The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4600
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LANCE EMANUEL BROWN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Chief
District Judge. (1:00-cr-00263-JAB-1; 1:00-cr-00365-JAB-1)
Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: February 12, 2009
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
Attorney, Angela H. Miller, L. Patrick Auld, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lance Emanuel Brown appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence
of five months in prison and thirty-one months of supervised
release. On appeal, Brown’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting, in his
opinion, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising
the issue of whether the district court erred in denying Brown’s
motion to dismiss the petition regarding revocation of
supervised release, because his revocation hearing was not held
within a reasonable time under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2).
Brown was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, but he has not done so. Finding no error, we affirm.
After absconding from supervision, Brown was arrested
in Florida on January 28, 2008. On January 30, 2008, Brown
appeared before a magistrate judge in Florida who ordered him
returned to the Middle District of North Carolina. He arrived
in the district around February 14, 2008, and after appointment
of counsel, he signed a waiver of preliminary hearing and
detention hearing on February 23, 2008. On February 25, 2008,
the magistrate judge accepted Brown’s waiver and ordered that
the revocation hearing be noticed by the clerk. On April 24,
2008, the clerk notified the parties that the hearing would be
held on May 5, 2008, which was seventy days after the magistrate
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judge accepted Brown’s waiver of a probable cause hearing. On
May 1, 2008, Brown moved to dismiss the petition regarding
revocation of supervised release, contending that the district
court failed to hold the revocation hearing within a reasonable
time as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2). At the hearing
on May 5, 2008, Brown admitted the violations alleged in the
petition. The district court denied Brown’s motion to dismiss
the petition, revoked his supervised release, and sentenced him
within both his advisory guideline range and statutory limits.
On appeal, Brown’s attorney concedes he is unable to
point to facts supporting a ruling that Brown’s hearing was not
held within a reasonable time. Moreover, because Brown admitted
the violations, and the three months he spent in custody prior
to the hearing were credited against his five-month prison
sentence, he concedes he cannot contest the district court’s
finding that he suffered no prejudice. We conclude that the
district court held the revocation hearing within a reasonable
time as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2), and the court
did not err in denying Brown’s motion to dismiss the petition.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing,
of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
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for further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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