Fields v. Prater

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TAMMY R. FIELDS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TOLBERT PRATER; LAURA ELKINS;

EMOGENE ELSWICK; RUBY RATLIFF

HALE; HAROLD THORNSBURY; JUDY

HOLLAND,

Defendants-Appellants,  No. 08-1437

and

W. PAT JUSTUS; CARROLL

BRANHAM; EDDIE LINDSAY; DAVID

RATLIFF; WILLIAM P. HARRIS;

BUCHANAN COUNTY,

Defendants.



2 FIELDS v. PRATER

TAMMY R. FIELDS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

W. PAT JUSTUS; CARROLL

BRANHAM; EDDIE LINDSAY; WILLIAM

P. HARRIS; DAVID RATLIFF,

Defendants-Appellants,

 No 08-1471

and

BUCHANAN COUNTY; TOLBERT

PRATER; LAURA ELKINS; EMOGENE

ELSWICK; RUBY RATLIFF HALE;

HAROLD THORNSBURY; JUDY

HOLLAND,

Defendants.



Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.

Norman K. Moon, District Judge.

(1:07-cv-00019-nkm-mfu)

Argued: March 25, 2009

Decided: May 21, 2009

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, WILKINSON,

Circuit Judge, and David A. FABER, Senior United States

District Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia,

sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkin-

son wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Williams and

Senior Judge Faber joined.

FIELDS v. PRATER 3

COUNSEL

Henry Keuling-Stout, KEULING-STOUT, PC, Big Stone

Gap, Virginia; Jim H. Guynn, Jr., GUYNN, MEMMER &

DILLON, PC, Salem, Virginia, for Appellants. Timothy

Worth McAfee, MCAFEE LAW FIRM, PC, Norton, Virginia,

for Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises out of plaintiff Tammy Fields’s suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleges that defendants con-

spired to prevent her from being hired as the local director of

a county department of social services ("DSS") because of her

political affiliation and in violation of her First Amendment

rights. Defendants have appealed the district court’s denial of

their motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity. We conclude that the First Amendment prohibits

consideration of political affiliation in hiring decisions for

positions like the one at issue here. To hold otherwise would

impose prohibitive costs on the exercise of associative rights

and political speech. However, because this conclusion was

not clearly established at the time of the decision under exist-

ing law, we think the defendants entitled to the qualified

immunity they seek.

I.

A.

This case concerns the selection of a local director for the

Buchanan County Department of Social Services ("BCDSS").

It is thus necessary to explain briefly at the outset the Com-

monwealth of Virginia’s system for administering social ser-

4 FIELDS v. PRATER

vices. Virginia’s social services apparatus serves a number of

functions related to public assistance and child welfare, such

as the provision of financial assistance and medical care to the

indigent, domestic violence prevention, and the enforcement

of court-ordered child support payments. This system has

both state and local components. At the state level, the Gover-

nor appoints the Commissioner of Social Services as well as

the nine members of the State Board of Social Services. Va.

Code §§ 63.2-201, 63.2-215. As the head of the Virginia

Department of Social Services ("VDSS"), the Commissioner

supervises the administration of social services throughout the

state. Id. § 63.2-203. The State Board advises the Commis-

sioner, but also has the power to pass regulations which are

binding throughout the state and which the Commissioner

must enforce. Id. §§ 63.2-203, 63.2-216, 63.2-217.

Subject to the supervision of the Commissioner and in

accordance with the regulations passed by the State Board,

local boards of social services and their corresponding local

departments of social services administer social services at the

local level. Id. §§ 63.2-313, 63.2-324, 63.2-332. Local depart-

ments can serve a single county, a single city, or some combi-

nation of counties and cities. Id. § 63.2-324. Here, we are only

concerned with the laws governing local departments serving

single counties. A local director of social services supervises

the local department; the director is chosen by, and serves at

the pleasure of, the county’s local board. Id. §§ 63.2-324-

63.2-326. Local directors are also considered the agents of the

Commissioner. Id. § 63.2-333. Local directors who do not

meet personnel standards established by the State Board can

be removed by the Commissioner. Id. § 63.2-327.

Although the local boards delegate responsibility to their

local departments, the boards are the entities ultimately

responsible for administering the laws related to social ser-

vices in their respective jurisdictions. In addition to selecting

a director, the duties of a local board include making local

policy decisions and exercising discretion over funding deci-

FIELDS v. PRATER 5

sions. Under state law and regulations adopted by the State

Board, all DSS employees are to be hired on the basis of

merit, not political affiliation. See id. §§ 63.2-100, 63.2-326;

Va. Admin. Code §§ 40-675-30, 40-675-130, 40-675-180.

The governing body of a county determines the composi-

tion of the county’s local board. Va. Code § 63.2-302. The

county may either designate one local government official as

the board, or appoint an administrative board consisting of

three or more residents of the county. Id. If the county’s gov-

erning body selects the first option, it must also appoint an

advisory board, consisting of between five and thirteen mem-

bers, to aid the government official who has been designated

the local board. Id. § 63.2-305.

B.

We turn now to the facts at hand. Plaintiff Tammy Fields

and her husband have been active supporters of the Republi-

can Party in Buchanan County for many years. Fields started

working for the BCDSS in 1995 as a social worker. In 1997,

she was promoted to office manager, a position she still holds.

As office manager, she deals with issues related to payroll,

insurance, and taxes.

In 2006, the BCDSS local director position became open

when the previous director retired. The Buchanan County

Board of Supervisors ("BOS"), the county’s governing body,

created an interviewing board to evaluate prospective candi-

dates for local director. Fields and six other candidates

applied. The interviewing board ranked the seven candidates;

Fields received the highest score, while a candidate named

Judy Holland received the lowest score. Tony Fritz, the

Regional Director for the VDSS, assisted in the interviewing

process.

At this time, a local government official was serving as the

local administrative board and several other individuals

6 FIELDS v. PRATER

served on an advisory board, as required by state law. For rea-

sons that on the record are unclear, on January 8, 2007, the

BOS passed a resolution dissolving the existing administra-

tive and advisory boards and creating a new, seven-member

administrative board ("the Local Board"). The resolution was

passed unanimously by the BOS, and each of the seven mem-

bers of the BOS chose someone from their respective supervi-

sory districts to serve on the Local Board. Shortly thereafter,

the newly-created Local Board interviewed three candidates,

including Fields and Holland. The Local Board subsequently

hired Holland.

Fields alleges that the Local Board’s hiring decision was

based on the applicants’ party affiliations. According to

Fields, Holland was the only applicant politically affiliated

with the Democratic Party. She alleges that five members of

the Local Board affiliated with the Democratic Party (Laura

Elkins, Emogene Elswick, Ruby Ratliff Hale, Tolbert Prater,

and Harold Thornsbury) conspired with five members of the

BOS who are currently or formerly affiliated with the Demo-

cratic Party (Carroll Branham, William P. Harris, W. Pat Jus-

tus, Eddie Lindsay, and David Ratliff) to prevent Fields from

being hired, and that their reason for doing so was Fields’s

support of the Republican Party. Fields further claims that the

BOS members chose to create the new administrative board

so that they could appoint Democratic Party loyalists to the

new board who would thus appoint Holland instead of Fields,

and that the new Local Board members cooperated by select-

ing Holland.

C.

Alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights, Fields

brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking relief in

law and equity in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Virginia on April 5, 2007. She named as

defendants BOS members Branham, Harris, Justus, Lindsay,

and Ratliff; Local Board members Elkins, Elswick, Hale,

FIELDS v. PRATER 7

Prater, and Thornsbury; Buchanan County; and Holland, the

newly-selected local director. All defendants moved to dis-

miss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The

individual defendants contended that they were entitled to

qualified immunity, and Buchanan County argued that coun-

ties cannot be held liable under § 1983 for personnel decisions

made by their local boards.

The district court ordered limited discovery on the issue of

qualified immunity. The district court also referred the issue

to a magistrate judge, who concluded, based on the pleadings

and the record, that defendants were not entitled to qualified

immunity.1 The magistrate also concluded that under Bockes

v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993), Buchanan County

could not be held liable under § 1983.

The individual defendants objected to the magistrate’s con-

clusion that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The

district court, reconsidering the qualified immunity issue de

novo, agreed with the magistrate’s recommended disposition.

The district court reasoned that consideration of political affil-

iation by defendants was clearly forbidden by Supreme Court

and circuit precedent both because a local director plays little

role in developing policy and because there was no evidence

that political affiliation was relevant to effective performance

of a local director’s duties. The individual defendants brought

this interlocutory appeal, arguing that the district court erred

in concluding that they were not entitled to qualified immu-

nity. As the issue before us is purely one of law, we possess

jurisdiction. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995);

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985).

1

The magistrate judge correctly concluded that defendants’ motions to

dismiss had to be treated as motions for summary judgment because in

their memoranda defendants had presented to the court matters beyond the

pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). We thus refer to defendants’ motions

to dismiss as motions for summary judgment.

8 FIELDS v. PRATER

II.

Fields alleges that her First Amendment rights were vio-

lated when defendants conspired to prevent her from being

hired because of her political affiliation. Defendants respond

that the local director position is one for which consideration

of political affiliation is permissible. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.

347 (1976), was the first case directly addressing whether the

First Amendment prohibits consideration of political affilia-

tion in government hiring generally. A plurality of the Court

concluded that the practice of patronage imposed an unconsti-

tutional restraint on "freedoms of belief and association. . . .

An individual who is a member of the out-party maintains

affiliation with his own party at the risk of losing his job." Id.

at 355 (plurality opinion). To condition employment on the

espousal of party loyalty was tantamount to a system of "co-

erced belief." Id. Although there was no majority opinion,

Elrod has come to stand for the proposition that under the

First Amendment, "a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential gov-

ernment employee" cannot be "discharged or threatened with

discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing on the

sole ground of his political beliefs." Id. at 375 (Stewart, J.,

concurring in the judgment).

In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Court refined

this approach, making clear that "the ultimate inquiry is not

whether the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a partic-

ular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring author-

ity can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate

requirement for the effective performance of the public office

involved." Id. at 518. The Court in Rutan v. Republican Party

of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), extended the holdings of Elrod

and Branti to "promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions

based on party affiliation and support," id. at 79, and thus to

the hiring decision at issue here. Therefore, we must deter-

mine whether the local director position was one for which

defendants "can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appro-

priate requirement." Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.

FIELDS v. PRATER 9

A.

Asking whether a position involves policymaking can be

helpful in resolving the aforementioned inquiry, and our cases

reflect that. In Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1990),

we adopted the First Circuit’s two-part test for conducting this

analysis. First, the court should ask whether "the position

involve[s] government decisionmaking on issues where there

is room for political disagreement on goals or their implemen-

tation . . . . If this first inquiry is satisfied, the next step is to

examine the particular responsibilities of the position to deter-

mine whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to confiden-

tial information, a communicator, or some other office holder

whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally

appropriate requirement." Id. at 141-42 (quoting Jimenez

Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir.

1986) (en banc)).

Under the first prong of the Stott analysis, we examine the

matters dealt with by the local director position at a very high

level of generality. Is there legitimate political disagreement

over the goals or the implementation of social services pro-

grams? We have previously answered this question in the

affirmative. Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 960 (4th Cir. 2008)

("With regard to the first part of the analysis, which is

whether the position relates to partisan political interests or

concerns, positions within social-services agencies clearly

may satisfy this requirement."). This conclusion is plainly

correct; few would dispute that decisions about how social

services are to be provided, and to whom, are a topic of fre-

quent political controversy.

The second step requires a much more concrete analysis of

the specific position at issue. "[I]n conducting this inquiry,

courts focus on the powers inherent in a given office." Stott,

916 F.2d at 142 (quoting Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242).

After examining the duties and responsibilities of a local

director under Virginia law, we conclude that the position is

10 FIELDS v. PRATER

not one for which political affiliation is an appropriate consid-

eration.

Defendants argue that a local director is a "policymaker."

However, local directors do not have significant policymaking

authority under Virginia’s social services scheme. Because

the Commonwealth’s social services programs depend in part

on grants and aid from the federal government, federal stat-

utes and regulations play a significant role in shaping state

policy. See Va. Code §§ 63.2-206, 63.2-406. Of that policy-

making which is not federal, most takes place at the state level

under Virginia’s system. As we earlier observed, "neither

[counties] nor the local boards have authority to set ‘general

goals and programs’ for social services personnel; that author-

ity is reserved for the State Board." Bockes, 999 F.2d at 791.

The State Board has the authority to pass regulations which

local directors must follow. Va. Code § 63.2-217. The Com-

missioner has the authority to remove local directors "who do

not meet the personnel standards established by the [State]

Board." Id. § 63.2-327. Local directors serve as the Commis-

sioner’s agents. Id. § 63.2-333. The VDSS establishes a state-

wide plan that local directors are required to follow. See

Commonwealth of Virginia, Dep’t of Soc. Services, Local

Board Member Handbook 72 (June 2007).

To the extent that there is policymaking authority at the

local level, it belongs not with local directors, but with local

boards. Local boards may set policies which "together [with

state policies], should cover all activities" of a local depart-

ment. Local Board Member Handbook at 22. Local directors

serve at the pleasure of local boards. Va. Code § 63.2-326.

Local directors exercise the power granted to them by state

law "[u]nder the supervision of the local board." Id. § 63.2-

332. Local boards, not local directors, control the budget of

their respective departments of social services, see id. § 63.2-

316, are responsible for hiring counsel to represent employees

of their local departments, id. § 63.2-317, and have the power

to conduct hearings and issue subpoenas. Id. § 63.2-322.

FIELDS v. PRATER 11

As the district court correctly observed, local directors have

"in effect three masters"—the Commissioner, the State Board,

and their local board. J.A. 494. In this system there is little

room for local directors to make important policy decisions.

To be sure, local directors do have the power to set some poli-

cies within local departments, as does any director of a gov-

ernmental institution. Defendants point to the local director’s

personnel responsibilities, namely the "duty to organize

agency staff[,] to supervise and train staff, [and] to make final

hiring promotion, transfer, and discipline decisions." Brief of

Appellants at 36. But that a local director has supervisory

power over her staff does not mean she sets social services

policy. If having power over subordinates were a sufficient

condition for exemption from the requirements of the First

Amendment, only the most low-level government employees

would be protected from politically-based hiring and firing.

"[T]he Branti inquiry is one of degree, and . . . low-level poli-

cymaking authority . . . does not outweigh [an] employee’s

First Amendment rights of political affiliation." Akers v.

Caperton, 998 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1993).

It is not enough for defendants to show merely that local

directors make some policy; the ultimate question under

Branti is whether local directors make policy about matters to

which political ideology is relevant, and we conclude that

they do not. Defendants make conclusory assertions about the

local director’s policymaking power, but they cannot show "a

rational connection between shared ideology and job perfor-

mance." Stott, 916 F.2d at 142 (quoting Savage v. Gorski, 850

F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1988)). Unlike the sheriff’s deputies in

Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc),

a local director is not the "alter ego" of an elected official, id.

at 1164, and does not "play a special role in implementing"

an elected official’s policies. Id. at 1162.

Defendants insist, however, that because a local director’s

duties involve confidential information, political affiliation is

a relevant consideration under Stott. But this argument proves

12 FIELDS v. PRATER

too much; by virtue of the sensitivity of such matters as public

assistance and child welfare, many social services workers

deal with confidential information. Yet it cannot be the case

that party affiliation is an appropriate criterion for the effec-

tive performance of their jobs. As with their arguments about

policymaking, defendants attempt to fit the local director

position into the labeled category "confidential" without

explaining how it proves that political affiliation is actually

relevant to a local director’s duties.

Indeed, there is every indication that political philosophy is

irrelevant to those duties. VDSS Regional Director Tony Fritz

stated in his affidavit that he was "aware of no relationship

between political party affiliation and the effective perfor-

mance of a local Director of DSS. The duties and responsibili-

ties of a local Director do not contain any reference to

political party ideologies." See McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d

1319, 1324 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that state Secretary of

Elections asserted that political affiliation was not relevant to

the job performance of a general county registrar).

We also find it significant that Virginia has explicitly des-

ignated the local director position as non-partisan. Regula-

tions passed by the State Board make clear that political

affiliation is not an appropriate consideration when hiring

DSS employees, and the handbook provided to all local board

members across the state underscores this point. See Local

Board Member Handbook at 63-67. At the top of the job

application form that Fields filled out is the statement that

political affiliation shall not be taken into consideration in hir-

ing. See Commonwealth of Virginia, Application for Employ-

ment, DHRM Form 10-012. The fact that the State Board—

one of the major policymakers in Virginia’s social services

system—has forbidden local boards from taking political

affiliation into consideration provides further support for our

conclusion that political affiliation is not relevant to the duties

of a local director.

FIELDS v. PRATER 13

Of course, "whether a patronage-based dismissal violates

the First Amendment is ultimately a question of federal law."

McCrerey v. Allen, 118 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 1997). But

whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a par-

ticular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is

"necessary for effective job performance." McConnell, 829

F.2d at 1323. Although we do not consider state law’s classi-

fication of a particular position as dispositive of the constitu-

tional issue, we certainly take it into consideration in our

analysis. See, e.g., Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1163-64; Stott, 916

F.2d at 142-43; McConnell, 829 F.2d at 1324. "[L]egislative

findings are given deference," Akers, 998 F.2d at 225 n.7,

even if that deference is not absolute; we see no reason why

a state administrative agency’s reasoned judgment should not

be given some respect as well. Here, the state’s judgment con-

firms our independent assessment and reinforces the conclu-

sion that the First Amendment prohibits the consideration of

political affiliation in hiring for the local director position. In

this instance, state law and constitutional law may be seen as

pulling in the same direction, with state law protecting the

goal of professional merit in employment and constitutional

law guarding simultaneously against retribution on the basis

of political belief.

This view is consistent with our holding in Nader v. Blair,

549 F.3d 953 (4th Cir. 2008), where we concluded that an

Assistant Director of the Baltimore City Department of Social

Services was a policymaker under Stott. Although the two

positions bear some similarities, Maryland law gives the

employees of local social services departments significantly

more power to shape local policy than does Virginia law. See

Nader, 549 F.3d at 960-62. In Virginia, most policy is made

at the state level; that which is made at the local level is made

by local boards, not local departments. Furthermore, while

Virginia regulations prohibit considering political affiliation

when hiring and firing local DSS employees, Maryland law

explicitly stated that the Nader plaintiff’s position was one

from which she could be dismissed "for any reason, solely in

14 FIELDS v. PRATER

the discretion of the appointing authority." Id. at 956. Virginia

has chosen to make its social services policymaking more

centralized and more separated from local departments than

has Maryland. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal

system" that two states are free to make different choices

about how to structure their governments. New State Ice Co.

v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-

ing).

B.

We therefore agree with plaintiff that in the event the facts

are as alleged, defendants violated her constitutional rights.

But to defeat defendants’ claim of qualified immunity plain-

tiff must further show that defendants violated clearly estab-

lished "constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). "Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas;

they are liable for transgressing bright lines." Maciariello v.

Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). It is true that

defendants knew or should have known that consideration of

political affiliation when hiring a local director was forbidden

by the State Board’s regulations. However, "an official’s clear

violation of a state administrative regulation does not allow a

§ 1983 plaintiff to overcome the official’s qualified immu-

nity." Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994). The law

requires something more, namely that it be clear to a reason-

able official at the time of the decision that selecting a local

director on the basis of political affiliation contravened the

First Amendment.

We conclude that at the time of the hiring decision the law

had not achieved that level of constitutional clarity that would

allow us to hold defendants liable. In Jenkins, we acknowl-

edged that the caselaw applying Branti had been "conflicting

and confusing." 119 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Upton v. Thomp-

son, 930 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1991)). See also Pike v.

Osborne, 301 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamilton, J.,

FIELDS v. PRATER 15

concurring in the judgment) (observing that "Jenkins is con-

fusing, at best" when applied to a slightly different context

than that at issue in the case). The lack of clarity is under-

standable, given that political patronage at the policymaking

level contributes not only to the growth of strong political par-

ties, but to the responsiveness of bureaucracies to electoral

mandates whose results policymakers and top government

officials properly seek to translate into programs for the pub-

lic benefit. Thus issues like this one are often matters of

degree, and matters of degree are not always plain a priori.

Because application of the principles of Branti and Jenkins to

new situations invariably requires particularized inquiries into

specific positions in the context of specific systems, it is not

always easy to say that there is a clearly drawn line between

those positions for which consideration of political affiliation

is allowed and those for which it is not.

We find McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir.

1987), which held that Virginia electoral boards could not

permissibly consider political affiliation in employment deci-

sions regarding county registrars, the closest analogue in our

precedent to the case at hand. This conclusion supports our

determination that there was a constitutional violation here.

The system Virginia uses for selection of registrars bears sig-

nificant similarities to that used to select local directors, and

in both contexts the state has strong reasons to prefer profes-

sionalism over partisanship. There, as here, we concluded that

the defendant board could not consider political affiliation

because there was no evidence that political affiliation was

relevant to the effective performance of the position, and sig-

nificant evidence to the contrary. Id. at 1324. There, as here,

the state agency whose policies the official in the position at

issue would be responsible for carrying out indicated that

political affiliation was not an appropriate requirement. Id.

However, because a registrar is even less involved in policy-

making than is a local director, we do not think that McCon-

nell would have clearly put defendants on notice that their

conduct was unconstitutional.

16 FIELDS v. PRATER

Our respect for the decisions and deliberations of our col-

leagues also counsels a certain caution in imposing liability

here. As we have earlier indicated, the facts of Nader are dis-

tinguishable from the case at bar, given the significant differ-

ences between Virginia’s and Maryland’s social services

systems. In designing its social services apparatus, Virginia,

in felicitous harmony with the Branti decision, sought to fur-

ther three goals: (1) protection of a measure of freedom of

conscience and belief within the daily administration of the

social services system; (2) recognition of professional merit in

a field in which education and experience weigh importantly;

and (3) prevention of the politicization of individual determi-

nations on matters such as child support collection and wel-

fare eligibility. Other states might legitimately attempt to

protect these values in other ways, but Virginia has sought to

do so by lodging policymaking authority at numerous levels

above the local director. Undisputed evidence in the record,

including an affidavit from a state official familiar with the

system and the job application itself, show that political affili-

ation was not "an appropriate requirement for the effective

performance of the public office involved." Jenkins, 119 F.3d

at 1161 (quoting Branti, 445 U.S. at 518).

But to say that the rule in the Commonwealth is now clear

going forward is a different matter from the retrospective

imposition of monetary consequence. Both Nader and this

case concerned management positions in local services agen-

cies. In both cases, resolving the constitutional issue required

a fact-intensive inquiry into the particular responsibilities of

the positions and their role in their respective state systems.

There was thus no "bright line[ ]" rule in this context. Maciar-

iello, 973 F.2d at 298. The values that Branti and Virginia’s

system seek to protect are significant, but qualified immunity

also protects important values. Without it, local officials like

defendants would be retroactively subject to significant penal-

ties at law for which they did not have proper notice. We find

no fault with the able district judge, who concluded that the

constitutional rights at issue were clearly established; this was

FIELDS v. PRATER 17

a close question. But because we cannot unequivocally say

that defendants knew or should have known they were violat-

ing Fields’s constitutional rights when they refused to hire

her, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

III.

Fields’s complaint underscores two important values. The

first is the right of a citizen to express her basic beliefs with-

out punitive consequences in the workplace. The second is the

interest of government in not having its administrative opera-

tions overly politicized through patronage below the policy-

making level. Defendants claim that when it comes to

welfare, "[t]here is a Republican perspective, [a] Democrat[ic]

perspective, an Independent perspective, and numerous other

political perspectives." Brief of Appellants at 8. But the Con-

stitution imposes limits on holding the livelihood of citizens

hostage to party loyalty and state law imposes limits on sup-

planting professional attainment and non-partisan administra-

tion in the field of social services with partisan requirements.

Both of these interests support the same conclusion here,

namely that basing this hiring decision on political affiliation

violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. "[E]ven though a

person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and

even though the government may deny him the benefit for any

number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the

government may not rely." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.

593, 597 (1972). Fields had no right to serve as BCDSS direc-

tor, but defendants had no right to rely on her political affilia-

tion as a reason for not hiring her. Because, however, it was

not clearly established under existing law at the time of the

hiring decision that the action taken was unconstitutional,

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The judgment

is accordingly reversed and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED