The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LASHAWN D. FITCH,
Plaintitl Civil Action No. 22-5884 (MAS) (RLS)
□ OPINION
VICTORIA L. KUHN et al,
Defendants.
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiff
Lashawn D. Fitch’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) and application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF
No. 1-1). Having reviewed the application, this Court finds that Plaintiff has shown his entitlement
to proceed without prepayment of fees, and he shall therefore be granted in forma pauperis status.
As Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, the Court is required to screen
his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.
I BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner currently confined in New Jersey State Prison. (ECF
No. | at 4.) Plaintiff's Complaint takes issue with the COVID-19 protocols and practices in place
at the prison between December 2021 and January 2022, during which period the prison suffered
from a large rise in the number of positive cases. Ud.) As Plaintiff himself notes, however, the
New Jersey State Prison system, including New Jersey State Prison, took substantial steps to
mitigate the risks posed by the virus. The steps included testing inmates and staff for COVID-19,
quarantining infected inmates, limitations on movements within the prison and access to certain
shared areas, the provision of masks to inmates and staff, and the implementation of various
federally-recommended practices. (/d. at 6-10.) Although the prison system did relax some rules
during late 2021, significant protections—including temperature checks, testing, and
quarantining—remained in place, although guards were apparently permitted to choose whether
or not they would wear masks. (/d.)
In December 2021, the prison suffered a large increase in the number of COVID-19 cases
among both prisoners and guards, with many of the guards suffering infection following a holiday
party. (Ud. at 9-10.) Following this increase, many of the units in the prison were placed on
lockdown and a significant number of inmates were quarantined following positive test results.
(Ud. at 9-12.) Although Plaintiff's housing unit was not initially quarantined, it was subjected to
limitations on recreation, law library use, and other services requiring movement outside of the
unit. Ud. at 10.) Prisoners in Plaintiffs unit continued sharing certain facilities, however, such as
showers, kiosks, and phones. (/d.) Prisoners also worked together in relatively close quarters to
clean the unit. Ud. at 10-11.) Frequent testing continued throughout December 2021, with infected
individuals being placed in quarantine. (/d.)
In early January, Plaintiff overheard that a large number of inmates had tested positive and
that the prison intended to quarantine as if all inmates had contracted the virus. (/d. at 11-12.) On
January 2, 2022, Plaintiff began to experience symptoms consistent with COVID-19, after which
he was tested once more. (/d. at 12-16.) On January 7, Plaintiff was told that he had contracted
COVID-19. Cd. at 16.) According to responses to Plaintiff's internal complaints, Plaintiff had
not tested positive in his final test in late December but did test positive following testing on the
fourth of January. (/d@ at 19.) Although Plaintiff blames his infection on loosened restrictions,
Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied care for his COVID-19 infection, that any staff
members ignored requests for treatment, or that he was otherwise mistreated in light of his
infection. (/d. at 20-25.) Instead, Plaintiff appears to believe his rights were violated merely
because he contracted COVID-19. (Ud)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Jd. “The legal standard for dismissing a
complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that
for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v.
Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 Gd Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d
Cir. 2000)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips
v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A
complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must
contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it
provides only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” /d. (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” /d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A
complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd.
(quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in
conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints
to support a claim.” Mala vy. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
I. DISCUSSION
In his current Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to raise conditions of confinement and medical
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various supervisory officials at New Jersey State
Prison and the New Jersey Department of Corrections in light of his having contracted COVID-19.
In Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2020), however, the Third
Circuit clarified that the mere risk or contraction of COVID-19 does not amount to a constitutional
violation. In Hope, the Third Circuit held that even under the Fourteenth Amendment standard
applicable to detainees, which is at least as if not more protective than that applicable to convicted
prisoners under the Eighth Amendment, see Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575,
581 (3d Cir. 2003), courts must defer to the expertise of prison officials in their responses to the
risks posed by COVID-19 unless there is “substantial evidence in the record that the officials have
exaggerated their response.” Hope, 972 F.3d at 325-29. Courts must not mechanically apply
constitutional rules to new factual scenarios and make a constitutional violation out of good faith
efforts to control unforeseen risks. The Third Circuit thus held that where a detention facility
has taken significant, concrete steps towards addressing the threat of COVID-19, the threat of the
virus in and of itself will not be sufficient to render a detainee’s conditions of confinement so
punitive as to create constitutional liability. /d at 327-29.
The Third Circuit in Hope similarly found that medical claims premised on the risk of
COVID-19 may only proceed where a prisoner shows that officials were deliberately indifferent
to the prisoner’s medical needs. Jd. at 329; see also Natale, 318 F.3d at 581-82. Such a claim
requires allegations which indicate that the defendants “knew of and disregarded an excessive risk
to [the plaintiffs] health and safety.” Hope, 972 F.3d at 329. As the Third Circuit explained,
“[t]he context of the Government’s conduct is essential to determine whether it shows the requisite
deliberate indifference,” and in evaluating this context a reviewing court must defer to the expertise
of both medical officials and jail administrators, and not assume a constitutional defect where
conerete action has been taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic as constitutional rules “are
not subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory.” Id. at 329-30 (quoting County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998)). Thus, where prison officials take concrete steps
aimed at mitigating the threat posed by the virus, and do not otherwise refuse to treat the infected,
a prisoner will fall “well short of establishing that the Government was deliberately indifferent
toward [his] medical needs” in light of the virus even though the detaining officials cannot entirely
“eliminate all risk” of contracting COVID-19, notwithstanding even serious pre-existing medical
conditions which may exacerbate a COVID-19 infection. Jd. at 330-31.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff readily admits that the prison in which he is housed took
significant steps at mitigating the threat and spread of COVID-19, including instituting
quarantining policies, frequent testing, the provision of masks to staff and inmates, frequent
cleaning, and limitations on movement throughout the facility. Although these steps did not
prevent Plaintiff from contracting the virus during a large increase in cases in early 2022, that
alone does not make out a constitutional claim. Indeed, although Plaintiffs Complaint reflects his
unease with the loosening of restrictions prior to the outbreak in question, the Complaint is also
replete with efforts taken by the prison to attempt to control the virus. This includes the deep
cleaning of Plaintiff's units, frequent and repeated testing, and the quarantining of infected
prisoners and the units with infected populations too large to individually quarantine. Plaintiff
thus alleges facts clearly indicating that the prison and its staff were not deliberately indifferent to
his needs, but instead sought to mitigate the threat of COVID-19. As Plaintiff has not alleged any
facts indicating that prison staff refused to treat him or denied him medical care after he contracted
the virus, and as his Complaint fails to adequately allege that staff were deliberately indifferent to
his medical needs or conditions of confinement, Plaintiff fails to plead a cognizable constitutional
claim related to the prison’s COVID-19 response, and his Complaint must be dismissed without
prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (ECF No. 1-1)
is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty
(30) days. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE