The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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PAMELA SAUNDERS,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 17-CV-1394(JS)(ARL)
COUNTY OF NASSAU, ROGER SOKENIS,
STEVEN O’MALLEY, RONALD ROGERS,
in their official and individual
capacities,
Defendants.
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APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: Rick Ostrove, Esq.
Andrew C. Costello, Esq.
Leeds Brown Law, P.C.
One Old Country Road, Suite 347
Carle Place, New York 11514
For Defendants: Jillian Jagling, Esq.
Steven Anthony Torres, Esq.
West Group Law PLLC
81 Main Street, Suite 510
White Plains, New York 10601
Peter Adelman, Esq.
The Law Offices of Peter Adelman, LLC
95 6th Avenue
Brooklyn, New York 11217
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Pamela Saunders (“Plaintiff”) commenced this
action against defendants County of Nassau (the “County”), Roger
Sokenis (“Sokenis”), Steven O’Malley (“O’Malley”), and Ronald
Rogers (“Rogers”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging violations
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, New York State Human
Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and the Fourteenth Amendment as enforced by
42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of alleged discriminatory and
retaliatory acts on the basis of race. (Compl., D.E. 1.)
Currently pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation
of Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay (“R&R,” D.E. 48),
recommending that the Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Mot., D.E. 39; Defs. Br., D.E. 40-67; Pl. Opp., D.E. 43;
Defs. Reply, D.E. 44; Pl. Sur-Reply, D.E. 46). For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s objections (Pl. Obj., D.E. 50; Defs. Obj.,
D.E. 52) are OVERRULED, the R&R is ADOPTED as stated, and
Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The Court presumes familiarity with the facts and ADOPTS
the detailed factual summary provided by Judge Lindsay. (R&R at
1-17); Ford v. Miller, No. 18-CV-1815, 2019 WL 4673445, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2019). The facts are recited herein as
relevant to the Court’s analysis, and unless noted, are not in
dispute.1
I. The Parties
In 1995, the Nassau County Sheriff’s Department hired
Plaintiff, who is black, to work as a corrections officer at the
Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCCC”). (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14;
1 The facts are drawn from the parties’ Local Civil Rule 56.1
Statement and Counterstatement. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt., D.E. 25; Pl.
56.1 Stmt., D.E. 26.)
Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) In 2005, Plaintiff was assigned to NCCC’s
Medical Unit. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) O’Malley also worked in
the Medical Unit from 1998 to 2017, when he was transferred to the
Security Unit. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2.) Rogers supervised various
NCCC employees and units, including the Medical and Security Units,
from 2005 until his retirement in December 2015. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 3.) Sokenis, one of Plaintiff’s supervisors, worked in the
Medical Unit from 2011 until his retirement in December 2015.
(Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4.)
II. Facts
On August 30, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an inter-
department memorandum (the “2013 Memorandum”) to O’Malley wherein
she wrote, among other things, that she was “the target of
harassment and discrimination” and did not “take this matter
further” due to retaliation, was called a “rat” for protecting
black inmates, and that she was “blacklisted.” (See 2013 Memo.,
Estes Decl., Ex. 7, D.E. 40-9.) O’Malley forwarded the 2013
Memorandum to the Affirmative Action Unit pursuant to the
Department’s Regulations and Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
Policy. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 9-10.) Andre Guilty (“Guilty”), an
Affirmative Action Specialist assigned to the Bias Unit, met with
Plaintiff who stated that she did not want to file a complaint
because she intended to retain a lawyer and because “she had no
faith in the office or the process.” (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 7, 12;
Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 12; Guilty Dep., Estes Decl., Ex. 9, D.E. 40-11,
24:24-25:24.)
Two years later, on June 30, 2015, Plaintiff submitted
an EEO complaint (the “EEO Complaint”) alleging discrimination and
retaliation on the basis of race, arising out of three incidents,
summarized below. (EEO Compl., Estes Decl., Ex. 50, D.E. 40-50.)
Guilty forwarded the EEO Complaint to Mary Ostermann
(“Ostermann”), the Director of Equal Opportunity Employment for
the Nassau County Office of Human Resources. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 15;
Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) Ostermann testified that upon receipt of
an EEO Complaint, she, along with EEO Representatives, and
Affirmative Action Officers, determine if a complaint is a formal
complaint, a limited inquiry, or not appropriate for further EEO
review. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 16.) Ostermann testified that in a
limited inquiry, the EEO Office investigates and a limited inquiry
turns into an investigation where a protected class is implicated
and an adverse employment action occurred. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 17.) The EEO Office determined that the EEO Complaint did not
implicate any violations of EEO or department policies. (Defs.
56.1 Stmt. ¶ 21.)
As for the substance of the EEO Complaint, first,
Plaintiff wrote that on December 24, 2014, a Medical Unit nurse
needed an officer escort but Plaintiff left the building without
approval from her supervisor. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 82-83.)
Plaintiff alleges another officer “berated” her and was verbally
abusive. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 84; Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 84.) A few
days later, Sokenis suggested that Plaintiff seek assistance from
the Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) because she told him “you
don’t know what I’m going through.” (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 86.) On
January 5, 2015, Plaintiff sent Sokenis a memorandum, titled
“Verbal Abuse in an Aggressive Threatening Manor by Correctional
Staff,” describing the December 24, 2014 incident, arguing that
her EAP referral was unwarranted, and questioning why other
officers’ conduct did not warrant an EAP referral. (Jan. 5, 2015
Memo., Estes Decl. Ex. 33, D.E. 40-30.) After this incident, at
the request of Rogers, Plaintiff submitted additional memoranda
expanding on her allegations. (Jan. 6, 2015 Memo., Estes Decl.,
Ex. 34, D.E. 40-31; Jan. 8, 2015 Memo., Ex. 45, D.E. 40-42; Jan. 9,
2015 Memo., Estes Decl., Ex. 46, D.E. 40-43.)
On January 7, 2015, Rogers sent an email to O’Malley
asking him to “keep the officers involved in this incident
separate” and that “Sokenis should have minimal contact with
witnesses present when dealing with” Plaintiff. (Jan. 7, 2015
Email, Estes Decl. Ex. 35, D.E. 40-32.)
Second, Plaintiff wrote that on February 5, 2015 she was
denied overtime “in favor of white officers.” (EEO Compl. at ECF
p. 3.) Specifically, two overtime posts were available, one for
3.5 hours in the Core building and another for 2.75 hours in the
832 building. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 109.) Although Plaintiff
requested the 3.5 hour post, Sokenis assigned her to the 2.75 hour
post because Dwyer and Sokenis were working in the Core Building
and Sokenis was instructed to keep Plaintiff and Dwyer apart.
(Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 109.)
On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff sent a memorandum to the
First Vice President of the Nassau County Sheriff’s Correction
Officers Benevolent Association and a union delegate on release
from the NCCC asking for an investigation into the unequal
distribution of overtime. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 13-14.) Judge
Lindsay provided a detailed summary for context and explained the
manner in which overtime is distributed. (See R&R at 8-10.) Judge
Lindsay further explained that:
In 2013, Saunders earned $67,304.80 in overtime pay,
more than any other officer who worked at the NCCC.
Consistent with overtime rules, Saunders’ placement as
the top overtime earner in the NCCC could be taken into
account in assigning future overtime. In 2014, Saunders
was the fifty-seventh highest overtime earner among the
over 800 corrections officers, earning $38,844.10. In
2015, Saunders dropped eleven spots to the sixty-eighth
highest overtime earner, earning $26,871.27. Saunders
who in 2014 through July 2015 was assigned to the Medical
Unit asserts that although she regularly applied for
overtime with the Visiting and Security units her
overtime pay dropped during this period as a direct
result of her having complained about Lima and filing
her 2013 [M]emo. The defendants counter this assertion
noting that the Visiting Unit overtime log books for
2014 reveals that Saunders never signed up for overtime
and only signed up for overtime on eleven days in July
2015. Saunders counters there are other ways corrections
officers can be added to the overtime list other than
physically signing the log books.2 Saunders admits,
however, that there are a multitude of reasons why
overtime can fluctuate from year to year including
fluctuations in the amount of money spent by the County
on overtime. In addition, the number of officers
working, various management initiatives and whether an
officer has taken leave can also cause fluctuations in
overtime. Saunders also acknowledges that overtime in
the Visiting Unit was at a five-year low in 2015.
Indeed, by 2016, Saunders was once again a top overtime
earner, earning $61,106.70, and in 2017, Saunders was
the highest overtime earner amongst of all corrections
officers, earning $129,953.47.
(R&R at 9-10 (internal citations omitted).)
Third, Plaintiff described that while working an
overtime shift on June 23, 2015, Plaintiff was assigned to escort
an inmate to the hospital. (EEO Compl. at ECF p. 4.) Although
Sokenis instructed her to wait, Plaintiff went to the bathroom.
(EEO Comp. at ECF p. 4). As a result, Sokenis assigned another
officer to the transport.3 (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 119.) On
2 Plaintiff disputes this fact by arguing another corrections
officer did not record all of her phone requests for overtime
and by citing to deposition testimony of Joseph Cavanaugh that
the same officer assigning overtime would “pass [Plaintiff] over
for overtime opportunities” in favor of a white officer. (Pl.
56.1 Stmt. ¶ 42.) Upon review of the docket, the Court notes
that neither party annexed the Joseph Cavanaugh deposition
transcript as an exhibit and the Court cannot consider these
allegations as admissible evidence.
3 Plaintiff disputes this fact in a long narrative. (Pl. 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 119 (citing to response in Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 115).) Upon
review of Plaintiff’s response, the Court finds there is no
dispute that Sokenis assigned another corrections officer to the
hospital run while Plaintiff was in the bathroom. Plaintiff
faults another non-party corrections officer for not informing
her “anyone was looking for her” or that “he was assigned to
June 24, 2015, both plaintiff and Sokenis submitted inter-
department memoranda. (Pl. June 2015 Memo., Estes Decl., Ex. 54,
D.E. 40-54; Sokenis June 2015 Memo., Estes Decl., Ex. 44, D.E. 40-
41.) Sokenis wrote that Plaintiff’s “actions of not being on post
caused an approximate half hour delay in bringing the [inmate to
the hospital] for treatment, and also the time wasted looking for
her. I believe she is not telling the truth. [Plaintiff] has a
long history of incidents with fellow Officers and Superior
Officers. The lack of her accountability for her actions is
causing problems for my ability to supervise the Medical Unit” and
requested Plaintiff’s transfer “out of the Medical Unit and put
under the direct supervision of a Corporal due to her inability to
go to[ ] or say on her assigned post.”4 (Sokenis June 2015 Memo.
at 2.) Rogers thereafter recommended Plaintiff’s reassignment to
the Security Unit. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 125.)
On June 24, 2015, Plaintiff was placed under Corporal
supervision (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 132) and effective June 25, 2015,
cover her post” based on her belief that this other officer is
racist and “did not like her because she complained to Sgt.
Sokenis about his treatment” of black inmates. (Pl. 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 115.) This, however, does not dispute the fact that Plaintiff
was in the bathroom, and not at her post.
4 Prior to this request, Sokenis had requested his own transfer
out of the Medical Unit after the February 5, 2015 incident.
(Defs. 56.1 Stmt ¶ 112.)
was reassigned to the Security Unit5 (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 127). On
July 13, 2015, Plaintiff’s reassignment orders were amended to
permit Plaintiff to work under the supervision of a Sergeant for
the purposes of overtime if a given area did not have a Corporal
assigned. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 138.) On March 23, 2017, the
Corporal supervision was lifted. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 139.)
ANALYSIS
I. Legal Standards
A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72.
Where a party “makes only conclusory or general objections, or
simply reiterates [the] original arguments, the Court reviews the
Report and Recommendation only for clear error.” Pall Corp. v.
Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Barratt
v. Joie, No. 96-CV-324, 2002 WL 335014, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
2002)). The district judge must evaluate proper objections de novo
and “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
II. Plaintiff’s Objections
A. Hostile Work Environment
5 In July 2014, Plaintiff requested reassignment to the Security
Unit. (July 2, 2014 Memo., Estes Decl., Ex. 31, D.E. 40-28.)
In opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff proffered
additional facts to support her hostile work environment claim.
As recited by Judge Lindsay, Plaintiff alleges that “sometime in
late March or early April 2013, [Plaintiff] learned from other
officers at the NCCC that” corrections officer John Lima (“Lima”)
made racist comments regarding black inmates and that she witnessed
an incident where Lima was aggressive with a black inmate. (R&R
at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that she complained to a Sergeant that
another officer called her an “inmate lover,” believed Plaintiff
filed a discrimination lawsuit against Lima, and said he would not
give her overtime in the Security Unit. (R&R at 4.) Plaintiff
approached the officer who, according to Plaintiff, admitted to
the comments and informed her she was “blackballed” and that no
one would hire her for overtime. (R&R at 5-6.)
Plaintiff first objects that Judge Lindsay applied the
wrong legal standard to her hostile work environment claim and
therefore incorrectly found that “none of [the claimed of comments]
amount of a constructive discharge.” (R&R at 38.) Plaintiff
argues that “the standard is lower—-all that is required is that
‘the harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable
employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for
the worse.’” (Pl. Obj. at 10 (quoting Whidbee v. Garzelli Food
Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis
omitted.)
To sustain a claim, Plaintiff “must show that the
workplace was so severely permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that the terms and conditions
of her employment were thereby altered.” Jian Li v. Chang Lung
Grp. Inc., No. 16-CV-6722, 2020 WL 1694356, at *11 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 7, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(emphasis added). “‘[W]hether racial slurs constitute a hostile
work environment typically depends upon the quantity, frequency,
and severity of those slurs, considered cumulatively in order to
obtain a realistic view of the work environment.’” Id. (quoting
Fenner v. News Corp., No. 09-CV-9832, 2013 WL 6244156, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2013)). When comparing the above-cited standard
to the R&R, the Court concludes that Judge Lindsay applied the
correct standard and OVERRULES this objection.
Plaintiff also asserts the conclusory objection that
summary judgment is inappropriate “[a]pplying the correct
standard, given the severity and the pervasiveness of the
comments.” (Pl. Obj. at 11.) Having determined that Judge Lindsay
applied the correct legal standard, the Court reviews Judge
Lindsay’s analysis for clear error. Finding no clear error, the
Court agrees that none of the complained of comments “rise to the
level of severity required to state a claim for hostile work
environment.” (See R&R at 37-38.) Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS
this portion of the R&R.
B. Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff next objects to Judge Lindsay’s recommendation
that the Court dismiss the Title VII, NYSHRL and Section 1983 race
discrimination claims. (Pl. Obj. at 11-17.) As relevant here,
Plaintiff argued in opposition to summary judgment that the
following constituted adverse employment actions: (1) the denial
of overtime (as a general principle) and (2) placement under
corporal supervision and her transfer to the medical unit that
resulted in her placement at the bottom of the Security Unit’s
overtime list thereby costing her overtime opportunities. (Pl.
Opp. at 13-14.) Judge Lindsay found that “none of the actions
relied upon by Saunders in support of her race discrimination claim
amount to a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions
of her employment” and “there is an absence of direct evidence of
discriminatory intent in the record.” (R&R at 30.)
As a preliminary matter, with respect to the objections:
(1) the denial of overtime and a loss of overtime opportunities
alone constitutes an adverse action (Pl. Obj. at 12) and
(2) regarding discriminatory intent (Pl. Obj. at 15-17), a
comparison between Plaintiff’s underlying brief and her objections
reveal that she has “done little more than rearrange [her]
arguments, often using largely identical wording.” Media Glow
Digital, LLC v. Panasonic Corp. of N. Am., No. 16-CV-7907, 2019 WL
1434311, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (subsequent history
omitted) (compare Pl. Opp. at 13 (restating the general principal
that a denial of and lost overtime opportunities constitutes an
adverse action) with Pl. Obj. at 12 (same); compare Pl. Opp. at
15-16 (arguing that Plaintiff was “treated differently than white
officers” and was “subject to disparate treatment” to argue an
inference of discrimination) with Pl. Obj. at 15-17 (same).) As
such, Plaintiff has “merely reiterated [her] original arguments
and the Court will, therefore, review this part of the Report for
clear error.” Media Glow, 2019 WL 1434311, at *3. Finding no
clear error, the Court OVERRULES these objections and ADOPTS those
portions of the R&R.
As for Plaintiff’s transfer to the Security Unit, Judge
Lindsay determined that the transfer, and any resulting loss in
overtime opportunities, did not constitute an adverse action. (R&R
at 27-28.) Judge Lindsay reasoned that she was “guided by the
principles set forth in” Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141
(2d Cir. 2012) when finding that Plaintiff’s “transfer was
certainly undertaken in response to her supervisor’s complaint
that she lacked accountability and that her actions [caused] a
problem in his ability to supervise the Medical Unit” and because
the transfer “came on the heels of her having admittedly left her
post in violation of NCCC Regulations.” (R&R at 27.) Plaintiff
objects and argues that Judge Lindsay’s reliance on Brown was
misplaced because Plaintiff’s reassignment to the Security Unit
was not a form of discipline and whether a disciplinary policy was
“properly enforced” is an issue of fact. (Pl. Obj. at 14.)
However, because Plaintiff concedes that her placement under
corporal supervision was not “actually discipline” there is no
issue of fact as to whether a disciplinary policy was properly
enforced. (Pl. Obj. at 14.) Nonetheless, the Court agrees with
Judge Lindsay’s analysis and Plaintiff’s objections regarding
Judge Lindsay’s reliance on Brown are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff also argues that Judge Lindsay erred in
concluding that her transfer to the Security Unit was not an
adverse action because it “shows a total disregard for the
realities of being a [corrections officer]” because “[i]nteraction
with more inmates makes it more likely a CO can be harmed or even
killed,” and is “far more significant than ‘lost pay.’” (Pl. Obj.
at 13.) This argument, however, was not raised before Judge
Lindsay and is therefore not properly before this Court for
consideration. See Brown v. Smith, No. 09-CV-4522, 2012 WL 511581,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2012). Therefore, the Court also OVERRULES
this objection and adopts Judge Lindsay’s finding that the transfer
to the Security Unit was not an adverse action.6 Kennedy v. Adamo,
6 Indeed, assuming, without deciding, Plaintiff’s transfer was
considered an adverse employment action, Defendants’ proffered
reasons for the transfer, as articulated by Judge Lindsay (R&R
at 27), are legitimate and non-discriminatory. Phillips v. Long
Island Rail Rd. Co., No. 13-CV-7317, 2019 WL 1757176, at *15
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 1758079 (E.D.N.Y.
No. 02–CV–1776, 2006 WL 3704784, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2006)
(collecting cases).
Next, Judge Lindsay found that “neither the placement
under corporal supervision nor the alleged loss in overtime
opportunities associated with that supervision amounted to a
materially adverse action” because nineteen days later,
Plaintiff’s “supervision assignment was amended so that she could
work under the direct supervision of a sergeant for the purposes
of overtime if a given area did not have [a] corporal assigned”
and Plaintiff did not offer “evidence to suggest that she actually
lost overtime opportunities in the nineteen days prior to that
amendment.” (R&R at 29-30 (citations omitted).) Plaintiff objects
and argues that “the loss of overtime opportunities can be an
adverse action, even if it was only for 19 days.” (Pl. Obj. at
15.)
However, there is nothing in the record to support the
finding that Plaintiff lost overtime opportunities for the period
between her placement under corporal supervision and the date that
her assignment was amended. In support, Plaintiff cites to
Paragraph 133 of her Local Rule 56.1 statement that states “[a]s
Mar. 25, 2019). Plaintiff’s underlying argument that “placement
on corporal supervision and her transfer from the Medical Unit
occurred for a non-sensical reason as she did nothing wrong”
does not establish that “Defendant’s reason for [the adverse
employment action] is pretextual.” (Pl. Opp.at 22-23.)
a result of being placed under corporal supervision, an officer
may lose overtime opportunities . . .” (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 133
(emphasis added).) Upon review of that paragraph, and the
underlying evidence cited in support, wholly missing is evidence
that Plaintiff actually lost overtime opportunities during those
nineteen days. As Plaintiff did not proffer evidence that “she
was denied overtime frequently enough to constitute a change in
the terms and conditions of her employment,” her claims of race
discrimination in connection with her placement under corporal
supervision necessarily fail and her objections are OVERRULED.
See Collymore v. City of N.Y., 767 F. App’x 42, 46 (2d Cir. 2019).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the R&R incorrectly found
that “the manner in which her [EEO] complaints were investigated
did not give rise to an adverse employment action” (R&R at 29)
because “despite identifying eighteen individuals in her EEO
complaint, only one was interviewed (the bad actor)” and a “jury
could infer that this was unreasonable and inadequate” (Pl. Obj.
at 14). These objections are conclusory and general and the Court
therefore reviews Judge Lindsay’s analysis for clear error. See,
e.g., Oxford Techs., Inc. v. E./W. Indus., Inc., No. 18-CV-1992,
2019 WL 4291584, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2019). Finding no clear
error, the Court ADOPTS the portion of the R&R that found Plaintiff
“has not presented any nonconclusory evidence that would permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that the defendants had failed to
respond in a reasonable and adequate manner.” (R&R at 28-29.)
Therefore, the Court agrees with the R&R’s conclusion
that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse action and her race
discrimination claims are DISMISSED.
III. Retaliation Claims7
With respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, Judge
Lindsay found for “the same reason previously stated,” Plaintiff’s
alleged adverse actions arising out of the placement under corporal
supervision, transfer to the Security Unit, and the investigation
of her EEO Complaint “do not amount to materially adverse action.”
(R&R at 34.) Plaintiff objects that Judge Lindsay incorrectly
applied the discrimination standard and argues these actions “are
adverse applying the lower [retaliation] standard” and that she
“was subjected to retaliatory adverse actions, or so a jury could
infer.” (Pl. Obj. at 14-15, 18.) Plaintiff also faults Judge
Lindsay for “mesh[ing]” the adverse action analysis with the
causation analysis under the burden-shifting standard adopted in
7 In support of her retaliation claims, Plaintiff argued in
opposition to summary judgment that the following were adverse
employment actions: (1) the denial of overtime opportunities by
a corrections officer who told her she was “blackballed” and
called Plaintiff a “rat” and “inmate lover;” (2) a decline in
overtime pay in 2014 after complaining about Lima’s abuse of a
black inmate; (3) the placement under corporal supervision and
the resulting loss in overtime opportunities; (4) the transfer
to the Security Unit; and (5) the investigation into Plaintiff’s
EEO complaint was unreasonable. (Pl. Opp. at 18-19.)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S. Ct.
1817, 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), when concluding that the
denial of overtime opportunities was not a retaliatory adverse
action. (Pl. Obj. at 18-24.)
The Court need not address these objections because
assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff established a prima
facie case of retaliation, Defendants articulated “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason[s]” for the alleged adverse employment
actions. Lawrence v. Chemprene, Inc., No. 18-CV-2537, 2019 WL
5449844, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2019) (collecting cases and
finding it appropriate to “skip past the first step of McDonell
Douglas” because the “burden of establishing a prima facie case is
not onerous, and has been frequently described as minimal.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Upon review of
the record, the Court finds that Defendants’ proffered reasons, as
detailed by Judge Lindsay, for: the limited inquiry into
Plaintiff’s EEO Complaint (detailed at R&R at 28-29), for
reassigning Plaintiff to the Security Unit (detailed at R&R at 26-
28), and for an alleged decline in overtime and lost overtime
opportunities in connection with these actions, including
placement under corporal supervision (detailed at R&R at 8-10, 35-
36) are legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory.8
Lawrence, 2019 WL 5449844, at *11.
The McDonnell Douglas analysis thus shifts “the burden
to Plaintiff to show that the Defendants’ legitimate,
nondiscriminatory justifications for” the alleged adverse actions
were “were mere pretexts for discrimination.” Lawrence, 2019 WL
5449844, at *12. “‘In such situations, plaintiff carries the
ultimate burden of persuasion and must produce evidence such that
a rational finder of fact could conclude that the adverse action
taken against her was more likely than not a product of
discriminatory animus.’” Id. (quoting Kerman-Mastour v. Fin.
Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 355, 370 (S.D.N.Y.
2011)). “‘Mere speculation is insufficient; a plaintiff must offer
specific, admissible evidence of pretext.’” Id. (quoting Fall v.
N.Y. State United Teachers, 289 F. App’x 419, 421 (2d Cir. 2008)
(summary order)).
Plaintiff’s objections regarding “pretext” largely
mirror the arguments in her underlying brief. (Compare Pl. Obj.
at 18-21 (arguing direct evidence, temporal proximity, and
pretext) with Pl. Opp. at 20-23 (same).) Even considering these
8 Plaintiff’s objection to the chart analyzing NCCC’s overtime
expenses are OVERRRUELD. (Pl. Obj. at 23-24; Overtime Expenses,
Estes Decl., Ex. 29, D.E. 40-26.) The chart was properly
attached to the Declaration of Michael Grunwald and there are
thus no concerns regarding authenticity or admissibility. (See
Grunwald Decl., Estes Decl., Ex. 15, D.E. 40-17, at ¶¶ 71-93.)
arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiff “offers no other evidence
on the record, such as testimony of a third party or written
documents, that could lead to any sort of reasonable inference”
that Defendants were discriminating and retaliating on the basis
of race when conducting a limited inquiry into Plaintiff’s EEO
Complaint, placing Plaintiff under corporal supervision,
reassigning Plaintiff to the Security Unit, and for the alleged
decline in overtime and overtime opportunities in connection with
these actions. Ghirardelli v. McAvey Sales & Serv., Inc., 287 F.
Supp. 2d 379, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Ghirardelli v.
McAvey Sales & Servs., Inc., 98 F. App’x 909 (2d Cir. 2004).
Indeed, “if this matter were to go to trial, a jury would
be presented, on the one hand, with [Plaintiff’s] conclusory and
unsubstantiated allegations that [race] must have been a factor in
[the alleged adverse actions], and, on the other hand, with
[Defendants’] sworn testimony that it was not. Such a conflict
does not raise a genuine issue of material fact; rather, it pits
sworn testimony against speculation, conjecture and self-serving
conclusions.” Id. (collecting cases). Thus, after a review of
the entire record in context of the legitimate reasons Defendants
proffered for the alleged adverse actions, and assuming Plaintiff
“could establish the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation,
a rational jury could not conclude that the grounds [Defendants]
articulated are false and merely a pretext for retaliation for
protected activity.” Id. (citing Gonzalez v. Beth Israel Med.
Ctr., 262 F. Supp. 2d 342, 357–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Therefore,
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s objections are
OVERRULED, the R&R is ADOPTED as stated, and Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is
directed to mark this case CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/_JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: April 28 , 2020
Central Islip, New York