SHEDDEN v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JASON SHEDDEN,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 20-17063 (SDW) (AME)

v. OPINION

PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND

January 25, 2024

NEW JERSEY,

Defendant.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court is Defendant Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s (“Defendant”

or “the Port Authority”) Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 40 (“Motion”)) pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue

is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant

to Rule 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion is

GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

A. Plaintiff’s Employment at and Termination by the Port Authority

1 Citations to “D.E.” refer to the docket entries for the Complaint and the parties’ motion papers, including briefs,

affidavits, declarations, and exhibits attached thereto. Facts cited in this opinion are drawn from Defendant’s

Statement of Material Facts (D.E. 40-19), Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts (D.E. 42),

Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (D.E. 43-12), and the record documents cited therein.

The facts are undisputed unless noted otherwise.

Plaintiff began his employment at the Port Authority’s Aviation Department as a Program

Manager for Newark Airport’s Redevelopment Program on August 19, 2019, under a one-year

probation. (D.E. 40-19 ¶¶ 1–2.) Plaintiff’s job duties were to know the Design Build Agreement’s

design and performance criteria to ensure that contractors were implementing the design

documents, to manage information technology consultant Keith Downing and baggage handling

consultant Angela Fisher, and to report to his direct superior Jacklyn McCarthy and her superior,

Thomas Lemanowicz. (Id. ¶ 3.)

In September 2019, Lemanowicz became concerned that, although all the relevant Design

Build Agreement documents were available to Plaintiff, Lemanowicz never saw documents on

Plaintiff’s desk or saw him reviewing documents. (Id. ¶ 4.) At the same time, McCarthy and

Lemanowicz started receiving complaints from Plaintiff’s co-workers about Plaintiff’s negative

attitude and persistent complaining at work. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7.) Specifically, the two consultants

Plaintiff was responsible for managing—Downing and Fisher—complained to McCarthy and

Lemanowicz about Plaintiff’s lack of interest and ability to manage them and that they would go

weeks without hearing from Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11, 14–15.) Plaintiff claims that he had weekly

meetings with the consultants and that neither Lemanowicz nor McCarthy ever discussed with him

their concerns related to his quality of work. (D.E. 42 ¶¶ 10–12, 17.)

In about October or November 2019, Lemanowicz’s supervisor “told him to fire Plaintiff

after she caught Plaintiff a few times on his phone and not working.” (D.E. 40-19 ¶ 9.) At around

the same time, Lemanowicz and McCarthy began discussing whether Plaintiff was a “good fit” for

the job “because he lacked program management and leadership skills and he was not trying to

learn them.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Lemanowicz informed Aviation Business Manager Kevin O’Driscoll

about Plaintiff’s job performance issues and recommended termination of Plaintiff’s employment

first in October 2019 and then again in January or February 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20, 24.)

Plaintiff’s wife became pregnant a few months after he started at the Port Authority. (D.E.

43-11 ¶ 11.) On March 26, 2020, Plaintiff sent an email to McCarthy and Aviation Business

Manager Andrea Welch with an attachment which stated: “I plan to use intermittent Parental

Leave starting in August after I [will] have been at the Port Authority for one (1) year.” (D.E. 40-

19 ¶ 25.) Exactly one month later, Plaintiff sent the same email to McCarthy and Welch, notifying

them again of his intent to take intermittent parental leave. (Id. ¶ 26.) The Port Authority’s policy

provides that where Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave is “taken because of a birth or

placement of a child for adoption or foster care, an employee may take leave intermittently or on

a reduced work schedule only with prior approval by the employee’s manager.” (Id. ¶ 52.)

Although the parties agree that McCarthy knew that Plaintiff intended to use intermittent leave,

they disagree whether Lemanowicz had any knowledge of Plaintiff’s intent to take intermittent

leave. (D.E. 43-11 ¶ 15.) The factual record shows that neither McCarthy, Welch, nor anyone

else approved Plaintiff’s intermittent leave request.

On May 19, 2020, Lemanowicz requested Plaintiff’s termination in an email to O’Driscoll,

which noted that it was “a follow[-]up to their discussion [about Plaintiff’s termination] from the

last week, which was the third discussion on the matter” and “that Plaintiff could not overcome

his lack of ability as a project manager.” (D.E. 40-19 ¶¶ 27–29.) The May 19 email is the first

documented request for Plaintiff’s termination. (D.E. 43-11 ¶ 21.)

A draft termination memorandum was drafted and edited between Lemanowicz,

O’Driscoll, and Welch through the months between May and August 2020 due to the disruptions

caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. (D.E. 40-19 ¶¶ 32–33.) On August 3, 2020, Lemanowicz

circulated a draft termination memorandum stating that Plaintiff’s termination was due to his

“under-performance resulting from not having the program management skills the job requires.”

(Id. ¶¶ 38–40.) The memorandum cited other reasons, including Plaintiff has shown a “lack of

consultant management and oversight,” is “slow to respond to requests and often provides

incomplete and inaccurate information,” and has “put the Terminal One Program at risk of

significant delays.” (Id. ¶ 39.) On the same day, the Aviation Department had “concurred in the

request to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.” (Id. ¶ 46.)

On August 10, 2020, Plaintiff emailed Defendant’s Human Resources department his

application for intermittent parental leave. (Id. ¶ 50.) Due to a typographical error with Plaintiff’s

hire date, the termination memorandum was not approved by Human Resources until August 13,

2020. (Id. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff was terminated on August 17, 2020. (Id. ¶ 56.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on November 24, 2020. (D.E. 1.) The Complaint asserts

two claims against Defendant for FMLA interference (Count One), and FMLA retaliation (Count

Two). (Id. ¶¶ 26–29.) On February 11, 2021, Defendant filed an Answer. (D.E. 7.) Following

discovery, Defendant filed the instant Motion on June 23, 2023, and the parties timely completed

briefing. (D.E. 40, 42, 43.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A fact is only “material” for purposes of a summary judgment motion if a dispute over that

fact “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to

admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its

burden of proof. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Once the moving

party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant who must “set forth specific

facts showing the existence of . . . an issue for trial.” Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d

Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

The nonmoving party “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations

or suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d

584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). Further, the nonmoving party

is required to “point to concrete evidence in the record [that] supports each essential element of its

case.” Black Car Assistance Corp. v. New Jersey, 351 F. Supp. 2d 284, 286 (D.N.J. 2004) (citing

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23)). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which . . . [it has] the

burden of proof[,]” then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 322–23.

“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358

F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). Instead, the district court

“must view all of the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” who is entitled to

“every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record,” and if “there is a disagreement

about the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn from them, a trial is required to resolve the

conflicting versions of the parties.” Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings two theories of FMLA violation against Defendant: interference and

retaliation. (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 26–29.) “An employer may be sued under the FMLA for interfering with

an employee’s FMLA rights, as well as for retaliating against an employee who exercises rights

under the FMLA.” Marsh v. GGB, LLC, 455 F. Supp. 3d 113, 121 (D.N.J. 2020) (citation omitted);

see also Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005) (outlining the FMLA’s

interference and retaliation provisions). “[F]iring an employee for a valid request for FMLA leave

may constitute interference with the employee’s FMLA rights as well as retaliation against the

employee.” Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2009).

An FMLA interference claim arises under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), which makes it

“unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to

exercise, any right provided under” the FMLA. On the other hand, an FMLA retaliation claim

arises under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), which makes it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or

in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful”

by the FMLA. See Callison, 430 F.3d at 119. For the reasons stated below, this Court grants

Defendant’s Motion as to both Plaintiff’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims.

A. Interference

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s interference claim should be dismissed because he has

not set forth any evidence that he was denied a benefit to which he was entitled under the FMLA.

Plaintiff is not entitled to intermittent parental leave without Defendant’s approval and Defendant

never approved Plaintiff’s intermittent leave request. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s interference claim

will be dismissed.

To state a claim for FMLA interference, a plaintiff must establish that:

(1) he or she was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant was an

employer subject to the FMLA’s requirements; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to

FMLA leave; (4) the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of his or her intention to

take FMLA leave; and (5) the plaintiff was denied benefits to which he or she was

entitled under the FMLA.

Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Unlike an

FMLA retaliation claim, “[a]n interference action is not about discrimination, it is only about

whether the employer provided the employee with the entitlements guaranteed by the FMLA.”

Callison, 430 F.3d at 120.

In this case, Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim fails because, when viewing the facts in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he cannot establish that he was denied a benefit to which he

was entitled under the FMLA. Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 401 (3d

Cir. 2007) (“In order to assert a claim of interference, an employee must show that he was entitled

to benefits under the FMLA and that his employer illegitimately prevented him from obtaining

those benefits.”).

The FMLA states that “[l]eave . . . shall not be taken by an employee intermittently . . .

unless the employee and the employer of the employee agree otherwise.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1).

Courts also have found that an employee is not entitled to intermittent leave for the birth of his or

her child unless the employer agrees to grant the employee such leave. See, e.g., De Luca v. Tr.

of Univ. of Pennsylvania, 834 F. Supp. 2d 282, 289 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting that employers may

refuse to grant intermittent leave for birth, adoption, or foster placement (citing Dotson v. Pfizer,

Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 293 (4th Cir. 2009)); Greer v. Cleveland Clinic Health Sys.-E. Region, 503 F.

App’x 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that an employee “may be permitted to take [FMLA] leave

intermittently”) (emphasis added); Dressler v. Cmty. Serv. Commc’ns, Inc., 115 F. App’x 452, 452

(1st Cir. 2004) (“[FMLA] intermittent leave [is] permitted at the employer’s discretion.” (citing

29 U.S.C. § 2612)).

District Courts within the Third Circuit have interpreted 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1) to mean:

[E]mployers may, at their option, require that employees take FMLA leave for

certain reasons (birth, adoption or foster care placement under § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B))

in one block of up to twelve weeks rather than intermittently. The requirement that

employer and employee must “agree” on intermittent leave means that employers

can refuse to allow this type of leave in birth, adoption and foster care placement

cases.

De Luca, 834 F. Supp. at 289 (quoting Dotson, 558 F.3d at 293); see also Padula v. Clarks

Summit State Hosp., No. 19-2184, 2021 WL 4429089, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021) (“If both

the employee and employer agree that it is medically necessary, leave under the FMLA can be

taken intermittently.”) (emphasis added).

Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to take intermittent leave without the Port Authority’s

approval. Defendant argues, and the record shows, that none of Plaintiff’s superiors (i.e.,

McCarthy, Lemanowicz, and Welch) approved his request for intermittent leave. Plaintiff has not

set forth evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether his request for

intermittent leave was approved.2

Plaintiff argues that no employee or representative of the Port Authority ever advised him

that his request for intermittent parental leave would not be approved. In addition, Plaintiff claims

that when he received the job offer from Lemanowicz, he expressed his concern about losing the

flexibility his previous job afforded him and that Lemanowicz assured him that the Port Authority

2 Plaintiff admits in his opposition brief that “Defendant’s policy specifically allows for intermittent leave upon the

approval of the employee’s manager.” (D.E. 42 at 13.)

is “very flexible” with remote work arrangements to help employees deal with family issues

because “family first.” ((D.E. 42 at 5, ¶¶ 2–3.) Plaintiff also asserts during his deposition that

when he inquired what “flexibility” he may have in his work schedule for the birth of his child,

McCarthy told him to “use family leave,” and that she never raised any concern or objection with

Plaintiff’s prospective use of intermittent leave. (Id. at 9, ¶ 39.)

Plaintiff’s arguments, however, are unpersuasive. The Third Circuit has unequivocally

stated that “for an interference claim to be viable, the plaintiff must show that FMLA benefits were

actually withheld.” Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2014). Here, the Port Authority

did not withhold any FMLA benefit because Plaintiff is not entitled to intermittent leave without

the Port Authority’s approval.

All Plaintiff has shown is that the Port Authority had held itself out as “flexible” in

accommodating arrangements for family issues and that neither McCarthy nor anyone else

disapproved his request to use intermittent parental leave. Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence

in the record to show that anyone employed at the Port Authority approved his FMLA intermittent

leave request. As a matter of logic, the absence of disapproval does not mean approval. Hilborn

v. Cordaro, No. 06-0223, 2007 WL 2903453, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2007) (dismissing

interference claim because the plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave was “neither approved or

denied”). Put simply, “an employer’s failure to respond to an employee’s request for leave,

without a showing of actual harm, is insufficient to state an FMLA interference claim.” Id.

“An interference action is . . . only about whether the employer provided the employee

with the entitlements guaranteed by the FMLA.” Callison, 430 F.3d at 119–20. Therefore, the

denial of FMLA benefits that an employee is entitled to is necessary to demonstrate an interference

claim. Plaintiff’s interference claim cannot withstand Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

because Defendant never approved Plaintiff’s intermittent leave requests and there is no dispute

that Plaintiff was not entitled to intermittent parental leave without Defendant’s approval.

B. Retaliation

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails similarly because he has not

established that he was entitled to FMLA intermittent parental leave. Alternatively, Defendant

argues that the retaliation claim should be dismissed for lack of causation. After considering both

arguments, this Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

Because FMLA retaliation claims “require proof of the employer’s retaliatory intent, courts

have assessed these claims through the lens of employment discrimination law.” Lichtenstein, 691

F.3d at 302. “[C]laims based on circumstantial evidence” are “assessed under the burden-shifting

framework” established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), whereas

“claims based on direct evidence” are “assessed under the mixed-motive framework” set forth in

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276–77 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Id.

Plaintiff’s claims are based on circumstantial evidence, thus warranting an analysis under

the McDonnell Douglas framework. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff “has

the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case” by “point[ing] to evidence in the record

sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute about each of the three elements of her retaliation

claim[.]” Id. The elements of an FMLA retaliation claim are: “(1) [plaintiff] invoked [his] right

to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) [plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) the

adverse action was causally related to [plaintiff’s] invocation of rights.” Id. If the plaintiff

succeeds in making a prima facie case, “the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Gilhuly, 755 F.3d at 193. The burden

then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the articulated

reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. Id.

As a threshold matter, Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to meet the first element,

invocation of a right under the FMLA, so his retaliation claim should be dismissed. Specifically,

Defendant argues that “[b]ecause Plaintiff never obtained the Port Authority’s consent to

[intermittent] leave, he did not invoke any right to FMLA leave” and thus his retaliation claim

fails. This argument is persuasive. The Third Circuit has stated that “the first elements of both

[FMLA] theories are essentially identical: a plaintiff pressing either theory must establish, among

other things, that he had a right to FMLA benefits.” Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 386 F. App’x

55, 60 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the absence of the Port Authority’s consent to Plaintiff’s

request for intermittent leave is sufficient to defeat the invocation element for his retaliation claim.

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s termination constituted adverse employment

action and that Plaintiff has met the second element of a retaliation claim. See Abramson v.

William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[Plaintiff’s] termination clearly

fulfills the second prong of the prima facie case for a retaliation claim.”).

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim also fails because he has not raised a genuine issue of material

fact about causation. A court considers two factors in determining causation: “(1) the temporal

proximity between the protected activity and the alleged discrimination and (2) the existence of a

pattern of antagonism in the intervening period.” Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 450 (3d Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]hese are not exclusive ways to show

causation,” however, and courts must consider all proffered evidence as a whole as the element of

causation is “highly context-specific.” Id. Given this consideration, the record evidence precludes

a reasonable factfinder from concluding that there is a causal nexus between Plaintiff’s invocation

of FMLA leave and his termination.

McCarthy and Lemanowicz made the decision to terminate Plaintiff before the first time

Plaintiff gave notice of his intent to take intermittent leave. Courts have found that “a plaintiff

cannot establish a causal link when the ‘decision’ to take adverse employment action occurred

before plaintiff exercised his or her FMLA rights.” Atchison v. Sears, 666 F. Supp. 2d 477, 490

(E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing cases); see Gilhuly, 755 F.3d at 194 (“An employee cannot easily establish

a causal connection between his protected activity and the alleged retaliation when he has received

significant negative evaluations before engaging in the protected activity.”).

Prior to Plaintiff’s March 2020 notice, Lemanowicz and McCarthy received complaints

about Plaintiff’s work performance and his lack of management capabilities. (D.E. 40-19 ¶¶ 5–

16.) In about October or November 2019, Lemanowicz’s supervisor “told him to fire Plaintiff

after she caught Plaintiff a few times on his phone and not working.” (Id. ¶ 9.) At around the

same time, Lemanowicz and McCarthy began discussing whether Plaintiff was a “good fit” for the

job “because he lacked program management and leadership skills and he was not trying to learn

them.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Lemanowicz also informed O’Driscoll about Plaintiff’s job performance issues

and recommended termination of Plaintiff’s employment in October 2019 and January/February

2020. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20, 24.) All of these events occurred before March 2020 when Plaintiff invoked

his intent to take FMLA intermittent leave.

While Plaintiff denies some of the complaints (id. ¶¶ 16–17; D.E. 42 ¶¶ 16–17) and asserts

that neither Lemanowicz nor McCarthy ever discussed with him his work quality (D.E. 40-19 ¶

22; D.E. 42 ¶¶ 12, 22), it remains undisputed that both Lemanowicz and McCarthy had serious

concerns about Plaintiff’s job performance and recommended to their superiors that Plaintiff

should be terminated before March 2020 when McCarthy and Welch learned, for the first time,

that Plaintiff wanted to take intermittent leave under the FMLA. (D.E. 40-19 ¶ 25.)

Finding that the plaintiff failed to establish causation for his retaliation claim, the Third

Circuit in Gilhuly noted that the reasons for plaintiff’s termination were “deficiencies that had

existed since before” his invocation of FMLA right and they were detailed in a memorandum

prepared by his supervisor. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d at 194. This Court reaches the same conclusion

based on the undisputed material facts. When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the

evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant had legitimate,

performance-based reasons to terminate Plaintiff before he informed his supervisors of his intent

to take intermittent leave under the FMLA.

Therefore, even though Plaintiff was terminated on August 17, 2020—seven days after he

submitted his application for intermittent parental leave to the Human Resources department—

Plaintiff’s supervisors had already decided to terminate Plaintiff based on deficiencies in his job

performance long before he applied for intermittent leave. See id. (finding that temporal proximity

between request for FMLA leave and adverse employment action was insufficient to show

causation when deficiencies in plaintiff’s job performance were documented before he took his

FMLA leave); Helfrich v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., No. 03-05793, 2005 WL 670299, at *20 (E.D. Pa.

Mar. 18, 2005) (“[W]hen an employer expresses concern about an employee’s performance

deficiencies prior to the time the employee engages in allegedly protected activity, no retaliatory

inference arises.” (citation omitted)).

Plaintiff has also failed to show any evidence of a pattern of antagonism. In sum, Plaintiff

has not demonstrated any genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim fails, and this Court need not proceed further under the burden-shifting

framework. Even if this Court determined that Plaintiff satisfied his burden of establishing a prima

facie case of retaliation, for all of the reasons set forth herein, Defendant had a legitimate, non-

pretextual, and non-discriminatory reason to terminate Plaintiff. In either analysis, Plaintiff’s

claim would fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED. An appropriate order

follows.

/s/ Susan D. Wigenton

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: André M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J.

Parties