DOE v. ROWAN UNIVERSITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

JANE DOE, in her individual capacity,

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 23-20657 (RMB-MJS)

v.

ROWAN UNIVERSITY and Dr. OPINION

JEFFREY GREESON, in his

individual and official capacities,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES

Montgomery Law, PLLC

Bradley R. Flynn, Esq.

1420 Locust Street, Suite 420

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

On behalf of Plaintiff

Saul Ewing LLP

James A. Keller, Esq.

Centre Square West

1500 Market Street, 38th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19102

On behalf of Defendants

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Motion for a

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against Defendants

Rowan University and Doctor Jeffrey Greeson, in his individual and official

capacities. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order is denied. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction will be

stayed pending the completion of expedited discovery. Following completion of

expedited discovery, the Court will hold a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction and adjudicate the claims accordingly.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jane Doe1 is a PhD student at Rowan University in the Department

of Clinical Psychology. [Compl. ¶ 24.] She alleges that between August 2019 and

January 2021, she was subjected to repeated sexual harassment by her professor and

mentor, Dr. Jeffrey Greeson. [Compl. ¶ 27.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Dr.

Greeson repeatedly asked her out on dates to lunch, dinner, and late-night drinks,

and would forcibly hug Plaintiff without her consent while they were alone in his

office with the door shut. [Compl. ¶ 27–29.] Plaintiff alleges that when she told Dr.

Greeson in July 2021 that she planned on leaving his lab due to his repeated

advances, Dr. Greeson responded by telling Plaintiff that if she left his lab, he

“would do everything in [his] power to get [her] dismissed” from the PhD program.

[Compl. ¶ 31.]2

1 The Court notes that parties to a lawsuit generally must identify themselves in their

pleadings and seek leave of Court to proceed anonymously. See FED. R. CIV. P.

10(a); Doe v. Schwerzler, 2007 WL 1892403, at *3 (D.N.J. June 28, 2007). Plaintiff is

ordered to file an appropriate motion requesting such relief.

2 Dr. Greeson is subject to a no-contact order against Plaintiff. [Compl. ¶ 40.]

As part of the University’s clinical psychology graduate program, students

must pass certain program benchmarks, including a qualifying PhD examination (the

“Qualifying Exam”). [See Unsworn Declaration of Dr. Jim Haugh ¶ 4–5 (“Haugh

Decl.”); Affidavit of Jane Doe in Support of her Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order and a Preliminary Injunction ¶ 12 (“Doe Aff.”).] To pass the Qualifying Exam

and matriculate within the program, a PhD student must receive passing marks

across seven different content areas. [See Haugh Decl., Ex. 6 at 54–56.] If a PhD

student fails four or more content areas, the student is deemed to have failed the

entire exam and must re-take the exam at the next available testing date. [Id. at 55.]

A student who fails the Qualifying Exam in part or entirely twice will be dismissed

from the program. [Id.] The exams are blindly graded. [Id. at 54.]

On October 25, 2021, the Department notified Plaintiff that she failed her first

attempt at the Qualifying Exam. [See Haugh Decl., Ex. 5.] Because she passed only

four of the seven content areas, she would have to re-take the entirety of the

Qualifying Exam. [Id.] On August 16 and 18, 2022, Plaintiff re-took the Qualifying

Exam. [Compl. ¶ 34.] She failed, only passing six of the seven content areas. [Id.]

The only section she failed—Integrated Health—was a section that Dr. Greeson (and

another professor) scored. [Id.]3 This issue was later addressed by the Department as

discussed below.

3 Plaintiff alleges that the second exam grader is “known to be a close colleague and

collaborator with Defendant Greeson.” [Compl. ¶ 9 n.2.]

Importantly, Plaintiff’s struggles with the Qualifying Exam were not the first

time she had difficulty with program benchmarks. Since 2020, Plaintiff has been on

academic probation. [Haugh Decl. Ex., 3.] While Plaintiff has excellent coursework

grades and some strong evaluations, [See Compl. ¶ 1; Pl.’s Br., Exs. C–I], she failed

her (i) First Year Research Project (twice); (ii) Master’s Defense Thesis and (iii) her

Case Conceptualization Benchmark—an oral presentation based on practicum

experience. [See Haugh Decl., Exs. 1, 4, 7.]4 While Plaintiff ultimately passed both

her First Year Research Project and Master’s Defense Thesis, [Haugh Decl. ¶ 10–11],

she has not yet passed her Case Conceptualization Benchmark. [Haugh Decl. ¶ 19.]

Like the Qualifying Exam, if a PhD student fails the Case Conceptualization

Benchmark in part or entirely twice, she will be dismissed from the program. [See

Haugh Decl., Ex. 6 at 30.]

On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff timely appealed her second failure of the

Qualifying Exam. [Compl. ¶ 37.] Plaintiff’s appeal included a request that Dr.

Greeson be excluded from the appeal process and to “throw[] out” Dr. Greeson’s

grade from her failed Qualifying Exam section. [Haugh Decl., Ex. 11 at 1.] Four

days after filing her appeal—and nearly two years after Plaintiff alleges that Dr.

Greeson’s harassing behavior ended—Plaintiff filed a Title IX complaint against Dr.

4 Plaintiff mentions none of these failures in her pleading. After they were raised by

Defendants in their opposition brief, she averred in a “counter affidavit” attached to

her reply brief that she failed these benchmarks—also graded by Dr. Greeson—

because she turned down Dr. Greeson’s advances. See Counter Affidavit of Jane Doe

in Further Support of her Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction ¶ 9 (“Doe Counter Aff.”).

Greeson. [Compl. ¶¶ 10, 37; Haugh Decl., Ex. 9.] The University’s Title IX

investigation remains ongoing. [Compl. ¶ 41.]5

On July 11, 2023, Dr. Jim Haugh, the program’s Director of Clinical Training,

sent a letter to Plaintiff regarding the status of her Qualifying Exam grade appeal.

[Haugh Decl., Ex. 11.] Dr. Haugh’s letter acknowledged that the Department had

honored her request to exclude Dr. Greeson’s grade, and that two new graders had

re-scored Plaintiff’s Integrated Health section. [Id. at 1.] After re-grading, Plaintiff

still failed the Integrated Health section of the Qualifying Exam. [Id. at 1–2.]

Nonetheless, Dr. Hough agreed to let Plaintiff’s appeal continue. [Id. at 2.] Dr.

Greeson would not take part in the appeal process. [Id.]

The Department’s Clinical Training Committee heard Plaintiff’s appeal on

August 10, 2023, and voted to deny it on August 11, 2023. [Compl. ¶ 57; Haugh

Decl., Ex. 12.] The Clinical Training Committee informed Plaintiff that she could

take a second appeal to the Dean of the College of Science and Mathematics and that

any decision regarding her dismissal would be put on hold pending the outcome of

that second appeal. [Haugh Decl., Ex. 12 at 1.] Plaintiff elected to pursue the appeal.

[Compl. ¶ 57.]

On August 23, 2023, the Clinical Training Committee informed Plaintiff that

based on the outcome of her appeal and her continuing probationary status in the

program, she was required to cease all program-related activities including teaching,

5 The Title IX investigators recently submitted a final report to the University and

will be scheduling a formal Title IX hearing. [Defs.’ Br. at 8.]

taking courses, and applying for her fall internship, unless and until she prevailed on

appeal before the Dean. [Haugh Decl., Ex. 13 at 1.] Plaintiff alleges that if she does

not apply for a fall internship by October 2023, she will have to repeat another year

in the PhD program. [Compl. ¶¶ 63, 70; Doe Aff. ¶ 3.]

On September 8, 2023, a committee from the Dean’s office heard Plaintiff’s

appeal of her Qualifying Exam grade. [Compl. ¶ 58.] On September 21, 2023, Dr.

Elisabeth Morlino, Associate Dean for Academics and Research Affairs, informed

Plaintiff that her appeal was denied. [Haugh Decl., Ex. 14 at 1.] Dr. Morlino

explained that the Dean’s Committee considered Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct

against Dr. Greeson but “found no evidence that the score on the second attempt …

was comprised in any way” given the blind grading system. [Id. at 2.]

Having twice failed the Qualifying Exam and unsuccessful in her appeals, Dr.

Haugh informed Plaintiff that she was dismissed from the Clinical Psychology PhD

program but had the right to appeal the dismissal decision with the Dean’s office

within ten business days. [Haugh Decl., Ex. 15.]6 The Clinical Psychology

Department’s Program Handbook makes clear that a student is finally dismissed

only after the Dean decides the appeal or a student decides not to appeal the

Department-level dismissal. [Haugh Decl., Ex. 6 at 91.] As of the date of this

Opinion, it is not clear whether Plaintiff has formally taken an appeal of her

6 Dr. Hough’s letter, although dated September 26, was delivered to Plaintiff on

September 27. [See Defs.’ Br. at 8.] Accordingly, Plaintiff’s deadline to appeal her

dismissal is October 12, 2023, in light of the October 9 Columbus Day Holiday.

dismissal but all of the evidence submitted indicates that she plans to do so. .

[Compl. ¶ 16; Defs.’ Br. at 8; Pl.’s Reply at 2, 7; Doe Counter Aff. ¶ 6.]

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2023—two days before learning that she was dismissed

pending appeal—Plaintiff filed suit in this Court and simultaneously moved for a

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the University and

Dr. Greeson. [See Docket Nos. 1–3.] Defendants filed an opposition brief on

September 29, 2023 [See Docket No. 9.] Plaintiff filed a reply brief on October 6,

2023. [See Docket No. 11.] Only Plaintiff’s claims of Title IX sex/gender

discrimination, Title IX retaliation and violation of the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination (“NJLD”) are at issue in her Motion. [See Docket No. 2 at 8 n.1.]7

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of temporary

restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. A Plaintiff must satisfy four familiar

requirements in order to obtain injunctive relief:

(1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and

(2) that [they] will be irreparably injured ... if relief is not granted....

[In addition,] the district court, in considering whether to grant a

preliminary injunction, should take into account, when they are

relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from

the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.

7 In addition to these claims, Plaintiffs alleges (i) denials of due process and equal

protection, and negligent hiring, retention, and training against the University, [see

Compl. ¶¶ 104–24, 146–55]; and (ii) intentional infliction of emotional distress,

against the University and Dr. Greeson [Compl. ¶¶ 141–45].

Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (June 26,

2017) (citing Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917,

919–20 (3d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted)). The Third Circuit has made clear that

“[p]reliminary injunctive relief is ‘an extraordinary remedy’ and ‘should be granted

only in limited circumstances.’” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708

(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42

F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)). Temporary restraining orders have the same

requirements as preliminary injunctions and are “stay-put orders ... designed to

maintain the status quo during the course of proceedings. They ‘function[], in

essence as an automatic preliminary injunction.’” J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd.

of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78

F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996)).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

1. Title IX quid pro quo Claim

The evidence submitted demonstrates that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on

her Title IX quid pro quo claim. Unwelcome sexual advances or verbal or physical

actions of a sexual nature constitute quid pro quo harassment under Title IX when

either “(A) the plaintiff’s submission to that conduct is made either explicitly or

implicitly a term or condition of her education or employment experience in a

federally-funded education program, or (B) submission to or rejection of that conduct

is used as the basis for [an] education … decision[] that affect[ed] the plaintiff.” Doe

v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 565 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Bonenberger v.

Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 27 (3d Cir. 1997)). Additionally, a Title IX plaintiff

alleging quid pro quo harassment must show deliberate indifference by an ‘official

who at a minimum’ had ‘authority to address the alleged discrimination and to

institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf,’ had ‘actual knowledge of

discrimination in the recipient's programs,’ and failed adequately to respond.” Mercy

Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d at 565–66 (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524

U.S. 274, 290 (1998)).

Here, and as Plaintiff admits, University officials are fully aware of her Title

IX complaint and are taking appropriate steps to address it through the pending

investigation. [Compl. ¶¶ 12, 38, 41, 63; Doe Aff. ¶ 15.] And once Plaintiff made the

University aware of her concerns that Dr. Greeson failed Plaintiff as retaliation for

rejecting his unwanted advances, the Department threw out that Qualifying Exam

score and had two completely new graders blindly re-score Plaintiff’s failed section.

[Haugh Decl., Ex. 11 at 1.] Still, Plaintiff failed. [Id.] It is also for that reason that

Plaintiff cannot likely show that her rejection of Dr Greeson’s alleged conduct was

the basis for her asserted adverse educational action (i.e., failure of the Qualifying

Exam)—Plaintiff appears to have failed the Qualifying Exam every which way.8

8 Plaintiff’s argument that the University was deliberately indifferent by excluding

her participation in the program lacks merit. [Pl.’s Reply at 5.] It is likely that

Plaintiff cannot show that the University’s response to the alleged sexual harassment

was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Doe v. Princeton

2. Title IX Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff is also unlikely to succeed on her Title IX retaliation claim. To make

out a prima facie retaliation case under Title IX, a Plaintiff “must prove she engaged

in activity protected by Title IX, [] suffered an adverse action, and there was a causal

connection between the two.” Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d at 564. Upon

establishing a prima facie retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to show

a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its conduct. Id. If the defendant can make such

a showing, the burden shifts again to the Title IX plaintiff to demonstrate why the

offered nonretaliatory reason is pretextual. Id.

Here, Plaintiff is unlikely to establish a prima facie retaliation case because

there is a weak nexus between the protected activity (the filing of her Title IX

complaint) and the alleged adverse action (her second failure of the Qualifying

Exam). Plaintiff alleges that the harassing conduct by Dr. Greeson took place

between August 2019 and January 2021 and that as a result of her outward rejections

of that harassing conduct, Dr. Greeson failed Plaintiff under blind grading conditions

well over a year later in August 2022. [Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, 27.] But those allegations are

Univ., 2018 WL 2396685, at *5 (D.N.J. May 24, 2018), aff’d, 790 F. App’x 379 (3d

Cir. 2019) (quoting Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 260 (6th Cir.

2000)). Indeed, the University followed its usual procedures in denying Plaintiff’s

participation in the program. [See, e.g., Haugh Decl., Ex. 6 at 88 (“Dismissal is

usually effective immediately and would prohibit registration for any future term. If any

registration for a future term was already performed, it would be dropped by Rowan Global

and the student will be made “inactive” in the system.”) (emphases added); see also id. at

85–86.]

backwards for the purposes of a Title IX retaliation claim. Plaintiff would have to

show that because of her Title IX complaint against Dr. Greeson, the University took

adverse action against her. Cf. Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d

Cir. 2021) (explaining in Title VII burden shifting context that a plaintiff must show

that their employer took an adverse action against them because of a protected

characteristic). Here, Plaintiff can show an adverse action and a protected activity,

but she likely cannot show that the protected activity caused the adverse action since

the adverse action took place before she engaged in the protected activity.

Plaintiff argues that the adverse action following the filing of her Title IX

complaint was the University preventing Plaintiff from accessing the benefits of the

program before her Qualifying Exam grade appeal was final. [Reply Br. at 8.] But

again, the University was simply following its own procedures. As the Program

Handbook makes clear, a student will be placed on probation following a failure of

the Qualifying Exam. [See Haugh Decl., Ex. 6 at 86.] And once a student is on

probation, she:

“may not be permitted to begin a practicum, participate in the

Clinical Competency or Qualifying Exams, apply for

Internship, or register for Dissertation credit until their

probationary status has been resolved. Students may also be

prohibited from engaging in other programmatic work (e.g.,

engaging in practicum) depending on the nature and reason of the

probation. Probationary status may also affect eligibility for

financial aid, assistantships, fellowships, and scholarships.

Decisions regarding students moving forward while on probation

will be made by the DCT in consultation with the CTC,

Department Head/Chair, the College Dean and other appropriate

constituencies.

Id. at 85–86 (emphases in original). In other words, there appears to be nothing

unusual with the University taking certain steps to remove program benefits from

Plaintiff in light of her probationary status.

Further, there is an abundance of evidence—that Plaintiff failed to mention in

a pleading subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11—supporting a conclusion

that the only reason that the University dismissed Plaintiff was that she was

unqualified. She failed her First Year Research Project (twice), her Case

Conceptualization Benchmark (which she must still pass to remain in the program),

and her Master’s Defense thesis. [See Haugh Decl., Exs. 1, 4, 7.] This is all in

addition to failing her blindly graded Qualifying Exam twice and the blindly re-

graded Integrated Health section of her Qualifying Exam. [Haugh Decl., Ex. 11 at

1.]. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s identified pretext that she is a strong student in the

classroom does not convince the Court that she is likely to succeed on her retaliation

claim.9

3. NJLAD Claim

Finally, Plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success on her NJLAD

claim. Plaintiff argues that because she is likely to prevail on her claims for Title IX

discrimination and retaliation, she will also prevail on her NJLAD claims. [Pl.’s Br.

9 Nor do the other pretexts identified by Plaintiff convince the Court of her likelihood

of success. Plaintiff was not dismissed before the University decided her grade appeal,

[see Hough Decl., Ex. 15], and 34 C.F.R. 106.71 does not prevent a school from

dismissing pending a Title IX investigating for legitimate nonretaliatory purposes.

at 12–13.] Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of

success on her NJLAD claim for the same reasons identified above.

B. Irreparable Harm

Plaintiff cannot show that it is more likely than not that she will face

irreparable harm absent a temporary restraining order. “[T]o demonstrate irreparable

harm the plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a

legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977

F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992). It is not enough for the harm to be “serious or substantial,

.... [I]t must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for

it.” ECRI v. McGraw–Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v.

Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)). The moving party must also “make a clear

showing of immediate irreparable harm.” Campbell Soup Co., 977 F.2d at 91 (emphasis

in original).

Plaintiff argues that she is suffering irreparable harm because the University is

abridging her constitutional rights by dismissing her prior to adjudicating her Title IX

complaint. [Pl.’s Br. at 14.]. But as Plaintiff admits, she has not been finally

dismissed and still has a right to appeal her dismissal. [See Haugh Decl., Ex. 6 at 91;

Pl.’s Reply at 6.] There is nothing immediate, final, or certain about the outcome of

that appeal. Plaintiff may be reinstated or not. If she is reinstated, there will be no

harm. And if she is not reinstated, there is still no indication that she would be

“unable to participate in [the Title IX] process,” which may also provide her with the

relief she seeks. [Pl.’s Br. at 14.] The availability of these additional means of internal

administrative relief necessarily means that any harm Plaintiff faces is not

irreparable.

Even if the Title IX and dismissal appeal processes are decided against

Plaintiff or are somehow futile, Plaintiff has alternative legal and equitable remedies

following a trial in this action. If she is successful in prosecuting her underlying

claims, she may be reinstated by the University and permitted to complete her PhD,

and/or compensated with money damages. [See Compl. at Prayer for Relief.] And if

she is successful, she will have at most, suffered a delay in her education which is a

genuine injury, but not an irreparable one. See Doe v. Princeton Univ., 2020 WL

2097991, at *7 (D.N.J. May 1, 2020) (delay in education not an irreparable harm);

Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 2020 WL 5211028, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2020) (same); Knoch

v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 2016 WL 4570755, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2016) (same).10

C. Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest

The Court briefly addresses the third and fourth factors and finds that they

both weigh against imposing a temporary restraining order. See Reilly, 858 F.3d at

176 (explaining that where a Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on

the merits or irreparable harm—the two “most critical” “gateway” factors, the court

need not address remaining factors). Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for temporary relief

will leave the parties no worse off: Plaintiff still will have both her Title IX and

10 For the same reason, Plaintiff’s inability to apply for fall internships by October

2023 is likely not irreparable. As she acknowledges, failing to apply for fall

internships will only delay her education. [Doe Aff. ¶ 9.] That delay would be

redressable through monetary damages.

appeal remedies available to her. But if the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court

is effectively acting as a super-administrator for the University deciding its internal

processes for it. That is both inequitable and against the public interest. The Court

declines to serve that function.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order is DENIED. An accompanying Order shall issue.

October 10, 2023 s/Renée Marie Bumb

Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge