at 595.
In both Kirwa and Vargas, the failure to grant injunctive relief would not have merely
delayed the path to citizenship but would have denied plaintiffs the time-sensitive rights to which
they were entitled. The only way to enforce the promise that the Kirwa plaintiffs would “be able
to pursue an expedited path to citizenship shortly after enlistment” was to grant injunctive relief
ordering the Government to provide the certificates needed to apply for citizenship immediately,
not at the conclusion of the litigation. Similarly, the only way to give effect to the statutory
provision allegedly violated by the new regulation in Vargas was an injunction forcing the
Government to accept the agricultural workers’ applications before their visas expired at the end
of the harvest. In contrast, the denial of injunctive relief in this case will not eviscerate some
time-sensitive right.
The other two district court cases cited by Plaintiffs do not involve preliminary injunctive
relief and are factually distinguishable. In You, Xiu Qing v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 451
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), District Judge Analisa Torres held that denying a stay of removal “would result
in irreparable injury” to the petitioner in that case and to other parties interested in the
proceeding. Id. at 468. While acknowledging that “removal is ‘not categorically irreparable,’”
id. (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)), Judge Torres held that that petitioner had
“demonstrated irreparable injury in this specific case” by adducing proof that his detainment and
threat of deportation was causing his wife to “show[ ] symptoms of severe depression and
anxiety.” Id. The judge found that the petitioner’s removal might “perpetuate grave emotional
and psychological harm to his wife and children by splitting apart their family, perhaps forever,”
and that “this factor weigh[ed] in favor of a stay of removal and release.” However, this fact-
specific holding, which was expressly limited to that case, has no implications for this case.
The other case cited by Plaintiffs – Al Karim v. Holder, No. 08-CV-671 (REB), 2010 WL
1254840, (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2010) – is even more inapposite. That opinion does not relate to a
motion for preliminary injunctive relief, but rather a motion for summary judgment brought by a
plaintiff whose application for adjustment of status had not been decided for six years. The
district court in that case noted that the “indefinite nature of the delay in adjudicating [Al
Karim’s] application” had “real and not insubstantial effects on [his] life and livelihood,
including limitations on his ability to travel, potential negative consequences on his legal status
as a refugee, and the financial and bureaucratic burdens of regularly filing travel and work
applications.” However, Al Karim did not hold or imply that the delay constituted “irreparable
harm” for purpose of a motion for injunctive relief. Even if it did, this case would be
distinguishable because Defendants promptly adjudicated Plaintiff’s applications, rather than
delaying decision indefinitely.
As Plaintiffs correctly note, Defendants’ rejection of their applications for adjustment of
status has cost Plaintiffs “the opportunity to stabilize their status” at this juncture. The Court
does not doubt that this instability is worrisome and unsettling to Plaintiffs. However, this
psychic harm arising from the loss of the “abilit[y] to plan for the future and make commitments,
whether familial, career-based, academic, or otherwise” is not irreparable harm and not a basis
for injunctive relief. Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
Because Plaintiffs have failed to make a “strong showing” of irreparable harm, their
motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. See Uppal, 756 F. App’x at 96; Rodriguez ex rel.
Rodriguez, 175 F.3d at 234. Accordingly, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiffs have
shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits, or whether the preliminary
injunction is in the public interest.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York Roslynn R. Mauskopf
May 18, 2020 ________________________________
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF
Chief United States District Judge