It is well-established that “under New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”
How later courts described this case
- It is well-established that “under New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”
- in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
K-MEL T. GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against- 19-CV-0107(JS)(SIL)
OFFICER BLUM #3177, MS. FLUDD,
NASSAU COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: K-Mel T. Griffin, pro se
19-A-1468
Washington Correctional Facility
72 Lock 11 Lane
P.O. Box 180
Comstock, New York 12821-0180
For Defendants: No appearances.
SEYBERT, District Judge:
By Memorandum and Order dated July 18, 2019 (the “M&O”),
the Court granted the application of incarcerated pro se plaintiff
K-Mel T. Griffin (“Plaintiff”) to proceed in forma pauperis and
dismissed his Complaint filed in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Nassau County Sheriff Vera Fludd
(“Sheriff Fludd”), the Nassau County Correctional Center (the
“Jail”), the “Medical Department” and “Prisoner Holding Center” at
the Jail (“Jail Departments”), and “Inmates (E1E) Sate[l]lite”
(“Inmates”). (See M&O, D.E. 10.) Plaintiff was granted leave to
file an Amended Complaint in accordance with the M&O within thirty
(30) days from the date of the M&O. Plaintiff requested an
extension of time to file an Amended Complaint and that application
was granted. (See D.E. 13; and Aug. 16, 2019 Elec. Order.) On
September 13, 2019, Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint
pursuant to Section 1983 against Officer Blum #3177 (“C.O. Blum”),
Sheriff Fludd, and the Jail. For the reasons that follow, the
Amended Complaint does not allege a plausible claim for relief and
is thus DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
1915A(b)(1).
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT1
The Amended Complaint is submitted on a form from the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Western Division, and alleges that Plaintiff’s claims are brought
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Am. Compl.,
D.E. 14.) The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim are
nearly identical to those alleged in the original Complaint. In
its entirety, the Amended Complaint alleges:2
On December 11, 2018, a fight had broke out in
which I ended up getting stabbed numerous
times. Correctional Officer Blum, Badge
number 3177 was in the dorm area when it
1 All material allegations in the Amended Complaint are presumed
to be true for the purpose of this Order, see, e.g., Rogers v.
City of Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in
reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court
is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint
as true).
2 Excerpts from the Amended Complaint are reproduced here exactly
as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling,
punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
occurred and failed to break it up or use his
state issued mace to stop my assailants.
Nassau County Medical left me in my cell
bleeding for 6 and a half hours without any
medical attention and left me with open wounds
bleeding without any proper stitches.
Failing to break up altercation as it was
happening. Failed at care, custody and
control.
Officer Blum Badge # 3177 failed to get me
medical attention as soon as possible after I
got stabbed.
Nassau County failed to put keep separates on
all parties after the incident. I seen the
person who stabbed me plenty of times after.
(Am. Compl. ¶ IV.) Plaintiff does not seek any relief and has
left blank the space on the form Complaint that calls for a
statement of “exactly what you want the court to do for you.”
(Am. Compl. ¶ V.)
DISCUSSION
I. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Section 1915 of Title 28 requires a district court to
dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint or amended complaint if the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-
(iii), 1915A(b). The Court is required to dismiss the action as
soon as it makes such a determination. See id. § 1915A(b).
Courts are obliged to construe the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff liberally. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,
537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d
197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). However, a complaint or amended complant
must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009) (citation omitted). The plausibility standard requires
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. at 678; accord Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011). While “‘detailed factual
allegations’” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels
and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
II. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States
. . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff
must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at
least in part to a person acting under color of state law and (2)
the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the
Constitution of the United States.” Rae v. Cty. of Suffolk, No.
07–CV–2138, 2010 WL 768720, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010) (quoting
Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999).
A. Claims Against Sheriff Fludd
As the Court made clear in the M&O, “[i]n order to state
a claim for relief under Section 1983 against an individual
defendant, a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of the
defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Farid v.
Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010).” (See M&O at 6.) “A
complaint based upon a violation under Section 1983 that does not
allege the personal involvement of a defendant fails as a matter
of law and should be dismissed. Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x
199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).” (See M&O at 6.)
Here, like the original Complaint, although Plaintiff
names Sheriff Fludd as a Defendant in the caption of the Amended
Complaint, she is not again mentioned in the body of the Amended
Complaint. Wholly absent are any factual allegations of conduct
or inaction attributable to Sheriff Fludd. Because the Amended
Complaint, like the original Complaint, is devoid of any
allegations sufficient to establish any personal involvement by
Sheriff Fludd in the conduct of which Plaintiff complains,
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Sheriff Fludd are not
plausible and are thus DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b).
B. Claims Against the Jail
Notwithstanding the fact the Plaintiff’s claims against
the Jail were dismissed with prejudice (see M&O at 7) and the Court
did not grant Plaintiff leave to amend his claims against the Jail
(see M&O at 10), Plaintiff continues to name the Jail as a
Defendant. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the
M&O, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the Jail are not
plausible and are thus DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b). (See M&O at 7, citing
Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (It is well-established that “under New York law, departments
that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have
a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and,
therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”).3
3 Nor has Plaintiff followed the guidance set forth in the M&O
(at 7-9) with regard to the requirements of a plausible Section
1983 claim against the municipality, Nassau County. Wholly
absent from Amended Complaint are any factual allegations from
which the Court could reasonably construe a plausible Section
1983 cause of action against Nassau County.
C. Claims Against C.O. Blum
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides, in relevant
part, that a pleading must contain “a demand for the relief sought,
which may include relief in the alternative or different types of
relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3). When a complaint or amended
complaint fails to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading standard, including
a demand for relief, a district court may dismiss it sua sponte.
France v. Nassau Cnty. Jail, No. 14-CV-2547, 2014 WL 1871937, *5
(E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2014) (dismissing pro se complaint that, inter
alia, did not seek any relief); see also Rodriguez v. Nassau Cnty.
Police Dept., No. 18-CV-00203, 2018 WL 2725421, *4 (E.D.N.Y. June
6, 2018) (sua sponte dismissal of pro se complaint that did not
seek any relief as is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(3)). Accordingly, in the absence of a demand for any relief
against C.O. Blum, Plaintiff has not complied with Rule 8’s
requirements. Given that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible
claim for relief, his claims against C.O. Blum are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii);
1915A(b).
IV. Leave to Amend
Given the Second Circuit’s guidance that a pro se
complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless
amendment would be futile, Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112
(2d Cir. 2000), the Court has carefully considered whether leave
to further amend is warranted here. In an abundance of caution
and given Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO
FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ORDER AND
THE M&O. Plaintiff is advised that the Second Amended Complaint
will completely replace his prior pleadings. Therefore, Plaintiff
must include any and all claims against any Defendant(s) he seeks
to pursue in the Amended Complaint. However, Plaintiff may not
include claims against the Jail in any further pleadings given
that the Jail lacks the capacity to be sued and his claims against
the Jail have already been dismissed with prejudice. (See supra
at 6, see M&O at 7.) The Second Amended Complaint must clearly
be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”, shall bear the same docket
number as this Order, 19-CV-00107(JS)(SIL), and shall be filed
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. If Plaintiff
does not file a Second Amended Complaint within the time allowed,
judgment shall enter without further notice.
Plaintiff is further advised that, to state a claim for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff
must show both that his medical need was serious and that the
defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Although Plaintiff did not indicate in the Complaint or Amended
Complaint whether he is a sentenced prisoner or a pretrial detainee
at the time of the incidents alleged, Plaintiff should include
such information because his deliberate indifference claims would
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause if he is
a pretrial detainee, and the Eighth Amendment if he is a convicted
prisoner. However, either way, prison officials who act with mere
negligence will not be held liable for constitutional violations
because “any § 1983 claim for a violation of due process requires
proof of a mens rea greater than mere negligence.” Darnell v
Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Grimmett v.
Corizon Med. Assocs. of N.Y., No. 15-CV-7351, 2017 WL 2274485, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2017) (holding that more than negligence is
required to hold a defendant liable for violating either the Eighth
or Fourteenth Amendment) (citing Darnell, 849 F.3d at 36).
Negligence that would support a claim for medical
malpractice does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference
and is not cognizable under section 1983; see Salahuddin v. Goord,
467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006); nor does a difference of opinion
regarding what constitutes an appropriate response and treatment.
Ventura v. Sinha, 379 F. App’x 1, 2–3 (2d Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, rather than file a Second Amended Complaint in this
Court, Plaintiff may elect to pursue any valid claims, including
medical malpractice and/or negligence, in state court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the
Jail for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A (b)(1). Plaintiff’s Section 1983
claims against Sheriff Fludd and C.O. Blum are not plausible and
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); 1915A(b).
Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint in order to allege any valid claims he may have against
any Defendant(s) other than the Jail in accordance with the
guidance set forth above and in the M&O. The Second Amended
Complaint shall be clearly labeled “Second Amended Complaint”,
shall bear the same docket number as this Order, 19-CV-
00107(JS)(SIL), and shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
the date of this Order.
Alternatively, rather than file a Second Amended
Complaint in this Court, Plaintiff may elect to pursue any valid
claims, including medical malpractice and/or negligence, in state
court.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose
of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-
45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of
this Order to the Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
JOANNA SEYBERT, U.S.D.J.
Dated: January 9 , 2020
Central Islip, New York