The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2347
CARL H. BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:07-cv-01585-AW)
Submitted: July 30, 2009 Decided: August 3, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Francis H. Koh, KOH LAW FIRM, LLC., Bethesda, Maryland, for
Appellant. Thomas L. McCally, Kelly M. Lippincott, CARR
MALONEY, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carl H. Brown, an African-American male, appeals from
the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”) and dismissing his
employment discrimination action alleging violations of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) (“Title VII”). Brown alleged that
Marriott unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of
race when he was not hired to a position as a production support
manager.
Our review of the record and the district court's
opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit. The
familiar burden-shifting scheme set forth by the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
applies to Brown’s claims. We find the district court properly
determined that, even assuming that Brown established a prima
facie case of discrimination, he failed to establish pretext for
Marriott’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to
hire Brown for the position at issue. See Texas Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Conkwright v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1991).
Specifically, the record evidence is consistent that, after two
telephone interviews and a number of email correspondences,
Marriott chose not to select Brown because of his poor verbal
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and written communication skills. While Brown contends that
Marriott gave inconsistent reasons for not hiring him, which
support a finding of pretext, the district court correctly
determined that the evidence established conclusively that
concerns regarding Brown’s communication skills began with his
first telephone interview and continued throughout the remainder
of the interview process, that Marriott had several reasons for
not hiring him, and that they communicated the most palpable
reason to him. That Marriott chose to provide Brown with an
alternate reason for not hiring him does not establish pretext,
as found by the district court.
We find that there is no evidence that those who chose
not to select Brown were motivated by any desire other than to
select the candidate they felt was the best suited for the
position. See Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv., Co.,
80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at
258-59). Because Brown failed to establish pretext, we find
that the district court did not improvidently grant summary
judgment to Marriott.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting Marriott’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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