The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
BRYANT D. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff
Civil No. 23-20649 (RMB/EAP)
v.
MATTHEW LEITH, et al., OPINION
Defendants
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Docket No. 1) filed by self-represented (“pro se”) Plaintiff Bryant D.
Taylor, a prisoner incarcerated in East Jersey State Prison in Rahway, New Jersey.
Plaintiff submitted an application to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“in forma pauperis” or “IFP App.”) (Docket No. 1-1),
which establishes his financial eligibility to proceed, and his IFP application will be
granted. For the reasons discussed below, the complaint may proceed in part.
I. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL
When a person is granted IFP status, courts must review the complaint before
service on the defendant(s) and dismiss any claims that are: (1) frivolous or
malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Courts, however, must liberally construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The legal standard for dismissing a
complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the
same as that for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See,
Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Complaint
Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his complaint, which the Court must
accept as true for purposes of screening the complaint for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) On December 1, 2019, Plaintiff was confined
in Burlington County Jail, and a dentist (“John Doe Dentist”) who was contracted to
provide dental services to Burlington County Jail inmates began a root canal
procedure on Plaintiff’s two front upper teeth and one bottom molar. After drilling
holes in Plaintiff’s teeth, John Doe Dentist informed Plaintiff that he did not have
enough filling material to fill Plaintiff’s teeth, and Plaintiff would have to schedule a
follow-up appointment. On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff complained of excessive
tooth pain, and John Doe Dentist informed Plaintiff that he still did not have filling
material, and the dental equipment at the jail was broken. John Doe Dentist gave
Plaintiff antibiotics and Motrin, and he used string and gauze to create temporary
fillings.
Plaintiff alleges all administrative remedies at Burlington County Jail are filed
with Warden Matthew Leith, who is responsible for investigating and responding to
inmates’ grievances. On February 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed his first grievance about his
need for permanent fillings after his root canal. His grievance went unanswered. In
May 2020, Plaintiff raised his concerns about his exposed nerve roots and risk of
tooth infection with his criminal defense attorney. Plaintiff’s attorney requested a
copy of Plaintiff’s medical file from Burlington County Jail, for the purpose of
making a bail motion because the jail had not provided Plaintiff with necessary
dental treatment.
On June 1, 2020, John Doe Dentist refused to complete Plaintiff’s root canal.
Plaintiff learned from another inmate that John Doe Dentist believed Plaintiff had
sued him because Plaintiff’s attorney had requested Plaintiff’s medical file.
Beginning July 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed multiple grievances with Warden Leith,
complaining of his tooth pain and his fear of nerve damage and infection.
In January 2021, John Doe Dentist told Plaintiff that the jail’s insurance
policy did not cover the work Plaintiff needed to complete the root canal. Because
the dental equipment at the jail was damaged, there was nothing more he could do.
Based on this information, Plaintiff concludes that John Doe Dentist was not
qualified or even permitted to perform root canal at Burlington County Jail, but he
had done so experimentally, and the equipment failed. Plaintiff filed another
grievance on April 2, 2021, and he was told he would be scheduled for treatment.
When his condition worsened and he had not been scheduled for treatment, Plaintiff
filed another grievance on June 1, 2021. On September 1, 2021, John Doe Dentist
informed Plaintiff that he would be scheduled for an outside appointment. Plaintiff
was transferred to Yardville Correctional Facility on December 20, 2021. During his
medical intake appointment, he was informed that his two front teeth could not be
saved and must be extracted. Plaintiff’s two front teeth were extracted on August 1,
2022, after he was transferred to East Jersey State Prison.
The defendants to the complaint are Warden Matthew Leith; CEO Leo
Paschall of CFG Health Systems, LLC; Health Administrator Doris Yaa of CFG
Health Systems, LLC; John Doe Dentist at Burlington County Jail; and Jane Doe
Dental Assistant at Burlington County Jail. All defendants are sued in their
individual capacities for damages and injunctive relief.
B. First Amendment Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff asserts Warden Leith violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to
redress and “protected speech about his confinement and treatment by CFG Health
Service Administrator. Denying Plaintiff grievance retaliation.” The Court liberally
construes this claim to allege Warden Leith retaliated against Plaintiff for filing
grievances by denying his grievances. Plaintiff also brings First Amendment
retaliation claims against the CEO and Health Service Administrator of CFG, Les
Paschall and Doris Yaa, and against John Doe Dentist and Jane Doe Dental
Assistant for violating Plaintiff’s “First Amendment retaliation for freedom of speech
about plaintiff’s confinement and dental service, petition for grievance complaints.”
(Compl. ¶ 35, Dkt. No. 1.)
To state a civil rights claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation
of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The elements of a First Amendment
retaliation claim are: 1) the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct; 2) the defendant took an “adverse action” against the plaintiff; and 3) the
plaintiff’s constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in
the adverse action. Murray v. Smithbower, No. 21-2156, 2023 WL 5378839, at *2 (3d
Cir. Aug. 22, 2023) (citing Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff alleges John Doe Dentist
retaliated by refusing to provide follow-up dental treatment because he believed
Plaintiff had sued him after Plaintiff’s defense attorney requested a copy of Plaintiff’s
medical records. This claim may proceed. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to
state that the remaining defendants took an adverse action against him, motivated by
his filing of grievances or belief that he had filed suit against John Doe Dentist. In
fact, Plaintiff has not alleged any actions taken by the remaining defendants, apart
from Warden Leith’s failure to answer his grievances. Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claims against Warden Leith, Leo Paschall, Doris Yaa, and Jane Doe
Dental Assistant will be dismissed without prejudice.
C. Third Party Beneficiary Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiff alleges Warden Leith is liable to him for breach of contract because
Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary to a contract with CFG Health Service, LLC to
provide inmates with dental care. For relief on this claim, Plaintiff explains,
“breached contract negated his obligation to the jail and those confined within his
facility.” The elements of a breach of contract claim under New Jersey law are: “(1)
the existence of a valid contract between the parties; (2) failure of the defendant to
perform its obligations under the contract; and (3) a causal relationship between the
breach and the plaintiff's alleged damages.” Coy Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Loc.
Union No. 27, AFL-CIO v. E.P. Donnelly, Inc., 737 F.3d 879, 900 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing
Coyle v. Englander's, 199 N.J. Super. 212, 488 A.2d 1083, 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985)). Plaintiff has not alleged that Warden Leith himself, rather than
Burlington County or some other governmental entity, was a party to a contract with
CFG Health Service, LLC (“CFG”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a breach
of contract claim against Warden Leith. Even construing the complaint to allege
Warden Leith was party to a contract with CFG, Plaintiff’s allegations are that John
Doe Dentist failed to complete Plaintiff’s root canal, or that CFG (which is not a
named defendant) failed to provide alternative dental services. Plaintiff has not
alleged what Warden Leith did in breach of the contract. The Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against Warden Leith without prejudice for
failure to state a claim.1
D. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Dental Care Claims
Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to
provide him with adequate dental care. “[T]he Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply until ‘after sentence and conviction.’”
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386. 392 n.6 (1989)). Plaintiff has not alleged that he was a convicted and
sentenced prisoner at the time he was allegedly denied adequate dental care. For
purposes of screening the complaint for dismissal, the Court will assume Plaintiff
was a convicted and sentenced state prisoner. If the Court’s assumption is incorrect,
and the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to Plaintiff because he was a pretrial
detainee at all relevant times, he may file an amended complaint to bring his
inadequate medical claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2
1 Plaintiff must also allege additional facts to establish that he was an intended third party
beneficiary to the alleged contract. See also Est. of Yearby v. Middlesex Cnty., No. A-1974-20,
2022 WL 1714534, at *17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 27, 2022), cert. denied, 252 N.J.
263, 284 A.3d 444 (2022) (holding trial correct correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ breach of
contract claim because facts failed to show inmate at Middlesex County Adult Correctional
Center was an intended third party beneficiary of a contract between the county and CFG
Health Systems, LLC).
2 Although Plaintiff must properly plead the applicable constitutional amendment, the
analysis of the claim is the same. “In Hubbard, the Third Circuit clarified that the Eighth
Amendment standard only acts as a floor for due process inquiries into medical and non-
medical conditions of pretrial detainees.” Callway v. New Jersey State Police Troop A, (quoting
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d at 165–67.) Nonetheless, “[i]n previous cases, the United States
“[P]rison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs by ‘intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.’” Pearson v.
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “that ‘the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs’ and (2) an
objective showing that ‘those needs were serious.’” Id. (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). A tooth infection is a serious medical need. See, e.g.,
Talbert v. Corr. Dental Assocs., 731 F. App'x 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2018). “Needless
suffering resulting from the denial of simple medical care, which does not serve any
penological purpose, violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citing Atkinson v. Taylor,
316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Deliberate indifference is more than negligence. Id. at 538. To state a claim, a
plaintiff must allege the defendant was both “aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and that the defendant
“also draw the inference.” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37
(1994)). Deliberate indifference may exist
where (1) prison authorities deny reasonable requests for
medical treatment, (2) knowledge of the need for medical
care is accompanied by the intentional refusal to provide
it, (3) necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-
medical reasons, and (4) prison authorities prevent an
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not applied a different standard” to pretrial
detainees and convicted and sentenced state prisoners who alleged inadequate medical care
claims. Id. at *5 (D.N.J. June 14, 2018).
inmate from receiving recommended treatment for serious
medical needs.
Pearson, 850 F.3d at 538 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Monmouth County Correctional
Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (1987)). A non-medical prison
official is not deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs absent
actual knowledge or reason to believe “that prison doctors or their assistants are
mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir.
2004). Furthermore, supervisors are not vicariously liable for the constitutional
violations of their subordinates under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Therefore, “a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id.
The complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, states an Eighth
Amendment claim that John Doe Dentist and Warden Leith were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need by delaying completion of Plaintiff’s
root canal for more than a year for non-medical reasons including the failure to
obtain the necessary tooth filling material, failure to repair the jail’s dental
equipment, or failure to schedule Plaintiff for a dental appointment outside the jail.
Plaintiff’s alternative claim that John Doe Dentist performed Plaintiff’s root canal
negligently, and that Warden Leith is vicariously liable for John Doe Dentist’s
negligence, fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.3 Although Plaintiff’s Eighth
3 If Plaintiff wishes to bring a state law malpractice claim, he must comply with the
procedural requirements in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1 et seq.
Amendment claim for delay in providing necessary medical care may proceed
against John Doe Dentist; Plaintiff must identify the dentist in an amended
complaint before he can be served with a summons. Moreover, if Plaintiff was a
pretrial detainee rather than a convicted and sentenced prisoner during all relevant
times alleged in the complaint, he may wish to file an amended complaint prior to
service on Warden Leith and John Doe Dentist, to avoid dismissal of the Eighth
Amendment claims. Plaintiff has not alleged the personal involvement of any other
defendant in denying or delaying completion of his root canal. The Eighth
Amendment claims against the remaining defendants will be dismissed without
prejudice.
E. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims
Plaintiff asserts all defendants violated his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying him dental services received by similarly-
situated inmates. Under the class of one theory, “a plaintiff states a claim for
violation of the Equal Protection clause when he ‘alleges that he has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d
225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000)). “[A]n equal-protection challenge must allege more than ‘broad generalities’
in identifying” similarly-situated persons. Stradford v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr.,
53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1204
(11th Cir. 2007)). “Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause
when they are alike ‘in all relevant respects.’” Stradford v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of
Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10
(1992)). “[T]he failure to identify similarly situated persons dooms an equal-
protection claim.” Stradford v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d
Cir. 2022) (citing Hill, 455 F.3d at 239) (citing Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767,
776 (7th Cir. 2005)). In this case, it is not sufficient to allege other inmates received
adequate dental services. Plaintiff has not alleged that there are similarly situated
inmates who had root canals performed inside Burlington County Jail, whose root
canals had to be suspended before completion, and the defendants delayed treatment
of permanent fillings, despite pain and risk of infection, for non-medical reasons.
Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Equal Protection claims against all defendants
without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will permit Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment inadequate medical care claims, as described above, to proceed against
Warden Matthew Leith and John Doe Dentist. The remainder of the claims in the
complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.
An appropriate Order follows.
DATE: January 29, 2024 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Renée Marie Bumb
Chief United States District Judge