Crews v. The County of Nassau

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

_____________________

N-o 06-CV-2610 (JFB)(GRB)

_____________________

RAHEEM CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT OF SHAHEEM CREWS,

Plaintiff,

VERSUS

COUNTY OF NASSAU, ET AL.,

Defendants.

___________________

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

December 18, 2019

___________________

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judge (sitting by claim, in favor of Nassau County on the

designation): Monell claim, and in favor of plaintiff on the

malicious prosecution claims against

Plaintiff Raheem Crews (“plaintiff”) Detective Lemma. The jury awarded

brought this action against the County of plaintiff $175,000 in compensatory damages

Nassau (“Nassau County”), Officer Ronald against Detective Lemma but did not award

Annarumma (“Officer Annarumma”), and punitive damages. Nassau County agreed

various other defendants employed by that it was also liable under the doctrine of

Nassau County (collectively, the “County respondeat superior for the compensatory

Defendants”), as well as Detective Nicholas damages awarded against Detective Lemma

Lemma (“Detective Lemma”), under 42 on the state law malicious prosecution claim.

U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law, for

alleged civil rights violations stemming from Presently before the Court are motions

his arrest, detention, and prosecution for a for fees and costs filed by plaintiff’s former

robbery he did not commit. counsel, Arshad Majid, of Majid &

Associates, who represented plaintiff from

Following discovery and summary the start of the case in May 2006 until January

judgment motions, the case proceeded to trial 2007, and plaintiff’s current counsel, the Law

on plaintiff’s claims against (1) Officer Offices of Frederick K. Brewington (“the

Annarumma for battery, (2) Detective Brewington Law Firm”).

Lemma for malicious prosecution under state

and federal law, and (3) Nassau County for Nassau County argues that it is not liable

municipal liability under Monell and under for attorneys’ fees or costs because the jury

New York state law in connection with the found in its favor on the Monell claim, and

malicious prosecution claim. The jury found because the Nassau County Police

in favor of Officer Annarumma on the battery Indemnification Board (“the Board”)

revoked Detective Lemma’s indemnification County and indemnification from Nassau

in April 2009 (a decision that was ultimately County, provided that the act or omission

affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals). complained of was within the scope of his

duties. On July 28, 2006, the Board found

In response, both plaintiff and Detective

that Detective Lemma was entitled to

Lemma argue that Nassau County should

indemnification for his legal defense under

indemnify Detective Lemma for any awarded

New York General Municipal Law § 50-l.

fees and costs under the doctrine of equitable

estoppel. In addition, Detective Lemma On December 27, 2007, the Court granted

argues that Mr. Majid’s application should be in part and denied in part defendants’ motion

denied in its entirety for failure to submit for judgment on the pleadings under Federal

contemporaneous time records or, in the Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See generally

alternative, that any award should be Crews v. County of Nassau, No. 06-CV-2610

reduced. Detective Lemma also asserts that (JFB)(WDW), 2007 WL 4591325 (E.D.N.Y.

the Brewington Law Firm’s award should be Dec. 27, 2007).

reduced.

The case proceeded to discovery. As

As explained below, the Court concludes relevant here, during Detective Lemma’s

that Nassau County is not obligated to February 9, 2009, deposition, he testified

indemnify Detective Lemma for attorneys’ that, at some point, he learned that plaintiff

fees and costs. With respect to the award was incarcerated on the day of the charged

against Detective Lemma, the Court robbery, but failed to notify prosecutors

concludes that the fees and costs requested by about that exculpatory information. As a

Mr. Majid and by the Brewington Law Firm result of this new information, Nassau

should be reduced. County reconvened the Board. On April 17,

2009, the Board revoked Detective Lemma’s

I. BACKGROUND

indemnification and withdrew representation

A. Factual Background by the Nassau County Attorney’s Office.

The Court set forth the factual The County Defendants moved for

background of this case in its February 11, summary judgment on July 11, 2011, and

2014 Order denying in part and granting in Detective Lemma moved for summary

part defendants’ motions for summary judgment on July 20, 2011. Plaintiff cross-

judgment and denying plaintiff’s motion for moved for summary judgment against

summary judgment in its entirety, see Detective Lemma on September 15, 2011.

generally Crews v. County of Nassau, 996 F. After hearing oral argument on the motions,

Supp. 2d 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), and will not the Court allowed further discovery and

repeat that background here. supplemental briefing by the parties,

followed by additional oral argument. On

B. Procedural History February 11, 2014, the Court granted in part

and denied in part the motions by the County

Plaintiff, represented by Mr. Majid, filed

Defendants and Detective Lemma, and

the complaint on May 25, 2006. On July 21,

denied plaintiff’s motion.

2006, the Nassau County Attorney’s Office

sent Detective Lemma a letter notifying him From March 9 through March 23, 2015,

that he had been named as a defendant in the the Court held a jury trial. The jury found in

case, and advising him that he was entitled to favor of Officer Annarumma and Nassau

legal representation provided by Nassau County on the battery and Monell claims,

respectively, and in favor of plaintiff on the In light of that decision, Detective

malicious prosecution claims against Lemma advised the Court that there was no

Detective Lemma. The jury awarded basis for a summary judgment motion on his

plaintiff $175,000 in compensatory damages crossclaim for indemnification against

but did not award any punitive damages. Nassau County, but requested permission to

submit a statement of his present financial

On May 8, 2015, plaintiff timely moved

condition for consideration by the Court in

to set aside the verdict and for a new trial

connection with the pending application for

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a).

attorneys’ fees and costs against him. The

The Court denied plaintiff’s motion on

Court granted that request, and Detective

December 16, 2015. See generally Crews v.

Lemma submitted the additional information

County of Nassau, 149 F. Supp. 3d 287

on August 15, 2018. On September 10, 2018,

(E.D.N.Y. 2015).

the Brewington Law Firm responded to that

On December 30, 2015, the Brewington supplemental submission.

Law Firm moved for attorneys’ fees and

On January 22, 2019, the Court heard oral

costs. On January 14, 2016, Mr. Majid also

argument on the motions for attorneys’ fees

moved for fees and costs. Nassau County and

and costs, and requested additional briefing.

Detective Lemma opposed the motions on

On February 12, 2019, Detective Lemma

February 12, 2016. On March 4, 2016, the

submitted additional briefing, arguing that

Brewington Law Firm and Mr. Majid

Nassau County should be equitably estopped

submitted replies.

from denying indemnification from the date

On March 16, 2016, Detective Lemma Detective Lemma entered into the

advised the Court that he wished to move for representation agreement with Nassau

summary judgment on his crossclaim for County on July 21, 2006, until it was revoked

indemnification against Nassau County, as it by the Board on April 17, 2009. In particular,

related to attorneys’ fees and costs. On May Detective Lemma argued that equitable

19, 2016, on consent of the parties, the Court estoppel should apply because the Nassau

stayed Detective Lemma’s time for moving County Attorney’s Office failed to advise

until the Appellate Division of the New York him of the inherent conflict of interest posed

State Supreme Court, Second Department, by that Office representing him and Nassau

decided Detective Lemma’s appeal from the County, and because the Nassau County

dismissal of his Article 78 petition for Attorney’s Office failed to exercise due

indemnification from Nassau County. After diligence in properly investigating the

the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal allegations. On February 12, 2019, the

of Detective Lemma’s Article 78 petition, Brewington Law Firm submitted a

Detective Lemma requested that the Court supplemental memorandum of law joining in

continue to stay his time for moving until the Detective Lemma’s arguments and, on

New York Court of Appeals heard his appeal. February 14, 2019, Mr. Majid also joined in

The Court granted that request. On June 14, those arguments. On March 5, 2019, Nassau

2018, the New York Court of Appeals County submitted a supplemental opposition

affirmed the Board’s decision to deny and, on March 22, 2019, the Brewington Law

indemnification. See generally Lemma v. Firm submitted a reply. Finally, on March

Nassau Cty. Police Officer Indemnification 11, 2019, Detective Lemma submitted

Bd., 31 N.Y.3d 523 (2018). updated financial information to the Court.

The Court has fully considered the parties’

submissions and arguments.

II. DISCUSSION indemnification agreement and that Nassau

County is estopped from denying

As noted earlier, presently before the

indemnification.

Court are applications for attorneys’ fees and

costs submitted by both Mr. Majid and the The Court finds these arguments to be

Brewington Law Firm. Mr. Majid requests without merit. As noted, after Detective

$186,937.50 in fees and $2,351.97 in costs. Lemma testified that he learned that plaintiff

The Brewington Law Firm requests was incarcerated on the day of the charged

$411,841.75 in fees and $19,357.60 in costs. robbery, but failed to notify prosecutors

about that exculpatory information, the

As a threshold matter, Detective Lemma

Board revoked its indemnification

and plaintiff argue that Nassau County

determination. The New York Court of

should indemnify Detective Lemma in

Appeals later affirmed that decision. See

connection with any award of attorneys’ fees

generally Lemma v. Nassau Cty. Police

or costs against him. Moreover, Detective

Officer Indemnification Bd., 31 N.Y.3d 523

Lemma argues that the Court should deny

(2018). Notably, the Court of Appeals

Mr. Majid’s fee request in its entirety, and

concluded that the “legislature . . . left the

substantially reduce the Brewington Law

determination of whether the statutory

Firm’s fees, on several grounds. One of the

prerequisites [for indemnification] are met to

grounds for the reduction of an award raised

the discretion of the Board,” id. at 529, and

by Detective Lemma is his financial

that “the Board did not err when it interpreted

situation. The Court addresses each of these

[General Municipal Law § 50-l] as permitting

issues in turn.

it to deny indemnification based on its

A. Indemnification assessment of the propriety of [Detective

Lemma’s] conduct,” id. at 532. In light of

Detective Lemma and plaintiff1 argue that decision, there is no basis for this Court

that Nassau County must indemnify to entertain arguments relating to the Board’s

Detective Lemma under General Municipal interpretation and application of General

Law § 50-l for any attorneys’ fees and costs Municipal Law § 50-l.

awarded from the commencement of the

lawsuit until the Board revoked Detective Notwithstanding the New York Court of

Lemma’s indemnification in April 2009. Appeals decision, Detective Lemma and

Specifically, Detective Lemma contends that plaintiff assert that this Court can and should

Nassau County should be equitably estopped find in favor of Detective Lemma on his

from denying indemnification during that indemnification claim on the basis of

time frame and that the New York State Court equitable estoppel. Detective Lemma did not

of Appeals decision does not preclude this raise an equitable estoppel argument in the

relief. Plaintiff similarly contends that New York state courts, and has not explained

Nassau County’s failure to exercise his failure to do so. Nor did plaintiff, at any

reasonable diligence requires it to honor the point during those proceedings, seek to

intervene to assert his objections on equitable

1 The Court notes that at least one New York State here. In any event, even assuming arguendo that such

court has held that the victim of a county police standing existed, the Court concludes that there is no

officer’s torts does not have standing to challenge the basis for Detective Lemma or plaintiff to challenge

Board’s indemnification decisions. See Galvani v. that indemnification decision on grounds of equitable

Nassau Cty. Police Indemnification Review Bd., 674 estoppel or any other grounds.

N.Y.S.2d 690 (2d Dep’t 1998). Plaintiff has not cited

any authority establishing that he has standing to do so

estoppel grounds, or any other grounds. In infliction of unconscionable injury and loss

any event, even assuming arguendo that this upon one who has relied on the promise of

challenge can be made to this Court in this another.” Am. Bartenders Sch., Inc. v. 105

context, the Court concludes that no grounds Madison Co., 59 N.Y.2d 716, 718 (1983)

for equitable estoppel exist in this case, nor (emphasis added).

are there any other grounds to disturb the

When equitable estoppel is invoked

New York Court of Appeals’ decision on

against the government, the bar is even

indemnification.

higher. “It is axiomatic that the doctrine of

“Equitable estoppel is grounded on equitable estoppel cannot generally be

notions of fair dealing and good conscience invoked against governmental agencies in the

and is designed to aid the law in the exercise of their governmental function.”

administration of justice where injustice Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. New York

would otherwise result.” In re Ionosphere State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 991

Clubs, Inc., 85 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1996). N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (3d Dep’t 2014).

“‘Estoppel’ generally means that one party in Accordingly, equitable estoppel against a

a dispute should not be permitted to reap any government agency “is foreclosed ‘in all but

benefit from its own misrepresentations.” the rarest cases,’” N.Y. Med. Transporters

United States v. Schmitt, 999 F. Supp. 317, Ass’n Inc. v. Perales, 77 N.Y.2d 126, 130

360 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 28 F. App’x 63 (1990) (quoting In re Parkview Assocs. v.

(2d Cir. 2002). Thus, to establish a claim for City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274, 282

equitable estoppel under New York law, a (1988)), and requires “a showing of fraud,

party must show: “(1) [a]n act constituting a misrepresentation, deception, or similar

concealment of facts or a false affirmative misconduct, along with

misrepresentation; (2) [a]n intention or reasonable reliance thereon,” In re Enf’t of

expectation that such acts will be relied upon; Tax Liens ex rel. Cty. of Orange, 903

(3) [a]ctual or constructive knowledge of the N.Y.S.2d 60, 70 (2d Dep’t 2010); accord

true facts by the wrongdoers; [and] Yassin v. Sarabu, 727 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (2d

(4) [r]eliance upon the misrepresentations Dep’t 2001).

which causes the innocent party to change its

Under the circumstances of this case, the

position to its substantial detriment.” Gaia

elements of equitable estoppel have not been

House Mezz LLC v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co.,

satisfied. Plaintiff and Detective Lemma

720 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Gen.

have not shown, with respect to the actions of

Elec. Capital Corp. v. Eva Armadora, S.A.,

Nassau County, “[c]onduct which amounts to

37 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994)).

a false representation or concealment of

As a general matter, equitable estoppel is material facts.” BWA Corp. v. Alltrans Exp.

an “‘extraordinary remedy,’ which should be U.S.A., Inc., 493 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1st Dep’t

invoked ‘sparingly and only under 1985). Although the Board could have

exceptional circumstances.’” Twersky v. expected Detective Lemma to rely on its

Yeshiva Univ., 579 F. App’x 7, 10 (2d Cir. initial indemnification decision and he could

2014) (first quoting Clark v. Ravikumar, 935 have, in fact, relied on it, his estoppel claim

N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (2d Dep’t 2011); then fails because there is no evidence (nor is it

quoting In re Gross v. N.Y. City Health & alleged) that the Board made its initial

Hosps. Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (2d decision with knowledge that Detective

Dep’t 1986)). Indeed, “[t]he purpose of Lemma had failed to disclose exculpatory

invoking the doctrine is to prevent the information to prosecutors. To the contrary,

the evidence indicates that Nassau County’s to advise Detective Lemma of the potential

decision to rescind indemnification was conflict support equitable estoppel in this

based on the discovery of this material case on indemnification. Similarly, to the

information (i.e., that Detective Lemma was extent it is argued that Nassau County was

not acting within the proper discharge and negligent in their investigation of plaintiff’s

scope of his duties when he knowingly allegations and thus failed to uncover

withheld exculpatory information), which Detective Lemma’s misconduct sooner, such

Detective Lemma disclosed for the first time negligence would not provide a basis for

at his deposition. In short, there is no basis equitable estoppel.

for equitable estoppel because Nassau

In short, neither Detective Lemma nor

County made no false representations to, nor

plaintiff has demonstrated “fraud,

concealed any material fact from, Detective

misrepresentation, deception, or similar

Lemma or plaintiff, but rather simply

affirmative misconduct” by Nassau County,

reassessed their initial indemnification

In re Enf’t of Tax Liens, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 70,

decision in light of new information

nor an “unconscionable injury,” Am.

uncovered during discovery (which was

supplied by Detective Lemma).2 Bartenders Sch., Inc., 59 N.Y.2d at 718, to

invoke this exceptional doctrine in this case.

None of the arguments raised by Accordingly, this Court finds no basis for

Detective Lemma or plaintiff are persuasive equitable estoppel in this case, or any other

on the issue of equitable estoppel. For grounds to preclude Nassau County from

example, although Detective Lemma argues relying on the Board’s finding that Detective

that Nassau County had an inherent conflict Lemma will not be indemnified. Therefore,

of interest in representing him in this case the motions by Detective Lemma and

under Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d plaintiff to find in favor of Detective Lemma

903 (2d Cir. 1984), that case provides no on his crossclaim for indemnification are

support for equitable estoppel here because denied, and the cross-claim for

the potential conflict that was raised in indemnification is dismissed based on the

Dunton (where the municipality is claiming decision of the Board, as upheld by the New

that the individual officer acted outside the York Court of Appeals.

scope of his official duties) did not exist

B. Attorneys’ Fees

during the period of joint representation here.

In fact, Nassau County did not dispute for “The general rule in our legal system is

purposes of trial that Detective Lemma was that each party must pay its own attorney’s

acting within the scope of his employment fees and expenses.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex

and agreed to be subjected to respondeat rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010). In

superior liability for plaintiff’s state law Section 1983 actions, however, “the court, in

malicious prosecution claim against its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,

Detective Lemma. Moreover, the Monell other than the United States, a reasonable

claim here was based on a failure to attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C.

adequately train and supervise detectives, § 1988(b). Here, plaintiff’s original counsel,

and not on a municipal policy. Thus, there Mr. Majid, requests $186,937.50 in

was no inherent conflict nor does any failure

2 For the same reasons, the Court finds plaintiff’s

claim that he also relied on the Board’s 2006 decision

for any award of damages provides no basis for

equitable estoppel.

attorney’s fees and $2,351.97 in costs. interrelated and required essentially the same

Plaintiff’s successor counsel, the Brewington proof.” Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 952

Law Firm, requests $411,841.75 in attorneys’ (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, “[t]he district

fees and $19,357.60 in costs. court . . . has the discretion to award fees for

the entire litigation where the claims are

To calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees,

‘inextricably intertwined’ and ‘involve a

the Court uses the “lodestar figure,” which is

common core of facts or [are] based on

determined by multiplying the number of

related legal theories.’” Kerin v. U.S. Postal

hours reasonably expended on a case by a

Serv., 218 F.3d 185, 194 n.6 (2d Cir. 2000)

reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v.

(alterations in original) (quoting Dominic v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983);

Consol. Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1259 (2d

Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 115

Cir. 1987)).

(2d Cir. 1997). “Both [the Second Circuit]

and the Supreme Court have held that the 1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

lodestar . . . creates a ‘presumptively

A “reasonable hourly rate” is “‘what a

reasonable fee.’” Millea v. Metro–North R.R.

reasonable, paying client would be willing to

Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)

pay,’ given that such a party wishes ‘to spend

(quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens

the minimum necessary to litigate the case

Neighborhood Assoc. v. County of Albany,

effectively.’” Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office

522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). “[T]he

of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr.,

lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the

652 F.3d 277, 289 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting

relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’

Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d

attorney’s fee.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553

170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009)). This Court follows

(quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley

the Second Circuit’s “forum rule,” which

Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.

“generally requires use of the hourly rates

546, 565-66 (1986)). Thus, the Supreme

employed in the district in which the

Court has recognized that “the lodestar

reviewing court sits in calculating the

method produces an award that roughly

presumptively reasonable fee.” Id. at 290

approximates the fee that the prevailing

(quoting Simmons, 575 F.3d at 174). In

attorney would have received if he or she had

Arbor Hill, the Second Circuit also instructed

been representing a paying client who was

district courts to consider the factors set forth

billed by the hour in a comparable case.” Id.

in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,

at 551. “The burden is on the party seeking

Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated

attorney’s fees to submit sufficient evidence

on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron,

to support the hours worked and the rates

489 U.S. 87 (1989). See 522 F.3d at 190. The

claimed.” Hugee v. Kimso Apartments, LLC,

twelve Johnson factors are:

852 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

(1) the time and labor required;

The Supreme Court has held that “the

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the

extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial

questions; (3) the level of skill

factor in determining the proper amount of an

required to perform the legal service

award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.

properly; (4) the preclusion of

§ 1988.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.

employment by the attorney due to

However, a “plaintiff’s lack of success on

acceptance of the case; (5) the

some of his claims does not require the court

attorney’s customary hourly rate;

to reduce the lodestar amount where the

(6) whether the fee is fixed or

successful and the unsuccessful claims were

contingent; (7) the time limitations

imposed by the client or the the firm, and the expertise of its attorneys.’”

circumstances; (8) the amount Houston, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (quoting

involved in the case and the results Siracuse v. Program for the Dev. of Human

obtained; (9) the experience, Potential, No. 07-CV-2205 (CLP), 2012 WL

reputation, and ability of the 1624291, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012)).

attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

the case; (11) the nature and length of

the professional relationship with the “The party seeking attorney’s fees also

client; and (12) awards in similar bears the burden of establishing that the

cases. number of hours for which compensation is

sought is reasonable.” Custodio v. Am. Chain

Id. at 186 n.3 (quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at

Link & Constr., Inc., No. 06-CV-7148 (GBD)

717-19). “The burden rests with the

(HBP), 2014 WL 116147, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.

prevailing party ‘to justify the reasonableness

Jan. 13, 2014) (citing Cruz v. Local Union

of the requested rate.’” Hugee, 852 F. Supp.

No. 3 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d

2d at 298 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.

1148, 1160 (2d Cir. 1994)). “Applications

886, 895 n.11 (1984)).

for fee awards should generally be

Courts in this district have concluded that documented by contemporaneously created

$200 to $450 per hour is a reasonable hourly time records that specify, for each attorney,

rate for partners, $200 to $325 per hour is the date, the hours expended, and the nature

reasonable for senior associates, and $100 to of the work done.” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd.,

$200 per hour is reasonable for more junior 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998). “Hours

associates. See Houston v. Cotter, 234 F. that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise

Supp. 3d 392, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing unnecessary,’ are to be excluded, and in

Sass v. MTA Bus Co., 6 F. Supp. 3d 238, 261 dealing with such surplusage, the court has

(E.D.N.Y. 2014)); Ganci v. U.S. Limousine discretion simply to deduct a reasonable

Service Ltd., No. 10-CV-3027 (JFB)(AKT), percentage of the number of hours claimed

2015 WL 1529772, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from a

2015) (collecting cases); Hugee, 852 F. Supp. fee application.’” Id. (first quoting Hensley,

2d at 298-99; Pilitz v. Inc. Village of 461 U.S. at 434; then quoting N.Y. Ass’n for

Freeport, No. 07–CV–4078 (ETB), 2011 WL Retarded Children, Inc., 711 F.2d at 1146);

5825138, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011) see also Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d

(citing Builders Bank v. Rockaway Equities, 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We do not require

LLC, No. 08–CV–3575 (MDG), 2011 WL that the court set forth item-by-item findings

4458851, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011)); concerning what may be countless objections

Olsen v. County of Nassau, No. 05–CV–3623 to individual billing items.”). Finally, when

(ETB), 2010 WL 376642, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. the Court makes this determination, it “does

Jan. 26, 2010); Gutman v. Klein, No. 03–CV– not play the role of an uninformed arbiter but

1570 (BMC), 2009 WL 3296072, at *2 may look to its own familiarity with the case

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009). and its experience generally as well as to the

evidentiary submissions and arguments of the

Ultimately, however, “in light of the

parties.” Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d

numerous factors that courts in this circuit

858, 876 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting DiFilippo v.

consider to determine a reasonable hourly

Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.

rate, ‘the range of “reasonable” attorney fee

1985)).

rates in this district depends on the type of

case, the nature of the litigation, the size of

3. Application U.S. at 433). Thus, fee applications must be

supported by contemporaneous records that

a. Mr. Majid

“specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours

Mr. Majid requests an hourly rate of expended, and the nature of the work done.”

$375. Defendants argue that $375 per hour is N.Y. Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc., 711

unreasonable in light of Mr. Majid’s limited F.2d at 1148. This requirement is strictly

experience with civil rights litigation, and enforced, which means that the records must

propose an hourly rate of $200. be made “while the work is being done or,

more likely, immediately thereafter.

In light of the prevailing hourly rates in Descriptions of work recollected in

this district, and all the other factors set forth tranquility days or weeks later will not do.”

in Arbor Hill, the Court concludes that $250 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 727 F. Supp.

per hour is a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. 2d 239, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

Majid. Although Mr. Majid is an able

lawyer, he does not have significant In the instant case, Mr. Majid submitted

experience in civil rights litigation. Because records showing that he spent 498.5 hours on

the upper range of rates is “reserved for this matter and a sworn statement that these

expert trial attorneys with extensive records were compiled contemporaneously.

experience before the federal bar, who The Court concludes that Mr. Majid’s sworn

specialize in the practice of civil rights law statement, and the records themselves, are

and are recognized by their peers as leaders sufficient to satisfy the contemporaneous

and experts in their fields,” Hugee, 852 F. time records requirement. To the extent that

Supp. 2d at 300, a reduction is appropriate. Detective Lemma challenges Mr. Majid’s

The Court will use a rate of $250 per hour to submissions on this ground, Detective

calculate the lodestar for Mr. Majid. Lemma’s arguments are insufficient for the

Court to conclude that the records were not

Mr. Majid has submitted a billing contemporaneously made. Thus, Detective

summary of work performed on the case. Lemma’s motion on that ground is denied.

Defendants contend that these hours should

be denied in their entirety because the time However, the Court finds the number of

records submitted were not made hours expended by Mr. Majid to be

contemporaneously. Defendants further unreasonably excessive in several respects as

argue that Mr. Majid’s hours should be discussed below. First, the Court agrees with

reduced because they are excessive, defendants that, apart from fees incurred in

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. preparing the instant motion, Mr. Majid is not

entitled to any fees after January 30, 2007,

As a threshold matter, the Court when this Court granted Nassau County’s

concludes that Mr. Majid’s time records, motion to disqualify him. As Mr. Majid was

though not exemplary, meet the requirements no longer plaintiff’s attorney, he cannot

for an award of attorney’s fees. As noted recoup fees after that date. Thus, for

earlier, “[t]he burden is on the party seeking example, time that Mr. Majid spent opposing

attorney’s fees to submit sufficient evidence defendants’ motion to implead him as a

to support the hours worked and the rates defendant is not recoverable.3 The Court

claimed.” Id. at 298 (citing Hensley, 461 similarly concludes that time spent on Mr.

3 The Court notes that, not only was this motion after underlying criminal case (and not on his representation

Mr. Majid’s representation of the plaintiff ceased, but of plaintiff in this civil rights case).

it was based on his conduct in connection with the

Majid’s opposition to defendants’ successful 32 hours); see also Romeo & Juliette Laser

disqualification motion is not recoverable. Hair Removal Inc. v. Assara I LLC, No. 08

Mr. Majid did not prevail in opposing that Civ. 442(TPG)(FM), 2013 WL 3322249, at

motion, and the time is severable from the *5-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013) (reducing fees

work he spent on behalf of his client.4 by 75% that were “grossly excessive relative

to the nature of the work performed”); Lide v.

Second, in its review of Mr. Majid’s

Abbott House, No. 05 Civ. 3790(SAS), 2008

billing records, the Court finds numerous

WL 495304, at *l-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008)

instances of excessive time that warrant a

(finding that “excessive and unnecessary

reduction. For example, counsel spent over

hours spent on indisputably straightforward

three hundred hours drafting the complaint. tasks” warranted a thirty percent reduction).

Having reviewed the complaint and billing

entries, and having presided over this case Third, with respect to the remaining work

(and many other Section 1983 cases), the (outside of the work on the complaint), the

Court finds that such time was grossly Court finds that a reduction is also

excessive and warrants a substantial appropriate based on vague and block-billed

reduction. In particular, although the time entries, such that the reasonableness of

complaint is lengthy and (as Mr. Majid noted each entry cannot be easily determined.

at oral argument) required legal research “Courts frequently respond to vague and

before drafting, the Court concludes that any difficult-to-decipher billing statements with

preparation for, or drafting of, the complaint an across-the-board percentage reduction in

beyond 40 hours is unreasonable under the the fees claimed, often in the range of 20-30

circumstances of this case. See, e.g., Hines v. percent.” Calvo v. City of New York, No. 14-

1025 Fifth Ave. Inc., No. 14-CV-3661 SAS, CV-7246 (VEC), 2017 WL 4119280, at *6

2015 WL 4006126, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017) (quoting Thai-Lao

2015) (finding 58.2 hours drafting a 27-page Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao

complaint was excessive even though People’s Democratic Republic, No. 10 CIV.

complaint covered 13 years of events where 05256 (KMW) (DF), 2012 WL 5816878, at

“nothing was achieved by tracing thirteen *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012)); see also, e.g.,

years and adding layers of detail when it Ass’n of Holocaust Victims for Restitution of

[wa]s evident” that that was not needed to Artwork & Masterpieces v. Bank Austria

render claims plausible); Simmonds v. N.Y.C. Creditanstalt AG, No. 04cv3600 (SWK),

Dep’t of Corr., No. 06 CIV. 5298 (NRB), 2005 WL 3099592, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17,

2008 WL 4303474, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2005) (applying 25% reduction to account for

2008) (finding that over 142 hours drafting “block billing, vagueness, and excess”).

complaint was “certainly an excessive

Here, Mr. Majid’s time records are

amount given that it corresponds to over one

riddled with vague and block-billed entries.

month of full time work by a single

For example, Mr. Majid’s entry on February

attorney”); Lynch v. Town of Southampton,

19, 2006 states that he spent 4.75 hours on

492 F. Supp. 2d 197, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)

“Conf. w/ clients – Legal research (Malic.

(finding 97.83 hours for 43 page civil rights

Prosec.) – Outline Complaint.” (Majid Reply

complaint unreasonable and reducing time to

4 Detective Lemma also argues that it would be Detective Lemma). However, the Court need not

inequitable to require him to pay for Mr. Majid’s work address this issue because it finds that the time Mr.

on the disqualification motion and the impleader Majid spent on those motions is unrecoverable for the

motion because the Nassau County Attorney’s Office other reasons discussed above.

made the decision to file those motions (rather than

Decl. Ex. A at 2.) On September 6, 2006, Mr. rate to $400 due to the “uncontested facts of

Majid’s entry states that he spent one hour on the case and the results achieved.” (Lemma

“Rev. Def’s letter-Conf. w/ Arthur-Conf. w/ Opp. at 19.)

clients (J. Bianco now has case).” (Id. at 4.)5

In light of the prevailing hourly rates in

Given the frequency of such entries, the

this district, and all other factors set forth in

Court concludes that a 30% across-the-board

Arbor Hill, the Court concludes that $450 is

reduction in hours is warranted in order to

a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Brewington.

“trim the excess from counsel’s billing

As noted, courts in this district “award hourly

entries.” Monette, 2016 WL 4145798, at *8.

rates ranging from $200 to $450 per hour for

Based on the foregoing, the Court partners.” Houston, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 402

calculates the lodestar for Mr. Majid to be (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting

$22,600. The Court sees no reason to depart D’Annunzio v. Ayken, Inc., No. 11-CV-3303

from the lodestar figure in this case. See, e.g., (WFK) (WDW), 2015 WL 5308094, at *4

Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 (noting that lodestar (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015)); accord Martinez

figure includes “most, if not all,” relevant v. City of New York, 330 F.R.D. 60, 70

factors in setting reasonable attorney’s fee). (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Based on a survey of

cases in the Eastern District of New York,

b. The Brewington Law Firm

experienced Section 1983 attorneys receive,

The Brewington Law Firm has submitted on average, fees calculated at an hourly rate

detailed records and an affidavit attesting to of between $300.00 and $450.00.”). Given

their legal experience and work on this Mr. Brewington’s extensive experience

matter. litigating and trying civil rights cases (which

defendants acknowledge), a rate at the upper

The Brewington Law Firm requests the end of this range is appropriate. See, e.g.,

following rates: Hugee, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 300. The Court

Attorney Role Rate also bases the conclusion to award Mr.

Frederick Brewington Partner $500 Brewington a fee on the high end of the range

Ira Fogelgaren Partner $300 in this district on its own observations of Mr.

Gregory Calliste Jr. Associate $315 Brewington’s excellent performance over the

Mili Makhijani Associate $250 course of this entire litigation. Even though

G. William Germano Jr. Associate $250 the Court does not view the case as

particularly complex, Mr. Brewington did an

Valerie M. Cartright Associate $315

impressive job during extensive motions

Johanna C. David Associate $225

practice and prevailed at trial. Accordingly,

Cathryn Harris Of Counsel $250 for the above reasons, the Court concludes

Cory Morris Associate $200 that an hourly rate near the high end of the

Precilla Lockett Associate $150 range in this district is warranted.

Ulrica Sheridan Paralegal $50

The Court notes that Mr. Brewington’s

regularly charged hourly rate is $500.

Although defendants generally object to

Although that rate “is persuasive evidence of

these proposed rates as unreasonable, they

reasonableness, compensable attorneys’ fees

suggest a reduction of only Mr. Brewington’s

must ultimately conform to market rates.”

5 More examples include an entry for December 19, December 22, 2005 that states, “Legal research

2005 that states, “Conf. with client – Legal research (criminal, civil issues) – Redraft and file NOC.”

(50-h issues) – Outline Complaint,” and an entry for (Majid Reply Decl. Ex. A at 1-2.)

Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06-cv-4290 award here was substantial, and not only

(PGG)(GWG), 2010 WL 334975, at *5 nominal. The cases defendants rely on to

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010). Accordingly, a argue that a reduction is appropriate are

district court is “not bound by the rate which therefore inapposite. E.g., Farrar v. Hobby,

a lawyer charges his other clients.” McCann 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (holding that the

v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 130 (2d Cir. “technical nature of a nominal damages

1983). Here, the Court concludes, based on award or any judgment . . . bear[s] on the

all of the relevant factors, that a rate above propriety of fees awarded under § 1988”). In

$450 would be unreasonable under the fact, the Second Circuit noted in Pino v.

circumstances of this particular case. Locascio that Farrar’s inquiry applies

“whe[re] the plaintiff has won only nominal

As to the rates for the other Brewington

damages.” 101 F.3d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1996)

Law Firm attorneys and their paralegal, the

(emphasis added) (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at

Court concludes that those hourly rates are

103); c.f., Hines v. City of Albany, 613 F.

appropriate. In particular, the requested rates

App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We are

are in accord with the prevailing rates in this

unpersuaded by Defendants’ attempts to

district and are supported by the other factors

characterize the $10,000 settlement in this

set forth in Arbor Hill and Johnson, including

case as meager. Moreover, the success here

the attorneys’ legal education, training, and

was hardly technical.”).

experience as set forth in the declaration

supporting the motion for fees. (See Decl. of Second, the Court disagrees with

Frederick K. Brewington in Supp. of Mot. for defendants’ argument that the Court should

Fees (“Brewington Decl.”) ¶¶ 27-65, ECF deduct time spent on the false arrest and false

No. 358-2.) imprisonment claims. Defendants are correct

that “[i]n calculating the total number of

The Brewington Law Firm has also

reasonable hours eligible for attorneys’ fees,

submitted a billing summary of work

courts should subtract any ‘hours dedicated

performed on the case. There is no dispute

to severable unsuccessful claims.’” Tatum,

here that the submissions satisfy the

2010 WL 334975, at *10 (quoting

contemporaneous records requirement.

Quarantino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422,

However, defendants contend that the hours

425 (2d Cir. 1999)). Courts “need not”

should be reduced because the Brewington

reduce the fee award, however, “where the

Law Firm obtained only limited success and

‘successful and the unsuccessful claims were

because the hours are excessive, redundant,

interrelated and required essentially the same

and improperly block billed.

proof.’” Id. (quoting Murphy, 118 F.3d at

i. Limited Success 952). Thus, if a plaintiff’s claims “involve a

common core of facts” or are “based on

Defendants argue that a reduction is related legal theories,” so that “[m]uch of

appropriate because plaintiff’s “degree of counsel’s time [is] devoted generally to the

success was significantly modest in litigation as a whole, making it difficult to

comparison with his original complaint and divide the hours expended on a claim-by-

monetary request for damages.” (Lemma claim basis,” no reduction based on

Opp. at 21-23.) The Court disagrees. unsuccessful claims is warranted. See

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Instead, plaintiff’s

First, the Court disagrees with

counsel “should be compensated even for

defendants’ characterization of plaintiff’s

work done in connection with an

victory in this case. The $175,000 damages

unsuccessful claim if that claim was

intertwined with the claim on which force/battery claims against Officer

[plaintiff] succeeded.” Gierlinger, 160 F.3d Annarumma (although not extensive) were

at 877. factually and legally distinct from the claims

against Detective Lemma. In such situations,

Here, the Court finds that virtually all of

even where the time entries do not delineate

plaintiff’s claims—including his successful

work on the successful claims as compared to

malicious prosecution claims in the form of a

the unsuccessful claims, a court can in its

$175,000 jury award—arose from the same

discretion utilize an across-the-board cut.

facts surrounding his arrest and subsequent

See, e.g., Todaro v. Siegel Fenchel & Peddy,

prosecution. Specifically, there is significant

P.C., 697 F. Supp. 2d 395, 401 (E.D.N.Y.

overlap in the claims that stem from the same

2010) (applying a 30% fee reduction even

facts concerning plaintiff’s arrest,

though the unsuccessful claim had a

imprisonment, and prosecution. Indeed,

significant amount of “overlap” because of

although Detective Lemma argues that the

“how much time [p]laintiff’s counsel would

litigation regarding the facts leading up to the

have saved by not litigating [plaintiff]’s

arrest were unnecessary to prove the

unsuccessful claim”). Although Mr.

malicious prosecution claim against him for

Brewington suggested at oral argument that a

his conduct after the arrest, the Court

modest reduction of 5% in the number of

disagrees. Plaintiff needed to prove, among

hours may be appropriate for work on the

other things, that Detective Lemma’s conduct

unsuccessful claims, the Court concludes that

following the arrest was malicious, and not

a 10% reduction is warranted in light of the

simply an oversight or mistake. Therefore, it

nature of the claims and the nature of the

was critical to explore his involvement in the

work that was required to pursue the claims

investigation (especially as the investigating

against Nassau County and Officer

officer) from its inception and to gather

Annarumma apart from the claims against

information from those who interacted with

Detective Lemma.

him during the investigation, arrest, and

prosecution. In sum, although virtually all of the

claims stem from the same material facts, an

However, notwithstanding the

across-the-board 10% reduction in the

inextricably intertwined facts, there are some

number of hours is appropriate because of the

portions of the unsuccessful claims,

additional legal work performed litigating the

especially the legal work on the Monell claim

unsuccessful claims, especially the Monell

and the claims against Officer Annarumma,

claim and the excessive force/battery claim

that the Court concludes are distinct. For

against Officer Annarumma.

example, the legal research and briefing on

the summary judgment motion with respect ii. Excessive, Redundant,

to the Monell claim, the jury instructions on and Vague Hours

that claim, the trial preparation on that claim,

and other related work were not inextricably The Court further finds that the number

intertwined with the Section 1983 claim of hours expended by the Brewington Law

against Detective Lemma. Moreover, some Firm on the case is unreasonably excessive

small amount of the facts (such as the facts for several reasons. First, the matter was

relating to Detective Lemma’s supervision overstaffed with nine attorneys, one law

and training) were primarily aimed at the school graduate, and one paralegal, who

Monell claim. Similarly, the discovery and spent more than one thousand hours on the

other legal work on the excessive matter. When evaluating fee applications, a

district court has discretion to reduce

requested attorneys’ fees where the Harris spent 10 hours on “File Review,

prevailing party assigned an inordinate document review.” (Id. at 42.) As explained

number of attorneys to litigate the action. above, the Court may, in its discretion,

See, e.g., Lochren v. County of Suffolk, 344 F. determine a reduction is appropriate in light

App’x 706, 709 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming of such deficient entries.

district court’s 25% across-the-board

Based on the foregoing, the Court

reduction because “plaintiffs overstaffed the

concludes that a 20% percent across-the-

case, resulting in the needless duplication of

board reduction to the Brewington Law

work and retention of unnecessary

Firm’s hours is warranted. See, e.g., Kirsch,

personnel”); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109

148 F.3d at 173 (finding no abuse of

F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t was within

discretion “in the adjustment of the rate to be

the purview of the court’s discretion to

paid for [counsel]’s time or as to the 20%

determine whether or not the actual time

reduction for vagueness, inconsistencies, and

expended by an additional attorney was

other deficiencies in the billing records);

reasonable.”). Moreover, the billing records

Monette, 2016 WL 4145798, at *8 (finding

indicate duplicative and inefficient efforts.

that the court has “discretion simply to deduct

For example, from September 10 to 14, 2011,

a reasonable percentage of the number of

it appears that Mr. Brewington, Ms.

hours claimed ‘as a practical means of

Cartright, Ms. Lockett, and Ms. Harris spent

trimming fat from a fee applications.’”

over a hundred hours on the summary

(quoting Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 173)).

judgment motion. (See Brewington Decl. Ex.

A at 43-45, ECF No. 358-3.)6 More broadly, c. Detective Lemma’s Financial

none of the legal or factual issues in the case Situation

was so complicated or unusual to warrant so

many attorneys and hours. See Husain v. Finally, defendants argue that the Court

Springer, 579 F. App’x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014) should impose a fee reduction in light of

(citing DiFillippo, 759 F.2d at 235-36) Detective Lemma’s financial situation. The

(holding that plaintiffs’ “attorney’s claim of Court disagrees.

2,741.4 hours of attorney time was Detective Lemma cites Faraci v. Hickey-

extravagant” in a Section 1983 litigation that Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979)

“established no new principle of law” but to support the argument that the Court should

rather “concerned a ‘straightforward’ consider his financial circumstances in

application of existing law, calling into determining the fee award here. In Faraci,

question their attorney’s enormous the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s

expenditure of time”). Title VII complaint as frivolous and awarded

Finally, the Court concludes that a the defendant the full amount of fees

reduction in hours is appropriate based on requested under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Id.

vague and block-billed time entries. For at 1027. On appeal, the Second Circuit

instance, there are numerous entries that explained that “successful defendants in Title

mention only “Legal Research” or VII actions are entitled to attorneys’ fees only

“Research.” (E.g., Brewington Decl. Ex. A where the suit is ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or

at 4, 14, 70.) On September 5, 2011, Ms. without foundation.’” Id. at 1028 (quoting

6 Ms. Cartright also spent 16 hours “finaliz[ing]

motions and exhibits.” (Id. at 45.) The Court finds

that this entry is excessive and vague.

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 relevant to the instant fee award

U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). In determining the determination.

amount of that fee, the Second Circuit stated

However, even assuming the Court could

that “courts should not hesitate to take the

consider the parties’ relative wealth or

relative wealth of the parties into account,”

Detective Lemma’s financial circumstances,

given that “fee awards are at bottom an

the Court, in its discretion, concludes that a

equitable matter.” Id. Since Faraci, courts

reduction is not warranted. Detective

in this Circuit have considered the parties’

Lemma’s own submissions demonstrate that

relative wealth almost exclusively when

he has more than sufficient assets to pay any

awarding fees against plaintiffs who bring

mandated attorneys’ fees, particularly in light

frivolous or sanctionable claims. E.g.,

of the previously explained reductions and

Shangold v. Walt Disney Co., 275 F. App’x

his ongoing retirement income. (See ECF

72, 73 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming district court

Nos. 392, 401.)7 In fact, Detective Lemma’s

consideration of financial status of plaintiffs

most recent submission reported that he sold

who submitted fraudulent evidence);

a home that he owned, and, as a result, his

Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No.

liabilities are significantly diminished. In

00CIV.5780(LAK)(JCF), 2003 WL

short, considering all of the equitable factors

22299203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2003),

in this particular case, including Detective

adopted by No. 00 CIV. 5780 (LAK), 2003

Lemma’s financial circumstances, the Court

WL 22493855 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2003)

does not believe a reduction is warranted

(reducing award against plaintiffs whose

based on those circumstances or for any other

claims were frivolous in light of their limited

equitable reason.

financial resources and defendant’s

“enormous” resources). Indeed, defendants Accordingly, the Court calculates the

have not cited a single case where a court total lodestar figure to be $298,122.55, based

reduced a successful civil rights plaintiff’s on the following:

fee award based on a defendant’s relative

wealth, and this Court’s research has not Attorney Rate Hours Total

Majid $250 90.40 $22,600

uncovered one. Relatedly, courts have

considered “the wealth of the losing party, in Brewington $450 316.92 $142,614

cases of real or extreme hardship.” Mariani Fogelgaren $350 14.14 $4,949

v. Banat Realty, No. 86 CV 2895, 1993 WL Calliste $315 93.55 $29,468.25

86530, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1993); see Makhijani $250 0.21 $52.50

also Cohen v. W. Haven Bd. of Police Germano $250 4.63 $1,157.50

Comm’rs, 638 F.2d 496, 506 (2d Cir. 1980) Cartright $315 204.02 $64,266.30

(“Ordinarily the court would not focus David $225 0.70 $157.50

exclusively on the financial condition of one

Harris $250 96.60 $24,150

party unless that party appeared to be in

extremis.”). Because this case does not Morris $225 1.40 $315

involve either scenario, it is not clear that Lockett $150 55.44 $8,316

Detective Lemma’s financial condition is Sheridan $50 1.53 $76.50

7 The Court notes that it considers Detective Lemma’s

Deferred Compensation Plan as part of his net assets

even with the potential tax penalty if the funds are

accessed before Detective Lemma turns 59 years and

six months old.

Finally, the Court sees no reason to depart 5431034, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012)

from the lodestar figure in this case. See, e.g., (quoting Local Civ. R. 54.1{a)), adopted by

Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 (noting that lodestar 2012 WL 5429521 (S.D.N_Y. Nov. 7, 2012).

figure includes “most, if not ail,” relevant . .

factors in setting reasonable attorney’s fee). . Both Mr, Majid and the Brewington Law

Firm attempted to rectify documentary

C. Costs deficiencies relating to their requests for

i ies. Brewington Ri

As noted, Mr. Majid requests $2,351.97 Deel Ba A Mai 1 Reply Deal tx. BY

in costs and the Brewington Law Firm However, the exhibits attached to those reply

requests $19,357.60 in costs. Defendants declarations do not support the full amount of

object on the ground that many asserted costs costs sought by either Mr. Majid or the

have not been appropriately documented and Brewington Law Firm. After reviewing

are EXCESSIVE. those exhibits, the Court finds that Mr. Majid

“([A] court will generally award ‘those has provided support for an award of

reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred $1,200.14, that the Brewington Law Firm has

by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their provided support for an award of $8,177.30,

clients.’” Pennacchio v. Powers, No. 05-CV- and that none of those costs are excessive.

985 (RRM)(RML), 2011 WL 2945825, at *2 Accordingly, the Court awards $1,200.14 and

(E.D.N.Y, July 21, 2011) (quoting LeBlanc— $8,177.30 in costs to Mr. Majid and the

Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Brewington Law Firm, respectively. The

Cir. 1998)). “Such reimbursable costs Court denies plaintiff's other requests for

‘include filing fees, process servers, postage, costs without prejudice, and will afford

travel, and photocopying,’ as well as legal plaintiff's counsel the opportunity to submit

research costs.” Tis. of the Pavers & Rd. further supporting documentation for their

Builders Dist. Council Welfare v. M.C. cost requests.

Landscape Grp., Inc., No, 12 CIV 00834

(CBA) (VMS), 2016 WL 6998640, at *8 HL. CONCLUSION

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016), adopted by 2016 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court

WL 7017336 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016) awards Arshad Majid $22,600 in fees and

(quoting Capone v. Patchogue-Medford $1,200.14 in costs and awards the

Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 04 Civ. 2947 (JS) Brewington Law Firm $275,522.55 in fees

(MLO), 2011 WL 743573, at *5 (E.D.NLY. and $8,177.30 in costs. Detective Lemma’s

Feb, 23, 2011)). The moving party “bears the crossclaim for indemnification is dismissed.

burden of adequately documenting and

itemizing the costs requested.” Jd; accord SO ORDERED.

First Keystone Consultants, Inc. _ v. alee

Schlesinger Elec, Contractors, Inc., No. 10- ee

CV-696 (KAM\SMG), 2013 WL 950573, at JOSEPH F. BIANCO) \_..

*10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013). In particular, United States Circuit Judge

“the party must include as part of the request (Sitting by designation)

‘an affidavit that the costs claimed are

allowable by law, are correctly stated and Dated: December 18, 2019

were necessarily incurred,”” and “[b]ills for Central Islip, NY

the costs claimed must be attached as

exhibits.” D.J. ex rel. Roberts v. City af New

York, No. 11-CV-5458 (IGK)(DF), 2012 WL

16

* * *

Plaintiff was formerly represented by Arshad

Majid, Majid & Associates, P.C., 300 Rabro

Drive, Hauppauge, NY 11788, and is

currently represented by Frederick K.

Brewington, the Law Offices of Frederick K.

Brewington, 556 Peninsula Boulevard,

Hempstead, NY 11550. Nassau County is

represented by Matthew A. Cuomo, Cuomo

LLC, 9 East 38th Street, New York, NY

10016, and Detective Lemma is represented

by Mitchell Garber, Worth, Longworth &

London, LLP, 111 John Street, New York,

NY 10038.