“If the underlying facts or 6 circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, [they] out to be 7 afforded an opportunity to test [their] claim on the merits.”
How later courts described this case
- “If the underlying facts or 6 circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, [they] out to be 7 afforded an opportunity to test [their] claim on the merits.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
2
3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 DOREEN BROWN, et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-00344-MMD-CLB
7 Plaintiffs, ORDER
v.
8
DEB HAALAND, et al.,
9
Defendants.
10
11 I. SUMMARY
12 This is an action for injunctive relief relating to the demolition of homes and eviction
13 of their residents on the Winnemucca Indian Colony. Plaintiffs, ten individuals who reside
14 on the Winnemucca Indian Colony, brought this action for injunctive relief against
15 Defendants Deb Haaland in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of
16 the Interior and the United States of America (collectively, “the government”). (ECF No.
17 6.) After attempts to resolve the dispute out of court failed, Plaintiffs moved for emergency
18 relief. (ECF No. 15.) The Court then permitted Winnemucca Indian Colony (“Intervenor”)
19 to intervene (ECF No. 22) in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for emergency relief, which
20 the Court ultimately denied. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their
21 Complaint.1 (ECF No. 29 (“Motion”).)
22 The government filed a notice of non-opposition (ECF No. 34), but Intervenor filed
23 a response opposing the Motion (ECF No. 36), to which Plaintiffs replied (ECF No. 42).
24 For the reasons explained below, the Motion is granted, and the Court accepts the First
25 Amended Complaint as the operative complaint.
26
27 1Also before the Court are Intervenor’s countermotion to dismiss (ECF No. 41), the
government’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 47), and Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a
28 surreply in response to the government’s motion (ECF No. 54). The Court defers
consideration of these motions and has scheduled a hearing to consider the issues they
2 Plaintiffs’ original complaint requested that the Court issue a mandatory injunction
3 reinstating their appeal pending before the Inter-Tribal Court of Indian Appeals, vacating
4 the Appeals Court’s order dismissing the appeal, and transferring their appeal from the
5 Winnemucca Indian Colony’s tribal court back to the Appeals Court. (ECF No. 6 at 13.)
6 Plaintiffs and the government stipulated to a 90-day stay while they attempted to resolve
7 the matter out of court. (ECF No. 13.)
8 While the stay was pending, Plaintiffs filed a motion for emergency relief. (ECF No.
9 15.) The Court ordered expedited briefing and set a hearing for the following day. (ECF
10 No. 16.) The Court construed the emergency motion as a request for a temporary
11 restraining order, which in part would require the law enforcement division of the Bureau
12 of Indian Affairs to enforce the order of a court which may lack jurisdiction. (ECF No. 25
13 at 6.) The Court found Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
14 merits of their emergency motion and denied the requested relief accordingly. (Id. at 27.)
15 On November 17, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint
16 (ECF No. 29) and an unopposed motion to lift the stay (ECF No. 28). The proposed first
17 amended complaint (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”) still alleges that the interim
18 government of the Winnemucca Indian Colony is unlawfully attempting to remove
19 Plaintiffs from their homes; however, the First Amended Complaint asserts claims against
20 Secretary Haaland for BIA’s alleged violations of the Indian Self-Determination and
21 Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq., and BIA’s own regulations. (ECF No.
22 29 at 20-24.) The First Amended Complaint requests that the Court order the Secretary
23 to reassume control over the Judicial Services and Law Enforcement Programs, which
24 were subject to the self-determination contract entered into with the interim government.
25 (ECF No. 29 at 24.) Plaintiffs further request that the Court enjoin the Secretary from
26 entering into any further self-determination contracts with the interim government, require
27 that the Secretary replace Plaintiffs’ homes and property that the interim government
28 demolished or took, and appoint a special master to oversee the Secretary’s actions. (Id.)
2 “The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
3 Civ. P. 15(a)(2).2 “[D]istrict courts should apply Rule 15(a) liberally, particularly when no
4 answer has been filed.” Wong v. Flynn-Kerper, 999 F.3d 1205, 1214 n.12 (9th Cir. 2021);
5 see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“If the underlying facts or
6 circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, [they] out to be
7 afforded an opportunity to test [their] claim on the merits.”). “In determining whether to
8 grant leave to amend, district courts consider five factors: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay,
9 (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) whether the plaintiff has previously amended the
10 complaint, and (5) futility of amendment.” Carvajal v. Clark County, 539 F.Supp.3d 1104,
11 1116-17 (D. Nev. 2021) (citing Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)).
12 Generally, leave to amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the
13 complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957
14 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).
15 IV. DISCUSSION
16 Intervenor argues that the amendment is: (1) requested in bad faith, (2) unduly
17 delayed, (3) prejudicial to Intervenor, and (4) futile. (ECF No. 36.) Because none of
18 Intervenor’s arguments are persuasive, the Court will grant the Motion. First, the Court
19 finds no shadow of bad faith on the part of Plaintiffs. Intervenor argues that Plaintiffs new
20 claims are a dilatory attempt to evade their obligation to exhaust their administrative
21 remedies (ECF No. 36 at 7), but the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that it is questionable
22 whether exhaustion in tribal court, as WIC suggests, is even possible (ECF No. 42 at 6).
23 Even assuming that Intervenor is correct that Plaintiffs’ claims are unexhausted, the Court
24
25 2Intervenor’s opposition is also a countermotion to dismiss the complaint. (ECF
Nos. 36, 41.) Plaintiffs argue that by filing the motion to dismiss, Intervenor triggered the
26 21-day period within which Plaintiffs could amend as a matter of right. (ECF No. 42 at 2.)
The Court need not resolve whether a later-filed motion to dismiss could transform a
27 motion for leave to amend with leave of court under Rule 15(a)(2) into a motion for leave
to amend under Rule 15(a)(1)(B) because the Court agrees that regardless, leave should
28 be given. Moreover, because Intervenor did not have the opportunity to respond to
Plaintiffs’ Ruel 15(a)(1)(B) arguments, the Court constrains its analysis to Rule 15(a)(2).
2 there is obviously no undue delay, as Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint the same
3 day they moved to lift the stay. (ECF Nos. 28, 29.) The entire litigation had been pending
4 for just over three months, during two of which the case was stayed. Moreover, the motion
5 for leave to amend occurred before either party was obliged to answer or otherwise
6 respond to the original complaint. For the same reasons, there is no risk of prejudice to
7 Intervenor. Because this is Plaintiffs’ first request for amendment, the only remaining
8 question is whether amendment would be futile.
9 Intervenor contends that amendment is futile because Plaintiffs are not members
10 of the Winnemucca Indian Colony and therefore lack standing and, alternatively, that
11 Plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before asserting their
12 claims in federal court. (ECF No. 36 at 8-10.) The Court addresses each futility argument
13 in turn.
14 A. Standing
15 The crux of Intervenor’s standing argument is that because Plaintiffs lack any right
16 to the land on which they had been living, there is no possibility that this Court could
17 redress their injuries through this suit. (ECF No. 36 at 10.) Plaintiffs first dispute that they
18 are not rightful members of the Winnemucca Indian Colony. (ECF No. 42 at 10.) Although
19 Plaintiffs do not appear to contest that they have not been enrolled as members by the
20 Rojo Council or a prior government, they do argue that the Rojo Council has prevented
21 them from enrolling despite their meeting the constitutional requirements for membership.
22 (Id.) Plaintiffs further argue that even if they are ineligible to be members of the
23 Winnemucca Indian Colony, they are “persons” who are affected by the Rojo Council’s
24 governance and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) therefore had a duty to prevent harm
25 to them when approving the self-determination contract—regardless of their membership
26 status. (ECF No. 42 at 11, 13.) The Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs need not be
27 members of the Winnemucca Indian Colony to have standing to pursue the claims
28 outlined in the proposed First Amended Complaint.
2 contains three elements’: (1) a concrete and particularized injury that is ‘actual or
3 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’; (2) a causal connection between the injury and
4 the defendant's challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will
5 redress that injury.” Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Nev. Dep’t of Wildlife, 724
6 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
7 61 (1992)). WIC contends that Plaintiffs “have no legally protected interest in
8 Winnemucca Indian Colony land,” so they “cannot claim any harm” and there is “no causal
9 connection between their alleged injuries and the conduct of BIA, or of Winnemucca
10 Indian Colony.” (ECF No. 36 at 10.) The Court focuses on whether Plaintiffs’ alleged harm
11 is redressable, because WIC’s argument that there is no causal connection between the
12 destruction of Plaintiffs homes or threats of their evictions and the actions of Intervenor
13 or the government is implausible on its face.
14 The Court disagrees with Intervenor’s standing analysis for two reasons. First, it is
15 not clear that Plaintiffs’ only interest in the outcome of this litigation is tied to their legal
16 interest in their land. Plaintiffs allege in the First Amended Complaint that the BIA violated
17 its duties under 25 U.S.C. § 5330 and 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.247-252. (ECF No. 29 at 20-24.)
18 It is not apparent from the face of the statute or BIA’s regulations that only members of
19 the tribal organization that contracted with BIA have standing to pursue reassumption of
20 a self-determination contract. Second, even if Plaintiffs were required to be members of
21 the Winnemucca Indian Colony to pursue the claims in the First Amended Complaint,
22 Intervenor has not shown that Plaintiffs are not members. Both parties’ arguments on this
23 point are conclusory and unsupported by any evidence. Because, at this time, there is an
24 open question as to whether the Court could supply a remedy for Plaintiffs’ alleged harm,
25 the Court rejects Intervenor’s standing argument.
26 B. Failure to Exhaust
27 Intervenor next argues that Plaintiffs are required to first exhaust their
28 administrative and/or tribal court remedies. (ECF No. 36 at 7-8.) In its opposition,
2 fall under the sole jurisdiction of the Winnemucca tribal court, or that challenges to BIA
3 action must first proceed before the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (“IBIA”). (Id. at 7.)
4 However, Intervenor’s arguments are cursory and do not explain their legal basis. For
5 example, Intervenor does not explain why Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to file an appeal before
6 IBIA renders their attempt to amend the original complaint “futile” rather than potentially
7 unsuccessful. It is not apparent from Intervenor’s opposition to the Motion whether
8 exhaustion before the IBIA is a mandatory prerequisite to bringing a claim under § 5330
9 in federal court; regardless, such issues are more properly the subject of a motion to
10 dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for summary judgment. Conveniently, both
11 Intervenor and the government have already filed motions to dismiss targeted at the
12 claims in the proposed First Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 41, 47.) The Court therefore
13 finds that the interests of judicial efficiency and the benefit of more complete briefing
14 warrants granting Plaintiffs leave to amend so that the parties may more clearly argue
15 whether Plaintiffs’ claims are unexhausted and, if so, if that defect warrants dismissal.
16 In sum, the Court finds that justice requires Plaintiffs be given leave to amend. The
17 Court will therefore grant the Motion.3
18 ///
19 ///
20 ///
21 ///
22 ///
23 ///
24 ///
25 ///
26
27 3The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several
cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and
28 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the
motions before the Court.
|) V. CONCLUSION
2 It is therefore ordered that Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 29) is
3 || granted. The First Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in this case.
4 It is further ordered that ruling on Intervenor’s countermotion to dismiss (ECF No.
5 || 41), the government’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 47), and Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to
6 || file a surreply (ECF No. 54) are deferred.
7 DATED THIS 26! Day of April 2022.
8 —.
5 J Lin
IRANDA M. DU
10 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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