The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4419
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LOUIS VINCENT BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (2:07-cr-00422-PMD-l)
Submitted: April 8, 2009 Decided: April 27, 2009
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished by per curiam opinion.
Joshua S. Kendrick, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Alston Calhoun Badger, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Louis Vincent Brown pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006) (Count One), use of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (Count Two), * and being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2006) (Count Three), and was sentenced to a total of
262 months in prison. Brown timely appealed.
Counsel for Brown filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether
the district court properly accepted Brown’s guilty pleas and
sentenced Brown as a career offender. Brown filed a pro se
brief arguing (l) the Government breached the plea agreement
when it argued for a career offender sentence enhancement, (2)
Brown was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and (3)
the district court erred in sentencing Brown as a career
offender. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
*
Brown entered a guilty plea to Count Two pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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I.
Counsel first questions whether the district court
properly accepted Brown’s guilty pleas. Our careful review of
the record convinces us the district court complied with the
mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Further, the court ensured
that Brown entered his pleas knowingly and voluntarily,
including his Alford plea to Count Two, and that the pleas were
supported by an independent factual basis. United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
II.
Counsel next questions whether the district court
properly designated Brown as a career offender, noting that
Brown’s predicate offenses were imposed under South Carolina’s
Youthful Offender Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 29-19-10 to -160 (2005
Cum. Supp.). However, counsel concedes the district court
properly determined that Brown’s state convictions were adult
convictions, for which Brown received and served an adult
sentence. We agree that the convictions under the state
Youthful Offender Act were properly considered in designating
Brown a career offender. See USSG §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2 cmt. n.1; cf.
United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555 (4th Cir. 2002) (remanding
for a determination of whether Mason received adult sentence of
over one year and one month).
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In his pro se brief, Brown argues that he was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
when counsel advised him to plead guilty in the absence of a
factual basis to support the plea to Count Two. As we have
found an adequate factual basis for the Alford plea, it is
apparent on the current record that this claim lacks merit. We
have examined Brown’s other pro se claims and find them
similarly without merit.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Brown, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Brown requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Brown.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4